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INTRODUCTION 
The Church is Ad Gentes, a Church on mission to the nations of the world, a Church 
confronted by a mainly liberal-secularist, hedonistic, materialistic, anti-authority and postmodern 
reality.  This is a Church that carries a message that is ancient, yet ever new, and which she must 
always make new.  This Church has a divine mandate to communicate this message to a new 
age, an age of unbelief.  In the face of the contemporary societal all permissive, pleasure seeking 
cultures, mostly the ethical aspect of religious faith, especially, the Christian faith seems to keep 
becoming more and more an unachievable utopia and pipe dream.  The excessive individualism, 
claims to personal rights, liberty and freedom makes orthodox Christian faiths suspect and 
unpopular.  The space of encounter becomes even more difficult to navigate when legislations in 
the political sphere pass into law acts that are totally at variance with the tenets of religious faith.  
Carson Holloway in his book, examining the impact of John Paul II’s theology on the dignity of 
the human person and secular liberalism,1 states that liberal modernity looks like a direct reaction 
to traditional premodern political thought; individual interest against the classicist medieval 
belief in communities oriented towards the common good achieved by a life of moral nobility 
and virtue.  
Holloway’s work gives me a template on which the foundational thesis of my work is 
based; the understanding of the background and turning point in modern western European and 
American socio-cultural and political systems and its impacts on the moral tradition of 
Christianity.  In contrasting John Paul II’s understanding of human dignity in Evangelium Vitae, 
                                                          
1 Holloway uses the term ‘liberal modernity’ to connote the intellectual, political and philosophic movement 
characteristic of the last recent centuries initiated by Thomas Hobbes and carried on by other political thinkers who 
focus on the idea of personal self-preservation and material wellbeing, especially as this thinking has impacted the 
political evolution of the western hemisphere to date. Cf. Carson Holloway, The Way of Life: John Paul II and the 
Challenge of Liberal Modernity (Waco Texas: Baylor University Press, 2008), 3ff 
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common good and acknowledgement of God as basis for the welfare of the human race against 
modern liberalism’s hedonistic individualism, shows that modern extreme liberalism invariably 
leads to tyranny.  This Holloway claims was already present in the work of Thomas Hobbes, 
later expounded and elaborated on by John Locke, David Hume, the American founding fathers 
and the declaration of independence, and the political articulations of M. de Tocqueville for a 
modern account of democracy.  Due to globalization, this experience is no longer limited to the 
societies of the global west.  It is gradually impacting and becoming entrenched in other cultures 
of developing and fledgling democratic systems around the globe.  Through technology 
(especially media), politics, trade and the global market, the world has become the proverbial 
‘global village.’  According to Holloway, John Paul II’s critique is directed at the philosophic 
modern liberal project also known as the enlightenment on which contemporary democratic 
systems are built.  Holloway notes that out of the enlightenment movement was born all of the 
totalitarian and murderous institutions of the twentieth century which are commonly traced to 
European philosophical enlightenment. 
Holloway notes that in contrast to the negative aspect of the enlightenment and the 
tyranny born of it, John Paul II teaches that humanity fully realizes its potentials in the vocation 
to love and serve each other rooted in the self-sacrifice of Christ.  In this account, John Paul II is 
of the opinion that modern enlightenment rejected the notion of love and service of one another 
thereby rejecting Christ.  In which case, the enlightenment’s rejection of Christ “ ‘opened’ up a 
‘path’ that would lead towards the devastating experiences of evil which were to follow – that is 
to the unheard of disregard for human dignity manifested by the ‘ideologies of evil’… 
Enlightenment’s novel contribution, it would seem, was to turn the dismissal of love into a 
public philosophy, and therefore to lay the intellectual and moral foundations of the culture of 
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death that has emerged in the societies erected on Enlightenment principles.”2  This is what John 
Paul II refers to as ‘The Culture of Death’, the rejection of love, the repudiation of God as the 
ultimate source of the supreme good and as the provider of all morals laws and their objective 
validity.  John Paul II pays particular attention to the radical re-orientation of philosophy by 
Rene Descartes away from the idea of God as the supreme and self-sufficient being, grounds for 
all created being “and to a concern with the thinking subject or with the ‘content of human 
consciousness.’  This turn - which is evident in Descartes’s celebrated point of departure, ‘I 
think, therefore, I am’,”3 (corgito ergo sum) influenced modern European liberalism and 
philosophy which morphed into a science of pure thought and on this rests a public morality of 
utilitarian foundations which reduces morality ‘enlightened self-interest’.4   It is this kind of 
fragmentation and separation in the society that inadvertently engendered the clash between 
religious claims and humanistic autonomy propounded by modern liberal political philosophies.  
A good number of studies and polls carried out in the western hemisphere within the last 
decade show a sharp drop in the number of people who claim affinity to the Christian faith.  
Church attendance has declined notably, and among those who attend, the number of those who 
adhere to magisterial and doctrinal authority have also dropped most significantly.  The reality of 
the situation, based on every observable social and cultural trend shows a widening gap between 
Church authority and the faithful, it shows also that this chasm will continue to expand.  
                                                          
2 Holloway, Ibid., 146 
 
3 Ibid. 
 
4 Some thinkers accept liberal humanism because they see in religion some moral unwholeness, for instance after the 
world wide large scale of terrorists attacks, they argue that religion “inspires an irrational fanaticism that leads to 
violence.”  But Holloway postulates that, “Examining such events in a different light, however, we might equally 
contend that they demonstrate society’s real need for the morality of love that John Paul II offers…. Events like 
those of September 11 surely demonstrate that the world remains a very dangerous place- in which, we might add, 
people are moved to violence not only by religion, but also by national or ethnic solidarities or economic interests, 
sometimes invoking religion as a convenient justification rather than responding to it as the genuine motivation. 
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Winfried Aymans, in her Introduction to her edited volume titled, Eleven Cardinals Speak on 
Marriage and the Family: Essays from a Pastoral Viewpoint, avers, “The notion that prevail, on 
the one hand, in secular society and those that result, on the other hand, from the Church’s faith 
have drifted apart, and, because of this, problematic situations and conflicts are increasing.”5 
Experientially, questions of sexual morality, marriage and family life are the mostly contested 
areas.  Sex, marriage, family have become new areas given new definitions and newer 
understanding.  Traditional understanding keeps evolving and from one culture to another, 
varying contexts continue to brew varied interpretations.  For instance, Aymans notes that 
despite renewed efforts by the Church to close the widening gap between ecclesiastical and 
secular approach to these issues, “The two sets of arrangements of drifted apart, nonetheless, and 
the main starting point of that trend was the ever increasing frequency of civil law divorces.”6   
Aymans opines that the very idea of marriage and family life are no longer unambiguous in 
contemporary societies to the point where they have become dubious.  For this reason, Aymans 
concludes “… it is all the more necessary for the teaching of Jesus Christ not to come into 
question and for Church teaching, unabridged, to find its indubitable expression in our days as 
well.”7 
This project therefore focuses on exploring the theological underpinnings by which 
secularists accuse the Church of been unable to develop with the contemporary age.  In this 
dissertation, I intend to argue that in the conversation between secular voices and the 
magisterium of the Roman Catholic Church, the accusation leveled against the Church on her 
                                                          
5 Winfried Aymans, ed., Eleven Cardinals Speak on Marriage and the Family: Essays from a Pastoral Viewpoint 
(San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2015), viii 
 
6 Aymans, Ibid. vii 
 
7 Ibid. 
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position on human sexuality as patriarchal, archaic, unchanging, callous and outdated is not 
accurate.  Drawing on John Paul II’s “Theology of the Body” as a frame work for current 
magisterial position on human sexuality, which in itself relies heavily on magisterial tradition of 
papal doctrinal encyclicals, and the Natural Law Theory, I will argue that there are developments 
in doctrine appropriate to the nature of doctrine, since doctrines are specific responses at 
particular times, carried on into the future, depending on what questions are raised. I consider 
taking this position timely and necessary since within the various dialogues or disputations on 
this issue, the two sides of the debate seem to have come to an impasse.  The ongoing 
conversation between the orthodoxy of the Catholic Church and what John Paul II refers to as 
“postmodern secular humanism8”and “ethical relativism of liberal society”9 need to refocus on 
the high and major points of the conversation, and more so look at the Church’s logic, tradition, 
consistency and the history of the development of this doctrine over time.  I intend to engage 
                                                          
8 Since the industrial revolution, the Church has had to respond to new waves of liberal modernity which challenges 
the authority of the magisterium.  John Paul II’s vast works is seen to be in tension with this “postmodern secular 
humanism”, making him often times target of criticism as an implacable enemy of development.  Richard Spinello 
surmises that the John Paul II understood modernity but disagreed with liberal thinkers like Locke and Kant who 
failed to develop an appropriate anthropology to ground the rights of the individual which they claim to focus on. He 
states thus “The primary problem in modern and postmodern culture is that…. Modern humanity becomes easily 
entangled in foggy doubts and stands on the precipice of a desolate nihilism…. Modern man has lost sight of the 
provident Creator, seduced into thinking he is the center of the universe …. By philosophers such as Freud, Sartre, 
and Marx who promise temporal bliss through pleasure, unfettered freedom, or an egalitarian utopia.” Richard A. 
Spinello, The Encyclicals of John Paul II: An Introduction and Commentary (New York: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers Inc., 2012) pp. ix-xi  In most of John Paul II’s works, he thematizes a philosophical and anthropological 
approach which puts into consideration an integral vision of the human person, a fight against modern skepticism 
and practical atheism which challenges moral truth.  Vincent Twomey in his work clarifies further that the kind of 
postmodern secular humanism that is referred to here is understood as “traditional and objective morality on the one 
hand and progressive or evolutionary and subjective morality on the other hand.  Those who reject traditional 
morality accordingly believe more or less in the evolution of moral values, namely that they must change with the 
times…. John Paul II…. attacked some of the fundamental assumptions of modern civilization… the denial, both 
theoretical and practical, of the existence of God.  It is one of the basic presuppositions of secularization.  The denial 
of God in turn produces anthropology – that is, a view of what it is to be human – which is at variance with the 
religious view…. Such an anthropology in turn gives rise to a view of morality which radically departs from 
classical morality, both pagan and Christian. (cf. D. Vincent Twomey. Moral Theology after Humanae Vitae: 
Fundamental Issues in Moral Theology and Sexual Ethics. (Dublin: Four Court Press, 2010) Pp. 18-19 Twomey 
states further that this kind of new morality created individuals who rebel against any kind of social discipline and 
external compunction.  “He seeks not mechanism but freedom, and his hostility to marriage springs from a romantic 
idealization of sex and a desire to free his emotional life from all constraints.” (Ibid. Pp. 24-5) 
 
9 John Wilkins, ed., Considering Veritatis Splendor (Cleveland, Ohio: The Pilgrim Press, 1994), p. x 
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these two sides, to consider in what ways the Church’s magisterial tradition respond to concerns 
raised by critics, while looking at exploring how current magisterial and doctrinal position 
attempts to address contemporary problems such as sexuality within sacramental marriage, the 
use of contraceptive devices as a therapeutic means for discordant couples, and the acceptance to 
sacramental and ecclesial communion of same sex friendships.  This work will be reviewed from 
the standpoint of history and the development of doctrine within the Roman Catholic tradition.  
There is no doubt that the Church’s magisterium in its doctrinal teachings especially when it 
broadly affects human sexuality has faced major opposition from within and outside the Church.  
There are many who argue that the Church’s position has become antiquated, a fossil of a 
historical past now outmoded.10  This situation calls for a renewed effort at re-evaluating and 
understanding the Church’s pedagogical, epistemological and hermeneutical methodology.  
Subsequently, I hope this essay may provide an essential foray into the history of the 
development of doctrine of marriage generally in the Church.  Such an examination, relying on, 
John Paul II’s philosophical and theological scholarship on human sexuality in his Theology of 
the Body11 should provide a foundational understanding of marriage in our (post)modern context. 
Lastly, I aim to construct a dialogical scheme between the historical voice of the Church, current 
secular arguments and the Church’s magisterial position. 
In this work, in an attempt to provide some clarifications on the question at hand, 
methodologically, the entire project is sectioned into five chapters.  Chapter one examines and 
studies   the encyclical tradition of papal teachings on family, marriage and various aspects of 
human sexuality.  This section helps to clarify a historical time line of a hundred years at the turn 
                                                          
10 This view remains till today and is often employed as a reaction against Catholic ethical hermeneutics.  More will 
be said on this issue when considering the import of modern pastoral and ethical encyclicals. 
 
11 From this point on, it will be referred to as TOB for Theology of the Body and JPII for John Paul II. 
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of the century up to date of consistency in doctrine and needed adaptations as theology evolved 
and understanding grew.  In Chapter two John Paul II’s Theology of the Body which is the main 
frame and reference for the entire project is reviewed mostly from the aspects where a 
theological anthropology of marriage, family life and sexuality are dealt with.  John Paul II’s 
‘body theology’ is arguably seen as the most contemporary encapsulation of magisterial position 
presented from a philosophical, phenomenological, spiritual, scriptural and theological 
perspectives.  John Paul II’s ‘theology’ is essential to the work because it takes into 
consideration various sociological and contemporary problems that this work aims to proffer 
some resolutions to.   The natural law theory is an essential component of Catholic moral 
theology and ethics.  Therefore, in the third chapter both a historical and critical analysis of the 
natural law is explored to provide a tradition that dates back to scholasticism of one of the major 
arguments proposed by the Church and most attacked in modern times as insufficient for making 
moral judgements.  Within this chapter, the development of the theory which is re-baptized as 
the new natural law theory by its proponents is also reviewed.  Germain Grisez et al, built a new 
theory that is purely philosophically argued without theism with the aim of making the natural 
law theory tenable to a wider public that is mostly made up of non-theists.  Having established 
these foundations, in the fourth chapter, various voices are engaged who contribute to the 
conversation on marriage, family life and human sexuality.  John Grabowski’s covenantal 
theology presents a perspective that is mostly scripturally based.  Lisa Cahill presents a Catholic 
theological and ethicist’s perspective with particular attention to gender issues.  The ‘Just Love’ 
of Margaret Farley is essential for a critical re-reading of Catholic moral theology in its tradition.  
Farley’s insight is invaluable as she is recognized by many as a thinker of commendable clarity 
in the area of moral epistemology, ecumenism, feminism and generally questions about human 
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sexual ethics.  And finally, the indispensable voice of Mercy Amber Oduyoye, womanist, 
ecumenist, ethicist and woman African theology; Oduyoye has been at the fore front of these 
various theological enterprise for over four decades.  Her versatility and African perspective 
provides an important addition to a necessary critical engaging of contemporary thinkers.  In the 
final and fifth chapter, situating the idea of a development in doctrine as a reality, the idea of 
development viewed from the prism of ‘tradition’ and continuous ‘traditioning’ will be explored.  
In the light in which doctrine as tradition that is continually traditioned is understood, two 
questions that are of utmost importance for contemporary theology and pastoral consideration are 
put in play.  First the question of discordancy of sacramentally married persons and the 
possibility of permitting condomized sexual encounter in such cases.  Second, the status of same 
sex unions to be recognized as sacramental marriage.  These two example are used to situate the 
idea of ‘matter and form’ which is considered in the following section.  The argument simply is 
that there are doctrines that by their very nature are unchangeable (usually referred to as dogma), 
and there are some doctrines that can accommodate renewal or re-interpretation.  In this way, 
this work concludes that doctrines can change in as long as it does not contradict its divine 
origin, transmission and consistency within the Church’s universal mandate.  If this position is 
understood, then the accusation that the Church is archaic and outmoded is no longer valid.  
More importantly, this work proves its thesis.   
Within contemporary (post)modern hermeneutics of theological discourse, current 
theological works no longer rely solely on the traditional Aristotelian/Thomistic deductive 
method but rely also on the inductive, experiential and historically conscious method.  This essay 
will incorporate inductive reasoning particularly in the final chapter which considers specific 
contemporary moral questions to approach general doctrinal reasoning which will be 
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hermeneutical, contextual and practical. The complexity of the subject matter requires a 
dialogical and cross fertilizing of differing theological and non-theological positions.  The 
methodology adopted for this work takes into account the historical, revisionist, contemporary, 
philosophical and anthropological foundations of the Church’s understanding of marriage, the 
natural law theory and human sexuality.  The focus is to engage the key points and arguments 
posited by the Church within a historical timeline as expounded in official documents and 
doctrinal teachings.  To review main line scriptural, traditional, philosophical and theological 
points that upholds the Church’s position while allowing contemporary scholarly voices from 
within and outside the Church to question these ecclesiastical doctrinal pre-suppositions.  This is 
the reason why the notion of “a history of development of doctrine” is utilized to delineate and 
expound on the idea that the Church’s magisterial position is not necessarily rigid, static or 
inscribed in stone.  Even though the doctrine remains constant, it also has evolved as it is evident 
in JPII’s TOB and within the corpus of most of the encyclicals that will be reviewed in this essay.  
It should be pointed out that the development in doctrine referred to is not in any way directly 
affective on the core of doctrine but as a response to shifts and changes in sacred tradition, 
culture, time and society.12  
To approach the fundamental question of my thesis, I appropriate and borrow the idea of 
“matter” and “form” in the sacramental theology of the Church as a metaphor, an analytical tool, 
to explain the converging point of disagreeing positions.  I suggest that to understand possible 
changes or shifts on doctrinal position on human sexuality can be better explored borrowing the 
                                                          
12 In Jan Hendrik Walgrave’s seminal work titled Unfolding Revelation: The Nature of Doctrinal Development, 
supports this position by positing that development of doctrine is the efforts of the church to consistently try to fit  
the expressions of faith into contemporary patterns  of thought, retouching, recreating and guiding the progressive 
movement of Christian belief by which faith is constantly  and continuously reincarnated in human culture and 
giving it new meaning within a developing human history. Jan Hendrik Walgrave, Unfolding Revelation: The 
Nature of Doctrinal Development (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1972), p. 41 
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idea of matter and form from liturgical theology.  The matter and form position as a metaphor 
helps to delineate the difference between theological essentials and its incidentals, its subjective 
and objective nature.  Therefore, we can trace shifts in the teachings in the areas of conjugality 
between married couples, leading to raising further specific questions about discordant couples 
and even the question of same sex unions.  My conclusion is to insist that the core of doctrine 
does not change because of its normativity but incidentals that are contemporary challenges 
needs the attention of the magisterium, theologians and secular society to study and dialogue 
carefully with mutual respect, in a listening environment, to give answers that are ethical and 
respect human beings and leads to life.  In this essay, my direction is to look back into history so 
as to evaluate the present, and possibly put a spotlight on the possibilities that lies ahead as the 
conversation between the Church, theologians and secular society continues.  Current interest 
shown in JPII’s TOB requires that we mine and milk its riches in an effort to respond to the 
various questions that challenges Christian sexual ethics today.  By engaging JPII’s 
anthropological-philosophical and theological method, the post Vatican II Church is challenged 
to take another look at how contextual problems challenge traditional hermeneutics of the 
Church.  The post synodal Church is well aware of these problems, and states unambiguously, 
 
….There should be no conflict between the Church’s divinely given teaching 
authority and the conscience of the faithful Catholics.  God does not contradict 
Himself.  Neither can the Church’s teaching on morality be reduced to one 
theological opinion among others.  Such a view undermines the claim that the 
spirit guides the Church.  Binding on theologians as much as on any other 
member of the faithful, the authoritative teaching of the Church determine the 
limits within which moral theologians is to develop a deeper understanding of the 
principles underlying  the Church’s teaching, to expound the validity and 
obligatory nature of the precept it proposes, to offer guidelines based on this 
precepts and principles, to help solve new  moral dilemmas created, for example, 
by cultural changes and the advances in technology, and to demonstrate the 
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connection of these principles and precepts with one another and their relationship 
with man’s ultimate end.13 
The fathers of the synod on the family, in their final report14 to the Holy Roman Pontiff, 
Pope Francis, strongly and carefully, without equivocations from the very first paragraph of the 
report make allusions to Christ’s words about marriage in Mark 10 and Mathew 19, these texts 
make immediate reference to the first two chapters of Genesis.  While this position resonates 
with the traditional position as the biblical texts on which heterosexual and Christian 
monogamous marriage rests, it also argue against those who see creation story in the Genesis 
account as some simple story modern people can no longer belief in.  The synod Fathers 
referencing a homily by Pope Francis asserts, 
God did not create us to live in sorrow or to be alone. He made men and women 
for happiness, to share their journey with someone who complements them, [...]. 
It is the same plan which Jesus presents [...] summarized with these words: ‘From 
the beginning of creation [God] made them male and female; for this reason a 
man will leave his father and his mother and cleaves to his wife and they become 
one flesh. So they are no longer two but one flesh’ (Mk 10:6-8; cf. Gen1:27; 
2:24).” God “joins the hearts of two people who love one another, he who joins 
them in unity and indissolubility. This shows us that the goal of conjugal life is 
not simply to live together for life, but to love one another for life! In this way 
Jesus re-establishes the order which was present from the beginning. [...] only in 
the light of the folly of the gratuitousness of Jesus’ paschal love will the folly of 
the gratuitousness of an exclusive and life-long conjugal love make sense.15  
Aware of contemporary liberal secularism and inn response to the major shifts in society, the 
synod Fathers acknowledge these changes but reiterate,  
                                                          
13 Veritatis Splendor #10 
 
14 This is the final report by the bishops of the synod on the family titled, “XIV Ordinary General Assembly: The 
Vocation and Mission of the family in the Church and the Contemporary World,” Vatican City, published 24th Oct, 
2015,  accessed Jan 30th, 2016, 
http://www.vatican.va/romaan_curia/synod/documents/rc_synod_doc_20151026_relazione-finaale-XIV-
assemblea_en. 
 
15 Homily at the Opening Mass of the Synod, 4 October 2015, #2 
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We are aware of the major anthropological cultural changes today which have an 
impact on all aspects of life. We remain firmly convinced that the family is a gift 
of God, the place where he reveals the power of his saving grace. Even in our day, 
the Lord calls a man and a woman to marry, abides with them in their life as a 
family and offers himself to them as an ineffable gift. “The Church is called to 
scrutinize the signs of the times, interpreting them in the light of the Gospel. 
Thus, in language intelligible to each generation, she can respond to the perennial 
questions which people ask about this present life and the life to come, and about 
the relationship of the one to the other. We must therefore recognize and 
understand the world in which we live, its explanations, its longings, and its often 
dramatic characteristics” (cf.GS, 4).16  
The Fathers affirm further, 
In today's society, we observe a multiplicity of challenges which manifest 
themselves to a greater or lesser degree in various parts of the world. In different 
cultures, many young people demonstrate a resistance in making definitive 
commitments in relationships, and often choose to live together or simply to 
engage in casual relationships. The declining birth rate is a result of various 
factors, including industrialization, the sexual revolution, the fear of 
overpopulation, economic problems, the growth of a contraceptive mentality and 
abortion. Consumerism may also deter people from having children, simply so 
they can maintain a certain freedom and life-style. Some Catholics have difficulty 
in leading a life in keeping with the Catholic Church's teaching on marriage and 
the family, and in seeing, in such teaching, the goodness of God's creative design 
for them. The number of marriages taking place in some parts of the world is 
declining, while separations and divorces are not uncommon.17  
After a careful expounding on contemporary problems, the fathers of the synod turn their 
attention to a bigger perennial problem which the Church faces by a redefinition of marriage by 
civil society.  The fathers states their understanding and position thus, 
Today, a very important cultural challenge is posed by “gender” ideology which 
denies the difference and reciprocity in nature of a man and a woman and 
envisages a society without gender differences, thereby removing the 
anthropological foundation of the family. This ideology leads to educational 
programmes and legislative guidelines which promote a personal identity and 
emotional intimacy radically separated from the biological difference between 
male and female. Consequently, human identity becomes the choice of the 
individual, which can also change over time. According to our faith, the 
difference between the sexes bears in itself the image and likeness of God 
                                                          
16 XIV Ordinary General Assembly, Ibid. #5 
 
17  XIV Ordinary General Assembly, Ibid. #7 
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(Gen1:26-27). “This tells us that it is not man alone who is the image of God or 
woman alone who is the image of God, but man and woman as a couple who are 
the image of God. ...  Modern contemporary culture has opened new spaces, new 
forms of freedom and new depths in order to enrich the understanding of this 
difference. But it has also introduced many doubts and much skepticism. [...] The 
removal of the difference [...] is the problem, not the solution” (cf. Pope 
Francis, General Audience, 15 April 2015).18  
The synod Fathers, referencing Pope Francis’ encyclical, Laudato Si, calls attention to 
“the family, which as a part of a significant human ecology, should be adequately protected (cf. 
John Paul II, Centesimus Annus, # 38). Through our family, we belong to the whole of creation; 
we contribute in a specific manner to promoting ecology…. In the family we first learn how to 
show love and respect for life; we are taught the proper use of things, order and cleanliness, 
respect for the local ecosystem and care for all creatures. In the family we receive an integral 
education, which enables us to grow harmoniously in personal maturity” (cf. also LS, 213).19   
Careful note is made for a consistent ethic in human ecology and as it relates to cosmological 
ecology.  Adequate care and concern must be extended to the elderly, widowed, dying, persons 
with special needs, the unmarried, migrants, refugees, the persecuted, those with unique cultural 
or social challenges, children, women, men and young people.  The Fathers, in their report 
continue, 
The great values of marriage and the Christian family are a response to the search 
inherent in human existence, even at a time characterized by individualism and 
hedonism. People ought to be received with understanding and sensitivity to their 
real-life situations and to learn how to continue their search for meaning in life. 
Faith inspires a desire for God and to feel fully part of the Church, even in those 
who are experiencing failure or are in very difficult situations. The Christian 
message always contains the reality and dynamics of mercy and truth, which 
converge in Christ: “The Church’s first truth is the love of Christ. The Church 
makes herself a servant of this love and mediates it to all people: a love that 
forgives and expresses itself in the gift of oneself.  Consequently, wherever the 
Church is present, the mercy of the Father must be evident” (MV, 12)…. 
                                                          
18 Ibid. #8 
 
19 Ibid. #15 
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Everyone needs to be understood, bearing in mind that situations far from the life 
of the Church are not always desired; oftentimes, they are created, and, at times, 
simply endured. From the vantage point of faith, no one is excluded: all are loved 
by God and are important in the Church’s pastoral activity.20  
The report give extensive and carefully worded pastoral guidelines to problems, old and 
new which family life and marriages continue to struggle with.  Parts II and III of the report 
shines a light on the re-examination and expounding on questions of pre-marital catechesis, the 
actual celebration of marriage, the initial and early years of marriage and family life.  The 
Fathers of the synod includes in the larger ecclesial family the importance of priestly formation 
and of all other pastoral agents.  The Fathers also restated the consistency of the magisterial 
position of fecundity and generativity in marriage and the training and raising of children.  
Keeping in line with the Church’s sacred doctrinal tradition, the value of human life in all its 
stages; from conception to its natural end is once again upheld.  And in situations where couples 
are unable to conceive and have their own biological children, adoption and foster parenting are 
recommended as a Christian good and solution.  In the section where the Synod fathers respond 
to the complexities of contemporary culture/society, they give pastoral guidelines for bishops, 
pastors and pastoral agent on how to guide people who are divorced, people who cohabit, and 
people who are married civilly and not sacramentally, or who are in a mixed marriage situation 
or a marriage with disparity of cult.  The Fathers reminds all, that, the Church “lovingly shares 
the joys and hopes and the sorrows and anxieties of every family.” For the Church, staying close 
to the family as a companion on the journey means to assume an attitude which is wisely 
nuanced. Sometimes, staying close and listening in silence is needed; at other times, moving 
ahead and pointing the way; and at still other times, the appropriate action is to follow, support 
and encourage. “The Church will have to initiate everyone — priests, religious and laity — into 
                                                          
20 Ibid. #34 
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this ‘art of accompaniment’ which teaches us to remove our sandals before the sacred ground of 
the other (cf. Ex. 3:5).”21  On the question or the possibility of seeing same sex unions as 
marriage, the synod Fathers states, 
The Church’s attitude is like that of her Master, who offers his boundless love to 
every person without exception (cf. MV, 12). To families with homosexual 
members, the Church reiterates that every person, regardless of sexual orientation, 
ought to be respected in his/her dignity and received with respect, while carefully 
avoiding “every sign of unjust discrimination” (Congregation for the Doctrine of 
the Faith, Considerations Regarding Proposals To Give Legal Recognition To 
Unions Between Homosexual Persons, 4). Specific attention is given to guiding 
families with homosexual members. Regarding proposals to place unions of 
homosexual persons on the same level as marriage, “there are absolutely no 
grounds for considering homosexual unions to be in any way similar or even 
remotely analogous to God's plan for marriage and family” (ibid). In every way, 
the Synod maintains as completely unacceptable that local Churches be subjected 
to pressure in this matter and that international bodies link financial aid to poor 
countries to the introduction of laws to establish “marriage” between people of the 
same sex. 
The report relies foundationally on scared scripture and tradition.  While nuancing the 
works of Vatican II, the report make copious references to the encyclical traditions of Popes Paul 
VI, John Paul II, Benedict XVI and Francis I.  The report makes clear connections by 
establishing their conclusions as consistent with previous traditions and recent teachings to show 
fidelity in continuity.  The Fathers propose journeying together in solidarity with reliance on the 
Eucharist as the food for the Church, preempting the eternal banquet where Christ the 
bridegroom will host his bride, the Church to an eternal banquet.   
The report of the synod father reiterates the responsibility of the Church to divine revelation held 
in apostolic trust and tradition.  At the same time acknowledging the need to be present to, and 
walk with women and men of our time.  And through the Holy Spirit remain true to what has 
been handed down to the Church.  It is this parallel state of encounter between the religious and 
                                                          
21 Ibid. #77 
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the secular in a shared space that this dissertation will attempt to explore and speak to. Perhaps 
by some divine intervention, there can be some resurgence in the practice of the Christian faith in 
the global west in the future.  But in the interim, the interplay between societal ethical mores and 
the Church’s ethical traditions will have to continue to exist in a shared space, unfortunately, it 
seems, in a mutually exclusive way.  If the Church sees divine revelation as ontological truth 
demanding total self-submission, adherence and obedience, and society lay claim to absolute 
autonomy, the impasse remains as a wall of separation. 
John ‘Segun Odeyemi 
Duquesne University, 
Pittsburgh, PA 
Feb. 2016 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE ROLE OF ENCYCLICALS IN DEVELOPING CHURCH DOCTRINE 
The encyclicals of the Roman pontiffs are of the utmost importance to this work. The 
Church claims that the Popes enjoy a divine teaching authority, which they exercise when 
issuing encyclicals among the other means by which they exercise their teaching authority. The 
original texts of an encyclical are written in Latin and published in the Acta Apostolicae Sedis, a 
monthly journal published by the Roman Curia. Through the use of encyclical letters, the Pope 
exercises his Petrine ministry of teaching. The Catholic Encyclopedia clarifies:  
It should be noted that encyclicals pertain per se to the Pope’s exercise of his ordinary 
magisterium…. The contents of an encyclical are presumed to belong to the ordinary 
magisterium unless the opposite is clearly manifested…. While encyclicals are not of 
themselves infallible pronouncements, and although their teachings are subject to 
change, Catholics are nevertheless obliged to assent to their doctrinal and moral 
content… this assent must be not merely a respectful silence, but a true internal… 
assent of the intellect to the doctrines precisely as they have been proposed.22  
Encyclicals are official Church documents written in the form of a formal letter addressed 
to the entire Church: “Christ has entrusted the Pope with a teaching authority whose purpose is to 
foster the unity of faith, safeguard the understanding of truth and build up ecclesial 
communion… characteristically denotes the communion of faith and charity that exists among 
various ‘Churches’ that is, among the various communities that make up the Church.”23 The 
encyclicals are fashioned traditionally after the example of the epistles of the apostles in the early 
Church, which are contained in the canons of the New Testament of the Bible.  
                                                          
22 New Catholic Encyclopedia, 1st ed., s.v. “encyclical.” 
 
23 Paul VI, General Audience, Aug. 5, 1964, The Encyclicals of John Paul II, J. Michael Miller, ed. (Huntingdon, 
Indiana: Our Sunday Visitor, Inc. 1996), 10. 
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Because encyclicals have various forms and uses, they are placed in a hierarchical level of 
importance.24 They are generally divided into three major categories: doctrinal, social, or 
exhortational. Most of the encyclicals under consideration in this dissertation will be doctrinal 
ones (there is one exception, an apostolic exhortation). Michael J. Miller distinguishes between 
“two kinds of doctrinal encyclicals …; first are those which deal with particular points of 
Catholic doctrine in a general way. While undoubtedly conditioned by the theological climate of 
their age, these encyclicals are primarily aimed at a serene exposition of Church teaching…. 
Second are those doctrinal encyclicals which more explicitly involve the Pope’s responsibility to 
safeguard the integrity of the apostolic deposit of faith.”25 By defending the authenticity of the 
apostolic faith and Church doctrine, the Pope also defends the right of the people of God to 
receive the teachings of the Church in their purity.26 The encyclicals which will be under 
consideration in this work were issued between 1880 and 1995 within the pontificates of four 
                                                          
24 Papal or apostolic constitutions are generally used for doctrinal or disciplinary pronouncements. Bulls are official 
documents by which dioceses are erected, saints canonized, and dignitaries appointed. Encyclicals are given as 
instructions on doctrinal or moral matters; rescripts are given to grant favors or dispensations or to bestow privileges 
based on a previous request; and decrees establish papal authority over juridic persons or places. A motu propio is 
an instruction or guideline given personally by the pope to assist in the development of a particular teaching, mostly 
for particular Churches. Cf. Ann Fremantle, ed., The Papal Encyclicals in Their Historical Contexts (New York: 
New American Library Publishers, 1956), 25-26.  
 
25 Miller, Encyclicals John Paul II, 13-14. 
 
26 Here, we must necessarily consider the question of papal authority, which is exercised collegially with the bishops 
and the entire Church to preach the gospel, administer the sacraments, and serve the Church in unity. When the Pope 
teaches ex cathedra, he exercises his ministry on behalf of the Church with a “charism of the Holy Spirit which 
protects the Church from error when he solemnly defines a matter of faith and morals…. Definitions of the pope are 
‘irreformable by themselves (ex sesse) and not by reason of the agreement of the Church (non autem ex consensu 
ecclesiae).” Infallibility, as this doctrine is known, does not apply to non-infallible teachings (such as those from the 
encyclical letters under consideration in this chapter). Infallible papal teachings must also be understood to enjoy a 
divine authority which requires “religious allegiance of will and intellect” (Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, 
#25). Cf. Richard McBrien, Catholicism, Vol. 2 (Minneapolis: Winston Press, 1980), 840-841. This must be 
understood differently when the Church teaches infallibly through the ordinary and universal magisterium. In which 
case, a teaching is infallible because the pope does not teach from the chair of Peter (ex cathedra) but acts in 
collegiality with all the bishops of the church around the world, teaching definitively and authoritatively as 
successors of the apostles. (The encyclical Evangelium Vitae of JPII is an example of a teaching that is infallible 
from an ordinary and universal magisterial position.) 
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Popes. Even though they were issued at different times and for different historical situations, one 
easily grasps a sense of consistency and a certain kind of flexible fluidity within the tradition.27  
This historical review is undertaken to study the relationships between one encyclical and 
another, to establish that they build on each other, and to establish the continuity of doctrine from 
one generation to another. Additionally, it will reveal how the Church attempts to address social 
problems as they arise in different historical and social contexts. This historical review is 
essential to the entire argument upon which this work relies: that is, that the Church must 
maintain doctrinal truth and, at the same time, be willing to see where doctrine can develop 
within the frame work of both the immutability of ontological and doctrinal truths, and the signs 
of the times. 
The Encyclical Tradition in Historical Review 
Leo XIII penned Arcanum Divinae Sapientiae (an encyclical letter on Christian 
marriage) published on February 10, 1880. This encyclical was a response to the question of the 
separation of Church and state in Italy at the time, and the question of who has the overall 
authority to legislate over marital issues, the civil government or the Church.28 The encyclical 
                                                          
27 Urbine and Seifert state that papal and Church documents, beginning with Arcanum, is the way the Church has 
responded to the “philosophical systems arising from the post-reformation era, and particularly those of the 
enlightenment. The emphasis on the empirical sciences led to a denial of God and organized religion and to the rise 
of a purely secular vision of human destiny. The resulting rejection of any religious vision led to the denial of the 
authority of the Church in the area of marriage and family life. The Church’s response led to Vatican I and 
subsequent official statements.” Cf. William Urbine and William Seifert, On Life and Love: A Guide to Catholic 
Teaching on Marriage and Family (Mystic, CT: Twenty Third Publications, 1996), 1-2. 
 
28 Urbine and Seifert, On Life and Love, note that the direction of Leo XIII’s Arcanum was ground breaking because 
of its efforts to respond to social conditions of married people of the time. They note that Arcanum preceded Rerum 
Novarum (The Condition of Labor) by eleven years. Leo XIII started the work of a first unified Code of Canon Law 
which was completed during the papacy of Benedict XV. In the new code, four chapters are dedicated to 
summarizing key juridical concerns about marriage. Canons 1012-1057 codify general provisions for marriage, 
sacramental impediments to marriage, valid consent and form for marriage, and the dissolution, separation, and 
convalidation of marriage. (cf. 7-8) Urbine and Seifert further note that Arcanum is the first in a series of papal 
20 
 
insists on the divine origin of marriage, over which the Church is naturally empowered to have 
jurisdiction rather than the State. The pope established very early in this letter that Christ 
entrusted the continuance of his work to the Church by restoring to order what might have 
become deranged in society or what might have fallen into ruin.29 Leo XIII drew attention to the 
initial corruption of marriage in both Jew and Gentile society wherein it became lawful for men 
to have more than one wife and to put their wives away by a writ of dismissal, thereby creating 
polygamy and divorce. The pope wrote that “all nations seem, more or less, to have forgotten the 
true notion and origin of marriage, and thus everywhere, laws were enacted with reference to 
marriage, prompted to all appearance by State reasons, but not such as nature required.30  
The pope next mentions the subjugation of women by men as society’s projection of 
confusion over the “mutual rights and duties of husbands and wives,”31 noting that “nothing 
could be more piteous than the wife, sunk so low as to be all but reckoned as a means for the 
gratification of passion, or for the production of offspring.”32 Leo XIII went on to promote the 
sacramental and monogamous nature of Christian marriage when he stated “that Christ our Lord 
raised marriage to the dignity of a sacrament…. And that in a wondrous way, making marriage 
an example of the mystical union between Himself and His Church, He not only perfected that 
love which is according to nature but also made the naturally indivisible union of one man with 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
teachings that will focus on marriage and family life as a reaction against a fast-growing, worldwide trend that 
questioned the authority of the Church over marriage.  
 
29 Arcanum, #2. 
 
30 Arcanum #7. From this section of the encyclical, Leo XIII starts to allude to the natural as always a backdrop to 
Roman Catholic ethics.  
 
31 Ibid. 
 
32 Ibid. 
 
21 
 
one woman far more perfect through the bond of heavenly love.”33 This union, in the teachings 
of Leo XIII, is not only open to the propagation of the human race, but also to the bringing forth 
of children for the Church and for upholding the ideals of the human and Christian family. 
In Arcanum, Leo XIII states succinctly that the attack on marriage, started by the 
“archenemy of mankind” is carried on today “because very many imbued with the maxims of a 
false philosophy and corrupted in morals, judge nothing so unbearable as submission and 
obedience; and strive with all their might to bring about that not only individual men, but 
families, also…indeed human society itself….may in haughty pride despise the sovereignty of 
God.”34 By so doing, society deprives marriage of its natural holiness, transferring it to civil 
jurisprudence where laws affecting marriage are made in direct contradiction to what the Church 
holds as impediments to marriage. Relying on the apostolic tradition of several popes before him, 
Leo XIII in Arcanum admonishes, 
Let no one, then, be deceived by the distinction which some civil jurists have so 
strongly insisted upon….. the distinction, namely, by virtue of which they sever 
the matrimonial contract from the sacrament, with intent to hand over the contract 
to the power and will of the rulers of the State, while reserving questions 
concerning the sacrament of the Church. A distinction, or rather severance, of this 
kind cannot be approved; for certain it is that in Christian marriage the contract is 
inseparable from the sacrament, and that, for this reason, the contract cannot be 
true and legitimate without being a sacrament as well. For Christ our Lord added 
to marriage the dignity of a sacrament; but marriage is the contract itself, 
whenever that contract is lawfully included.35 
                                                          
33 Arcanum, #9. Leo XIII based this teaching on the normativity of scripture and the Pauline text of Eph. 5:25-32. 
 
34 Arcanum, #16. Leo XIII explicitly clarified, “Again in the very beginning of the Christian Church were repulsed 
and defeated, with the like unremitting determination, the efforts of many who aimed at the destruction of Christian 
marriage, such as the Gnostics, Manicheans, and Montanists; and in our own time Mormons, St. Simonians, 
Phalansterians, and communism.”  
 
35 Arcanum, #23. 
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Central to the Pope’s argument in Arcanum is the idea that the Church’s divine mandate 
over contracting marriage can never be strictly under the powers of the State. He argues that such 
usurpation by the State can only bring calamity and great evil, as unhallowed marriages could 
never be the source of any fruitful benefit to the individual or the public. Under the counsel of 
God, marriage “strengthens the union of hearts in the parents; to secure holy education for the 
children; to temper the authority of the father by the example of the divine authority; to render 
children obedient to their parents….”36 Consequently, he states further, “when the Christian 
religion is rejected and repudiated, marriage sinks of necessity into the slavery of man’s vicious 
nature and vile passions, and finds but little protection in the help of natural goodness.”37 Though 
secular society and governments clamor to exclude God and the Church, they cannot provide a 
remedy for moral corruption, which is spreading widely. Such corruption, the Pope claims, is 
evident in unfaithfulness in marriage and weakened mutual kindness between spouses, the 
breakdown of families resulting in divorce, and the improper discipline and education of 
children; and the dignity of womanhood is lessened when women are cast aside after having 
been abused as sex slaves.  
Leo XIII summarized the overall effect thus: “Since, then, nothing has such power to lay 
waste families and destroy the mainstay of kingdoms as the corruption of morals, it is easily seen 
that divorces are in the highest degree hostile to the prosperity of families and States, springing 
as they do from the depraved morals of people, and, as experience shows us, opening out a way 
to every kind of evil-doing in public and in private life.”38 
                                                          
36 Ibid., #26. 
 
37 Ibid., #27. 
 
38 Ibid., #34. 
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  The encyclical condemns any novelties within secular and religious cultures that accept 
any form of marriage outside of monogamy: marriage as a union between one man and a woman. 
The encyclical posits that modernity, as represented by liberal secularists, is wrong in trying to 
usurp the natural rights of the Church to legislate on marriage, thereby attacking the foundations 
of the true human family as ordained by God.39 
Leo XIII acknowledges the distinction that exists between religious and civil authority 
and the necessity for each to be free and remain unhindered in its spheres. He asserts, however, 
that it is in the interest of common good that some form of union and accord should exist 
between them, for “the intellect of man is greatly ennobled by the Christian faith, and made 
better able to shun and banish all error….”40 Following earlier magisterial tradition, Leo XIII 
concludes that “if there be any union of a man and a woman among the faithful of Christ which 
is not a sacrament, such union has not the force and nature of proper marriage; that, although 
contracted in accordance with the laws of the State, it cannot be more than a rite or custom 
introduced by civil law…[;] further… that no power can dissolve the bond of Christian marriage 
whenever this has been ratified and consummated…[; and] that the doctrine and precepts in 
relation to Christian marriage … tend no less to the preservation of civil society than to the 
everlasting salvation of souls.”41 
Theodore Mackin, who critiques Leo XIII’s Arcanum on various levels in his seminal 
work Marriage in the Catholic Church: The Marital Sacrament, pointed out that prior to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
39 Claudia Carlen, ed., The Papal Encyclicals, Vol. 2 (Wilmington, NC: McGrath, 1981), 1878-1902. 
 
40 Arcanum, #36. 
 
41 Ibid., #40, 41, 45. 
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publication of Arcanum, Leo XIII had published two42 earlier letters on marriage which could be 
seen as preliminary drafts for Arcanum. Mackin notes that the Pope grounds the origin of 
marriage in God, based on “the historical factuality of the first two chapters of Genesis as the 
source of his information. And unembarrassedly combined the creation poem of Genesis 1…. 
with the garden narrative of Genesis 2….”43 Second, Mackin criticizes Arcanum by stating that 
Leo XIII’s biblical exegesis is inadequate whereby he establishes the permanent and unitive 
traits of marriage and shows Christ raising marriage to sacramental status:  
When Leo gets explicitly at the sacramentality of marriage, we note his going 
decisively to a kind of predication with which he only dallied earlier in the 
encyclical. It is a kind which he avoided when writing in detail about innumerable 
degradations that marriages suffered during the four millennia between creation 
and the ministry of Christ. There he recorded the fate of marriages in their 
historical concreteness, in the misery of wives in real life. But here as he begins 
his reflections on the sacrament, he recedes into abstractions; he writes about 
“marriage.” And this leads into an at least prima facie inexactness, since he stays 
in his abstraction to say that Christ raised “marriage” to the dignity of a 
sacrament, not that he made the marriages of his Christian followers sacraments.44  
Mackin suggests that this exegesis fails because Leo XIII, when naming the precise 
agency of Christ in raising marriage to the sacramental level, fails to cite any references from the 
synoptic tradition. According to Mackin, Leo XIII “turns instead to the Pauline tradition, to the 
loci classici in 1 Corinthians 7 and Ephesians 5: 21-33.”45 Based on the text from Ephesians 5, 
Leo XIII situates the duties of the spouse, seeing the husband as ruler in his family and head of 
his wife, the wife is subject to him not as a servant but as a companion. Mackin argues that in 
                                                          
42 Theodore Mackin, Marriage in the Catholic Church: The Marital Sacrament (Mahwah, NJ: Paulist Press, 1989), 
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this analogy “the husband is the image of Christ while the wife is that of the Church.”46In doing 
so, “Leo referees the details and the meaning of the metaphor to the spouses in ‘marriage’ not 
with deontological valence, but unhesitatingly with ontological. That is, he does not say that the 
husband ought to be guide to his wife as a head is to the body, but that the husband simply is 
head to his wife—husband in abstraction to wife in abstraction. The result is an ideal construct, 
and the metaphor has been turned into the reality.”47 Therefore, historically, Leo XIII argues that 
marriage is not a product of the semi-deliberate evolution of social structures or the capitalist 
society’s economic arrangement and its tyranny against women. Rather, marriage is of a divine 
origin which from the beginning “has foreshadowed the becoming man of the word of God and 
its end product of an image of the mystical marriage of Christ and the Church. Marriage taken 
abstractly this way becomes universal.” Mackin argues further that in asserting that “any 
marriage of two Christians is a sacrament…. Leo feels no unease and suspects no anomaly in 
saying that ‘the form and figure’ in a marriage’s imaging the mystical marriage of Christ and the 
Church is a contract.”48 Despite the critique, Mackin agrees that Arcanum is in agreement with 
the traditional magisterial position on marriage. 
Mary Shivanandan points out that Arcanum is interesting because it lays out two aspects 
essential to a personalist view of marriage without ever using the word “person”49: the 
sacramentality and contract form of marriage, which ground communiorum personarum. She 
states that Leo XIII was responding to the neo-liberalism of nineteenth century Europe, which 
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centered on individualism; the new scientific ways of the Enlightenment, which explained better 
the meaning of sex; and the new market economy, which redefined new gender roles in the 
public sphere. In this secular context, this encyclical was promulgated so as to prevent marriage 
(as a sacrament) from becoming secularized.  
Pope Pius XI published Casti Connubii (On Christian Marriage) on December 31, 1930, 
fifty years after Arcanum. In this encyclical, which is said to have closely echoed the Council of 
Trent, Pius XI attempts to speak to humanity at the dawning of a new age with new ideas about 
marriage and family life. It is generally accepted that this encyclical was also a response to the 
Lambeth Conference of 1930, in which the Anglican Church broke ranks with the orthodox 
position on contraception by agreeing to its use in limited circumstances.50 This encyclical is also 
seen as a reaction against the widespread socialist and communist philosophies that were gaining 
ground after the economic depression following World War I.51  
In Casti Connubii, Pius XI copiously references Arcanum and endorses again magisterial 
and papal tradition on the subject of marriage and sexuality. He focuses on five issues: (1) the 
sanctity of marriage, (2) the opposition to eugenics, (3) re-clarification of the Church’s position 
on artificial birth control, (4) the purpose of sexuality, and (5) the continued insistence on the 
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prohibition of abortion. Pius XI states that “the dignity of chaste wedlock” must be renewed by 
the Church’s speaking for the dignity of marriage. His argument is based on the “immutable and 
inviolable fundamental doctrine” that matrimony was instituted as God’s law, which cannot be 
subject to any human decree or contrary pacts, even by the spouses themselves.52 To this 
sanctified state of life comes the gift of propagation of progeny, their proper education,53 and 
“the blessing of conjugal honor which consists in the mutual fidelity of the spouses in fulfilling 
the marriage contract….”54  
The encyclical contrasts two “evils” that oppose the benefits of matrimony. First, it 
maintains that offspring must be seen as a gift of life and not a burden.55 Therefore, any 
deliberate means of frustrating ability of the conjugal act to generate life is to be branded grave 
sin. Second, tampering with human life in the womb is equally forbidden.56 The encyclical calls 
this “direct murder of the innocent” and denounces eugenic laws made at the time against those 
whom society deems “unfit” to marry and have children. Pius XI clarifies, “Finally, that 
pernicious practice must be condemned which closely touches upon the natural right of man to 
enter matrimony but affects also in a real way the welfare of the offspring.”57 He goes further, 
“For there are some, over solicitous for the cause of eugenics, who not only give salutary counsel 
for more certainly procuring the strength and health of the future child—which, indeed, is not 
contrary to right reason—but put eugenics before aims of a higher order, and by public authority 
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wish to prevent from marrying all those whom, even though naturally fit for marriage, they 
consider, according to the norms and conjectures of their investigations, would through 
hereditary transmission, bring forth defective offspring.”58 
Casti Connubii expresses the true meaning of conjugality within Christian marriage as 
intrinsically tied to procreation while acknowledging as licit a sexual encounter that is unitive. 
Seen from its volitive perspective, it should be viewed from the “chaste honor existing between 
man and wife, the due subjection59 of wife to husband, and the true love which binds both parties 
together.”60 The encyclical calls on the Bishops and upon Catholic Action (a lay organization) 
around the world to join hands in fighting tendencies that destabilize marriages, family life, the 
protection of unborn life and whatever promotes abortion.61 
In critiquing Pius XI’s Casti Connubii, Mackin states that Pius XI substantially continues 
in the Arcanum tradition with further, more exact, and more inclusive details than did his 
predecessor. For Mackin, the first area for substantial improvement is a reworking of and 
improvement on the Church’s approach to the anthropology of marriage, where hitherto in its 
juridical definition it had simply joined “contract” to sacrament. Pius XI’s anthropology of 
marriage, according to Mackin, is “crucial because from this it follows that marriage’s natural 
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indissolubility has a holding power greater than only the demands of marriage’s nature.”62 In 
making this bold move, Pius XI alludes to Ephesians 5: 21-23 and to Christ’s words in one of the 
synoptic gospels, “Therefore they are no longer two but one flesh” (Mk. 10:8), in this way 
making more explicit what makes marriage a sacrament.63 Pius XI in stating the structure of this 
new anthropology relies again on Ephesians 5, insisting that whereas the husband is the head and 
ruler of the household, the wife must live in subjection and obedience. This does not take away 
her freedom, which is found in the fact that she is the heart in the marriage of which the husband 
is the head. As previously mentioned, this sacramental marriage is indissoluble by any State 
powers and not even by the will of the couple because it is ordained as a sacrament by God. 
Finally, an indissoluble marriage as the consummated, sacramental union of two Christians is 
based on the traditional teaching of the Church that Christian marriage images the union of 
Christ and his Church, which can never be dissolved. 
In response to Pius XI’s teaching on the connection between the indissolubility of 
marriage and consummation, Mackin opines that “Pius does not offer to explain the ontological 
link…. Nor does he explain how the consummation brings the imaging to its fullness.”64 Mackin 
then points out what he refers to as “an overall ambiguity” created by this document. He holds as 
suspect the idea that the conjoining in a sacramental marriage of two Christians images the union 
of Christ and the Church.65 Mackin further argues that such exhortation is pointless if the 
dereliction from that which is exhorted were not possible. Otherwise, “Pius implies clearly 
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enough that even without their actually imaging, in their conduct, the union of Christ and the 
Church, the marriage of Christian spouses nevertheless does this imaging.”66 He surmises that it 
will be difficult for others to detect this imaging and wonders for whom the sacrament is a sign 
of Christ’s presence in the world. 
Mary Shivanandan’s critique is mainly from the perspective of gender equality. She 
disagrees with the application of the legal language of “contract” over “covenant” and the over 
emphasis on the superiority of the male over the inferior role assigned to the woman, as well as 
with the application of the analogy of Christ and his spouse the Church without reference to 
Christ who gave himself up for his spouse. She argues further that Pius XI “specifically did not 
propound a personalist view of marriage but [that] all the elements are implicit, the necessity of a 
transcendent relationship to God, self-determination and self-possession, openness to 
communion of person and to parenthood.”67 Shivanandan’s point being that the idea of covenant 
makes male gender superiority over the female inadmissible as an argument.  And that in Pius 
XI’s Casti Connubii, the idea of ‘personalism’, even if not intentional on the part of Pius XI, 
gives foundation to expounding equality of both persons entering into a marriage covenant as 
equal in gender and personhood.  
Daniel Callahan in a journal essay critiques both Casti Connubii and Humanae Vitae 
from the standpoint of the magisterial refusal to acknowledge a sociological need to re-evaluate 
contraception and abortion. He premises his critique with the idea that conflicts on the Church’s 
position on questions of sexual doctrine and practices have overshadowed more serious dogmatic 
conflicts like questions about the Trinity, the Incarnation, and papal infallibility and so on. He 
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continues that questions of sexual ethics embody the new conflict that endangers ecumenical 
work. The Catholic hierarchy has also been seen by some as an obstacle to governments’ efforts 
in family-planning programs, changes in abortion laws, and the availability by choice of 
contraceptive devices. These issues are a cause of discord even within the Catholic Church itself.  
Callahan argues that Pius XI’s position on contraception as “intrinsically evil” and 
insistence on the “rhythm” method and abstinence demonstrates that “the papal argumentation 
tended to rely heavily on the language of natural law philosophy,”68 thus implying that the 
teaching on contraception is not viewed as a sectarian Catholic teaching but as applicable for all 
peoples. On this basis, the Catholic Church opposes all laws and policies which support 
contraception. Callahan concludes his critiques by citing two adverse effects of this encyclical. 
First, “the difficulties encountered by Catholic couples in trying to make the ‘rhythm’ method 
work effectively, together with their understandable reluctance to embrace abstinence, meant that 
a faithful adherence to the papal teaching imposed great, and in many cases insuperable, burdens 
on them.”69 Secondly, Pius VI’s teaching, Callahan believes, afforded some theologians an 
opportunity to successfully create “a theological line of attack on papal teaching”70 by elevating 
what Pius XI referred to as the “secondary ends” of the marital act to a position of parity with the 
primary end, which is procreation.  
In Carl Reiterman’s essay, he suggests that the real issue is an internal controversy within 
a Church faced with an accelerated social shift. Initially between theologians, the controversy 
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expanded, seeming to pit the clergy and struggling married members of the Church against 
traditional Catholic dogmas. In conclusion, he summarizes the situation thus: 
The internal dissension we have outlined has been viewed in the light of a clash 
between the ideals established by the allegedly immutable dogmas of the Church, 
as defended predominantly by the clergy; and the practical problems of the laity. 
The conflict has centered on the question of whether or not the regulation of 
family size is morally permissible and, if so, by what means. It is clear that, 
whatever may be the status of the dogmas, the manner in which they are 
expressed and defended has undergone considerable modification….71 
Reiterman succinctly concludes: 
It is apparent that the confrontation between immutable dogma and the rapidly 
changing contemporary world is severely challenging the adaptive powers of the 
Church. This may have encouraged contemporary efforts to examine a 
fundamental base of the Catholic birth control doctrine—the  
natural law arguments…. Difficulties—both theological and practical—will 
always remain. To face the former, to question, to reformulate, is not to abandon 
tradition or admit to error; it is simply to acknowledge the wonderful depth of 
reality and the limits of the human mind. There is nothing sacrosanct, however, 
about this or that formulation of natural law.72 
Susan Ross, in reacting to Pius XI’s Casti Connubii encyclical, suggests an approach to 
the encyclical that includes a critical appraisal of the contemporary Catholic theology of 
marriage with attention to questions of body and gender. While crediting Pius XI for moving 
away from the “predominantly juridical and reductionist language for marriage found in canon 
law and in the manuals of moral theology,”73 she contends that even though Pius XI provided a 
more personalist approach, the overall teaching still relied heavily on the traditional scholastic 
conception of marriage. Ross avers that this move was met by opposition from traditionalists in 
the Church. Pius XI realized that to present a more positive view of the body and sexuality, 
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especially within the fast-changing social and cultural milieu, was of the utmost importance. 
According to her, this body/personalist approach served as a pivot between the Church and the 
world. 
Ross argues further that the insistence on Natural Law Theory, “with its reliance on an 
ahistorical and, critics claimed, ‘physicalist’ view of the person, failed to take into account the 
subjective and ‘personal’ character of the human.” This situation persists, according to Ross, 
because marriage theologically is a primary, if not central, metaphor for the Church. From the 
covenant between Yahweh and Israel, to the Pauline Christ and his bride the Church, this marital 
parallel is continually drawn. She posits that this metaphor remains necessary because “gender 
relationships and sexuality were and are primary loci for establishing and maintaining power in 
the Roman Catholic Church.” Ross insists that this dynamic in Catholic marriage theology 
represents the hierarchical authority as symbolized and exercised. 
Ross surmises thus: 
The hierarchical relationship of husband and wife was symbolic of the Church’s 
own hierarchical structure. The masculine power of the clergy to lead and instruct 
the feminine and receptive laity was supported by this “gendered” theology of 
marriage. Therefore, the “degendering” of this theology reconceived relationships 
between men and women, clergy and laity: no longer hierarchical, but free and 
mutual. The threat to the Church was clear.  
 Paul VI’s Humanae Vitae of July 25, 1968, remains perhaps the most 
controversial of the Catholic Church’s encyclicals especially because it forcefully 
denounces the use of contraception as “intrinsically evil,” arguing that it violates the very 
purpose and nature of the sexual act, consequently violating the dignity of the human 
person. Humanae Vitae re-affirms previous encyclicals regarding the aspects of married 
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love, conjugality within marriage, and responsible parenthood, and supports the total 
rejection of any form of artificial birth control. The encyclical states that  
any direct interruption of the generative process already begun, even if for 
therapeutic reasons, are to be absolutely excluded as licit means of regulating 
birth; sterilization whether perpetual or temporary, in either the female or male, 
and any action which either in anticipation of the conjugal act, or in the 
accomplishment of it, or in the development of its natural consequences, proposed 
whether as an end or as a means, to render procreation impossible is illicit.74  
Even though Paul VI continues in the apostolic tradition of his predecessors, the volatility 
of public response was strong. Vatican II had just taken place, with what many perceived to be a 
more progressive and less conservative and traditionalist approach to Church teaching. Paul VI’s 
rejection of the majority opinion of the Pontifical Commission on Birth Control that had been set 
up by his predecessor was seen as authoritarian.75  
The encyclical’s first sentence states its overarching view: “The transmission of human 
life is a most serious role in which married people collaborate freely and responsibly with God 
                                                          
74 Paul VI, Humanae Vitae: Encyclical Letter on the Regulation of Birth, #14, published 1968, accessed June 1, 
2015, www.vatican.va/holy_father/paul_vi/encyclicals/documents/hf_p-vi_enc_25071968_humanae-vitae_en.html 
 
75 John XXIII had established a commission in 1963 to advise him on the question of contraception and population 
as a response to the availability of oral contraception. The committee was still meeting when John XXIII passed 
away while sessions of Vatican II were still in progress. Paul VI was elected the next Pope and he expanded the 
Commission to fifty-eight members from its original six, which now included lay men and women from the 
scientific/medical fields, married couples, theologians, and bishops. It is generally argued that the work of this 
Commission forms a large part of the drafting of the last document of Vatican II titled Gaudium et Spes #47-52, 
which focuses on the nobility of marriage and responsible parenthood. The question of the licit or illicit forms of 
contraception was reserved to Paul VI. In May 1966, shortly after the close of Vatican II, the Commission presented 
its findings to Paul VI, in which it approved by a majority the possibility of the use of contraception by married 
couples in certain cases. The minority also issued its own statement to counter the majority report. It would take 
another two years of consultations and study before Humanae Vitae was issued, which definitively disapproved of 
any hormonal anti-ovulants used for contraceptive purposes. Because of the lack of consensus between the two 
factions of the commission, Paul VI states that what is true yesterday will be true today and true in the future. 
Therefore towing apostolic tradition is the best way to go rather than change revealed truths of the sacred scriptures. 
It must be stated also that this Commission was acting in a consultative role to the Pope, who was not under 
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the creator.”76 “Collaboration,” as used by Paul VI, connotes a responsible acceptance of 
working with Divine Providence, without any arbitrary choices on the part of the human agent 
which may seem to interfere with God’s design. Paul VI acknowledges the reality of the married 
state when he states, “[Marriage] has always been a source of great joy to them, even though it 
sometimes entails many difficulties and hardships.”77 The pope recognized changes that 
continually takes place in society and which challenges married people, such as demographic 
problems of over population, causing greater economic and educational demands; a very 
important new understanding of the dignity of women in the society; the true meaning of 
conjugality in marriage; and the relationship of conjugal acts to love. Paul VI insists that despite 
a “most remarkable development….in man’s stupendous progress in the domination and rational 
organization of the forces of nature to the point that he is endeavoring to extend this control over 
every aspect of his own life—over his body, over his mind and emotions, over his social life, and 
even over the laws that regulate the transmission of life.”78 All of these, for Paul VI, raise the 
following questions: “Would it not be right to review the moral norms in force till now, 
especially when it is felt that these can be observed only with the gravest difficulty?” Further, 
“could it not be accepted that the intention to have a less prolific but more rationally planned 
family might transform an action which renders natural processes infertile into a licit and 
provident control of birth?” And finally, “whether, because people are more conscious today of 
their responsibilities, the time has not come when the transmission of life should be regulated by 
their intelligence and will rather than through the specific rhythms of their own bodies?” 
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To be able to respond to these questions adequately, Paul VI clarifies that the Church’s 
magisterium has the competency to interpret the natural moral law. Based on this, the encyclical 
is directed at clarifying the question of human procreation, a mission that humanity is called to in 
both its natural and earthly aspects and its supernatural and eternal aspects. These, he avers, 
transcend specific disciplines, such as biology, psychology, demography, or sociology. Married 
love, therefore, is revealed in its true nature and nobility because it takes its origin from the God 
who is love. This married love among baptized Christians is sacramental, fully human, an act of 
free will, faithful and exclusive until death, and fecund. It is this kind of married love that Paul 
VI argues must give birth to responsible parenthood: “In a word, the exercise of responsible 
parenthood requires that husband and wife, keeping a right order of priorities, recognize their 
own duties towards God, themselves, their families and human society.”79 In referring to the 
natural law, Paul VI writes, “The Church, nevertheless, in urging men to the observance of the 
precepts of the natural law, which it interprets by its constant doctrine, teaches that each and 
every marital act must of necessity retain its intrinsic relationship to the procreation of human 
life.”80  
The foregoing, therefore, becomes the logical background for Paul VI to ground his 
teaching on the unlawful means of birth control: 
Therefore, we base Our words on the first principles of a human and Christian 
doctrine of marriage when We are obliged once more to declare that the direct 
interruption of the generative process already begun and, above all, all direct 
abortion, even for therapeutic reasons, are to be absolutely excluded as lawful 
means of regulating the number of children. Equally to be condemned, as the 
magisterium of the Church has affirmed on many occasions, is direct sterilization, 
whether of the man or of the woman, whether permanent or temporary. Similarly 
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excluded is any action which either before, at the moment of, or after sexual 
intercourse, is specifically intended to prevent procreation—whether as an end or 
as a means. Neither is it valid to argue, as a justification for sexual intercourse 
which is deliberately contraceptive, that a lesser evil is to be preferred to a greater 
one…. Though it is true that sometimes it is lawful to tolerate a lesser moral evil 
in order to promote a greater good, it is never lawful, even for the gravest reasons, 
to do evil that good may come out of it….. Consequently, it is a serious error to 
think that a whole married life of otherwise normal relations can justify sexual 
intercourse which is deliberately contraceptive and so intrinsically wrong.81  
Paul VI clarifies that the Church does not “consider illicit the use of those therapeutic 
means necessary to cure bodily diseases, even if a foreseeable impediment to procreation should 
result there from—provided such impediment is not directly intended for any motive 
whatsoever.”82 Therefore, “the Church teaches that married people may then take advantage of 
the natural cycles immanent in the reproductive system and engage in marital intercourse only 
during those times that are infertile, thus controlling birth in a way which does not in the least 
offend the moral principles….”83 
Reflecting on the consequences of a contraceptive culture, Paul VI warns of three 
consequences: (1) that the practice of methods of artificial birth control could easily open wide 
the way for marital infidelity and the general lowering of moral standards; (2) that a man who 
grows accustomed to the use of contraceptive methods may forget the reverence due to a woman, 
and disregarding her emotional and physical equilibrium, reduce her merely to an instrument of 
his own desires while no longer considering her within a sacramental frame work as a partner 
who needs care and affection; and (3) that careful consideration is given to the danger of public 
authorities having legislative power over this matter as they care little for the precepts of the 
moral law. The Pontiff warns as to the limits of the control humanity has over itself, stating that 
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“….unless we are willing that the responsibility of procreating life should be left to the arbitrary 
decision of men, we must accept that there are certain limits, beyond which it is wrong to go, to 
the power of man over his own body and its natural functions—limits, let it be said, which no 
one, whether as a private individual or as a public authority, can lawfully exceed.”84  
Paul VI then turns to the concerns of the Church and reasons for publishing Humanae 
Vitae:  
It is to be anticipated that perhaps not everyone will easily accept this particular 
teaching. There is too much clamorous outcry against the voice of the Church, 
and this is intensified by modern means of communication. But it comes as no 
surprise to the Church that she, no less than her divine Founder, is destined to be a 
“sign of contradiction.” She does not, because of this, evade the duty imposed on 
her of proclaiming humbly but firmly the entire moral law, both natural and 
evangelical. 
Since the Church did not make either of these laws, she cannot be their 
arbiter—only their guardian and interpreter. It could never be right for her to 
declare lawful what is in fact unlawful, since that, by its very nature, is always 
opposed to the true good of man. 
In preserving intact the whole moral law of marriage, the Church is 
convinced that she is contributing to the creation of a truly human civilization. 
She urges man not to betray his personal responsibilities by putting all his faith in 
technical expedients. In this way she defends the dignity of husband and wife. 
This course of action shows that the Church, loyal to the example and teaching of 
the divine savior, is sincere and unselfish in her regard for men whom she strives 
to help even now during this earthly pilgrimage “to share God’s life as sons of the 
living God, the Father of all men.” 85 
 
  The encyclical concludes by issuing pastoral directives to the entire Church to recognize 
this encyclical as a “promulgation of the law of God Himself,” which requires from “men and 
women, from families and from the human family, a resolute purpose and great endurance” 
which makes periodic continence and self-discipline possible, and can create an atmosphere 
favorable to the growth of chastity so that true liberty may prevail over license and the norms of 
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the moral law may be fully safeguarded. The Pontiff then appeals to public authorities not to 
accede to legislation which introduces practices opposed to the natural law of God for marriage 
and family life. To scientists, Christian couples, doctors and nurses, family apostolates, the 
bishops of the Church, the pope called for a unified voice that condemns contraceptive culture 
and abortion and calls for a renewed respect for human life, marriage, and the education of 
offspring.  
As noted already, this encyclical and Paul VI met with public outcry and critique. Some 
bishops and a good number of theologians in Europe and America openly either tried to soften 
the perceived harshness of the encyclical or outright oppose it in public dissent. The critique of 
Humanae Vitae continues to this day, mostly along the same broad lines of argumentation. For 
example, Charles Curran’s critique of this encyclical offers the standard objections. His work 
points out the basic criticisms of Paul VI’s Humanae Vitae.86  
The first area of difficulty in the encyclical, Curran says, is the questionable appeal to 
natural law. Revisionists argue that there are weaknesses in the philosophical aspects of the 
natural law in the traditional manuals employed by Paul VI. They argue that Paul VI’s approach 
to and use of natural law accept a classicist worldview that does not make room for historical 
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consciousness, and accepts and absolutizes the physical aspect of the human act without 
consideration for the truly holistic person. In addition, the nature and finality of the sexual 
faculties are overly emphasized, whereas relationships and the person are not sufficiently taken 
into consideration. For Curran, historical consciousness gives pride of place to the human 
subject, who is a knower and an acting person, embedded in history and culture. The shift, 
therefore, is from the classicist method to the historical consciousness which is flexible and open 
to change and development. In Curran’s words, manualistic natural law employed deductive 
syllogism as its method, which “claims that the conclusion is just as certain as the premises, 
provided the logic is correct.”87 Herein, the end of the deductive and syllogistic method is 
certitude. On the other hand, historical consciousness applies an inductive method, which 
considers many aspects of any one particular act, thereby affecting the application of the old 
natural law argument. According to Curran, the old manuals assume a monolithic natural law 
theory which can be applied deductively across the board to moral problems. An insistence that 
the natural law is eternal, immutable, and unchanging and that its conclusions are always certain 
becomes a problem in itself because it contradicts the reality of Catholic teachings on specific 
moral questions, such as slavery, defendants’ right to silence, usury, and even the understanding 
of the ends of marriage in the ways it has currently been re-arranged. 
Curran takes up the issue of physicalism. Here Curran refers to “the a priori identification 
of the human moral act with the physical or biological aspect of the act…. In sexual ethics there 
exists an a priori identification of the physical structure with the moral aspect of the act.”88 
Curran argues that one of the main problems here is the traditional understanding of and reliance 
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on Aquinas and the use of “Ulpian’s” understanding of Natural Law Theory as that which nature 
teaches all animals and humans. Even though Aquinas distinguishes between the natural law of 
humans based on pure reason versus the natural law in animals, this anthropology ended up 
creating two layers in the human person: a bottom layer common to humans and animals alike 
and a top layer which is unique only to humans. Curran then questions, “Why should the 
physical structure of the marital act always be morally obliging? Why cannot human reason 
interfere with the physical structure of the act for a proportionate good?”89 In which case Curran 
takes the position that “[a] more personalist or relational anthropology does not absolutize 
finality of the faculty itself. The sexual faculty or power exists in light of the total person and the 
person’s relationships.”90 Therefore, and according to Curran, “for the good of the person or the 
good of the marriage, one can and should interfere with the sexual faculty or power.”91  
Two other equally difficult problems from Humanae Vitae’s use of Natural Law Theory 
must be noted—namely, the question of absolute moral norms and intrinsically evil acts. Even 
though revisionists are not opposed to absolute moral norms and acts that are intrinsically wrong, 
yet they argue that “actions that are described only in terms of the physical aspect or structure are 
neither necessarily always wrong nor intrinsically evil.”92 The revisionists defended their 
arguments based on their understanding of proportionalism, as represented mostly by the 
moderate proportionalism of Richard McCormick. According to Curran, McCormick 
“recognizes his own position as avoiding the two extremes of absolute deontology, as found in 
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the Catholic manualist tradition and in Germain Grisez, and absolute consequentialism, as 
identified with Joseph Fletcher and some utilitarians. His moderate teleology sees the role of 
consequences as necessary but not sufficient for determining the morality of actions.”93 
McCormick’s moderate proportionalism relies on three foundational assumptions. First, there 
must always be a proportionate reason to justify any moral act; one must not knowingly choose a 
wrong option. Second, the basic goods are themselves incommensurate, and third, there can be 
no establishment of a hierarchy or order among the basic goods.94 
Even though the encyclical Humanae Vitae continues to receive negative critique, a few 
voices see its value and support it. Mary Shivanandan, relying largely on John Paul II’s writings 
and support for the encyclical, posits among other positive remarks that even though the 
language of Humanae Vitae uses the term “human” rather than “personal” when referring to the 
conjugal act, the encyclical emphasizes a communion of being and an integral understanding of 
the person. This analysis develops the concept of love understood as a reciprocal gift of persons, 
understood from revelation and theology as an anthropology which is profoundly personalistic. 
She further clarifies that this anthropology of the person-subject within the principle of totality is 
a question of this specific man or woman who in their sexual nature have a common object, 
which is the body. She avers, “Only an integral vision of man can serve as a basis for ethics. 
When this is ignored, the body comes to be looked at exclusively in the somatic dimension to be 
manipulated technologically, as in the case of contraception.”95 She then traces a connection 
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between Humanae Vitae and Gaudium et Spes as well as John Paul II’s Wednesday catechesis 
which gave birth to his Theology of the Body. She surmised that in this encyclical, “[t]he integral 
vision of man … is a ‘vision of faith,’ which views man’s natural and supernatural destiny in the 
light of revelation. It penetrates the search for the truth about man himself.”96  
She sees the encyclical as a bold defense of the dignity and sacredness of human life, an appeal 
for responsibility in sexual relationships within marriage, especially in the face of contemporary 
problems of artificial birth control. She also sees Paul VI’s insistence on the competence of the 
magisterium to teach in the areas of Christian ideals of conjugal love as promoting responsible 
parenthood within an integral vision of the human person. She points out that the Pope 
recognizes also the responsibility of spouses in conscience to be able to determine the number of 
children they intend to have and their spacing. Within the purview of Paul VI, the encyclical 
Humanae Vitae gives directives as for what may be considered licit or illicit as means of 
regulating birth while also proposing pastoral directives to support human dignity and Christian 
values.  
In John Paul II’s Synodal exhortation, Familiaris Consortio (The Christian Family in the 
Modern World), promulgated on November 22, 1981, he develops the Church’s position on 
marriage as family life noting that this institution currently faces an attack from modernity which 
attempts to deform its nature and character. In the very opening lines of the document, JPII 
states, “The family in the modern world, as much as and perhaps more than any other institution, 
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has been beset by the many profound and rapid changes that have affected society and culture.”97 
He points to signs of a  
…disturbing degradation of some fundamental values; a mistaken theoretical 
concept of independence of spouses in relation to each other: serious 
misconceptions regarding the relationship of authority between parents and 
children; the concrete difficulties that the family itself experiences in the 
transmission of values; the growing number of divorces; the scourge of abortion; 
the evermore frequent recourse to sterilization; the appearance of a truly 
contraceptive mentality.98  
JPII points to the roots of these phenomena as “a corruption of the idea and the experience of 
freedom, conceived not as a capacity for realizing the truth of God’s plan for marriage and the 
family, but as an autonomous power of self-affirmation, often against others, for one’s selfish 
well-being.”99  
In an attempt to respond to these phenomena of which the pope speaks, the 1980 Synod 
of bishops, in line with previous episcopal synods, pointed out ways by which it could catechize 
and bring to full human and Christian maturity the Christian family. They claimed that an 
educated Christian community and family help people to discern justice, interpersonal 
relationships and their own individual vocations in life. For the Synodal fathers, the task ahead 
was to help humanity to recapture the ultimate meaning of life and its fundamental values. The 
bishops insist that  
[o]nly an awareness of the primacy of these values enables man to use the 
immense possibilities given him by science in such a way as to bring about the 
true advancement of the human person in his or her whole truth, in his or her 
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freedom and dignity. Science is called to ally itself with wisdom…. Modern 
culture must be led to a more profoundly restored covenant with divine Wisdom. 
Every man is given a share of such Wisdom through the creating action of God. 
And it is only in faithfulness to this covenant that the families of today will be in a 
position to influence positively the building of a more just and fraternal world.100  
Familiaris Consortio recalls the grounds by which God instituted marriage and family: 
God created human beings in His own image and likeness, bringing us into existence through 
love and calls us to love. For this reason, love is the fundamental and perennial vocation of every 
human person. This invitation to God’s love is expressed either in marriage or in a life of 
virginity or celibacy; in either instance, its proper form is an actuation of a most profound truth 
about humanity as created in the image of God and called to love. In the exhortation, JP II 
surmises,  
Consequently, sexuality, by means of which man and woman give themselves to 
one another through the acts which are proper and exclusive to spouses, is by no 
means something purely biological, but concerns the inner most being of the 
human person as such. It is realized in a truly human way only if it is an integral 
part of the love by which a man and a woman commit themselves totally to one 
another till death. The total physical self-giving would be a lie if it were not the 
sign and fruit of a total personal self-giving in which the whole person, including 
the temporal dimension, is present; if the person were to withhold something or 
reserve the possibility of deciding otherwise in the future, by this very fact he or 
she would not be giving totally.101  
JPII states that this kind of totality of self-giving in conjugal life demands responsible 
fertility which truly can be found only in marriage where spouses freely and reciprocally give of 
each other exclusively. This kind of self-giving according to JP II, is free and “far from being 
restricted by this fidelity, [the person] is secured against every form of subjectivism or relativism 
and is made a sharer in creative Wisdom.”102 The family’s mission and role in the world is to 
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represent its dynamic and existential nature as a community of life and love, which it must 
safeguard, reveal, and communicate to the world by being at the service of life, form a 
community of persons, participate in the integral development of society, and share in the life 
and mission of the Church.103  
This document focuses on the ideals of a truly Christian family life and marriage, at the 
same time re-stating the Church’s opposition to artificial birth control and abortion.104 The bulk 
of the exhortation is devoted to articulating the ideals of marriage as a sacrament, noble and 
indissoluble, the need for prayers and self-giving of spouses, and the education of offspring. The 
exhortation concludes by rejecting as illicit any other form of unions outside of what it has 
enumerated.105  
In John Paul II’s Veritatis Splendor (The Splendor of Truth), published August 6, 1993, 
the Pope approaches the foundations of Catholic moral teaching from a theological and 
philosophical standpoint. This encyclical is the official, most comprehensive and up-to-date 
teaching on moral theology in the Catholic tradition. It has an introduction, three chapters, and a 
conclusion. In the introduction, JPII states that his reason for writing the encyclical is to react 
against a crisis in fundamental moral theology. He notes that within the Christian community, the 
church is faced not only with dissent but also by “an overall and systematic calling into question 
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of traditional moral doctrine, on the basis of certain anthropological and ethical presuppositions. 
At the root of these presuppositions is the more or less obvious influence of currents of thought 
which end by detaching human freedom from its essential and constitutive relationship to 
truth.”106 In the post-conciliar Church, the pope declares his intention as “clearly setting forth 
certain aspects of doctrine which are of crucial importance in facing what is certainly a genuine 
crisis, since the difficulties which it engenders have most serious implications for the moral life 
of the faithful and for communion in the Church, as well as for a just and fraternal social life.”107 
To do justice to this issue, the pontiff proposes, “to set forth, with regard to the problems being 
discussed, the principles of moral teaching based on scripture and the living apostolic tradition, 
and at the same time to shed light on the presuppositions and consequences of the dissent which 
that teaching has met.”108 
This encyclical aims at establishing the relationship between Christian faith and morality, 
faith being what we believe in our hearts and morality being that which determines how, as 
influenced by faith, we make choices with our wills. JPII identifies the authenticity of Christian 
morality only if it is based on “Truth”—that is, on Christ who is the truth.109 
The three chapters of Veritatis Splendor present three themes under which JPII discusses 
the role of the Church in teaching authoritatively concerning morals. The first chapter bears the 
title “Teacher, what must I do?” and is an in-depth commentary on the question the rich young 
man asks Jesus in the Gospel of Matthew (19: 16-21). With this text, JP II emphasizes the 
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existential significance of the question, which is asked with a presupposition that there is a nexus 
between moral good and the ultimate destiny of every human being. JPII concludes that this 
question in itself is “a religious question… the goodness that attracts and at the same time 
obliges man has its source in God, and indeed is God himself.”110 Here JPII lays out the doctrinal 
position of the Church on some “fundamental questions regarding the Church’s moral teaching, 
issues being debated by ethicists and moral theologians, while responding also to erroneous 
views from principles of a moral teaching based upon scripture and tradition.”111 JPII argues that 
the answer to the young man’s question “can only be found by turning one’s mind and heart to 
the ‘One’ who is good…, [which] ultimately means to turn towards God, the fullness of 
goodness.”112 God has answered this question, the pope says, by creating human beings and 
ordering them with wisdom and love through a law inscribed in their hearts (Rom. 2:15), the 
“natural law” infused by God at creation, as a way of understanding what must be done and what 
must be avoided. In the history of the Israelites, God gave them the Decalogue, linking it to the 
new covenant revealed and communicated in Jesus. The Ten Commandments of God, given 
through Moses, are contrasted with the Sermon on the Mount, which JPII understands as making  
a close connection … between eternal life and obedience to God’s 
commandment… From the very lips of Jesus, the new Moses, man is once again 
given the commandments of the Decalogue…. The commandments are linked to a 
promise. In the Old Covenant the object of the promise was the possession of a 
land…. (cf. Deut. 6:20-25). In the New Covenant the object of the promise is the 
“kingdom of Heaven.”113 
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JPII expatiates further that the commandments of the Decalogue are rooted in the commandment 
expressing “the singular dignity of the human person”:  
The different commandments of the Decalogue are really only so many 
reflections on the one commandment about the good of the person, at the level of 
the many different goods which characterize his identity as a spiritual and bodily 
being in relationship with God, with his neighbor, and with the material world… 
The commandments of which Jesus reminds the young man are meant to 
safeguard the good of the person, the image of God, by protecting his goods.114  
The precepts of the Decalogue couched in the negative form, “thou shall not,” express the 
need always to safeguard human goods and values. Here again, the pope re-enunciates the entire 
Catholic moral tradition. JPII will return again and again to this crucially important point in this 
encyclical, especially while discussing intrinsically evil acts, asserting that if there were no 
absolute moral norms excluding intrinsically evil acts, the human person would have no truly 
inviolable rights. In the Sermon on the Mount, Jesus extends and re-interprets the law and the 
prophets by bringing out their fullest meaning (cf. Mt. 5:17): that certain specific kinds of human 
behavior are incompatible with the Christian way of life. Furthermore, Christ has handed 
authority to his disciples and their successors to interpret “authentically” the word of God either 
in written form or in transmission by tradition, which is also known as the Church’s living 
tradition.115  
The second chapter is titled “Do not be conformed to this world.” Its main theme is that 
there is no absolute conflict between human freedom of choice and the moral law because the 
moral law, which has God as its author, does not contain an arbitrary legalism designed to 
impinge on human freedom. Rather, moral laws contain truths meant to help people in making 
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morally sound choices. JPII’s focus was to articulate a proper understanding of the nature of true 
autonomy proper to human beings as against moral theories that uphold human freedom with 
subjectivistic notions that human beings determine the moral order.116 In line with Augustine, 
Aquinas, and Vatican II, in articles #38-45, JPII insists that “the moral law has its origin in God 
and always finds its source in him… by virtue of natural reason, which derives from divine 
wisdom; it is a properly human law.”117 In reaction to Catholic theologians who criticize the 
traditional conception of the natural law as “physicalistic” and “biologistic,” the pope argues that 
this sort of position “does not correspond to the truth about man and his freedom.”118 In article # 
53, JPII repudiates as relativistic the view that because of human historicity, moral norms are not 
immutable but change under every varying historical and cultural situation. JPII opines that this 
is incompatible with Christ’s teaching and the idea of the immutability of revealed truths. 
JPII then offers a brief reflection on “conscience and truth.” For him, conscience is not a 
decision on how to act or not act in a given situation, it is a practical judgement “which makes 
known what one must do or not do, the proximate norm of personal morality, the capacity to 
disclose the truth about moral good and evil, the truth indicated by divine law, the universal and 
objective norm of morality.”119 The pope opposes those who attempt to make “pastoral 
solutions” on the norm of an individual conscience in its process of making a moral judgment, to 
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justify a hermeneutic in which the conscience is in no way compromised in every case, by any 
kind of negative precept.120 Contrary to this position, the pope asserts that the conscience is not a 
“creative” decision but rather a judgment drawn from moral truth.121  
Concerning the relationship between free choices of specific kinds of acts and the 
fundamental option to choose for or against God, for or against truth, these are choices that 
determine the person and shapes the individual’s entire moral life. While condemning a theology 
that seeks to separate the person from an act, he affirms that, “to separate the fundamental option 
from concrete kinds of behavior means to contradict the substantial integrity or personal unity of 
the moral agent in his body and in his soul.”122 He goes on to state that the choice of freedom 
acknowledged in Christianity as fundamental moral choice-making is “the decision of faith, of 
the obedience of faith (Rom. 16:26)…by which man makes a total and free self-commitment to 
God, offering the full submission of intellect and will to God as he reveals.”123 The pope points 
out that “the morality of the human act depends primarily and fundamentally on the ‘object’ 
rationally chosen by the deliberate will.”124 We do know that “there are objects of the human act 
which are by their nature ‘incapable of being ordered’ to God because they radically contradict 
the good of the person made in his image.”125 He then concludes this section by repudiating 
consequentialism and proportionalism as flawed moral theories which are opposed to divine 
revelation and magisterial authority. 
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  In the third and final chapter, titled “Lest the cross of Christ be emptied of its power,” the 
pope lays out a catechesis for returning to Jesus and His Gospel in order to live by and hand on 
the moral truths taught by the Church as a moral teacher. This responsibility is more for teachers 
and priests, and especially for bishops, to whom the encyclical is specifically addressed. In this 
section, JPII insists that true human freedom is possible only when it is linked to Christ, who is 
truth revealed, and to the truth that Christ reveals in the “law” written naturally in the human 
mind. In the relationship between human freedom and truth, he states that “the crucified Christ 
reveals the authentic meaning of freedom; he lives it fully in the total gift of himself and calls his 
disciples to share in his freedom.”126 JPII insists that the intimate, inseparable unity of faith and 
morality is one acute pastoral concern in the face of contemporary growing secularism, where 
faith is separated from morality. He calls for a rediscovery of the authentic reality of the true 
Christian faith, which cannot be reduced to a set of mere propositions accepted intellectually but 
the newness of faith, which has the power to judge and can prevail in all cultures.  
Authentic faith according to JPII, possesses a moral content, which calls for a 
commitment to observing the commandments of God, a faith which must bear fruit in works of 
“charity and of the authentic freedom which is manifested and lived in the gift of self even to the 
total gift of self, like that of Jesus.”127 In concluding this third section, JPII, refuting those who 
raise the objection that the Church is too rigorous and unrealistic when it insists on absolute 
moral norms prohibiting intrinsically evil acts, JPII responds that there is an absolute need for 
God’s grace to live a morally upright life. Alluding to the witness of martyrs, he states further, 
“The unacceptability of ‘teleologism,’ ‘consequentialism,’ and ‘proportionalist’ ethical theories, 
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which deny the existence of negative moral norms regarding specific kinds of behavior, norms 
which are valid without exception, is confirmed in a particularly eloquent way by Christian 
martyrdom.”128  
Addressing the socio-economic and political realms, JPII illustrates and expounds further 
in these words: 
These norms in fact represent the unshakeable foundation and solid guarantee of a 
just and peaceful human coexistence, and hence of genuine democracy which can 
come into being and develop only on the basis of the equality of all its members, 
who possess common rights and duties. When it is a matter of the moral norms 
prohibiting intrinsic evil, there are no privileges or exceptions for anyone.129  
Two short sections in Chapter 3 are devoted to addressing pastors, theologians, and 
bishops of the Church, urging them to recognize their “grave duty” to instruct the faithful about 
the commandments and practical authoritative norms declared by the Church. The theologians 
are called to develop a better articulation of the Church teachings by “expounding the validity 
and obligatory nature of the precepts it proposes, demonstrating their connection with one 
another and their relation to man’s ultimate end.”130 He condemned “dissent,” which he sees as a 
form of carefully orchestrated protests and polemics carried on in the media… 
opposed to ecclesial communion and to a correct understanding of the hierarchical 
constitution of the people of God…. The Church’s pastors have the duty to act in 
conformity with their apostolic mission, insisting that the right of the faithful to 
receive Catholic doctrine in its purity and integrity must be respected.131 
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Finally in this encyclical, John Paul II argues that the content of divine revelation 
contains “a specific and determined moral content, universally valid and permanent,”132 which 
the Church’s magisterium has competence to interpret and teach. He argues that the faith at the 
turn of the third millennium faces “ a crisis of truth”133 which, according to him, has the most 
serious implications for the people’s moral lives, for the Church, and for a just and fraternal 
social life. The focus of John Paul II in Veritatis Splendor was particularly on the dignity of the 
human person from conception to natural death. Using scriptures copiously, referencing Aquinas 
and Augustine, he argues his position on the basis of the natural moral law.134 
Charles Curran’s critique of JPII’s Veritatis Splendor is of primary theological 
significance. He acknowledges JPII’s insistence and emphasis on the primacy of Christ as “the 
truth” in considering human morality. However, Curran disagrees with him because JPII, in his 
encyclical, does not develop human sources of truth but actually excludes them. According to 
Curran, “one might explain the tension or the inconsistency about common human sources of 
truth….but still one would expect documents coming from the Catholic tradition to explicitly 
recognize and develop both faith and reason as sources of truth….”135 Curran continues further 
to say that JPII in Veritatis Splendor seem to fail to recognize truth as an analogous concept but 
persistently uses truth in the univocal sense. For Curran, there necessarily exists a significant 
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difference between truths and faith regarding existential questions. In addition, because there is 
significant differentiation between specific truths of moral questions and truths about the 
ultimate meaning of human existence, Curran states “Catholic tradition has often used casuistry 
as a way of trying to deal with specific moral issues, thus showing how important it is to 
consider all the details of the situation.”136 Curran cites also what he calls “the age old 
epistemological problem—what is truth and how do we know truth?”137 For Curran, JPII 
approaches this question from a classicist notion of truth: that it exists and is knowable by all.  
Curran also disagrees with JPII’s exegetical work in Veritatis Splendor, stating that while 
the encyclical relies heavily on scriptures to defend its thesis, it distorts them.138 In the story of 
the rich young man in Matthew 19 that JPII uses to start the encyclical, Curran argues that it is 
misapplied because the story deals with riches, not with a universal call to Christians to obey 
precepts from the Old Testament. Curran further argues that JPII distorts the true meaning of 
Christian morality as it is found in scripture by insisting on obedience to commandments. For 
Curran, morality as portrayed in the scriptures is more than this; he asserts that “morality 
involves a change of heart, conversion, response to the loving God, and the virtues, attitudes, and 
dispositions that characterize the Christian person.”139 Curran also disagrees with the pope’s use 
of scripture in an attempt to ground his philosophical and ethical concepts, especially because 
these were unknown in biblical times. Curran asserts, “Veritatis Splendor explicitly uses 
scripture to support the notion of intrinsic evil proposed by the contemporary hierarchical 
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magisterium in its arguments against proportionalism and consequentialism. But scripture does 
not know any of these concepts.”140 He also critiqued JPII’s appropriation of the text of 
Ephesians 5:21-33. Curran argues that this text represents households as they were structured in 
biblical times. However, JPII uses this text in an attempt to ground equality in mutual subjection 
out of respect for Christ. For Curran, “such an interpretation seems to go against the very words 
used by the biblical author.”141  
Gilbert Meilaender wrote an essay that addresses Veritatis Splendor from what he called 
a “Reformation perspective.” To explore this dimension, he appropriates Karl Barth’s142 
explanation of the story of the rich young ruler in contrast to the way JPII explicates this text. 
Meilaender argues that the question under investigation played a significant role in the history of 
the split of the Western church in the Middle Ages. Meilaender opines that JPII seems to 
translate the rich young man’s story to mean that the performance of good acts and adherence to 
the Decalogue constitutes the indispensable condition and path to everlasting life. He claims that 
JPII’s perspective could be admissible as a description of one way towards fellowship with God 
and not simply a condition of it. From a Reformation perspective, therefore, “the language of 
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142 Karl Barth’s exegesis explains the story of the rich young man as coming into the “sphere” of Jesus where all are 
invited either in obedience or disobedience. The directive of Jesus to the rich young man to go and sell, give and 
come follow him brought a new awareness to the disciples who had done this but now understand the lure of riches 
and what they had given up; here, according to Barth’s explanation in Meilaender’s essay, “the apostles themselves 
stand on the edge of the abyss of disobedience.” Here, then, we find what he considers the distinguishing contrast to 
JPII’s exegesis: “With no clear distinction remaining between the obedient and the disobedient, with both constantly 
standing on the edge of an abyss they cannot cross, Jesus can only be the one who is for both.” Structurally 
therefore, Barth’s exposition focuses not just on the rich young mans as JPII does, but also on the disciples, the 
obedient and the disobedient. Gilbert Meilaender, “Veritatis Splendor: Reopening Some Questions of the 
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‘conditions’ in these contexts risks undercutting the centrality of grace in the journey towards 
God.”143 According to Meilaender, JPII’s exegesis seems to offer the power of grace apart from 
pardon, a grace that seems not to accept human weakness and sinfulness. In this case, there is a 
rejection of the Reformation understanding of faith as fiducia where going to Christ even in sin 
makes one right with God. He summarizes his critique of Veritatis Splendor by acknowledging 
that it speaks a theological language of Christian ethics which keeps the language of faith in the 
vision of the reformation alive and makes possible a conversation born of current theological 
existence. He concludes his essay by stating, 
Against that emphasis on the soul-making power of deeds, spoken entirely alone, 
spoken apart from an unconditional promise of acceptance to the disobedient in 
their disobedience, the reformers—whether correctly discerning the nature of late 
medieval Catholicism or not—spoke a message not just of sola gratia but of sola 
fide. If Veritatis Splendor grasps—albeit a bit haltingly in places—the importance 
of sola gratia, it fails to enunciate clearly the sola fide. It is necessary, therefore, 
to reassert against its pattern of thought the centrality of the language of faith for 
Christian life.144  
In Evangelium Vitae (The Gospel of Life), promulgated November 25, 1995, John Paul 
II insists on the traditional Catholic position concerning the value of human life and its 
inviolability: “The gospel of life is at the heart of Jesus’ message…. It is to be preached with 
dauntless fidelity as “good news” to the people of every age and culture.”145 This encyclical is 
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145 John Paul II, Evangelium Vitae [The Gospel of Life] (Vatican City: Liberia Editrice Vaticana, 1995), #1. This 
point is made further in article #2 thus: “Man is called to a fullness of life which far exceeds the dimensions of his 
earthly existence, because it consists in sharing the very life of God. The loftiness of this supernatural vocation 
reveals the greatness and the inestimable value of human life even in its temporal phase…. It remains a sacred 
reality entrusted to us, to be preserved with a sense of responsibility and brought to perfection in love and in the gift 
of ourselves to God and to our brothers and sisters…. Every person sincerely open to truth and goodness can, by the 
light of reason and the hidden action of grace, come to recognize in the natural law written in the heart (cf. Rom. 
2:14-15) the sacred value of human being to have this primary good respected to the highest degree. Upon the 
recognition of this right, every human community and the political community itself are founded… believers in 
Christ must defend and promote this right…. This saving event [the incarnation] reveals to humanity… the 
incomparable value of every human life.” 
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unique because it is given as part of the aftermath of a special consistory of cardinals held in 
Rome between April 4 and 7, 1991, and in collegial consultation with bishops from all around 
the world. This collegial act on the part of JPII gives this encyclical a greater force in the unified 
voice of the Church’s hierarchy and magisterial authority.146 
In the first part of this encyclical, JPII refers to and explicates various biblical texts to 
support the biblical injunction against the taking of human life. He uses these texts to affirm the 
injustices of abortion, euthanasia, and the death penalty. He argues that this teaching is “based on 
the natural law, upon the written word of God and transmitted by the Church’s tradition as taught 
by the ordinary and universal magisterium.”147 The encyclical touches on capital punishment; 
ecological concerns; society and its contemporary wish to improve efficiency and productivity 
over family life and human life values; the tendency to see the sick, the weak, and the poor as 
expendables; and “the education of teenagers in the proper understanding of sex.”148 He also 
calls on the mass media to be serious and responsible in how they present the positive values of 
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sexuality and human love, insisting on “a scrupulous concern for factual truth… to combine 
freedom of information with respect for every person and a profound sense of humanity.”149  
The encyclical focuses on the gift of human life as a sharing in the divine life of God and 
on the necessity of holding human life sacred, especially that of the weak, the defenseless, and 
the unborn.150 The encyclical calls attention to “scientific and systematic threats” against life, 
asking that everyone respect, love, protect and serve every human life because the “value at stake 
is one which every human being can understand by the light of reason” 151 and is “written in the 
heart of every man and woman.”152  
Abortion, the killing of innocent human life, and euthanasia are central to the entire text 
while an explanation of the Christian message, a new culture of life, and the biblical injunction 
“Thou shalt not kill” are presented as panaceas for the present day culture of death and threats to 
human life. John Paul II asserts that humanity needs to return to building a civilization at the 
service of life, a duty binding on the Church and on all sectors of society. Evangelium Vitae 
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issues a vigorous challenge to the various political systems around the world to the inviolability 
of human life, the grave moral evil of euthanasia and abortion.153  
Evangelium Vitae is a follow up to Veritatis Splendor in its use of biblical sources, its 
resorting to the natural law argument and strong condemnation of direct killing, direct abortion, 
and euthanasia; thus, one clearly sees a hermeneutic of continuity. JPII recognizes that in the 
widely diversified and pluralistic society common to most modern societies, an appeal to natural 
law is the only possible route to getting civil laws enacted which will not endorse abortion, 
euthanasia, or any other unjust taking of human life.  
In critiquing Evangelium Vitae, Curran presents the encyclical as a flash point of tension 
and inconsistency. He opines that “the pope insists on the tectonic struggle between truth and 
error, between the culture of life and the culture of death. But the encyclical then claims that its 
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… in the democratic culture of our time, it is commonly held that the legal system of any society should limit itself 
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teachings opposing direct killing, direct abortion, and euthanasia are based on natural law with 
its emphasis on human reason common to all.”154 Curran claims that the references to the Natural 
Law Theory are similar all through the text with no proof to how JPII develops to any depth this 
argument. As in all other JPII’s doctrinal encyclicals, he relies heavily on scripture with constant 
references to both the Old and New Testaments. Curran states “the frequent headings and 
subheadings in the text invariably contain a scriptural citation together with a short description of 
the matter to be treated…. The scripture citations are often proof texts used to affirm a particular 
point that is not all that clearly present in the original scriptural text.”155 According to Curran, 
from the perspective of theological method, JPII employs a consistent Christology from above. 
Depending mostly on Johannine writings, the pope provides nine citations in order to ground his 
argument that life originates from the being of the Father. 
Additionally, Curran critiques the eschatology of Evangelium Vitae as not being 
consistent with the eschatology in JPII’s other encyclicals. Curran thinks that JPII’s eschatology 
in Evangelium Vitae completely lacks the basic transformationalist motif common to his earlier 
works. Curran surmises that JPII spends too much time, fourteen paragraphs, dealing with the 
negative factors that spawn the culture of death, and then assigns two paragraphs to presenting 
the positive signs in support of the culture of life. Therefore, it seems, “the pope has allowed his 
rhetoric and his concentration on two controversial issues to replace the eschatology that has 
consistently developed elsewhere.”156  
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On the question of the viability of the fetus in its mother’s womb, Curran asserts that 
until the twentieth century, which constitutes very recent history in the Church, delayed 
animation was the popular theological position and leaning, to which JPII makes no allusion. 
Curran points to two questions when it comes to the viability of the embryo and its abortion: 
first, that concerning the status of the embryo-fetus after conception and, second, the resolution 
of conflict. Within this question, he believes, there is the need to understand the idea of direct 
and indirect actions, which the encyclical did not clarify. For instance, direct abortion by the very 
nature of the act or the intention of the agent aims at killing the fetus either as a means or as an 
end. Curran argues that “as in the question of killing, direct abortion is always wrong, but 
indirect abortion (killing) maybe permitted.”157 
Curran’s critique then engages one of the dynamic and dialectical developments in 
Catholic moral theology within the last century. Curran argues, 
Note that here again the problem of physicalism occurs—the moral concept of 
directness is based on the physical structure or causality of the act. Catholic 
theologians who accept the theory of proportionalism maintain that direct killing 
understood as the physical causality of the act is not necessarily always morally 
wrong. The “direct—indirect” solution to conflict situations is based on one 
philosophical approach (the twentieth century neoscholastic) that is not accepted 
even by all Catholic theologians. Because the teaching that direct abortion is 
always wrong is not as certain as John Paul II implies, he definitely goes too far in 
quoting from Paul VI “that this tradition is unchanged and unchanging.”158 
Curran goes on to critique Evangelium Vitae on what he sees as JPII’s unequal treatment 
of an identical issue. Concerning abortion, JPII pays compassionate attention to the 
circumstances that force women at times to seek abortion to protect their health or to protect the 
living standards of their family. However, in the case of suicide, Curran argues that JPII insists 
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that suicide is always as morally objectionable as murder, though the pope acknowledges there 
may be circumstances in which a difficult life situation influences a person to commit suicide, 
thereby “lessening or removing subjective responsibility.”159 Curran says when the pontiff then 
speaks about abortion, he never mentions the possibility of “lessening or removing subjective 
responsibility.”160  
On euthanasia, Curran argues again that the pope does not do enough to ground his 
argument. Curran states, “Condemnation rests on the definition of direct killing as an act that by 
the intention of the agent or the nature of the act aims at death either as a means or an end, as 
distinguished from indirect killing.”161 The difference therefore in Curran’s thinking between 
euthanasia and indirect but permissible killing in the pope’s presentation is not based on scripture 
or even the incomparable value of human life but purely on JPII’s philosophical understanding of 
the difference between acts of omission and acts of commission. Curran submits that “specific 
teachings condemning direct killing, direct abortion, euthanasia, and suicide simply repeat what 
has been frequently proposed by the papal magisterium in the past.”162 However, he agrees that 
JPII’s treatment of capital punishment in this encyclical is “definitely new and different” wherein 
the pope clarifies that “punishment exists to redress the violation of personal and social rights, to 
defend public order, to ensure people’s safety and to furnish rehabilitation of criminals. To 
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achieve this purpose, the extreme case of capital punishment can be justified only in cases of 
absolute necessity.”163  
On JPII’s use of magisterial tradition, Curran states that it is in this encyclical that JPII 
cites sources from tradition more than in any other encyclical. Curran alludes to the third chapter 
of the encyclical wherein Gregory of Nyssa, John Damascene, the Didache, the letter of Pseudo-
Barnabas, Augustine, Aquinas, and Alphonsus Ligouri are all cited. Also, JPII frequently had 
recourse to previous papal teachings, documents of Vatican II, and the Catechism of the Catholic 
Church.  
Summary  
This entire chapter has been devoted to studying the encyclical tradition that deals with 
sexual ethics, marriage, the dignity of human life (especially the unborn) and the related ethical 
questions from a contemporary perspective. The overriding aim is to situate material from these 
encyclicals in order to demonstrate a development in the Church’s doctrinal tradition. Vitaliano 
Gorospe164 in a journal essay situates this type of development within four periods in history: the 
first is between 50 and 450 AD, at which point the view of Clement of Alexandria held sway, 
that within marital intercourse, procreation must be the one and only intention of the spouses. In 
the second period, from 450 to 1450 AD, St. Augustine’s view that the only justification for 
sexual intercourse is for procreation and controlling of concupiscence was prevalent. This view 
was held by the Church for over a thousand years. According to Gorospe, the third period 1450-
1750 marked a period of both innovation and preservation of the Church’s teaching, relying 
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heavily on Augustine’s anti-Manichean position and the Church’s ruling against contraception. 
The fourth period, situated between 1750-1965, marked the beginning of a slow shift in Pius 
VI’s Casti Connubii where for the first time in the known history of Christian doctrine, the 
Church acknowledged and stated that marital sexual intercourse has several purposes: first and 
most important, that sexual intercourse between spouses is to foster love and their marital unity 
and then for the rearing of offspring. This position was reiterated by the second Vatican Council 
and has marked current magisterial position as can be seen in many doctrinal documents of 
contemporary times.  
That there is development in doctrine is therefore true, no matter how slowly the wheels 
of change may turn. In Gorospe’s view, moral rules are always a response to practical questions 
and that always, in different cultures and times “[t]he Church will be developing traditional 
values, while changing old norms.”165  
Theodore Mackin’s work is helpful in understanding the timeline of how specifically 
each of these encyclical builds on the previous to establish development in doctrine and the idea 
of the Church coming to a better understanding while growing with the signs of the times. He 
asserts that in the nineteenth century, even though the magisterial position on marriage and 
relevant questions surrounding it were doctrinal, they were yet largely apologetic. They were 
written and published to combat secularist claims that marriage is merely a social institution with 
no sacramental or divine dimension. This idea, for example, is the focus of Leo XIII’s 1880 
Arcanum Divinae Sapientiae. Then in the twentieth century, the first major document that 
followed up Arcanum was Pius XI’s Casti Connubii in 1930, which was a response to the 
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massive moral disillusionment in Europe after the First World War. Pius XI extended the 
understanding of Christian marriage by establishing that men and women create their own 
marriages by making of themselves a self-donation one to the other. This self-donation in love 
takes on a greater meaning because the spouses minister the sacrament to one another. According 
to Mackin, Pius XI in his encyclical “brought the human and the divine elements in the 
sacrament closer together than any of his predecessors had ever done.”166 Within this history, 
even though mentioned briefly in this text, the Fathers of the Second Vatican Council, in their 
Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, innovated by stating further that 
spousal self-gift is a covenant, a primary sanctifying of grace which binds the spouses to one 
another and to God. They also moved away from the claim that procreation and nurture are the 
primary ends of marriage. Children are therefore the natural fruits of a fecund love in a 
sacramental union. 
Paul VI in Humanae Vitae, responding to the question of contraception insisted that 
marital love must be fruitful because “God who awakens and animates it in the spouses does so 
with his own essentially fruitful love.”167 Therefore, any form of artificial contraception before, 
during or after the conjugal act is sinful. Following the 1980 synod of bishops on the family, 
John Paul II published his apostolic exhortation Familiaris Consortio, which is unique because 
he takes into cognizance the experiences and understanding of couples who are already living the 
sacramental life of marriage as essential for building a new vision of the theology of marriage. 
Following the teaching of Paul VI, the exhortation states that “[b]ecause God is essentially an act 
of love… [t]his same creative love has produced the human race and draws human beings 
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together…. This condition is realized most vividly in marriage, because in order to be creative, 
human love, because it is embodied, must be sexual… The marital sacrament in its fullest 
expression and in its primary meaning is life in family.”168 In Mackin’s opinion, the revision 
most relevant for this period is the identification of the spouses’ exchange of covenantal 
commitment by which they create their own marriage, the personal exchange of the gift of the 
self, one to the other. We find supporting documents in Veritatis Splendor, where moral theology 
challenges the “crisis of truth” which endangers the moral life and fraternal social co-existence. 
Evangelium Vitae then reiterates the values of human life, establishing the Church’s position on 
abortion and euthanasia in a response to the modern day culture of death. 
Conclusion  
The strength and true genius of the Catholic Church remains in its ability to stand against 
the tides of time and perceived popular opinions, to uphold as the truth what Christ teaches and is 
upheld by apostolic tradition, such as rights and duties, liberty, law, truth and freedom with a 
basis in objective truth as revealed at different epochs of the Church’s history. According to 
Anthony Lusvardi, the Church is committed to this stance because “[a] threat to the moral law is 
a threat to freedom…. John Paul offered a spirited defense of both of these commitments—to 
freedom and to truth—in Veritatis Splendor.”169 Perhaps in the pursuit of this objective, any 
change that is needed for doctrine to develop and to answer modern questions happens very 
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slowly so that the Church is able to listen to the Holy Spirit and so that her doctrines may remain 
one and the same with the gospel of Jesus Christ, truly offering freedom and truth.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
JOHN PAUL II’S THEOLOGY OF THE BODY: AN OVERVIEW 
In the previous chapter, I reviewed the encyclical tradition in an attempt to gain an 
understanding of the historical and theological development of doctrine via papal encyclicals.  
We turn now to John Paul II’s Theology of the Body, which represents the contemporary and 
standard position of the Catholic Church on the question of human sexuality, presenting human 
beings as embodied persons living within the matrimonial covenant.  This chapter will focus on 
how John Paul II’s Theology of the Body affects and contributes to our understanding of what is 
essentially doctrinal in the marriage between a man and his wife, their sexuality as married 
persons, and some of the hermeneutical underpinnings of how John Paul arrived at and presents 
this teaching to the Church and society.   
The Theology of the Body (TOB), as JPII envisioned it and presented it to the Church, is 
regarded by many as a tour de force in contemporary Catholic philosophical and theological 
thinking on the question of human sexuality.  The original texts of TOB are 129 papal general 
audiences and catechesis held between September 5, 1979 and November 28, 1984.  JPII used 
the tradition of the Fathers as his foundation but only as a source of departure as he avoids past 
suspicion of the body to create a new way of looking at the body: it is “a sign and instrument of 
the same message of our salvation in Christ…human embodiment and the call of man and 
woman to unite in ‘one flesh’ signifies and foreshadows the mystery of Christ (see Eph. 5:31-
32).”170  JPII approaches TOB’s catechesis in the first part of his work as a question of 
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embodiment, male and female, as a basis for his theological anthropology.171  In the second part, 
JPII addresses how humanity can successfully live out the truths about itself.  In this work, he 
describes the human body as the locus of a pre-eminent and primordial sign of a reality which is 
not merely a biological organism, but also a locus of a spiritual and divine mystery.172 
Michael Waldstein opines that the greatness of JPII’s TOB is in  
… his concern for spousal love in the larger context of his concern about our age, 
above all for the question of scientific knowledge and power over nature, that is, 
the characteristically modern question of “progress”….  John Paul II sees…the 
quest for freedom, with “owning and controlling” one’s own body… he sees such 
individual autonomy (which is the only freedom [Margaret] Sanger speaks about, 
exactly like Descartes and Kant) as standing in the service of a still greater kind of 
freedom, ‘the freedom of the gift.’173   
 
Mary Shivanandan pursues the same line of thinking when she argues that there is a 
conflict of ideas between modern civilization and the Catholic sexual ethics tradition which JPII 
represents.  For her, JPII’s central focus on the person and family as argued in Humanae Vitae 
and as JPII clarifies in his 1991 “Letter to the Families” is to show “how the family is placed at 
the center of the great struggle between good and evil, between life and death, between love and 
all that is opposed to love.”174  Referencing JPII’s work, she states,  
                                                          
171 “Hence, John Paul’s Theology of the Body is much more than a reflection on sex and married love.  Through the 
lens of marriage and the ‘one flesh’ union of spouses the Pope says we rediscover ‘the meaning of the whole of 
existence, the meaning of life.’ (Oct. 29, 1980)  Christ teaches that the meaning of life is to love as he loves (Jn. 
15:12) One of the Pope’s main insights is that God inscribed this vocation to love as he loves in our bodies by 
creating us male and female and calling us to become ‘one flesh’ (Gen. 2:24).” Christopher West, Theology of the 
Body for Beginners: A Basic Introduction to Pope John Paul II’s Sexual Revolution (West Chester, Pennsylvania: 
Ascension Press, 2004), 2. 
 
172 Christopher West clarifies this point further by stating, “Christ’s mission is to restore the order of love in a world 
seriously distorted by sin.  And the union of the sexes, as always, lies at the basis of the human ‘order of love.’”  
Therefore, what we learn in the Pope’s theology of the body is obviously “important in regard to marriage and the 
vocation of husbands and wives.”  However it “is equally essential and valid for the understanding of man in 
general.”  Ibid., 2.  
 
173 John Paul II, Man and Woman He Created Them: A Theology of the Body (Boston: Pauline Books & Media, 
2010), xxiii. 
 
174 Mary Shivanandan, Crossing the Threshold of Love: A New Vision of Marriage in the Light of John Paul II’s 
Anthropology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark Ltd, 1999), 117. 
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Only if the truth about freedom and the communion of persons in marriage “can 
regain its splendor” can the “civilization of love,” which is the essence of culture, 
replace the “civilization of use.”  Contemporary society has elevated scientific 
and technological progress in a one-sided way that results in a utilitarian approach 
to the person.  In such a society the “woman can become an object for man, 
children a hindrance to parents, the family an institution obstructing the freedom 
of its members.”175   
 
The TOB of JPII responds to this modernist interpretation of the ontological reality of 
what it means to be embodied and the integrality of human sexuality. 
JPII’s purpose in the catechesis was to provide a modern conceptual frame work to re-
articulate and present a hermeneutic of continuity which, rather than merely defending the 
spousal meaning of the human body in its gender differentiation, responds to the questions about 
the person in contemporary times; who are we, why are we here, what does it mean to be 
enfleshed, why are we male or female, etc.?  These questions were pursued as an integral vision 
of the human person in Humanae Vitae, where Paul VI locates this integrality in the two 
inseparable meanings of the conjugal act, the unitive and the procreative.  As a follow-up, the 
over-arching aim of JPII in TOB is to develop further the spousal meaning of the body in the 
teachings of Jesus, who went back to the beginning.176  This he approaches in three ways: first, 
he addresses God’s original plan from the very beginning, in the present struggle against 
concupiscence, and in the hope for future fulfilment at the resurrection.  Second, he studies the 
spousal meaning through the sacrament of love and the language this love speaks as an effective 
sign of this sacrament.  Third, he shows conclusively that just like Humanae Vitae, TOB is 
                                                          
175 Ibid., 117. 
 
176 Going back to “the beginning” is essential to understanding the entire Catholic doctrine on marriage and the 
insistence that marriage will always be located within the gender differentiation of a man and a woman.  In Jesus’ 
teaching, going back to the intention of the creator clarifies and leaves no doubt that any cultural or popular sub 
culture cannot distort the intentions of the creator from the very beginning. 
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asking modern minds to re-read the language of the body in its freedom, consisting mainly of 
love, which gives of its own freedom to the other, truthfully.177    
JP II’s work is divided into two broad parts with sub-sections in which he thematically 
sets out a map for a new way to understand the human body, its sexuality, marriage, and the 
human person’s being in God.  JPII invites his readers to see in the incarnation of Christ and his 
body on the cross the meaning of the gospel, of being in the body of Christ as the justification for 
a “theology of the body.”178  From the original “nakedness” of Adam and Eve, the incarnated 
Christ reveals himself to humanity.  According to JPII, the body represents the original “sign” of 
God’s own mystery whereby what is visible makes known the invisible.179  In this way, he links 
anthropology and theology in an organic manner.  He introduces the analogy of spousal love to 
elucidate divine mystery.  According to Christopher West, this “nuptial mystery provides a lens 
through which we view and penetrate the most important theological and anthropological truths 
of faith.”180  West clarifies further, “We can see the fundamental importance of the nuptial 
                                                          
177 Michael Waldstein summarizes this position thus: “There is a main argument that runs through TOB.  It is 
enriched by many subthemes, but it is in itself clear and simple.  What is at stake in the teaching of Humanae Vitae 
about the inseparability of the unitive and procreative meaning of the conjugal act is nothing else than ‘rereading [it] 
the “language of the body” in truth’ (TOB 118:6).  John Paul II developed the concept ‘language of the body’ and 
‘rereading [it] it in truth’ in the section of the sacrament in the dimension of sign (TOB 103-16).  The whole 
argument preceding TOB 103 can be understood as providing the foundation on which the concept of ‘rereading the 
“language of the body” in the truth’ can be understood.   The key concept in this foundation is ‘the spousal meaning 
of the body.’ It is this meaning that is reread in the truth when man and woman engage in authentic sexual 
intercourse.”  From Waldstein’s introduction to John Paul II, Man and Woman, 120.   
 
178 West, reflecting on this point, argues thus: “When it comes to religion, people are used to an emphasis on the 
spiritual realm.  However, many people are unfamiliar, and sometimes even uncomfortable, with an emphasis on the 
body.  For John Paul II, this is a false divide.  Spirit certainly has priority over matter.  Yet the Catechism of the 
Catholic Church teaches that ‘[a]s a being at once body and spirit, man expresses and perceives spiritual realities 
through physical signs and symbols’….  Many think Christian teaching considers their spirits to be ‘good’ and their 
bodies to be ‘bad.’  Such thinking couldn’t be further from an authentic Christian perspective!  The idea that the 
human body is ‘bad’ is actually a heresy… known as Manicheanism.” TOB for Beginners, 3.  
 
179 Ibid., 53. On page 5, West also asserts, quoting JPII, “The body, in fact, and it alone is capable of making visible 
what is invisible: the spiritual and divine.  It was created to transfer into reality of the world, the mystery hidden 
since time immemorial in God, and thus to be a sign of it (Feb. 20, 1980).”  
 
180 Ibid., 54. 
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mystery by looking at the signs of the Old and New Covenants.”181  In the resultant primordial 
sacrament of nuptial communion, man and woman participate in God’s life and love which the 
“original temptation” debased and ruptured in the harmony of humanity’s body and soul, 
humanity and the mystery of God. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this way, the human body is seen by JPII, in a sense, as a sacrament but not simply 
within the traditional classification of seven sacraments.  It is sacramental in a more generic way 
as “a sign that makes visible the invisible mysteries of God,” a material way of encountering the 
spiritual, thus making the human body the crown of God’s creation.182 On these grounds, West 
offers further insight on how the Pope’s thinking develops further: “Christianity is the religion of 
God’s union with humanity.  It’s the religion of the word (who is pure spirit) made flesh.  In the 
body of Jesus, ‘we see our God made visible and so are caught up in love of the God we cannot 
see.’”183 In this way of seeing the body as a primordial sacrament in and of itself, a “theology of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
181 Ibid.  For instance, the blood from Abraham’s circumcision foretold the blood of Christ’s body on the cross and 
his Eucharist. 
 
182 West points out that the sacramental practices of the Catholic faith makes it sensual and fleshy because in the 
sacraments we encounter God in bodily senses: “through bathing the body with water (baptism); anointing the body 
with oil (baptism, confirmation, holy orders, anointing of the sick); eating and drinking the Body and Blood of 
Christ (Eucharist); the laying on of hands (holy orders); confessing with our lips (penance); and the unbreakable 
joining of man and woman in ‘one flesh’ (marriage).” Ibid., 4. 
 
183 Cf. 1 Jn. 4:20. 
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the body” is born.  It is in this sacramental imagining that the mystery of the “communion of 
persons” draws our attention to yet another reality. God is an eternal communion of persons 
bound by love where the Father begets the Son, and the Son responds in love by giving himself 
back to the Father.  This co-relation generates the Holy Spirit who “proceeds from the Father and 
the Son.”  It is this Trinitarian love that is extended to humanity, which according to West, 
makes our male and female-ness. “In this way, sexual love becomes an icon or earthly image in 
some sense of the inner life of the Trinity.”184 
Christ thus calls humanity to reclaim the mystical meaning of nuptial love and 
communion, which is revealed in the proper ordering of our sexual bodies and realized only 
through the dynamism of the incarnation.  JPII’s TOB is “an extended commentary on this 
fundamental truth: Christ fully reveals man to himself through the revelation-in his body-of the 
mystery of divine love.”185  West posits that TOB is also a reaction to “the subjective turn in 
modern philosophy186 and the massive shift of Western cultures from religion to science which 
demands a new synthesis of the faith to which the contemporary world can relate… a bold 
philosophical project to integrate the faith with insights of the modern philosophy of 
consciousness, without sacrificing anything essential to the traditional philosophy of being.”187 
At this point, JPII embraced phenomenology by approaching the reality of things as they are 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
184 Ibid., 8–9. 
 
185 John Paul II, Man and Woman, xxviii.  
   
186 “The human family is facing the challenge of a new Manichaeism, in which body and spirit are put in radical 
opposition… This neo-Manichaean culture has led for example, to human sexuality being regarded more as for 
manipulation and exploitation than as the basis of that primordial wonder which led Adam on the morning of 
creation to exclaim before Eve: ‘This at last is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh’ (Gen 2:23).”  Ibid., xxiv.  
 
187 Ibid., 55. 
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experienced, thereby making room for “subjective experience.”188 West believes that JPII’s 
acknowledgement of subjectivism within an objective or realist philosophy, avoids the pitfalls of 
objectivizing rigorism and subjectivizing relativism.  
West succinctly summarizes the main thrust of JPII’s TOB thus: 
Its first step consists in unfolding the teaching of Jesus about the spousal 
meaning of the body (in its three dimensions: in God’s original plan “from the 
beginning”; in the present struggle with concupiscence; and in the future fulfillment by 
the resurrection).  Its second step consists in observing how this spousal meaning 
functions in the great sacrament of love, particularly in the language of the body that is 
the effective sign of this sacrament.  Its third step consists in showing that Humanae 
Vitae simply asks men and women to reread this language of the body in the truth.189  
 
Many argue and subscribe to the view that TOB is written as a re-affirmation of Paul VI’s 
Humanae Vitae,190 yet JPII’s “philosophical project prove more fruitful…. [A]s a corrective to 
antiquated explanations of sexual ethics that were often impersonal, legalistic, and authoritarian, 
John Paul II’s theological pedagogy of the body provides a winning personalistic affirmation of 
                                                          
188 John Hamlon argues against any question of whether JPII was a phenomenologist or not by stating, “JPII realizes 
that….phenomenology captures the attention of modern man.  It speaks to people of our age with conviction and 
force that even the system of St. Thomas Aquinas does not approach…. Wojtlya and the Lublin/Cracow school were 
to employ the essential discoveries of phenomenology in the service of faith without sacrificing objective ethical 
principles and the teachings of the Church.  We are persons because we are like God, made in God’s image…. The 
truth that we are created in the image of God is both subjective and objective.  It saves the subjective insight of the 
phenomenologist without losing the objectivity of the gospel….  His philosophical insight when applied to the truths 
of the faith, produce a new theological synthesis.  The unifying element in this synthesis is the individual subject—
the human person—created by God in His own image and redeemed by Christ.  JPII is teaching the world a new 
presentation of the faith.  Most significantly, he has developed a new theology of the body and a theology of the 
family.”  John S. Hamlon, A Call to Families: Study Guide and Commentary for Familiaris Consortio (Collegeville, 
MN: Human Life Center, 1984), x-xii. For further readings on the aspects of JPII’s use of phenomenology, cf. 
Kenneth L. Schmitz, At the Center of the Human Drama: The Philosophical Anthropology of Karol Wojtyla/Pope 
John Paul II (Washington DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1994); John Paul II, Man and Woman;   
and Rocco Buttiglione, Karol Wojtyla: The Thought of the Man who Became Pope John Paul II (Wm. B. Eerdmans 
Publishing, 1997). 
 
189 John Paul II, Man and Woman, 124. 
 
190 One of the main goals of the theology of the body is the defense of Paul VI’s encyclical Humanae Vitae.  The 
defense must be seen in the context of John Paul II’s defense of the ordinary human experience of love and it 
reasonableness.  The teaching of Humane Vitae, as John Paul II understands it is based on the spousal meaning of 
the human body, that is, on the God-given power of the body to be a sign of the radical gift of self between man and 
woman. Cf.  John Paul II, Man and Woman, xxv. 
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Humanae Vitae.”191 JPII adopts the theology of spousal love from St. John of the Cross and 
builds a new pedagogy around it, thereby creating a fresh perspective on what had hitherto been 
looked upon as sinful and disgraceful.  JPII grounds TOB on a correct understanding of three 
fundamental questions about sexuality and sex; first, to avoid the traditional excessive distinction 
between “eros” and “agape” since in JPII’s view, “erotic tension and sexual enjoyment are 
essential parts of spousal agape.[192]  Through such tension and enjoyment, the human body 
speaks the spousal gift of self in sexual intercourse.”193  Second, he advocates for an appreciation 
of the goodness of sexual pleasure as against the traditional Manichaean annihilation of the body 
or the toleration of sex on the grounds of need or necessity only.  For JPII, “the sexual revolution 
does not sufficiently appreciate the value and beauty of sex.  It deprives sex of its depth by 
detaching it from the spousal meaning of the body.  It favors the sexual lie, in which the 
language of radical gift is overlaid by the contrary language of individual autonomy and the use 
of persons for pleasure.”194 He emphasizes the goodness of sexual pleasure as belonging “by its 
deepest and innermost nature to the dynamism of radical gift between man and woman.”195  
JPII ascribes two vocations to the Christian life: marriage and virginity/celibacy both are 
geared towards realizing the profound reality of being created in the image and likeness of God.  
JPII sees in the celibate vocation a free self-gift also for the sake of the kingdom, a sign that the 
body, whose end is not the grave, is directed towards redemption by Christ and glorification. 
                                                          
191 Ibid., 56. 
 
192 In the encyclical “Deus Caritas Est” of Pope Benedict XVI, this theme is picked up again and better light is shed 
on the theological import of erotic love. 
 
193 John Paul II, Man and Woman, 125. 
 
194 Ibid., 126. 
 
195 Ibid., 127. 
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Therefore, “[t]he idea of virginity or celibacy as an anticipation and eschatological sign derives 
from the association of the words spoken… in the conversation with the Sadducees, when he 
proclaimed the future resurrection of the body.”196 JPII teaches that the state of virginity 
prefigures the eschaton where people will no longer be given in marriage (Mt. 22:30, Lk. 20:34, 
Mk. 12:25, 1 Cor. 15:28).   Christopher West clarifies this line of thought thus: “Christian 
celibacy, therefore, is not a rejection of sexuality.  It points to the ultimate purpose and meaning 
of sexuality… [an] anticipation of the heavenly reality, the ‘marriage of the lamb’… Christian 
celibacy reveals that the ultimate fulfilment of solitude is found only in union with God.”197  This 
is what the Church calls the consecrated life of avowed celibacy or virginity, which in and of 
itself also is a call, alongside marriage, a vocation to love and the gift of the totality of the self. In 
this case there is no reciprocal human giving of the self in return.  This self-gift in 
celibacy/virginity is never to be construed as “a lack but as an overflowing plenitude of love.  
Christ, the son and the bridegroom, reveals in his own flesh that virginity is the highest summit 
of the spousal meaning of the body itself….”198  
Carl Anderson and Jose Granados adapt what they call “the threefold pattern” of the body 
to see how celibacy or consecrated life is constitutive of the Jesus’ mission.  First, we see in the 
life of Christ that he himself embraced  
… the virginal meaning of the body with his exclusive dedication to the Father’s 
will… Second point… [:] it is not that Christ… fulfils ordinary earthly marriage 
by transforming it into a sacramental image of his spousal relation with the 
Church.  The Son, in other words, is also the bridegroom who generates, and 
unites himself to, the Church on the cross.  Third and finally, Christ’s spousal 
                                                          
196 John Paul II, The Theology of the Body: Human Love in the Divine Plan (Boston: Pauline Books and Media, 
1997), 264. 
 
197 West, TOB for Beginners, 66. 
 
198 Carl Anderson and Jose Granados, Called to Love: Approaching John Paul II’s Theology of the Body (New 
York: Doubleday, 2009), 217. 
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union with his Bride is supremely fruitful; through baptism, Christ begets sons 
and daughters for the Father from the womb of the Church.”199   
 
The final section on virginity closes with a reflection on Mary’s virginity as a model for 
consecrated living.  Her virginity also plays out in filiation through the conception of the son, in 
nuptiality both in the sense of birth and at the foot of the cross; she is truly mother because from 
her womb came forth son who is the salvation of the world.  JPII includes the experience of 
people who various situations must live the single life.  They are to find a home in the Church 
and their place around the table where they participate in the triple pattern of being a child of 
God, spouse of Christ (as members of the Church), and possibly parents at some stage.  
Most of those who undertake the study of JPII’s theology broadly will agree with 
Christopher West when he concludes, “We have not fully penetrated the teachings of John Paul 
II if we have not penetrated his theology of the body.”200  The published works, encyclicals and 
apostolic letters of JPII illustrate that the pontiff grounded his philosophical and theological 
thinking using TOB as the starting point with great implications for his pontificate and legacy. 
Faith and Love in St. John of the Cross 
A twenty-one-year-old Karol Wojtyla in 1941 met and became friends with a layman, Jan 
Tyranowski, who became a mentor and spiritual guide and who introduced the young Karol to 
the works of St. John of the Cross.  Because of the German invasion of Poland and the 
suppression of the Catholic Church at this time, young Karol enrolled and started his studies for 
                                                          
199 Ibid., 218-9.  The writers explain that the consecrated life is a gift that manifests the true face of humanity’s 
original solitude which is characterized by the face of the son.  In the fulfilment of the original unity, the consecrated 
person is called like Christ, who is the bridegroom and embodies the totality of the meaning of self-giving.  
Consecrated persons therefore configure themselves to Christ by living out the spousal love of Christ, sharing in his 
compassion and in the hopes and struggles of their brothers and sisters.  They emphasize the “spiritual 
fatherhood/motherhood” which Pauline theology sees as fruitful; it is not sterile or purely ethereal but flowers in a 
sense also according to the nuptial meaning of the body.  
 
200 West, TOB for Beginners, 5. 
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the priesthood in the underground seminary.201  In order to get a better grasp of St. John of the 
Cross, Karol Wojtyla learned Spanish to be able to read the mystic in his original language. This 
marked the beginning of a lifelong study of John of the Cross which, in turn, marked the future 
pope’s vision and theological understanding of life, love, and truth.  At the age of twenty-eight, 
now a priest, Karol Wojtyla wrote his dissertation on the understanding of faith in St. John of the 
Cross under the direction of the renowned spiritual theologian at the Angelicum, Reginald 
Garrigou-Lagrange.  Wojtyla’s central thesis concerned faith as a means of union between 
humanity and God. 
Mary Shivanandan notes that Wojtyla’s dissertation on faith in St. John of the Cross 
marked the beginning of his developing an analytical and methodological approach to moral 
theology that would be reflected even in his later works as Pope John Paul II.  It is also in this 
dissertation that Wojtyla starts to develop the ideas on original solitude, the person, and love.  
Shivanandan elucidates this point further: 
In analyzing both faith and love in St. John’s writing, Wojtyla gains a 
clearer understanding of the relation of the person, especially his will and 
intellect, to God and to the union with God in love.  In virtue of its relation to the 
intellect, faith possesses an essential likeness to God because faith makes God 
known to the intellect in a way in which no created thing can do.  The union with 
the supernatural being of God is brought about and increased through grace and 
love. It gives a “new birth.”  St. John applies the word “transformation” to this 
process.  Love determines the degree of transformation, and progress in love 
depends on uniting the will to God.  Wojtyla comments how much more vividly 
the truths of speculative theology can be expressed by someone who has actually 
experienced them.202 
 
                                                          
201 John Paul himself chronicles the history of these parts of his development in Gift and Mystery: On the Fiftieth 
Anniversary of my Priestly Ordination (New York: Doubleday Publishers, 1996). 
 
202 Shivanandan, Crossing the Threshold of Love, 19. 
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Shivanandan therefore concludes that Wojtyla “learns from St. John of the Cross the 
essential character of love, which is to subject the lover to the beloved.  It is a union of likeness 
effected by love.  Love operating in the will draws the whole person to the object loved.”203   
Even though Wojtyla was deeply influenced by John of the Cross, in his later 
development his attraction to psychology, phenomenology, and anthropology helped him to 
create a vision of man which is personal and at the same time mystical.  JPII’s personalist view 
cuts broadly across his moral theology but especially in the way he approaches human sexuality 
and marriage.204  JPII sees humanity’s relationship as this one person in a mystical union with 
God because God cannot be understood or known as an object, but as a person which comes into 
being through mutual self-donation.  In Wojtyla’s philosophical and anthropological theology, 
the subjective aspect of faith in relation to experience remains objective in its subjectivity 
                                                          
203 Ibid. 
 
204 The Jeweler’s Shop is a play the young priest Karol Wojtyla wrote as a meditation on the sacrament of 
matrimony, passing on occasion into drama (the play’s official subtitle).  In this play, one begins to get a glimpse of 
Karol Wojtyla’s thoughts about marriage and human sexuality. Boleslaw Taborski, who translated the 1992 English 
edition from the Polish writes articulately in his introduction of the young playwright and author, “The timeless, 
nonlinear structure of The Jeweler’s Shop, connected as it is  with the author’s unique imagery and oblique way of 
reasoning, makes for complexity.  But on another level it is simple enough.  The three parts of the play deals with 
three couples, married or about to be married, loving each other in the present, or having loved each other in the 
past, their histories are intertwined… The Jeweler stands for the durability of the sacrament of marriage.  He not so 
much sells as dispenses his wedding rings and refuses to take them back when they are no longer wanted, if both the 
marriage partners are still alive… He writes with insight and at times with great power, about human love; love that 
has survived the grave… love that has withered and died… love budding out of complexes, doubts and 
uncertainties… There are no easy solutions, there is no happy ending.  But there is hope, if only we can reach out of 
ourselves, see the true face of the other person, and hear the signals of a love that transcends us.  To this state of 
mind and heart we are not browbeaten but invited. 
 
“The Jeweler’s Shop seems to me a significant link between the future Pope John Paul II’s writings on ethics (Love 
and Responsibility among them), on the one hand, and his poetry on the other.  It combines the elements of a treatise 
with rich poetic imagery and inner dramatic development.  It is the work of a man in whom unbending principles are 
connected with boundless forbearance and understanding for people.  Here, too, out of the chaos created by our 
human loves, hates and weaknesses, he gently points the way in the right direction.”  Karol Wojtyla, The Jeweler’s 
Shop: A Meditation on the Sacrament of Matrimony, Passing on Occasion into Drama, trans. Boleslaw Taborski 
(San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1992), 18-19.  
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completely.  Shivanandan clarifies this point further by stating, “As a person, man, too, cannot be 
objectivized…. Neither must he be treated simply as an object.”205 
Waldstein opines that to understand JPII’s philosophical and anthropological theology is 
to understand the triangle thesis of John of the Cross that has remained the depth and structure of 
JPII’s understanding of the person based on a Trinitarian personalism.206  The foundation to this 
Carmelite Trinitarian personalism Waldstein calls “The Sanjuanist Triangle.” Characteristic to 
this triangle, Waldstein points out, first, love as self-giving; second and paradigmatically, this 
self-giving is vivified in spousal exchange between a man and a woman; and third and finally, 
the trinity is an archetype which exemplifies the love between two human persons which derives 
from imitation and participation in divine self-gift.  Waldstein, in reflecting on JPII’s catechesis 
on this Trinitarian/spousal self-exchange as gift, maintains, 
 When there is union of love, the image of the beloved is so sketched in the 
will, and drawn so intimately and vividly, that it is true to say that the beloved 
lives in the lover and the lover in the beloved. Love produces such likeness in this 
transformation of lovers that one can say each is the other and both are one.  The 
reason is that the union and transformation of love each gives possession of self to 
the other and each leaves and exchanges self for the other.  Thus, each one lives in 
the other and is the other, and both are one in the transformation of love.207 
 
This spousal self-giving in John of the Cross is equated with and analogous to JPII’s 
interpretation of the carnal and physical sexual consummation aspect of human spousal self-
giving within marriage.  Waldstein restates it thus: “The defining element of ‘spiritual marriage,’ 
according to this text is the total surrendering of the self-possession of each to the other, 
analogous to the consummation of love by sexual union in marriage.”208 He later says, “The 
                                                          
205 Ibid., 22. 
 
206 Waldstein in JPII, Man and Woman, 34. 
 
207 Ibid., 30. 
 
208 Ibid., 31. 
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fullest, the most uncompromising form of love consists precisely in self-giving, in making one’s 
inalienable and non-transferable ‘I’ someone else’s property.”209  JPII’s works, especially his 
books Love and Responsibility and Man and Woman He Created Them, and the encyclicals 
Familiaris Consortio and Evangelium Vitae, offer the analogy of the “gift of self” that echoes 
John of the Cross as well as the Vatican II document Gaudium et Spes. 
In his philosophical, anthropological, and theological works, JPII constantly returns to 
sacred Scripture, the Fathers, sacred Tradition, and St. John of the Cross.  In a more modern 
context, the pontiff’s affiliation with phenomenology and his engaging of Kant and Max Scheler 
gives his writing a greater dimension in which to engage a doctrine going through development. 
In JPII’s use of phenomenology, he examines the natural and everyday experiences of life 
as phenomena, the reality of things as they are, a way in which the links between objective 
reality and subjective experience, ethics and anthropology, truth and freedom, God and man are 
reconfigured to present a new philosophical, theological, and anthropological methodology.  
George Weigel, in his commentary on JPII’s TOB writes, 
With human experience as a point of departure, Wojtyla gains a much needed and 
traditionally neglected perspective in the interior life of the human person.  He 
discovers in the subjectivity of man’s inner world a unity with the objectivity of 
man’s outer world.  By analyzing this unity he can confirm objective truths while 
avoiding “objectivizing” abstractions.  He demonstrates that the Church’s vision 
of man is not foisted him from “the outside,” but corresponds to his self-
experience as a person on “the inside.”210  
 
Wojtyla/John Paul II’s anthropological vision from its philosophical and theological 
standpoint cannot be fully grasped without recognizing his understanding of the personal 
freedom of the individual person for truth, in recognizing and embracing the truth and to search 
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210 Christopher West, TOB Explained, 40.  
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for it.  Weigel opines that JPII’s “philosophical project has been to find the both/and—to give 
proper recognition to the discoveries of phenomenology without renouncing the philosophy of 
being; to ‘make room’ for subjectivity within a realist philosophy.”211 
JPII’s work on the German philosopher Max Scheler is invaluable for the over-all system 
by which he approached TOB.  Scheler was of the school of Edmund Husserl, who is largely 
regarded as the father and founder of phenomenology.  As a reaction against Kant’s ethics of 
pure duty (duty for duty’s sake), Scheler argues for an ethical system based on an ethical 
emotional value.  Wojtyla sees a loophole in both Kant’s duty for duty’s sake and Scheler’s 
emotional experience of value: while the one does not account for the emotional aspect of the 
human person, the other does not clarify the human aspiration to value.  Therefore, Wojtyla 
started to work on integrating a self-sufficient Christian ethic, “a reformed phenomenological 
approach [which] could be integrated with the faith and would greatly aid in bringing the much- 
needed stamp of subjective experience to the normative science of ethics.”212  As a University 
professor, Wojtyla rubbed against the rising intellectual minds of the “Lublin School of 
Philosophy” who believed that through linking of metaphysics, anthropology, and ethics, a new 
way of doing philosophy would be born.  In various lectures at this time, Wojtyla continued to 
study and to develop his work around themes like freedom and law, value and duty, experience 
and ethics, person and nature, subjectivity and objectivity, all in an effort to arrive at a synthesis 
of his own vision of an integral Christian ethical system.213 
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Mary Shivanandan does an excellent job of unpacking the inadequacies of Kant and 
Scheler even as they affect JPII’s personalism and ethics.  Shivanandan thinks that to understand 
Wojtyla/JPII’s critique of Kant and Scheler, one must read his essay “The Problem of the 
Separation of Experience from the Act in Ethics in the Philosophy of Immanuel Kant and Max 
Scheler”, published in the mid-1950s, which analyzes Kant’s and Scheler’s inability to recognize 
“the casual efficacy of the human subject in ethical action.”214 Based on the Aristotelian and 
Thomistic theory of potency and act, experience and metaphysics, persons experience 
themselves as the efficient cause of their own actions, actualizing their will according to the 
dictates of practical reason.  According to Shivanandan, the point of departure includes Kant’s 
rejection of the philosophy of being, which is the basis for Aquinas’ theory of potency and act; 
by doing this, Kant deprives the ethical act of meaning by severing its connection with objective 
reality.  Shivanandan notes further that Scheler, on the other hand,  
….reinstated sensory experience as a source of knowledge, accepting the 
essence of a thing exactly as it appears in experience, making no clear distinction 
between the rational and sensory elements in human knowledge.  Both the 
intellect and emotions are involved in bringing to our consciousness the essence 
of a thing, but Scheler gave much greater weight to the emotional aspect both in 
his theory of cognition and ethics.215  
 
In Scheler’s phenomenology, reason could understand the “thingness” of an object but 
not its value; emotion, primarily, is able to understand the good.  Though these values 
encountered in the objects are objective, their objectivity is made possible only through 
emotional experience.  Even though Wojtyla is attracted to Scheler’s ethics, he rejects it 
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ultimately because in Wojtyla’s thought, as translated by Shivanandan, “Only an ethics that has 
the acting person as the efficient cause is truly an ethics of the person.  Emotions are 
secondary… we experience ‘good or ‘evil because we experience ourselves as the efficient cause 
of our own acts.”216 This apparent discontinuity between Kant, Scheler, and JPII is summarized 
by Shivanandan aptly thus: 
Whereas Kant has reduced the ethical life to pure reason, Scheler has 
replaced the mind with emotions as the source of ethical values.  But, says 
Wojtyla, the ethical life cannot be reduced to either pure reason or emotional 
experience because “ethical experience is a personal whole whose specific 
properties cease to be themselves apart from this whole.”  He believes that a 
proper understanding of the nature of the will can only be achieved by a thorough 
analysis of ethical experience and that only the ethics of Aristotle and St. Thomas 
are based on a proper relation to experience.217   
 
Apparently, Wojtyla does not agree with an ethic that denies the subjectivity of the 
person and in the personal will ordered towards ethical actions (the good).  To counter this 
denial, he had to express the truth about the person in a way that would fit into the categories that 
contemporary men and women can understand—a philosophy of a person who lives in truth and 
in love. 
Wojtyla/JPII’s philosophical system is also largely understood to be a reaction against 
Francis Bacon and Rene Descartes, who sought a return to the primeval condition where the 
mind has authority over nature. Michael Waldstein aptly describes the Bacon/Descartes task and 
its implication in the following words: 
Bacon’s project of reconstructing the entire order of knowledge in light of the 
ambition of power over nature is connected with a premise developed earlier in 
the philosophical and theological current that stands behind the reformation, 
namely, nominalism: “Late medieval nominalism defended the sovereignty of 
God as incompatible with there being an order in nature which by itself defined 
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good and bad.  For that would be to tie God’s hands, to infringe on his sovereign 
right of decision about what was good.  This line of thought even contributed in 
the end to the rise of mechanism: the ideal universe from this point of view is a 
mechanical one.”218  Nominalism, however, did not yet formulate the goal of 
power as measure of knowledge.  Still it eliminated from nature precisely those 
features that resist its subjection to power, namely, a strong teleology and formal 
causality. The universe most suited to the goal of power is a mechanical universe, 
grasped and made ready for use by the mathematical science of mechanics.219  
 
The morality of this Baconian program questions its own morality for its lack of control 
over itself.  With the kind of power achieved in technology, and even more so with the weapons 
and arsenal of mass destruction that nations are stock piling, the earth and humanity itself now 
need protection which humans seem incapable of providing.  Apparently Bacon did not imagine 
a dynamic where scientific progress can come to mean that all available resources at one’s 
disposal “that can be used will be used.”220 Waldstein goes further to theorize that the Baconian 
project took on monstrous proportions when the mathematician/philosopher, the father of 
modern day scientific and technological project, embraced the theory.  Descartes specifically 
argued for the termination of speculative scholasticism to be replaced with a practical and 
technological philosophy.  In this way, “doing” and “making” would become ultimate reality.  
This Baconian/Cartesian project of radically aligning knowledge with power over nature makes 
free will the greatest human good.  Waldstein continues, “This apotheosis of the freedom of 
choice as the greatest human good seems to anticipate already the core of Kant’s philosophy of 
freedom and autonomy.”221 In direct and opposite contrast to this radical Cartesian metaphysical 
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liberalism, Wojtyla argues in line with Christian tradition, first, that free choice is power 
subordinated to love because love is a limiting of one’s freedom for another’s sake. 
This mechanistic and scientific domination of nature profoundly affects the meaning of 
human life within the cosmos.  In JPII’s Letter to Families, he draws attention to the close 
relation between a scientific picture of the world and utilitarianism: 
The development of contemporary civilization is linked to a scientific and 
technological progress which is often achieved in a one-sided way and thus 
appears purely positivistic.  Positivism, as we know results in agnosticism in 
theory and utilitarianism in practice and in ethics.  In our own day, history is in a 
way repeating itself. Utilitarianism is a civilization of production and of use, a 
civilization of things and not of persons, a civilization in which persons are used 
in the same way as things are used.222 
 
This sort of change in relating to nature by subjugation has resulted in a nihilistic 
existentialism according to Waldstein, “a certain estrangement between man and the world, with 
the loss of the idea of a kindred cosmos – in short, an anthropological a-cosmism.”223  JPII sees 
this situation as the rise of a new Manicheanism, in which there is a radical opposition between 
body and spirit; man is no longer subject but object.  In this sense, human sexuality becomes 
manipulable, subject to exploitation; it becomes a commodity to be used, a product to be 
purchased, totally disconnected from its primordial wonder at creation. 
 Despite Wojtyla’s limited participation as one of the Fathers of the Second Vatican 
Council, owing to the German occupation of Poland and suppression of the Catholic Church, the 
Council is nonetheless regarded by many commentators as part of his theological growth and 
development.  The focus of this great council was the question of a new humanism, a 
development of modernity: how to confront it with almost twenty centuries of Christianity and 
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how to make the Church’s message relevant and understood by modern man and woman in their 
new realities.  In his philosophical work The Acting Person,224 Wojtyla tries to make the 
objective truths about faith an experience to bring within the realm of subjective appropriation.  
According to Weigel, Wojtyla’s most elaborate effort in The Acting Person is “to wed the visions 
of ‘person’ found in St. Thomas and Max Scheler.  His thesis, as the title indicates, is that the 
irreducible core of the person is revealed through his actions… we are not only passive objects, 
but acting subjects.”225  Because action is interpreted as subjectivity, Wojtyla translates efficacy 
as “this experience of freedom and subjectivity [where] man begins to experience his own 
transcendence as a person.  Wojtyla believes there is a law of self-giving that defines the person 
objectively. And in the experience of his own freedom, his own ability to act, man comes to 
experience this truth of his personhood subjectively.”226 
Significant to his finding his voice and to his continuous spiritual and intellectual growth  
is his work in Signs of Contradiction,227  which was born of twenty-two conferences he gave 
while preaching the papal household and Roman Curia Lenten retreat in 1976 (under Pope Paul 
VI).  In the conferences/book, Wojtyla concentrated on the question, “Who is man and how does 
Christ fully reveal man to himself?”  In what he calls the “signs of the times,” Wojtyla 
envisioned a renewed Church where Christ will be re-introduced to men and women of our age 
even though the great challenge is that he will be a sign of contradiction.  Wojtyla referred to 
different signs that transmit transcendental realities, but the greatest sign of all is that of man and 
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woman.  It is in this relationship that the Church becomes a sign of contradiction, in her sexual 
ethic.  It was in an effort to respond to this that Pope John Paul II penned and gave to the Church 
what has become perhaps his greatest biblical, philosophical, anthropological, and theological 
project: the Theology of the Body (TOB). 
For the proponents of JPII’s philosophy and theology, what makes TOB endearing, if 
challenging, to modern humanity is the challenge to freedom through the truth.  While JPII’s 
work does not impose, the advocates of personal freedom are challenged to understand the 
“splendor of truth” which according to JPII separates and distinguishes between “knowledge” 
and “consciousness.”  Weigel articulates it thus: 
For a person to be at peace with himself and the world, he must not only 
know the truth, he must interiorize it, feel it, experience it, and freely embrace it 
as his own.  To do so, he must trust the truth wholeheartedly, have an impassioned 
love for the objective good and abandon himself to it fearlessly.  This is only 
possible if truth is perfect love, which is only possible if truth itself is a person. 
Truth is. Truth’s name is Jesus Christ.228  
 
Herein lies the heart of the matter, at once ontologically true while simultaneously 
epistemologically impossible for the unbelieving heart.  In a rudimentary manner, JPII is asking 
modern human persons not to limit their experience of the divine to technical knowledge and 
discernment only.  Rather, he asks that modern man and woman engage the freedom of intellect, 
will and person to the experience achievable only by the self-donation found in the love of a God 
who loved us first.  Even though we understand concepts with the mind, true love is in the heart. 
“Ultimate Reality is much more than a concept.  It is a Person.”229  This person is Jesus, who 
brings us from our personal being and existence to the “I” and “Thou”—in our one co-existence 
and communion with God and with other people.   
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John Paul II’s Biblical and Exegetical Foundations 
 In all of Wojtyla’s/John Paul II’s writings, an unbroken thread evidently 
developed as he himself matured philosophically and theologically.  JPII depends on and 
grounds his foundational thoughts and arguments on biblical tradition and his profound 
exegetical work with an in-depth tapestry woven by traversing the Old and the New Testaments. 
JPII’s use of proof texts one after the other helps him to situate what is authentically God’s plan 
from the very beginning.  Going to “the beginning” and finding foundational texts not only give 
credence to his arguments but also provide an insight into the development of doctrine.  His skill 
at historical critical redactionism makes it possible for him to elucidate scriptural texts upon 
which doctrines and Christian moral tradition rest.   
Even though the historical-critical method has become a common tool for reading 
scripture in contemporary times, commentaries on JPII’s works do not identify him specifically 
as a student of the historical-critical method.  However, Waldstein thinks JPII’s views, as 
expressed in his comments on the hundredth anniversary of Leo XIII’s Providentissimus Deus 
and the 50th anniversary of Pius XII’s Divino Afflante Spiritu, are overly positive. In these 
comments, JPII states, 
The Church of Christ takes the realism of the incarnation seriously, and this is 
why she attaches great importance to the “historical critical” study of the bible… 
[Exegetes must strive] to understand the meaning of the texts with all the 
accuracy and precision possible and, thus, in their historical, cultural context.  The 
God of the Bible is not an absolute being, who crushing everything he touches, 
will suppress all differences and all nuances.  On the contrary, he is God the 
creator, who created the astonishing variety of things… God respects them and 
makes use of them (cf. 1Cor. 12:18, 24, 28).  Although he expresses himself in 
human language he does not give each expression a uniform value, but uses its 
possible nuances with extreme flexibility and likewise accepts its limitations.  
That is what makes the task of exegetes, so complex, so necessary, and so 
fascinating.230 
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Even though JPII seems to see the historical-critical method in a positive light, he 
nonetheless was not concerned merely about what the text says within a historical context; he is 
rather more concerned about what a text says to the realities of contemporary times and 
questions.  According to Curran, JPII does not address the use of scripture as a systematician or 
approach the use of scripture methodologically.  Rather, JPII “writes as an authoritative teacher 
for the whole church on moral issues and questions.”231 Beyond what the historical text says 
about contemporary realities, JPII is more concerned about the divine meaning of each text: what 
God intends to pass along within the wider context of ongoing revelation of the incarnation.  The 
revelation of scripture focuses on the Incarnation, which is the act of a God who is love.  In this 
light, JPII is able to read historical texts critically and exegetically and make them speak the 
word of God (love) into the consciousness of contemporary realities and questions.  JPII relies 
heavily on the Gospel of John to situate “the Word that became flesh”; in the Incarnation he is 
able to point to redemption, thereby establishing for his theological purposes a Christology from 
above.  In Waldstein’s opinion, “of all the works of John Paul II, TOB is the most direct, 
profound, and extensive analysis of “what God…wishes above all to transmit to human beings in 
his WORD.”232  The foregoing forms a hermeneutical problem for Curran, who states that “the 
major issue in using scripture in moral theology involves the hermeneutical problem—how one 
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moves from the time and place of the scripture (and recognizing that there are different times and 
places for the different scriptural books) to the time, culture, and place of today.”233   
Eduardo Echeverria, while discussing JPII’s use of the scriptures to support TOB 
contends that “… in accordance with the biblical hermeneutic of Vatican II’s Dei Verbum, and in 
the Church’s teaching regarding the unity and reliability of the word of God, he gives ‘serious 
attention… to the content and unity of the whole of scripture’ in developing the biblical 
foundation of the theology of the body”234 and that “[h]is is a canonical exegesis, which involves 
placing the individual biblical texts in their immediate literary context, of God’s revelation, the 
context of scripture as a whole, and the living tradition of the Church.”235  Echeverria sees four 
hermeneutical approaches to JPII’s use of scriptures: first, a hermeneutic of canonical wholeness, 
unified in such a way that it becomes impossible fundamentally for God to contradict himself.  
Second, because of the assumption that scripture is of dual authorship, human and divine, JPII’s 
hermeneutical schema necessarily must accede to the unity of historical exegesis and theological 
interpretation, which means that scripture possesses a “multivalent potential of meaning.”  Third, 
Christ is the unifying principle that makes scripture a canonical whole. Fourth and finally, the 
interpretation of scripture must be in line with the Church’s sacred tradition and within 
scripture’s hermeneutical relevance to the contemporary Church’s living experience and 
understanding.236     
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In constructing his theological anthropology in TOB, JPII relies on the “triptych” or the 
three key biblical verses in the first cycle on which the adequate understanding of the nature of 
the human person is understood within the three stages of the human drama: stage one is original 
man, “in the beginning” (cf. Mt. 19:3-9); this is the way the human person experienced the self 
before sin.  Stage two is the historical man “in the heart” (Mt. 5:27-28), referring to the way the 
human person experiences the self as affected by sin but redeemed by Christ.  The third stage 
will be the eschatological man “in the resurrection” (Mt. 22:23-33), which reflects on 
humanity’s sexual embodiment as it will be realized in the resurrection.  These texts, based on 
the words/teachings of Jesus, ground JPII’s sexual ethics (as well as incorporating the teachings 
of Humanae Vitae) in divine revelation. From JPII’s encyclicals, it is easy to see his dependence 
on scripture as the primary source of his moral theology.  Veritatis Splendor is specifically 
written to reiterate the importance of scripture for contemporary moral theology, and the idea is 
also referenced in Dei Verbum.237 
JPII creates his theological anthropology of TOB around the themes of creation, fall, and 
redemption.  The two accounts of creation in Genesis used by JPII situate the two accounts of 
creation, establishing humanity as made in the image and likeness of God (from which is derived 
human dignity), as well as humanity’s authority and dominion over everything else in the created 
order.  In this locus JPII sees the original nakedness of humanity in Adam and Eve.  In the same 
Genesis accounts (Chapters 1-4), the account of the fall is narrated.  Curran favors an 
interpretation of a threefold break in relationship engendered by the fall; “a break in the 
relationship of loving dependence of Adam and Eve upon God (Adam and Eve hid themselves); 
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a break in the relationship between man and woman (Adam accused Eve of causing the 
problem); and a break or struggle within the human person brought about by concupiscence (they 
recognized their nakedness and covered it).”238 JPII sees the transition from original nakedness 
and the fall to redemption as residing in the nuptial meaning of the body, based on a number of 
scriptural texts other than the Genesis account.  According to Curran in the Horizons article, 
“among the texts developed here are 1 Cor. 6:15-20 with its emphasis on the human body as the 
temple of the Holy Spirit and the member of Christ; 1 Thess. 4:4 with its call for controlling the 
body in holiness and honor; and Romans 8:32 with its explicit recognition of the redemption of 
the body.”239 JPII’s reflections on Ephesians 5 are so central to the entire treatise that it will be 
discussed under its own sub-heading later on in this work.  For now, it suffices to say that the 
spousal analogy of Christ as the groom of his bride, the Church, is used to teach about the 
sacramental nature of marriage and the relationship of love that exists between husband and wife 
as an example of the love of Christ for his Church.240  
The Pontiff’s reliance and insistence on giving his teaching a solid scriptural foundation 
is a pointer to the idea of a consistent theological Christian moral ethic and an understanding of 
ontological ethical truths that speaks to constantly a shifting and changing culture, which from 
different cultures and times, leaves itself open to newer ways of thinking and societal milieus.    
“Male and Female, He created them”: The Genesis Account 
JPII thematically builds his philosophical and theological anthropology of the theology of 
the body by presenting the ontological meaning of the creation of human persons in their gender 
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differentiation as male and female by going back to the two accounts of the creation of man in 
the book of Genesis.  Chapter 2 of Genesis, verse 18 says, “it is not good that man should be 
alone,” whereupon the idea of original solitude becomes the grounds for building the idea of 
original unity.  Again, JPII ties this to the beginning, to the original intention of the creator.  Key 
to understanding the idea of original unity is Genesis 2:24: “For this reason, a man will leave his 
father and mother and unite with his wife, and the two will become one flesh.”  Christ appeals to 
this text in Mt. 19:5 in response to the question of the Pharisee about divorce.  Unlike the 
account of creation in Genesis 1, the Yahwist account in Genesis 2 approaches man in the duality 
of its sex.  According to JPII, “Bodiliness and sexuality are not simply identical.  Although in its 
normal constitution, the human body carries within itself the signs of sex and is by its nature 
male or female … the fact that man is a ‘body’ belongs more deeply to the structure of the 
personal subject than the fact that in his somatic constitution he is also male or female.”241  It is 
for this reason that JPII insists that “the meaning of original solitude, which can be referred 
simply to ‘man,’ is substantially prior to the meaning of original unity; the latter is based on 
masculinity and femininity, which were,….two different ‘incarnations,’ that is, two ways in 
which the same human being, created ‘in the image of God’ (Gen. 1:27), ‘is a body.’”242 
Genesis 2:18-22243 plays a crucial role in JPII’s exegesis of what it means biblically to be 
male and female, both made in the imago dei. The pontiff pays particular attention to the deep 
sleep (torpor) into which Adam falls when God took the rib from his side to create Eve.  He 
contrasts this sleep, induced by God to create the woman from the side of the man, with 
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contemporary scientific and Freudian psychoanalytic understanding, which emphasizes the 
association of the subconscious, such as dreams, with repressed ideas of sex.244 
For JPII, gender differentiation exists truly only within the prism of the homogeneity of 
the being of both.  Woman made from the rib of man is a metaphoric and figurative way for the 
ancient people to express the idea of homogeneity in body and the entire somatic structure.  JPII 
claims that this homogeneity is recognized by Adam when he woke up and exclaimed, “This 
time she is flesh from my flesh and bone from my bones” (Gen 2:23).245  This joy echoed by the 
man upon seeing the woman establishes a somatic homogeneity in a reciprocal recognition and 
affirmation of the second “I,” thereby establishing the original unity from the beginning. 
In developing the meaning of “male” and “female,” JPII further asserts that…. 
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other living beings created earlier.  In biblical anthropology, ‘bones’ signify a very important component of the 
body, given that for the Hebrews there was no precise distinction between ‘body’ and ‘soul’…. ‘bone from my 
bones’ can thus be understood in the relational sense, like ‘being from being.’  ‘Flesh from flesh’ signifies that, 
although she has different physical characteristics, the woman has the same personhood that the man has.” Cf. 160. 
 
97 
 
[t]he account of creation of man in Genesis 1 affirms from the beginning 
and directly that man was created in the image and likeness of God inasmuch as 
he is male and female.  The account in Genesis 2, by contrast, does not speak of 
the “image of God,” but reveals, in the manner proper to it, that the complete and 
definitive creation of “man” (subject first to the experience of original solitude), 
expresses itself to giving life to the “communion personarum” that man and 
woman form…. Man becomes and image of God not so much in the moment of 
solitude as in the moment of communion.  He is, in fact, “from the beginning”… 
essentially the image of an inscrutable divine communion of Persons.246 
 
In the second creation account, JPII shows that it is in this way the trinitarian concept of 
the ‘image of God’ can be understood. “This is obviously not without significance for the 
theology of the body, but constitutes perhaps the deepest theological aspect of everything one 
can say about man.”247  And that in the mystery of creation “… man has been endowed with a 
deep unity between what is, humanly and through the body, male in him.  On all this, right from 
the beginning, the blessing of fruitfulness descended, linked with human procreation (cf. Gen 
1:28).”248  Gen 2:23: “Then the man said, ‘This time she is flesh from my flesh and bone from 
my bones.  She will be called woman because from man has she been taken.’” According to JPII, 
this verse clarifies the point that the understanding of the person necessarily passes through 
masculinity and femininity, two incarnations but the same metaphysical solitude—“two 
reciprocally completing ways of ‘being a body’ and at the same time of being human—as two 
complimentary dimensions of self-knowledge and self-determination and, at the same time, two 
complementary ways of being conscious of the meaning of the body (emphasis in the 
original).”249 JPII argues further that this complementarity/unity of which Gen. 2:24 speaks, “and 
the two will become one flesh,” is expressed and realized in conjugality:   
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When they unite with each other (in conjugal act) so closely so as to 
become “one flesh,” man and woman rediscover every time and in a special way 
the mystery of creation, thus returning to the union in humanity (“flesh from my 
flesh and bone from my bones”) that allows them to recognize each other 
reciprocally and to call each other by name, as they did the first time…. Sex, 
however, is something more than the mysterious power of human Bodiliness, 
which acts, as it were, by virtue of instinct.  On the level of man and in the 
reciprocal relationship of persons, sex expresses an ever-new surpassing of the 
limit of man’s solitude, which lies within the makeup of his body and determines 
its original meaning.  This surpassing always implies that in a certain way one 
takes upon oneself the solitude of the body of the second “I” as one’s own.250  
 
JP II elucidates further that in this intimacy of becoming “one flesh,” the conjugal act 
becomes a mature, conscious choice of the body and persons involved.  This conjugal union 
“carries within itself a particular awareness of the meaning of that body in the reciprocal self-
gift of the persons.”251 Expounding on this theme, JPII writes, 
In this sense, too, Genesis 2:24 is a future oriented text.  It shows, in fact, 
that in every conjugal union of man and woman, there is a new discovery of the 
same original consciousness of the unitive meaning of the body in its masculinity 
and femininity; the biblical text thereby indicates at the same time that each union 
of this kind renews in some way the mystery of creation in all its original depth 
and vital power. “Taken from the man” as “flesh from his flesh,” the woman 
consequently becomes, as “wife” and through her motherhood, mother of the 
living (Gen. 3:20), because her motherhood has its proper origin also in him.  
Procreation is rooted in creation, and every time it reproduces in some way its 
mystery.252 
 
In this section of JPII’s work, using the accounts of Genesis 2, he establishes that the 
nuptial meaning of the body shows the human person’s capacity to be a gift to the other with 
deep affirmation, which is lived through the complementarity of the sexes.  According to 
Christopher West, “Man, having first received woman as a gift from God, is disposed towards 
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initiating the gift of himself to the woman.”253  He avers further that conversely, the woman in 
receiving this gift leaves herself open to a mutual self-exchange.  West calls this “an ever-
deepening exchange which in some way reflects the eternal exchange within the trinity.”254   
The Matthew 5:27-28 Account: In the light of The Sermon on the Mount 
“You have heard that it was said, ‘you shall not commit adultery.’ But I say to you: whoever 
looks at a woman to desire her lustfully has already committed adultery with her in his heart.”  
 
JPII uses this text almost in the same radical way as with his constant reference to the 
“beginning”;255 here he is applying the text within its immediate and more expansive context.  
This is one of the fundamental teachings of Jesus where he develops and explains the moral 
ethics of the Decalogue within a newer and stronger exegetical purview.  This meta-pedagogy is 
applied variously to related laws in the Decalogue, such as “Thou shall not commit adultery” and 
“Thou shall not covet thy neighbor’s wife.”  These have great implications for personal 
responsibility, for one’s ethos and the interiority of one’s subjective acts.  In JPII’s words, this 
text from Matthew’s Gospel, in the Sermon on the Mount, introduces us to a global context:  
It refers to the following commandments of the Decalogue, in order: the 
fifth, “You shall not kill” (cf. Mt. 5:21-26); the sixth, “You shall not commit 
adultery” (cf. Mt. 5:27-32); and the eight, according to the text of Exodus (cf. Ex. 
20:7) “You shall not swear falsely, but shall perform to the Lord what you have 
sworn” (cf. Mt 5:33-37).  It is significant that at the end of the passage about 
adultery the question of the certificate of divorce also appears (cf. Mt. 5:31-
32)….256 
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255 Ibid., 133. West, in his commentary notes, avers, “Like Christ’s words that pointed us to the “beginning,” John 
Paul says that the Lord’s words about lust are pregnant with theological, anthropological, and ethical content.  They 
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JPII teaches that “adultery in the heart” consists of dwelling on the lustful desire to have 
sexual knowledge of someone else who is not one’s spouse.  This is an interior act for men and 
women expressed through sight and by mere sensory perception.  For any moral action that is 
physically performed, a conscious pre-meditation is required for it to be considered right or 
wrong.  Therefore, adultery necessarily takes place in the heart before it takes place 
physically.257  In this case, JPII argues that it is impossible to keep God’s commandments 
externally only; there is a need for “a vital participation coming from the depths of the heart.”258  
It is in this inner world of virtues that each person fights the battle between good and evil, a 
complex arena of the subjectivity of individual conscience and the sensitivity of the heart.  
Mastering the heart’s interiority prevents legalism or moralism.  In this call to a personal ethos 
and the recovery of the fundamental meaning of the law as ethic, this Sermon on the Mount is 
rephrased by West thus: “you have heard the objective law and interpreted it externally.  Now I 
tell you the subjective meaning of the law – what it calls you to internally…. You have heard the 
ethic.  Now I speak to you of its proper ethos.”259  West clarifies that there is an organic 
relationship between the law and the teachings of Christ, which must be maintained while any 
                                                          
257 Ibid., 126-7. JPII asserts that “[t]he heart has become a battlefield between love and lust.  The more lust 
dominates the heart, the less the heart experiences the nuptial meaning of the body.  It becomes less sensitive to the 
gift of the person, which expresses that meaning in the mutual relations of man and woman…. Violating the 
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subjectivity.  They do not express communion, but they remain unilaterally determined by sex….. Manifested as 
‘coercion sui generis of the body,’ concupiscence limits interiorly and reduces self-control.  For that reason, in a 
certain sense it makes impossible the interior freedom of giving.  Together with that, the beauty that the human body 
possesses in its male and female aspect, as an expression of the spirit, is obscured.  The body remains as an object of 
lust and, therefore, as a ‘field of appropriation’ of the other human being.”   
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sharp contrast between them must be avoided. This way of approaching a new “Christian ethos” 
is certainly new but not divergent from its Old Testament roots if understood in the sense of 
fulfillment.260   
JPII argues that the uniqueness of man is not based on his rationality; to be considered 
unique to man, among other qualities, is his heart.  According to JPII, “the category of the heart 
is, in a way, the equivalent of personal subjectivity.  The way of appeal to purity of heart, as it 
was expressed in the Sermon on the Mount, is in any case a reminiscence of the original solitude, 
from which the man was liberated….”261  The purity of heart that Jesus reflects upon and which 
JPII enunciates is a call that is indispensable for holiness and the communion of persons.  The 
words of Mt. 5:27-28 reflect the Beatitude of Mt. 5:8: “Blessed are the pure in heart, for they 
shall see God.”  The war between purity and sinfulness (sometimes referred to as the opposition 
of the flesh to the Spirit) as it rages in the human heart is a theme that is taken up in the epistles 
of the New Testament, more so in Pauline writings: “But I say, walk by the Spirit and do not 
gratify the desires of the flesh.  For the desires of the flesh are against the Spirit, and the desires 
of the Spirit are against the flesh.  For these are opposed to each other, to prevent you from doing 
what you would” (Gal. 5:16-17).  Romans 8:5 also says, “For those who live according to the 
flesh set their minds on the things of the flesh, but those who live according to the Spirit set their 
minds on the things of the Spirit.”  JPII’s treatment of this Mathean text seen through the prism 
of the Sermon on the Mount gives a new pedagogical hermeneutic for a newer way of 
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subjective values correspond to that which is objectively true, good and beautiful.  But even the impure man has a 
duty toward the objective good.” 
 
261 Ibid., 177. 
 
102 
 
approaching marital and sexual purity hitherto non-existent in the Jewish scriptures.  It also 
presents a new and dynamic way of understanding the call to holiness required of both the male 
and female within and outside of marriage.  
The Marriage of the Lamb: The Ephesians 5:21-33 Account 
This Pauline text is perhaps JPII’s strongest connection with other New Testament texts 
in terms of what, over time, have come to be called the “key words” from scripture used to 
ground the theology of the body. In this text, we find the appeal to the “beginning” (Mt. 19:4; 
Mk. 10:6), the appeal to the human heart from the Sermon on the Mount (Mt. 5:28), and the 
appeal to the future resurrection of the body (Mt. 22:30; Mk. 12:25; Lk. 20:35-36).  In this 
evangelical outline, JPII sees the author of the letter to the  Ephesians262 as centering his message 
on the body, “…. both in its metaphorical meaning, that is, on the body of Christ which is the 
Church, and in its concrete meaning, that is on the human body in its perennial masculinity and 
femininity, in its perennial destiny for union in marriage, as Genesis says: ‘For this reason a man 
will leave his father and his mother and unite with his wife and the two will be one flesh’ (Gen. 
2:24).”263  JPII’s preliminary approach to this text was to reference Gaudium et Spes, saying that 
this text reveals—in a particular way—man to man himself and makes his supreme vocation 
clear (GS. 22:1) as he participates in the experience of the Incarnated One.  Mary Shivanandan 
sees JPII’s reflections on Ephesians 5 as reflecting his teachings on marriage and celibacy, the 
analogy which brings together the great mystery of Christ and the Church, redemption and the 
                                                          
262 In JPII’s thinking, there is no doubt that this letter to the Ephesians is genuinely of the Pauline corpus, even if it is 
imagined by some that it was an idea Paul entrusted to a later secretary.  The pope is at variance with biblical 
scholars who suggest that this letter was a later text adduced to Paul for credibility’s sake. 
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spousal meaning of love.264  In the light of Ephesians 5, JPII approaches the understanding of 
marriage from the dual dimensions of covenant/grace and the sacramental sign.  These two can 
be approached from the perspective of the mystery of Christ realized in the Church as an 
expression of the divine plan for redemption, and the Christian vocation of the baptized also seen 
within the idea of the redemption of the person and of the community as the body of Christ.  The 
text from Ephesians 5 reiterates the communitarian aspect of marriage, not simply as the union of 
spouses but as the familial relationship of parents and offspring, and its relationship and 
obligations with and in the society.  
The most contested part of Ephesians 5:21-33 is found in these verses: “Wives, be subject 
to your husband as you are to the Lord.  For the husband is the head of the wife as Christ is the 
head of the Church, he who is the savior of his body.  And as the Church is subject to Christ, so 
also wives ought to be subject to their husbands in everything.  And you, husbands, love your 
wives….” JPII’s exegesis of this text explains it thus:  
What is at issue here is a relationship with two dimensions or on two 
levels: reciprocal and communitarian… the reciprocal relations of husband and 
wife must spring from their common relation with Christ.  The text chosen… has 
a “parenetic” character, that is, the character of moral instruction.  The author of 
the letter wants to point out to the spouses how their reciprocal relations and all 
their behavior should be formed.  He draws the specific indications and directives 
as a conclusion from the mystery of Christ presented at the beginning of the 
letter…penetrating their hearts, kindling in them that holy “fear of Christ” (that is 
pietas), the mystery of Christ must lead them to “be subject to one another”:… 
Husband and wife are, in fact, “subject to one another,” mutually subordinated to 
one another.  The source of this reciprocal submission lies in Christian Pietas and 
its expression in love.265 
 
The command to love addressed to the husband in this text, and in light of contemporary 
sensibilities to the idea of the “subjection” of one to the other, takes away any fear that might be 
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created.  “Love excludes any kind of submission by which the wife would become a servant or 
slave of the husband, an object of one-sided submission.  Love makes the husband 
simultaneously subject to the wife, and subject in this to the Lord himself, as the wife is to the 
husband.”266  JPII interprets the vision of Ephesians 5 as not merely a discussion of the 
traditional and ethical bounds of marriage but as expressing consideration for the reciprocity 
required by the sacramental nature of marriage and which the Ephesians 5 text demands of 
spouses.  JPII affirms his position by stating that “…the teaching that belongs to this parenetic 
part of the letter is in some sense inserted into the very reality of the mystery hidden from 
eternity in God and revealed to humanity in Jesus Christ.”267  He states further, “In the letter to 
the Ephesians, we are witnesses, I would say, of a particular encounter of this mystery with the 
very essence of the vocation to marriage.”268 
JPII also draws attention to another salient yet equally important parallel that can be 
instructive to understanding the Ephesians 5 text, the analogy of the relationship that exists 
between Christ and the Church to the relationship between bride and groom in the spousal 
bound.  In this Pauline analogy, JPII locates a supplementary analogy of the head and the body, 
which is purely ecclesiological in its ontology.  JPII’s analysis posits that the text “speaks as if in 
marriage also the husband were ‘head of his wife’ and the wife ‘body of her husband,’ as if 
spouses also form an organic union.  This perspective can find its basis in the text of Genesis that 
speaks about ‘one flesh’ (Gen 2:24)…. especially in this passage at the beginning of Ephesians 
5:22-23, the ecclesiological dimension seems decisive and predominant.”269  In Shivanandan’s 
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explication, Christ is head, savior, and bridegroom; his redeeming love transforms into spousal 
love. According to her, “the head-body analogy is primarily of an organic nature implying the 
somatic union of the human organism, which also includes the psychic and bodily unity of the 
human person…. It is clear from the Genesis text that the man and woman are ‘two distinct 
personal subjects….’”270 Then quoting John Paul, she notes that “this analogy… does not blur 
the individuality of the subjects: that of the husband and wife, that is, the essential bi-subjectivity 
which is at the basis of the image of ‘one single body.’  In the whole passage ‘bi-subjectivity 
clearly dominates.’”271     
Shivanandan surmises that John Paul’s use of the Ephesians 5 text builds the catechesis 
on marriage and human sexuality on the basis of the following understanding: 
John Paul II calls marriage the “sacrament of creation.”  Marriage was created to 
make visible the invisible plan of God for humanity.  The invisible plan or 
mystery is God’s intention for mankind to participate in divine Trinitarian life for 
all eternity… Redemption in Christ after sin became the source of man’s 
supernatural endowment or gracing…. The mystery of God’s spousal love 
becomes visible in Christ.  Since the visible sign of marriage is linked to the 
visible sign of Christ and the Church, it has from the beginning transferred God’s 
eternal plan of love and salvation into the “historical” dimension.272 
 
 
 
Sexuality and Marriage in John Paul II’s Theology of the Body: 
JPII’s work in his anthropological, philosophical, and theological expose on the Theology 
of the Body centers on human sexuality in its core meaning as found in its nuptial understanding.  
Its method is truly new, especially considering his personalist approach, the attention given to the 
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gift of the self in marriage, and the extensive exegetical biblical foundations.  JPII moved away 
from the traditional focus on the “weakness” of the body (the flesh) and concupiscence to 
placing greater value on created humanity in the “beginning” and through redemption.273 The 
question can be raised if this is a departure from tradition or a development?  While the pope’s 
contribution maybe new and even “refreshing,” as some say it is, it does not deviate from 
Catholic tradition.  I agree with Mary Shivanandan when she states succinctly that “John Paul’s 
Theology of the Body and sex is both faithful to the tradition and frees it from certain negative 
evaluations.  Scripture has been his guide in this new interpretation, but he has also been aided 
by the Aristotelian and Thomistic concept of potency and act and a phenomenological analysis of 
human experience.”274  
The Theology of the Body examines questions about human sexuality in light of the 
totality of the human person; either in the sexuality of the celibate person or the sexuality of non-
celibate persons located within the marriage bond and expressed within its conjugality.  When 
JPII teaches about sexuality within marriage, he talks about the ontological and intrinsic nature 
of the human person as “designed” by the creator from the very beginning.  The arguments to 
support human sexuality within marriage, central to JPII’s thesis, hinge on the body as intrinsic 
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of man, who is made in the image of God, reveals the holiness of creation, but lust, which is the fruit of disordered 
desire, makes the woman especially an object and not a disinterested gift.  The body itself did not become evil, but 
man lost a sense of its nuptial meaning.  Redemption reaches into the interior of the person and makes possible again 
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to human beings who exist as bodily beings, within marriage; and this body, which is intrinsic to 
this one person, necessarily exists in a unity of body and soul, making the person a subject of his 
own moral acts.  As a bodily person within the marital union, the conjugal act constitutes the 
person’s bodily, subjective, and moral act.  It is in this sense that JPII argues that for the sexual 
act to be morally right, the unity of the person’s integrity as a human person in the union of body 
and soul must exist as an intrinsic good of self-integration.  Therefore, through mutual consent 
and mutual respect, marital intercourse as bodily union becomes a mutual gift between a man 
and his wife, becoming a communion of persons that is always open to the possibility of 
procreation, the gift of another life.   
At the same time, the sexual union of spouses is intrinsic to the nature of their union as a 
personal union, which is also directed at friendship and the development of love.  According to 
Echeverria, in JPII’s view, “the sexual act is much more than a natural bodily symbol; indeed, it 
embodies marital union, becoming bodily, or organically complete, and thus one, expresses total 
self-giving and makes it bodily present…”275  JPII’s claim that all individual persons, because 
they exist as a union of body and soul, possess the capacity for self-determination, and that it is 
through the medium of the individual person that human actions take place, that each person 
establishes his ethics of sex.  Echeverria interprets this assertion by JPII in the following context: 
In light of this truth, namely, that the sexual act is the bodily constituent or 
substratum of that multi-leveled union we call marriage, we can understand the 
profound significance of John Paul II’s theology of the body for the ethics of sex.  
Given that the human person is a unity of body and soul, it follows that the body 
is personal.  Rather than the body being extrinsic to the person, the subject and the 
human act, says the pope, or bodily existence being a mere instrument or extrinsic 
tool in the service of man’s consciously experiencing self, the body is the 
indispensable medium in and through which I reveal myself.  Human bodily 
existence has the character of a subject in and through which my actions are 
realized as bodily persons.  In other words, given man’s anthropological unity of 
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body and soul, he exercises the capacity for ethical self-determination as a whole 
man, meaning thereby in and through his body.276  
 
In such a case, the sexual act, when it does not bring about the union of spouses, involves 
merely an objectification for self-gratification.  Echeverria, therefore, submits that only marital 
sex “can constitute a real union of persons...  a constitutive element or substratum, a necessary 
condition, of marriage, which along with marital consent that conjugal intercourse fulfils, 
succeeds in realizing the fundamental but complex human good.”277  The goods of marriage that 
he highlights are “intimate human friendship” (“person-uniting”), procreation (which is “life 
giving”), and the good of personal integrity, which “entails one’s own bodily integrity, for one’s 
body is integral to one’s being as a human person.”278 
In his earlier work Love and Responsibility, JPII had clarified, and he re-affirmed in TOB, 
that “the proper foundation for a monogamous and indissoluble marriage is… the personalistic 
norm together with recognition of the objective aims of marriage.  From this norm also derives 
the prohibition of adultery in the broad sense of the word, and hence the prohibition of pre-
marital relations.”279  This text is essential because it establishes a coherency in thought and 
lineal agreement with magisterial tradition.  JPII in the same earlier work avers, “Only a 
                                                          
276 Ibid., 250. 
 
277 Ibid., 251. 
 
278 Ibid.  This view is also found in JPII’s encyclical Familiaris Consortio, #11. Echeverria reiterates: “… the 
creator’s sexual design for marriage, which is necessarily a bi-unitary bond of a man and a woman, that is, a two-in-
one-flesh covenantal union of mutual love… the male and the female must become complementary parts of a single 
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profound conviction of the non-utilitarian value of the person (of the woman for the man, of the 
man for the woman) enables us to justify fully, fundamentally and irrefutably, this ethical 
standpoint and try to observe it in practice.”280 
Critical Evaluations of John Paul II’s Theology of the Body 
The theology of the body in John Paul II’s hermeneutical pedagogy over a period of time 
has been subjected to scrutiny and critique, as any academic and ecclesiastical/magisterial 
positions are wont to be.  It is noteworthy also that theologies of the body and about the body 
have begun to spring up in more recent times, particularly since John Paul II’s Theology of the 
Body, more than at any other time in history.  I will offer what can be considered the basic 
themes in criticism of JPII’s TOB to demonstrate the current state of intellectual discourse on the 
matter.  It is worthwhile to note that these critiques themselves serve another purpose: that they 
sometimes establish that there is “movement” in doctrine because each critique takes off from a 
point where agreement becomes divergent, meaning that the original thesis forms grounds for 
contention.  To prove the point, the critique will not only have to argue why the thesis is wrong, 
but by so doing, will have to show tangibly what other thesis is placed alongside, before, or after 
the original thesis.  Putting these arguments side by side makes genuine development possible 
and visible. 
Questions relating to the body, embodiment, sexuality, and marriage in the last couple of 
decades have become relevant in many fields of study, relating to their meaning both within 
theological circles and outside of it in scientific scholarship.  Even though the following works 
are not written as a direct reaction to JPII TOB, from a purely scientific point of view, they offer 
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nuance to questions about the body or its embodiment and the ways in which they affect 
knowledge and the experience of the self.  In a co-authored article, the authors argue that in 
centuries of Christian theological thought, the physical body has been viewed as an integral part 
of personhood, which an entity is functioning in a psychosomatic union of body and soul.  
However, there is an alternative view within the same tradition that emphasizes a radical 
separation of the soul from the body, associating the sinful nature with the physical body and 
purity with the soul, and which tries to subjugate the excesses of the sinful body.  Using purely 
empirical data analysis and scientific means, the authors of this work investigate how religious 
beliefs effect sanctification in people’s body image and behavior using four constructs: body 
satisfaction, objectification, depersonalization, and awareness.  The authors surmise that 
“sanctification is related to a greater investment of time and energy into the sanctified domain of 
life.  Valuing and caring for one’s body requires consistent, regular attention, which might result 
in a lower frequency of feeling disconnected from one’s body.”281  Conversely, they make the 
claim that “adhering to religiously based negative attitudes towards the body, which accentuate 
the separation of the soul from the body, might over time result in a greater phenomenological 
experience of separation from the body consequently… sanctifying the body by viewing it as an 
integral part of oneself would be related to fewer feelings of dissociation from one’s body.”282  
With several analytical graphs and tables they conclude that body theology or embodiment 
understood from within the Judeo-Christian tradition as sanctification has “potentially  beneficial 
links to how people relate to their bodies, and extends them by demonstrating that sanctification 
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is lined to experiences of the body in addition to behaviors.”283  Their overriding conclusion is 
that “the religiously influenced views people hold about their bodies may impact the way they 
live their lives, their health, and even their psychological well-being.” 284 
In another work, similar to the one previously mentioned, Bonnie J. Miller-McLemore 
explores what attention theology and practical theologians pay to the idea of embodiment—the 
physical dimensions of bodies.  She argues that the interchangeable use of phrases like embodied 
knowing, embodiedness, cultural embeddedness or cultural constructions of the body might be 
the reason for the inadequate attention to physical embodiedness of bodies.  In stating her 
objective for writing this essay, she asserts, “I am interested in gaining a greater understanding of 
how physical (sensual, somatic, visceral, material, carnal, mortal, fleshly, vulnerable…) 
dimensions of our bodies inform our thought and knowing… What is the relationship between 
this dimension of human bodies and human knowledge?  And how do actual physical bodies 
shape religious and theological knowledge?”285  Miller-McLemore is convinced and argues for 
the position that theology and religion have inadvertently ignored physical bodies.  She claims 
that within Western intellectual cultures, detachment from bodies is often considered a mark of 
spiritual maturity, of morality, and of science.  She states that “late twentieth-century experts on 
moral and faith development who have had significant influence on pastoral theology… agree 
with cognitive development theorists that concrete thinking denotes immaturity rather than, for 
example, an imaginative or philosophically astute way of seeing the world.”286  She goes on to 
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question if this view “harbors unwarranted prejudice against material religion, bodies, children, 
laity, ritual, and the knowledge within physical acts of faith.”287  She is of the opinion that some 
of the recognition given to the physical body is a recent evolution in theological studies, using an 
analysis from Sam Gill, a religious studies scholar, who gives the example of the heavily robed 
and garbed bodies of both professors and clerics as paradigmatic, the academic and liturgical 
gowns reflecting a deep rooted cultural belief.  These garments may be re-translated as a 
transformation of the human body “into a cloth covered pedestal on which is prominently 
displayed the all-important head, the domain of mind and spirit.  Everything else from the neck 
down is under suspicion and so its articulation, its sexuality, its fleshiness, is to be covered, 
suppressed, denied.”288  She clarifies further that academic institutions themselves discipline the 
body to sit still and pay attention, with educational architecture and furnishing designed to limit 
mobility and thus to disembody.  Class room furnishings are designed and bolted to the floor to 
face in one direction only, the teacher and the chalk board.  According to Miller-McLemore, 
“Academic bodies are not natural bodies; they are bodies disciplined from their earliest days of 
school to privilege the head part and to develop agnosia with respect to everything from the 
mouth down.”289 She avers that the intellectual thrill constitutes the relief from entanglement 
with bodies, what she calls the “monological subject” of the modern scientific mindset-mind 
operating independently of bodies.  She poignantly states in her work, “The hubris of modern 
mind sustains a certain disdain for our mammalian bodies and the knowledge gained through 
them.  Thus, centuries after Greek Platonic thought shaped early religious history, basic 
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perceptions of bodies remain relatively unchanged.  The physical world, like the body, is still ‘a 
place of transit’, a temporary and dangerous place to be overcome and transcended.”290 
Her conclusion is not far from that of Jackson et al. when she says, in conclusion, 
“Theologians have begun to see and analyze the raced body, the disabled body, bodies whose 
physical attributes matter, bodies whose place in time and space make a difference.”291  Keeping 
the physical body in tension is paramount for Bonnie Miller-McLemore, and attending to 
research in the sciences and their investigation of physical bodies as dialogue partners and 
sources of insight, coupled with the normative hermeneutical resources  of the humanities, can 
guide newer discoveries about the human brain, hormones, genetics, evolution, and the totality of 
the physical body.  She concludes her work by stating, “At the very least, we have witnessed the 
complexity and necessity of taking physicality, biology, evolution, and neurology more 
seriously.”292  
Judith Butler theorizes in her work that the materiality of the body is constructed by 
cultural determinism prediscursive of ‘sex’ which acts as the reference point or in relation to how 
socially gender is constructed and produced.  Butler argues that the question of the materiality of 
the body is linked to the performativity of gender, a category that is always normative.  
Sex/gender is a construct which materializes through time, “the regulatory norms of ‘sex’ work 
in a performative fashion to constitute the materiality of bodies and more specifically, to 
materialize the body’s sex, to materialize sexual difference in the service of the consolidation of 
the heterosexual imperative.”293In doing her queer theology, Butler opines that “The forming of a 
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subject requires an identification with the normative phantasm of ‘sex’, and this identification 
takes place through a repudiation which produces a domain of abjection, a repudiation without 
which the subject cannot emerge.”294  Butler queries that within the culturally, politically and 
linguistically constructed gender idea, how and to what ends bodies are constructed (or not 
constructed), to what ends do bodies that materialize as other support bodies that materialize the 
norm, then qualify as bodies that matter.295 Butler goes further to question, 
How does that materialization of the norm in bodily formation produce a domain 
of abjected bodies, a field of deformation, which, in failing to qualify as the fully 
human, fortifies those regulatory norms?  What challenges does that excluded and 
abjected realm produce to a symbolic hegemony that might  force a radical 
rearticulation of what qualifies as bodies that matter, ways of living that count as 
‘life,’ lives worth protecting, lives worth saving, lives worth grieving.296 
 
Butler rejects the kind of social construct that creates ‘bodies’ in difference to other ‘bodies’ in 
such a way that some bodies matter and become oppressive of other bodies that are marginalized 
and doe s not matter. 
Father Charles Curran is perhaps the foremost theologian known for critiquing and 
highlighting John Paul II’s moral theology and theology of the body.  As is evident in his critique 
of the encyclicals of JPII in Chapter 1 of this work, his expertise will be relied on as an approach 
to a fundamental theological critique of the theology of the body, especially concentrating on 
human sexuality within marriage, as well as a platform for a critique of the theological 
foundations for JPII’s theological “building blocks.” The first ground of Curran’s critique is the 
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argument that JPII’s TOB is not based on a systematized approach because many areas remain 
unclear. These deficiencies are explored under the following four headings; first, the idea of the 
theology of the body, generally, as developed by JPII does not serve as a theology for all bodies.  
In Curran’s view, JPII’s TOB speaks to heterosexual bodies without addressing whether this is 
the only meaning of sexuality for the body.  There are single people, widowed people, and same-
sex couples to whom his theology of the body does not speak, to making it less a theology of the 
body and more of the nuptial body.  Second, Curran believes there is an overemphasis on the lust 
of the flesh, even though JPII clearly denounces a Manichean dualism between body and soul.  
JPII continually references and devotes a section to both the passage from the Sermon on the 
Mount about looking at a woman lustfully and thereby committing adultery with her in one’s 
heart, and Paul’s text in 1 Cor. 12:18-25, thereby building an idea of a persistent opposition in 
the heart  between the spirit and body.  Therefore, the “man of lust” after original sin is unable to 
subordinate the flesh under the guidance of the spirit as was possible in the state of original 
innocence.  JPII necessarily turns to the question of discipline and self-control against 
concupiscence and lust.  According to Curran, “John Paul II’s incomplete discussion of 
concupiscence, lust and self-control seems too one-sided.  Yes, sin affects the body; but it also 
affects the spirit.  Sin does not necessarily bring about an opposition between the higher and the 
lower parts of the human person….”297  He draws the conclusion that there is no absolute 
necessity for the sexual senses and passion to be controlled by reason as they also have the 
tendency to point to the good even though they are plagued by sin.  He makes the assertion that 
JPII in his TOB gives the impression that passion and sexual pleasure are always in need of 
taming.  “The pope does not seem to acknowledge a fundamental goodness about sexuality… 
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There is just an occasional remark along more positive lines, but the heavy emphasis of the talks 
remain on the negative reality of sexual passion and the need for spirit and reason to control 
it.”298  
Third, Curran questions JPII’s understanding of human love.  For Curran, because of the 
lack of a systematized approach mentioned earlier, human love is understood as the contrast 
between the selfless gift of self and the selfish use of the other for sexual self-fulfillment as if 
this “self-gifting” does not entail some human fulfilment and sexual pleasure.  Curran contends 
that JPPII is to be commended for developing the idea of marriage as mirrored after the covenant 
between Israel and God, and Christ and the Church in the incarnation and death of Jesus, 
commonly interpreted as “agape” love. JPII develops a Platonic and philosophical understanding 
of “eros” as erotic love and uses the Song of Songs from the Bible to present this love as another 
form of human love.  In this way, erotic love is no longer viewed as something completely 
negative but a good in itself.  Curran’s disagreement with JPII stems from what he posits as 
JPII’s inability to develop the mutuality and reciprocity parts of marital love in his talks.  Curran 
avers, “John Paul II does not discuss at length the proper love of self in marriage… the emphasis 
on love as a sincere gift of self—together with a narrow focus on Genesis—results in a 
somewhat romantic, narrow, and unreal understanding of marriage in its total life context.”299  
Curran asserts that it is thinking like this from the past that has limited the life, especially of 
married women, to the sphere of the home solely as wives and mothers without any 
consideration for their individual existence outside of their roles as married persons/bodies.  
Fourth and finally, Curran comments on the lack of proper treatment of sexual pleasure in JPII 
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talks.  He argues that JPII’s over insistence on self-control and the control of reason over the 
“unruly” passions and emotions, and the negative attitude associated with sexual pleasure, makes 
it difficult for him to develop this aspect of conjugal sexual encounter. 
Similar to Curran’s critique of JPII’s use of scripture in Chapter 1, in this section Curran 
critiques JPII’s use of scriptures on different grounds.  With specific reference to the use of 
scripture in developing the Wednesday catechesis, Curran opines that naturally, JPII uses 
scripture to support existing Catholic teachings.  As an academic metaphysician, he sees in the 
first account of creation in Genesis a deeply metaphysical content, but here again, Curran 
believes, he interprets scripture in the light of his own academic interests and presuppositions.  
Curran points out that in the pope’s appropriation of the two texts from the New Testament (Mt. 
19 and 1 Cor. 7), he uses only half a text without referring to what later Catholic theology calls 
the “Pauline privilege,” which gives grounds for remarriage and may be seen as such since it can 
contradict the pope’s position and condemnation of divorce in all cases.  Curran accuses JPII of 
ignoring other sources of moral wisdom and knowledge that have consistently characterized 
Catholic theological and moral tradition: for instance, lack of the development in the Natural 
Law theory and contemporary experience, especially in the light of the sensus fidelium (the sense 
of the faithful), which the Church recognizes as valid source of wisdom and truth. 
Methodologically, Curran points again to a lack of synthesized historical development 
and consciousness, which remains a largely static and classicist methodology and which makes 
Christian marriage the same at all times and in all places by insisting that the words of Christ 
essentially refer to every man of every time and place.  However, historically, it is known that 
many changes have taken place with reference to marriage even in its acceptance as a sacrament 
which did not happen until the Second Lateran Council of 1139, becoming explicit with the 
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Council of Verona in 1184.300 More important is the issue of the dissolution of marriage, in 
reference to which Curran uses John Noonan’s work Power to Dissolve to point out that it was 
not until the end of the twentieth century, according to Catholic Canon law, that the Church 
could dissolve five types of marriages.301   
On the question of virginity and celibacy in the Church, Curran asserts that because JPII 
bases his understanding on the lives of Jesus and Mary, and orients it to eschatology, the 
traditional superiority of the celibate life over marriage is necessarily located wholly on its link 
to the kingdom of God.  There seems then to be a division of the Christian community into two 
camps of those who are “perfect” owing to continence and those who are “less perfect” because 
they are married and engage in the gift of their conjugality.  Curran acknowledges that JPII tries 
to nuance this position by teaching that perfection comes about in the obedience to the rule of 
perfect love of God and of neighbor.  Vatican II also recognizes a universal call of all Christians 
to holiness and perfection.  Curran summarizes this position as a perception of the fundamental 
and primary vow of every Christian, like the vow at baptism.  All other vows, both at marriage or 
for religious life, “simply specify the basic baptismal vow and indicate the means by which one 
is going to strive for holiness.”302  Finally, Curran looks at JPII’s understanding and use of 
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complementarity and how it affects women’s vocations.  Curran states that in the bridegroom-
bride analogy, the traditional Catholic belief that women “receive” love in a passive role in 
gender differentiation is the basis upon which the subordination of women takes place.  It is 
according to this same kind of argument that JPII resists the non-inclusion of women in the rank 
of ordained priesthood in the Catholic Church.  Curran’s second problem with the idea of 
complementarity as used in JPII’s TOB is an overemphasis on the “dignity and vocation of 
women” which is limited to their maternal and family roles.  This is found in other encyclicals 
and writings of JPII, in which attention is not given to possible roles for women in the public 
sphere.   
Thirdly, Curran accuses JPII of putting women on a pedestal far removed from reality 
and the everyday struggles of life by asking women to rise to their vocation of bringing dignity 
to conjugal life and assuring the protection of the moral dimension of cultural life.  Finally, 
JPII’s treatment of the role of self-giving and service in the life of women (outside of mutual 
self-donation), Curran believes, places them in a position of self-subservience for life with little 
or no consideration for their own proper and individual self-love and personal fulfilment in life. 
Curran is also quick to acknowledge that JPII was a universal catechist and not a purely 
systematic theologian.  Notwithstanding these critiques, the pontiff’s work has moved the 
tradition forward in many ways, challenging the “Church in the modern world” to explore newer 
language and narratives to express to contemporary postmodern humanity why the Church 
teaches what she teaches, especially in the area of ethics and morality.   
Even though Mary Shivanandan’s work can be considered pro JPPII/TOB, she still 
critiques his treatment and interpretative schema of what it means to be male and female, spouse 
or parents.  She suggests that the difficulty might have arisen because of the emphasis JPII places 
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on each dimension in different contexts.  In Shivanandan’s view, the Pope sometimes seems to 
place mother before spouse, which obscures the recognition of woman first as a person, then 
spouse and then mother.  In line with the overall vision of TOB, it is in this realization of 
personhood that the woman can then fulfil her role as spouse and mother.  In addition, the first 
step of realizing the person logically leads to JPII’s treatment of Ephesians 5 concerning the 
mutual roles of bride and bridegroom.  Shivanandan’s critique on this point is relevant and 
worthy of note because JPII’s TOB is considered the first instance in which adequate 
consideration is placed on personalism. 
Susan Ross, among many other contemporary women theologians, speaks up for the 
feminist position to decry what feminists claim is modern day patriarchy couched in newer 
theological language, which still fails to take into account the sacrality of the feminine body.  In 
her work, Ross takes for her point of departure the inadmissibility of women to priestly 
ordination in Roman Catholicism and Orthodoxy—the most sacramental traditions in Christian 
history.  This she claims “perpetuates the ontological distinction between clergy and laity (which 
is also a distinction between the ‘male’ and ‘female’ elements in the Church.)”303  In Ross’s 
view, recent theological efforts influenced by phenomenology, such as the works of Hans Urs 
von Balthasar, Louis Boyer, and John Paul II, moved away from a sacramental theology of the 
body which was mainly male oriented and hierarchical.  Ross claims, however, that they remain 
essentially within the frame work of the ontological difference of male/female dichotomy.  She 
calls this theology a retrieval of the metaphysics of activity and receptivity, which remains 
rigidly traditional.  Taking phenomenology as a point of departure, these contemporary 
theologians perceive male bodies as “source” in generation and the female as “potential.”  In this 
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symbolism, by linking God to the active source and humanity to the receptive and coupled with 
the bridal imagery, especially as espoused by John Paul II in his encyclicals, this analogy 
reinforces the idea of the nature of women as receptive, as stated in John Paul II’s encyclical 
Mulieris Dignitatem: “The bridegroom is the one who loves.  The bride is loved: it is she who 
receives love, in order to love in return.”304  Ross argues that this sort of ambivalence and 
ambiguity about “bodiliness” on the part of these (male) theologians ultimately result in an 
ontological dualism which separates reality into opposing spheres that are mutually exclusive of 
one another. 
Feminists note that both incarnational and sacramental theology in Catholic tradition 
have laid more emphasis on male bodies so as to create a history of “sacramental sex 
discrimination.”  Ross argues that as things stand currently, incarnational and sacramental 
theology is hollow if the denigration of women’s bodies remain, if there is a persistent 
proscription against female bodies in terms of coming into contact with the holy, if women 
continue to be classified as ontologically different from and consequently inferior to men, and 
when negative sexual matters continue to symbolize women to men.  In which case, the body of 
Christ suffers a dualism and remains incomplete.  Ross also explicitly rejects the idea of 
“complementarity” because of the ways in which she sees complementarity valued.  Quoting 
Mary Jo Weaver,305 she posits, “I interpret ‘complementarity’ as ‘completing’ or ‘mirroring,’ 
which suggest a nature not complete in its own right.  It would follow therefore, that 
complementarity and inferiority are at least subliminally linked.”306 Interestingly, Ross refers to 
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the work of Naomi Goldenberg, who depends on Freud’s psychoanalysis to argue that human 
beings are essentially physical creatures whose emotional and mental experiences are derived 
from bodiliness.  This way of perceiving the body overcomes the alienation of body and soul 
caused by the dualism created by Western philosophical and religious thought.  Ross quoting 
Goldenberg states, “In order to stop disparaging the body, we might well have to give up all 
theism and take our inspiration from ideas which see human beings as nothing more (or less) 
than human.”307 The implication here is that Goldenberg sees dualism as dangerous for women’s 
self-understanding; therefore, theism within the Western philosophical and theological 
understanding must be abandoned to put a stop to this sexual disparagement against women’s 
bodies and create a purely new humanism. 
In all of the foregoing, Ross seeks to relocate a feminist theology that reacts against the 
alienation of the dualism of spirit over matter, male over female and mind over body.  To keep 
this structure in place is to erase the ancient ideas of the Gnostics and Manicheans, and to 
perpetuate sexism. According to Ross, “What is unspoken in this understanding of the body is its 
very ambiguity: that is, its toleration of different and even possibly conflicting meanings.”308  For 
many feminist theologians, the “self” means the unity of these diverse and ambiguous elements 
of selfhood, the physical and spiritual.  She asserts that “[f]eminist theology thus tolerates bodily 
differences and bodily ambiguity without sacrificing distinctions.  Difference is not to be 
overcome or placed in a hierarchy but valued as distinctive and contributing to the richness and 
variety of human experience.  Ambiguity is not to be dismissed or resolved dualistically, but 
explored as a way of amplifying and correcting the ways in which human experience is 
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interpreted.”309 Ross concludes that even though sacramental theology informed by feminism 
remains largely untried, yet feminists’ sacramental understanding and appreciation of the 
spiritual dimension of the physical reveals some recurring fundamental themes.  This 
understanding of the self is seen as “interrelated, historically situated, and embodied—that 
constitutes feminist theological anthropology.”  She concludes by saying, “What I have 
described here as a feminist critique of the sacramental tradition’s understanding of the body is 
not a whole sale rejection of any principle of sacramentality.  It is rather…a differentiated and 
historical understanding of the person which includes (or should one say ‘incorporates’) a 
concern for the body….”310    
John Nelson is widely recognized and acknowledged as one of the foremost contributors 
to the development of body theology and human sexuality in America.  In one of his seminal 
works,311 he argues for the position that taking bodily and sexual experiences seriously will help 
to reshape contemporary understanding of a theology of sexuality. He speaks of how theological 
perceptions and categories intersect with what it means today to be “a body” within the body of 
Christ.  He offers a historical analysis which locates the churches of the twenty-first century in 
the Victorian nineteenth century where everything sexual is reduced and located within the inner 
sanctums of one’s privacy.  Outside of privatizing the body, Victorian sexuality also privatized 
the spirit with an interesting twist to the Victorians’ understanding of the body-spirit split; there 
came a dramatic shift in the notion of Romanticism in terms of what it means to be male or 
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female.  Women suddenly were no longer viewed as the carnal opposite to men.  They were now 
more spiritual, more religious, and more moral than men.  This Victorian habit of putting women 
on a pedestal was bourgeois, white, upper class, and elitist; it did not include working class 
women in the “sweat-shops.”  Yet they were less rational than men, and their place was still in 
the private sphere of the home and at most the Church.  This privatization has met newer 
challenges in contemporary sexual issues because individual bodies exist within the public 
sphere and within the idea of creation and redemption.312  Nelson writes, “Thankfully, in recent 
years, mainline churches in the UK, the US, and elsewhere have increasingly recognized the 
public character of many sexuality issues.”313  For this reason, “churches have attempted to speak 
and act on such issues as gender and orientation justice, sexual abuse, commercialization of sex, 
family planning, population control, abortion, new reproductive technologies, teen pregnancy, 
pornography, and sexually transmitted diseases, including HIV/AIDS.”314 It is, therefore, self-
evident that questions of sexuality today are no longer a “Victorian secret” or in the private 
sphere but both public and communal.  
Nelson argues further that sexual theology is dialogical because it is born out of a 
common human sexual and bodily experience that has become part of our public discourse.  He 
advocates for embracing embodiment not “as curse or affliction, nor as incidental to our search 
for meaning, but as opportunity to learn the poetry of mortal dwelling and, understanding more 
of that poetry, to live differently.”315  This, he says, can be done by paying attention to three 
central Christian affirmations of the way of faith: “the paschal mystery of Christ – incarnation, 
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crucifixion and resurrection.”316 This model allows theology to speak to a society in which the 
distortion of sexuality, especially in the light of the subjugation of one gender to the other, is a 
question of power, fear and vulnerability.  In Nelson’s words, this vulnerability “so pronounced 
in heterosexism and male homophobia – are deeply connected with such sexually transmitted 
social diseases as violence, racism and environmental deterioration… It may yet be that the 
conversation of our sexual bodies with the Christic meaning of the cross will illuminate them 
further.”317  In this way Nelson imagines a sexuality that encapsulates all bodies, including the 
body of the created order around us.  His vision of an integral sexuality leaves the door wider 
open and encapsulates the “other” and “things,” thereby challenging the traditional Christian 
approach to sexuality as limited to humanity with a superior role granted to the male gender over 
the female.      
 Conclusion 
When either TOB is critiqued directly or questions about the human person, embodiment, 
sexuality, and marriage are raised, both are volatile and heavily contested battle grounds, and 
more so in the conversation between postmodern liberal humanism and doctrinal orthodoxy.  A 
careful read of JPII’s work shows a passionate yet highly intellectual exploration of matters that 
are of the utmost significance and importance to both the celestial and earthly domains.   John 
Grabowski summarizes JPII’s seminal corpus, TOB, and his other works thus: 
The common thread which unites all of John Paul’s teaching…is a focus 
on the human person in the light of the mystery of Christ.  While much of the 
teaching of Paul VI in Humane Vitae was based on an appeal to the natural law, 
John Paul II consistently bases his teaching, not only on the dignity of the person, 
but on biblical revelation.  Thus it is primarily an exposition of various biblical 
texts which frames the teaching offered within the catechesis on the theology of 
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the body, Mulieris Dignitatem, and Evangelium Vitae.  This is consistent with the 
Pope’s teaching as a whole.  Whether grounding his understanding of morality 
within the invitation to discipleship which Jesus extended to the rich young man 
of Mathew 19 (cf. Veritatis Splendor), or his theology of work within the opening 
chapters of Genesis (cf. the social in Laborem Exercens), John Paul II has 
attempted to make the human person revealed in the light of Christ the basis of 
the Church’s teaching in sexual, social and medical morality.318  
 
John Paul II’s Theology of the Body represents today the current magisterial position on 
human sexuality, marriage, and sex.  There is no doubt that the pope brings a new dimension, a 
new vision, and a new language into how we perceive and converse on the Church’s position and 
the liberal-modernist position.  As it is evident from the last section of this chapter, there is still a 
lot to unpack and re-investigate, especially in the light of newer moral and ethical questions of 
our time.  Whatever these questions might be, John Paul II has opened a greater avenue to 
discussing these issues, doctrinally, theologically, philosophically, and with a new humanism. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
NATURAL LAW, CONTEMPORARY THINKING, AND  
MARRIAGE AS A BASIC GOOD 
This chapter considers questions of sexuality and marriage in light of natural law, with 
special attention to Thomas Aquinas and the philosophers/theologians Germain Grisez and John 
Finnis. The Aristotelian/Scholastic natural law theory vis-à-vis the attempt at reformulation from 
the new proponents of natural law is too wide a field for extensive study here. Thus, this chapter 
will be limited to an overview for purposes of situating natural law theory in relation to 
traditional Catholic doctrine on marital and sexual morality. This material is also reviewed by 
way of supporting the argument that natural law theorists across the ages all agree and perceive 
that marriage and human sexuality is a basic human good.  
Natural law theory has enjoyed a revival319 in the last few decades in such fields as moral 
philosophy and theology. The resurgence of the natural law debate inadvertently re-sparked an 
age old moral discourse which is argued along two major lines: whether the natural law theory 
needs divine causality or can exist without it.320 Contested is the question of the relationship 
between natural law (in the sense in which it is understood within moral philosophy when it 
                                                          
319 Some theorists like Leo Strauss, George Sabine, and J.B. Schneewind argue that scholastic natural law theory 
collapsed entirely and that its resurgence is the birthing of the new natural law theory. However, some others like 
David Braybrook argue otherwise. Braybrook states, “My contention that the core of St. Thomas’ natural law theory 
survives in a successful natural law theory upheld by the modern authors… in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries… [But] became secularized as a rationalistic theory before being displaced by an empirical approach to 
ethics… [It] was superseded and lost from sight; but did not collapse. The empirical foundation proclaimed for it 
was not a complete innovation, since it was foreshadowed in earlier authors- in St. Thomas… and clearly revived by 
Hobbes and Locke. David Braybrook, The Natural Law Modernized (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 
17.  
 
320 “[Aquinas’s] natural law doctrine is embedded in a larger philosophical and theological context. For instance, 
natural law theory requires a normative view of nature, one that implicitly rejects a purely mechanistic natural 
science in favor of a philosophy of nature that appeals to formal and final causality. An account of natural law also 
requires certain metaphysical and theological presuppositions since it presumes that nature is governed by divine 
providence.” John Goyette, Mark Latkovic and Richard Meyers (eds.), St. Thomas Aquinas and the Natural Law 
Tradition: Contemporary Perspectives (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 2004), ix. 
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gives an account of the human good) and its theological implications. This contention centers on 
the relationship between faith and reason, and nature and grace.321 A philosophical and 
theological controversy on this issue resonates with reformation thinkers like Martin Luther and 
Calvin.  They in turn build their reflections on previous works of Suarez, Grotius and Pufendorf.  
Intellectualism or voluntarism became a way of exploring the necessity of theism as an essential 
aspect of natural law thinking; for Luther and Calvin, “morality as such concerns human life on 
earth.  It extends no further… And it can have no hold on God.”322 
Historically, natural law theory (NLT) is traced back to the Stoics, with definite historical 
links to the pre-Socratic schools, Plato, Aristotle, and other Greek philosophers. Broadly, in Stoic 
natural law theory we find “concepts of divine governance, of rationality or logos embedded in 
nature, universal human equality and brotherhood… and harmonizing oneself with nature.”323 
Timothy O’Connell avers that Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics in some sense depends on the 
natural law for its validity, but Aristotle did not use the exact term or anything of its equivalent. 
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322 J.B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Philosophy (London: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), 36.   Samuel Pufendorf’s voluntarism seem to encapsulate Luther and Calvin’s later position, as it is 
stated by J.B. Schneewind, “… voluntarism itself bears on two major aspects of moral theory.  It affects both our 
understanding of the ontological position of morality in the universe, and our understanding of our moral relation to 
God. 
The ontological significance of the doctrine of moral entities is fairly definite.  It is a major effort to think through a 
new understanding of the relation of values and obligations to the physical world.  It presents a new response to the 
developing scientific view of the world as neutral with respect to value.  Accepting the concept of a purely natural 
good dependent on the physical relations of things to humans, [Pufendorf] refuses to see it as the sole kind of value, 
and insists that moral norms and conventional values of all kinds are conceptually independent of it... Moral entities 
are inventions, some of them divine, most of them human.  Their ontological status gives us no reason to doubt their 
ability to serve their purpose. 
… Only voluntarism leaves God untrammeled… and what makes Pufendorf’s voluntarist account of the 
construction of morality so striking, is that humans are accorded the ability to construct functioning moral entities in 
just the way that God does, and just as efficaciously.  It takes God to get the process started; but God has made us so 
that constructive willing is part of our normal rational activity… That God keeps watch on his creation does not 
entail that we should expect any special help from him.” Cf. p. 139-140  
 
323 Howard P. Kainz, Natural Law: An Introduction and Re-Examination (Chicago, Illinois: Open CourtPublishing 
Company, 2004), 13. 
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In his Rhetoric, Aristotle refers to an unchanging universal law,324 and this passage is often 
quoted to ground Aristotelian natural law theory. The “law which is binding on all men” seems 
to establish a foundation for the natural law in Aristotle. Howard Kainz finds Plato ambiguous 
with regard to the natural law. Kainz states that in the Republic, Plato offers an approximation by 
analogy “in his discussion of the formal idea of justice as ‘the just by nature (to phusei 
dikaion).’”325 Kainz therefore concludes that in Plato, the concept of an ideal abstract “divine” 
law, existing prior to all human affairs, bears a resemblance to NLT; they are an “adumbration of 
some higher law, they fall short of an attempt to develop an explicit theory of the natural law.”326 
Stoic philosophers, later explicating Aristotle, developed the theory that they defined as “an 
objective reality placed on human kind to conform to the giveness of reality.”327 The Roman 
civilization, building on preexisting Greek thinking, developed the idea of natural law further as 
“the law of the natural order and human nature and, in fact, compared and contrasted that law 
with the other laws of their experience.”328 From Cicero329 to the legal philosopher Gaius and the 
                                                          
324 “Universal law is the law of Nature. For there really is, as everyone to some extent divines, a natural justice and 
injustice that is binding on all men, even on those who have no association or covenant with each other… Not of 
today or yesterday it is, but lives eternal: none can date its birth. Nay, but, an all-embracing law, through the realms 
of the sky Unbroken it stretcheth, and over the earth’s immensity.” Aristotle, Rhetorica, as quoted in Kainz, 6. 
 
325 Ibid., 5. 
 
326 Ibid.  
 
327 Timothy E. O’Connell, Principles for a Catholic Morality (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1990), 150. 
 
328 Ibid., 151. 
 
329 According to Kainz, Cicero is said to have given the first clear systematic development to the concept of natural 
law in On the Republic where he established the content of the natural law theory on which others would later build 
on: “True law is right reason conformable to nature, universal, unchangeable, eternal, whose commands urge us to 
duty, and whose prohibitions restrain us from evil. Whether it enjoins or forbids, the good respect its injunctions, 
and the wicked treat them with indifference. This law cannot be contradicted by any law, and is not liable either to 
derogation or abrogation. Neither the senate nor the people can give us any dispensation for not obeying this 
universal law of justice. It needs no other expositor and interpreter than our conscience. It is not one thing at Rome 
and another at Athens; one thing today and another to-morrow, but in all times and nations this universal law must 
forever reign, eternal and imperishable. It is the sovereign master and emperor of all beings. God himself is its 
author, its promulgator, its enforcer. And he who does not obey it flies from himself, and does violence to the very 
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Categories of Ulpian, the Romans distinguished between three forms of law: jus civile (civil 
law), jus Gentium (law of the nations) and jus natural (the natural law). According to O’Connell, 
the Roman contribution to structuring the idea of natural law raised two questions: first, is the 
idea of the natural law to be understood as an obligation (perceived by reason) to conform to 
nature? Or, second, or is it to be perceived as an obligation (built into nature) to use reason in 
moral judgement? These questions, according to O’Connell, are the questions succeeding 
cultures have turned to repeatedly. The Stoics, depending on an Aristotelian framework, created 
concepts upon which the natural law theory would be defined: the idea of a divine legislator, 
human rationality, rights and human respect, and coordination with nature.  
In Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae, approaching the natural law can be understood within 
the framework of nature and the types of law synthesized by philosophy and theology. There is 
in Aquinas a cryptic separation of divine laws as it is set out in the scriptures and the eternal and 
universal laws governing the universe and rational beings. Aquinas places this eternal and 
universal law as workable in a union of nature and grace, thereby situating his definition within a 
strictly theological frame work. Every other kind of (jus) law is based on the natural law, which 
bears an imprint of the divine legislator on the heart. It follows that because human beings 
generally are inclined to want to achieve ends congruent to their nature, they thereby participate 
in the natural law. In Kainz’s estimation, natural law in Aquinas “is the actual participation in the 
eternal law, facilitated by human inclinations to implement the will of the divine legislator. 
These natural inclinations lead humans to cooperate in divine providence, even though they may 
not be aware that they are doing so. The primordial springboard for human participation in the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
nature of man. And by so doing he will endure the severest penalties even if he avoid the other evils which are 
usually accounted punishments.” Marcus Tullius Cicero, On the Republic, translated by Charles Duke Yonge 
(London: H.G. Bohn, 1853), III, 22, as quoted in Kainz, Natural Law, 10-11. 
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eternal law is the fundamental rational apprehension that ‘good is to be done and pursued, and 
evil is to be avoided.’ This is the ‘first precept’ of the natural law.”330 Natural law is a “dynamic 
mediating factor, which helps maintain a harmonious relationship between the divine laws on the 
one hand, and human laws on the other.”331 Aquinas’ contribution to the construction of the 
natural law theory remains invaluable up till contemporary times. In a later section in this 
chapter, his philosophical construct will be discussed. The later scholastics viewed natural law as 
“a participation or reflection of the eternal law, inciting humans at best to a voluntary 
implementation of the ontological, biological and rational telos of human nature.332 Within 
Catholic tradition, this is referred to as the scholastic synthesis in the late 19th and early 20th 
century manuals.  
There other natural law philosophers of the 16th and 17th century whose “development” or 
“adjusting” of Thomistic Natural Law became notable. Our consideration here includes 
Francisco Suarez (1548-1617), Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) and Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1694), 
among many others. Westerman identifies these three as revealing the conceptual fissures 
underlying the Thomistic tradition are shown.333  
Suarez’s points of departure from Aquinas relate to an altered metaphysical assumption, a 
critique of Aquinas’s proof of God from motion, and Aquinas’s distinction between essence and 
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331 Ibid., 24. Bruno Schuller, SJ, defines the natural law as follows: “From the side of the knowing subject natural 
law can be defined as the complexus of all those moral (and legal) norms of behavior knowable to man by reason 
independently of God’s revelation. For without access to revelation man can only rely on the natural humanity of 
mankind for the validity and meaning of moral commands….Natural moral law is man’s potential oboedentialis for 
the lex gratiae.” Bruno Schuller, “Can Moral Theology Ignore Natural Law?” in Introduction to Christian Ethics: A 
Reader, ed. Ronald P. Hamel, and Kenneth R. Himes, OFM (New York: Paulist Press, 1989), 408. 
 
332 Ibid. 31. 
 
333 In this section, I am deeply indebted to the works of Pauline C. Westerman, Howard Kainz, and John Goyette, 
Mark S. Latkovic, and Richard S. Myers. All their works are carefully referenced in this text. 
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existence.334 Suarez’s differences on these points notwithstanding, he agrees with Aquinas on a 
host of other issues. For instance, he agrees with the idea of a link between the natural law and 
Divine and eternal law. These he claims we have knowledge of first, through the natural light of 
reason and second, through the Decalogue. According to Westerman, Suarez refers to the last 
seven of the Ten Commandments and St. Paul’s teaching in Romans 2:14-15 as demonstrating 
that God’s eternal laws are written on the heart. She asserts further if one is looking for empirical 
confirmation of the rational application of the natural law, “the ‘law of the nations’ is the closest 
approximation to it.”335 In his book II, Treatise on Law,336 Suarez develops a hierarchy 
concerning the application of natural law. He differentiates between lex naturalis (the law of 
nature) and ius naturale (natural law). Suarez’s work opened up questions about individual rights 
and locating the three fundamental inclinations of human nature as individuality, mortality and 
rationality. This is quite divergent from Aquinas’s acceptance of what is common to humanity 
and all beings and animals. However, he maintains a commonality between grounding these 
inclinations and Aquinas/scholastic/Aristotelian moral virtues: temperance and fortitude are the 
same as preserving one’s life, chastity parallels the preservation of the species, and prudence is 
associated with the use of reason to pursue social harmony and spiritual development.337 Like 
Aquinas, Suarez accepts civil laws enacted by competent authority to be binding on all in their 
own right. However, when civil law contradicts natural law, “positive law is superseded, and can 
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335 Kainz, Natural Law, 26. 
 
336 Francisco Suarez, “A Treatise on Law and God the Lawgiver,” in Selections from Three Works by Francisco 
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even be nullified.”338 Suarez’s effort was not so much to reconstruct scholastic natural law but an 
attempt to find “how the precepts of natural law can play a role in the ius civile as well as in the 
ius Gentium.”339 Suarez argues overall that human rational nature is the foundation for natural 
law. The divine will necessarily means that rational nature and perception have obligatory 
precepts. Suarez advocates rational creatures’ adoption of God’s laws but, as rational beings, 
they must exercise some dominium, because all law invariably deals with the regulation of 
humanity’s dominium. 
Hugo Grotius, a Dutch jurist, is a Protestant lawyer whose work lays out the modus 
vivendi for balancing the competing claims of the emerging nation-states of his time. Westerman 
claims he “rehabilitated natural law in the Protestant world as the proper basis for international 
law; he is even heralded as the founder of a new science of natural law.”340 Grotius’s 
development of natural law theory is seen as furthering Suarez’s work, with slight theoretical 
innovations in the internal and overall structuring of the natural law arguments. His thesis is to 
reconstruct the notion of “nature” and “divine” differently from the natural law tradition. In 
Grotius’s work, nature is the proximate source of the natural law and its starting point. 
Westerman states, “By establishing human nature as the intermediate link between God and His 
laws, he short circuited the discussion about the kind of role God plays in a concept of natural 
                                                          
338 Ibid, 30. 
 
339 Westerman, The Disintegration, 80. Regarding Suarez’s overall ambitious project of reconstruction, Westerman 
opines, “…. Suarez’s theory should be understood as the attempt to rescue natural law from the charge that it infers 
norms from facts. The three pillars that together form the foundation of natural law are designed in order to avoid 
the impression that it is only nature (facts), or only nature plus reason (ought-statements) which give rise to moral 
obligations. In order to turn normative statements into real obligatory norms, additional divine obligation is needed.” 
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law.”341 By following this trajectory, Grotius brings together reason, will, and nature as the basis 
for human nature. In Grotius, there is a distinction between natures ontologically, as understood 
by the scholastics, and rational nature. A distinction is also made between “volitional divine law” 
and the law of nature. Based on these distinctions, Kainz asserts that the notion that the natural 
law can be valid without the idea of God precedes Grotius. However, Kainz thinks that “Grotius 
made this point more explicitly and forcibly, and is frequently credited with the ground breaking 
proto-modern attempt to disengage natural law from the question of the existence of a divine 
legislator.”342 Grotius explains that the separation of the natural law from any essentialist 
religious or theological links is possible owing to the social nature of Homo sapiens and the need 
to maintain civility among them for maintaining the social order. “Grotius takes the intrinsically 
social, altruistic nature of rational beings as the pivotal principle on which the dictates of natural 
law hinge—even if there were no God.” In Westerman’s opinion, Grotius’ construct is an idealist 
at the best whose essential traits do not fit harmoniously together. Westerman concludes that 
there is a profound ambiguity in the definition of the various traits and the relationship between 
these essential traits of human nature.343 The differentiation between natural law and natural 
rights begin to take shape out of Grotius’s thinking. In consequent history, the effect of this 
separation marks a crucial position in international and philosophical jurisprudence. 
Samuel Pufendorf, a German philosopher, formulates a set of absolute and conditional principles 
to situate the human need for society and the attainment of societal equilibrium. Pufendorf’s 
absolute duties include doing no harm to others, valuing and treating others naturally as equals, 
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and being of value to others as long as it can be done conveniently. The “conditional” duties, 
according to Kainz, “have to do with mutual agreements which results in rules, contracts, and 
conventions to assure and maintain sociability and mutual trust.”344 In Pufendorf’s work, 
interpersonal relations requiring belief in God justify the obligations connected with human 
nature; thereby he was able to arrive at duties to one’s self. Pufendorf is regarded as the 
“mediator” between Grotius and Hobbes without shying away from an “immutable standard on 
the basis on which positive law can be evaluated.”345 He distanced himself from those who 
separate or try to collapse natural law and natural rights. While Suarez argues for nature as part 
of the foundations for natural law, Pufendorf claims an impositio by intelligent beings, God or a 
human being. In Pufendorf’s thinking, on the basis of nature “it is no longer possible to arrive at 
rational judgements about good and evil. Moral distinctions are the products of a rational 
impositio that comes from without and that should be added to nature. God imposes moral 
entities; human beings add norms and values to a physical substratum.”346 That is, the physical 
world around us has meaning because human beings add such value to it. Westerman restates 
Pufendorf’s view that human beings do not impose their values upon an empty world, but that 
“Divine imposition is prior to human imposition. We are therefore not born as mere physical 
‘substrata’ but as human beings…. They are already value-laden by God’s imposition.”347 
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In Pufendorf’s natural law, all that is known is that man’s nature is governed by the law of God, 
which is not subject to rational inquiry. “Natural law and divine law are ontologically identical. 
This means that we can only judge or criticize positive law by means of that God-ordained 
law.”348 These principles derived from God, which grant the grounds for the notion of moral 
rights, is universal for all human beings. Pufendorf therefore evaluates “positive law, as well as 
social contract that forms the basis of positive law as consistently informed by this notion of 
moral rights and the corresponding so-called ‘absolute’ duties.” 349 The notion of moral rights 
stabilizes positive law and dispenses a citizen’s obligation to obedience or dissent if positive law 
were to be in conflict with individual or collective moral rights. In the conclusion to this era, the 
theories of Suarez, Grotius, and Pufendorf provide a key to understanding how the Natural Law 
Theory of Aristotle, Aquinas, and the Scholastics shifted into neo-liberal and 
political/jurisprudence natural law theories. Pufendorf’s theory is seen as “the last attempt to 
provide a theory in which an explanation of social phenomena and a justification of these 
phenomena in the light of universal principles are tied together with one comprehensive 
theoretical frame work.”350 Westerman avers that after Pufendorf, two separate branches 
developed which had nothing in common with the natural law theory but which continue to 
shape the intellectual world we now inhabit more thoroughly than any natural law theory that 
preceded it.351 
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With Immanuel Kant and his proposal for a categorical imperative, as well as some work 
from contemporary natural law theorists, there is an attempt to ground the natural law purely on 
human reason rather than in nature. These theorists consider “nature to be completely extrinsic to 
reason and thus of no moral value.”352 Kant tries to account for justifying principles by which he 
extends the gap between “is” and “ought” on the claim that they are both logically and 
ontologically different.  In this account, “the empirical world is irrelevant to moral discourse. 
Unambiguously, Kant contrasts the empirical laws of nature with normative laws that can only 
be supplied by reason. Inclination and passions belong to the realm of nature.”353 Here we note 
immediately the divergence from Aristotelian-Scholastic natural law. For Kant, hypothetical 
imperatives can lead to subjective goals as means, not ends, which will be intrinsically good and 
universally reasonable. Since Kant allows no room for nature, he therefore relies on pure reason. 
Kant, Bentham, and Locke’s influence on this aspect is noteworthy because they influenced the 
crafting of the “American constitution, with its emphasis on human equality, and self-evident 
rights to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness.”354  
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Natural Law, 18. 
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When “natural law” is referred to in contemporary times, its interpretation will depend 
largely on the tradition from which it is referenced. The Natural Law Theory has evolved over 
time and can indicate the various ways in which morality, religion, politics, and society can 
interact and inter-mingle. “The expression ‘natural law’ is a familiar one in several normative 
contexts. Within the discipline of jurisprudence, for example, it names the most common 
alternative to legal positivism. In political philosophy it is frequently used to refer to theories of 
political obligation distinct from the prevailing social contract and natural rights views. In moral 
philosophy and theology, ‘natural law’ refers to a distinctive conception of the foundations of 
moral responsibility.”355 Within these various fields, there now exist differences in the 
interpretation of moral and ethical codes within the natural law and theorists. Within these 
differing positions, the task of the natural law can be summed up as such “that there exist some 
supervening meta-laws, or as working toward a clarification of such laws, or as the specification 
of just what the laws are.”356 Or as clarified further by Kainz, “…as one of a group of theories 
that emphasize the objectivity of morality…. a subset of moral norms that are not merely the 
products or creation of subjective intentions, but based in human nature, the nature of society, or 
evolving nature.”357 Because of the varied interpretations given to “law” and “nature,” the 
definition of the natural law is varied and often complex.358  
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 One of the major divergent aspects of the natural law is that “some criticize natural law 
as being too closely connected with religion, in the sense that the magisterium of the Catholic 
Church and Catholic ‘scholastic’ philosophers, have traditionally promoted natural law as the 
paramount moral theory.”359 Within the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition, upon which the natural 
law theory is built in the Catholic tradition, it is seen as embracing the whole question of 
morality. “It is understood as the order of things assigned to man by his creator for the 
development of his human qualities. This order is to be rationally known and used as the basis 
for free action.”360 The ontological starting point of Catholic natural law theory is found in the 
nature of man and in the idea that there is a divine thought in the roots of all created being, in the 
nature and essence of things, which is to be respected by all. This principle demands of every 
human being a morality which is not merely juridical but is the structure of a moral order which 
is assigned by God to man in creation and imposed on him as the goal of self-fulfillment.361  
Since Vatican I, the Catholic Church has continually re-affirmed through various 
encyclicals362 and official Church documents that in spite of original sin, human beings “can 
know the norms of morals and rights independently of the words of revelation; the doctrine of 
the natural law is one of the foundations which Christians can use to discuss ethical questions 
with all men.”363 This position is clarified and understood to mean that “the ontological basis and 
the knowability of the natural law gives it universal validity and make it the criterion of all 
                                                          
359 Ibid., xiii. 
 
360 Karl Rahner, Cornelius Ernst and Kevin Smyth, eds., Sacramentum Mundi: An Encyclopedia of Theology. 
(Montreal: Herman-Herder-Foundation, 1969), 157. 
 
361 Ibid. 
 
362 Especially in the encyclical Humani Generis. 
 
363 Rahner et al., Sacramentum Mundi, 158. 
 
140 
 
legislations.”364 The tradition understands that humanity is still discovering the full essence of its 
being and nature; thus, knowledge of the natural law is also in a historical process that brings 
new perspectives, which can be more precise or altered. Within this understanding, the Church 
claims “that there is a true natural law and hence moral duties deriving from the nature of man 
which are knowable by human reason at least in their fundamental structure.”365  
Relatively recently, because of the rapid changes in the field of ethical studies, and with 
greater consideration as well as opposition being directed at the magisterial position on certain 
issues of sexual, marital, and moral questions grounded in the natural law theory, what is 
regarded as “The New Natural Law Theory”’366 (NNLT) has evolved. This theory offers a 
comprehensive and philosophically systematized argumentation against contraception, abortion, 
homosexuality, and other issues along such lines against which the Church has taken a stand. 
Catholic moralists, ethicists, and philosophers like Germain G. Grisez, John Finnis, Robert 
Shaw, Robert George, Joseph Boyle, and a host of others are proponents of this position. Grisez, 
who collaborates often with John Finnis, is generally recognized as the father of the NNLT.367 
Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274): Natural law theory generally predates Aquinas, yet his 
contribution to our understanding of this theory remains invaluable. In Aquinas, natural law 
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proceeds from a human being’s capacity to live and react as a rational, social, and political 
animal. For Aquinas, divine laws, God’s self-disclosure and intervention in human history, help 
humanity to participate rationally as a part of a cultural whole, and human beings also make laws 
to guide the whole. However, he posits that “every law as far as they partake of reason, are 
derived from the eternal law”368 and natural law is the “rational creature’s participation in the 
eternal law…founded on human nature which is shared by all human beings. It regards primarily 
those things which pertain to human nature: …. the preservation of the species, the inclination of 
the good which is possessed by the human person in accordance with reason.”369 For Aquinas, 
the self-evident general principles of practical reason are the primary precepts of natural law, 
which is theoretic reason; “the good” is the first principle to be comprehended by practical 
reason. Aquinas states, “....every agent acts for an end, an end which is pursued as ‘the good.’ 
Consequently, the first principle of practical reason is founded on the notion of good, namely 
that good which all things seek after. Hence, the first principle of natural law: that good is to be 
done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided.”370 The Catholic Church re-affirms the 
gnoseological background given by Aquinas to the understanding of the natural law when in 
Gaudium et Spes, she declares, “Deep within their consciences men and women discover a law 
which they have not laid upon themselves and which they must obey. Its voice, ever calling them 
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to love and to do what is good and to avoid evil, tells them inwardly at the right moment: do this, 
shun that, for they have in their hearts a law inscribed by God.”371 In the Summa, Aquinas states,  
Human beings have a natural inclination to accomplish the general ends 
congruent with their nature, and this inclination is a mark or impression of the 
eternal law in which they are participating. Natural law thus is the actual 
participation in the eternal law, facilitated by human inclinations to implement the 
will of the divine legislator. These natural inclinations lead humans to cooperate 
in divine providence, even though they may not be aware that they are doing so. 
The primordial springboard for human participation in the eternal law is the 
fundamental rational apprehension that “good is to be done and pursued, and evil 
is to be avoided.” This is the “first precept” of the natural law.372 
 
In developing the notion of reason and faith, Aquinas argues that they cannot contradict each 
other because they have God as their common source.  
Key to understanding Aquinas are two approaches to the question of the natural law: first, 
human reason, which even though crippled by sin is yet capable of knowing the natural law, 
especially within the nature of the human person. Second, even though natural law is knowledge, 
which can be independent of divine revelation, it does not follow that it does not recognize 
divine revelation. Being falls within the ordering of those things apprehended by all, but within 
the apprehension of practical reason is the good ordered toward action.373 According to Aquinas, 
every agent acts for the sake of an end, which has the character of a good, which grounds the 
first principle of practical reasoning on the notion of good which all rational beings desire:374  
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Therefore, the first precept of law is that good ought to be done and pursued and 
that evil ought to be avoided. And other precepts of the law of nature are founded 
upon this principle…..there is an ordering of the precepts of the natural law that 
corresponds to the ordering of natural inclinations. 
 
First, man has an inclination toward the good with respect to the nature he shares 
in common with all substances… Second, man has an inclination toward certain 
more specific [goods] with respect to the nature that he shares in common with 
the other animals. Accordingly, those things are said to belong to the natural law 
which nature teaches all the animals, i.e., the union of male and female, the 
education of offspring, etc. Third, man has an inclination toward the good with 
respect to the rational nature that is proper to him… those things are related to this 
sort of inclination belong to the natural law, e.g., that a man avoid ignorance, that 
he not offend the others with whom he has to live in community, and other such 
things related to this inclination. 
Insofar as all these precepts of the law of nature are traced back to a single first 
principle, they have the character of a single natural law.375 
 
Aquinas adds and distinguishes three component parts to practical reasoning: synderesis, 
conscientia, and prudential. In these ways Aquinas is able show how he conceives ways by 
which individuals deliberate and arrive at virtuous decisions on moral matters, and how these 
three components affect the legislative process. The “virtuous man” is key to understanding 
Aquinas’s moral theory, one who possesses wisdom, one who acts according to right reason and 
has well-tempered affections.  
 Aquinas understands synderesis to be that pure part of the soul that is untouched by 
original sin, that “passive and innate disposition by which we can understand the starting point or 
‘seed-bed of all subsequent knowledge,’ the first principle of practical reasoning.”376 Synderesis 
is said to be the human power of understanding at its highest peak, known as the “angel’s eye.” 
This is an ability to grasp things at once, a guarantee of non-error; it links human beings with 
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higher creatures and separates them from irrational creatures. It also guarantees choices made in 
freedom (free will); the ability to freely choose how to pursue and do that which is good.377 
Aquinas avers that synderesis also grasps principles; in a first instance, the first principle of the 
natural law, “good is to be done and pursued while evil is to be avoided,” and in the second 
instance, he refers to the principles that are natural inclinations in creatures—sociability, self-
preservation, and a desire to know God.378  
 Conscientia is the practical application of synderesis to everyday circumstances that arise 
which is not to be confused with conscience. In Aquinas’ thinking, conscientia “is associated 
with some ‘inner voice’, innate or acquired, that informs us about the moral rectitude of our 
actions.379” Aquinas defines conscientia further as “essentially an activity, the operation through 
which general rules are translated or processed into more specific rules and eventually into 
conclusions, which refer to particular cases or circumstances.”380 Aquinas points out that the 
function of conscientia is comparable to synderesis: “The conclusion drawn by conscientia, just 
like the principles perceived by synderesis, play a role in both the context of discovery and the 
context of justification.”381 Synderesis and conscientia orient a person in pursuing the good and 
in the ability to evaluate the choice of that which is good. However, the two do not have the 
same object: synderesis grasps the major principles, whereas conscientia draws particular 
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conclusions to guide moral choices/behavior in daily living. Aquinas points out that human 
relationships are variable and contingent; therefore, some flexibility is needed in moral choice 
making, since the kind of certainty achievable in theoretical reasoning may not always be 
achievable in the practical domain. “Complete certainty cannot be reached in our conclusions 
concerning practical affairs, because man’s nature, though essentially striving to fulfil its natural 
inclinations, is—accidentally—variable. Human affairs are contingent, variable, and prone to 
exceptions. That is why… we should not rely on demonstrations when it comes to practical 
reasoning.”382  
By Aquinas’ definition of Prudentia, “… applying general moral principles to particular 
conclusions regarding human conduct,”383 it seems a replication of the function of conscientia 
and an overlapping of roles. Westerman clarifies that conscientia is purely cognitive while 
prudentia makes known the moral ideal and the fortitude to put it into action.384 Aquinas 
attributes a number of virtues to the function of prudentia, but more important are its component 
parts/features, which includes acumen, memory, circumspection, teachability, insight, prevision, 
and reasoning. Westerman asserts that “reasoning” as a component part of prudentia refers to the 
ability to reason well, which is present in the virtuous man and is the difference between 
conscientia and prudentia. According to Westerman, conscientia is as different from prudentia as 
“speaking” is from “eloquence.”385 She clarifies further that “… just as eloquence can only be 
valued in respect to the degree in which the public is actually convinced, prudentia can only be 
accorded to those who actually carry out the decisions which are the fruits of their 
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deliberation.”386 Thus, “prudentia is not only cognitive, but has a link to action as well. The 
prudent man first ‘takes counsel,’ then forms a judgement, and finally commands himself to 
execute his decision.”387  
 Using the analogy of a talented and skillful artist for prudentia, Westerman posits that 
while synderesis makes it possible to grasp the divine [style],388 conscientia specifies 
requirements and prescribes all that is applied to particular situations. But prudentia, applied to 
moral matters, allows for an imperfect humanity and world, as Aquinas grants a certain freedom 
for deliberation about how to act in contingent circumstances.389 In this sense, the three stages of 
practical reasoning enumerated above include as the first step, synderesis, the perception and 
understanding of divine law; second, conscientia, a syllogistic system which helps to determine 
moral inferences from general principles; and third, prudentia as the wisdom that helps the 
individual and is necessary for the perception of the good and the ability to act virtuously. 
Westerman, however, asserts we should not over emphasize man’s rational capacity, which is 
limited to the discovery of the main principles but may not always be able to infer indubitable 
rules from these general principles. The rational being can miss the mark in deductions and thus 
still fail to grasp divine moral principles.  
  On the question of whether all acts of virtues belong to the law of nature, Aquinas 
espouses that because the rational soul is the proper form of a person and every person has a 
natural inclination to act in accord with reason, this translates to acting in virtue. “Hence, in this 
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sense all the acts of the virtues belong to the natural law, since the faculty of reason proper to 
each man dictates by nature that he act virtuously.”390 In Question 94, article 4 of the Summa, 
Aquinas treats the question if there is a single law of nature for everyone. For Aquinas, the 
natural law is universal because with respect for the universal principles of either speculative or 
practical reasoning, there is only one possible outcome; the same truth known naturally to all. 
Aquinas states, 
Therefore, one should claim that with respect to its first universal principles, the 
law of nature is the same for everyone both with respect to correctness and with 
respect to knowledge. On the other hand, with respect to various particular (rules), 
which are, as it were, the conclusions of those universal principles, the law of 
nature is the same for everyone in the greater number of cases (ut in pluribus) 
both with respect to correctness and with respect to knowledge, and yet there can 
be exceptions in a fewer number of cases (ut in paucioribus) both (a) with respect 
to correctness, and this because of certain impediments (just as the generable and 
corruptible natures are defective in a fewer number of cases because of 
impediments), and also (b) with respect to knowledge, and this because the faculty 
of reason has been perverted in some people by passion or by a bad natural 
condition.391  
 
On the immutability of the natural law, Aquinas argues that the “natural law dates from 
the very beginning of the rational creature. Neither does it change over time, but remains 
immutable.”392 However, Aquinas clarifies that through the divine and sometimes by human law, 
as has been noted in history, certain things useful to human life have been added to the natural 
law by way of addition. Conversely, with respect to natural law’s secondary principal, changes 
can occur by subtraction but remain always unchangeable with respect to the first principle. 
Kainz surmises that ultimately, “natural law for Aquinas is a dynamic mediating factor, which 
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helps to maintain a harmonious relationship between divine law, on the one hand, and human 
law on the other.”393  
If any set of arguments can be truly construed as a critique of Aquinas, it is generally 
within the area of teleology in terms of the distinctions between “nature,” “natural,” 
“unnaturality,” the meaning of “law,” and the idea of perversion. Natural law theorists from 
Aquinas’s era debated the question from a totally different history and context. For instance, 
Aquinas’s natural law theory forms only a part of a larger treatise on law. The entire treatise was 
an attempt to argue philosophically for the theistic sovereignty of a divine law giver, in whose 
law every other law participates. Contemporary theorists live in a post-Newtonian world of 
physics wherein the individual person is understood biologically and structurally, and a shift has 
occurred from processing the “philosophy of nature” to the “philosophy of mind.” These come 
from developments in genetic encoding research (DNA), understanding of the physical world 
around us, and even development in biblical studies as the historical-critical method. From 
Cicero to contemporary times, the natural law theory has relied on reason as a starting point, with 
or without reference to God. Most times, “the existence of God and notions of divine law are 
either inferred with concomitant metaphysical arguments, or taken for granted as a faith 
commitment complementing the ethical system.”394 The scholastics, however, understand 
“natural” as the way in which a human being is born with specific innate characteristics, and 
morally, “natural” is perceived in the sense of the introduction of that which is extraneous to the 
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human being, especially as it affects ethical questions. For example, the introduction of a 
prosthetic leg is not natural to the human body, but it is not an ethical choice nor does it prevent 
the injured member from fully being able to achieve its natural potency. Rather, it supports and 
enhances it. Conversely, the question of artificial contraception is an “unnaturality”; and 
“[u]nnatural with a moral connotation has to do with a threat to the exercise of some essential 
property of human nature (or ‘basic value’), the right to which has not been forfeited.”395 Today, 
there are hardly any references to divine laws in political jurisprudence, compared to the 
Thomistic era. However, Howard Kainz notes that comparing eras still points us to the fact that 
“progress in theorizing about human nature depends to a great extent on the relative richness of 
the concept of human nature taken as the starting point.”396 
Another major disconnect between the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition and contemporary 
natural law theorists lies in the conversation about the relationship between mind (soul) and 
matter (body). The relationship between two physical substances is known as a prime analogate 
for causality. Quantum mechanics, therefore, challenges the idea of mind over matter simply 
because the immaterial does not interact with the material. Arguments on this issue are many 
sided, and volumes have been written on these questions. Kainz gives what can be considered a 
balanced response to this seeming impasse: 
An argument with regard to natural law might follow a similar path: Possibly the 
prime analogate for our concept of law is not positive law, but the laws of our 
nature. These laws are expressed in the imperious and ineluctable drive to 
happiness, which functions as the command of all commands; likewise in the 
drive for self-preservation, the drive to reproduce, the drives to attain knowledge 
and freedom. Perhaps these are the source of our primordial experience of 
authoritative laws whose obedience can put us at peril of losing ourselves. Then, 
when we encounter laws laid down by the municipality or the state or 
government, we see something analogous to the imperiousness and ineluctability 
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of our own basic impulses. Or when we see evidence of predictable and calculable 
tendencies in the material world, we understand these “laws” by comparison with 
analogies in our experience…. We must conclude that natural law is “law” only in 
the same sense that the laws of gravity and thermodynamics are laws… The worst 
infractions of the natural law would be acts contrary to nature—the perversions. 
Here one could encounter a bedrock of agreement, concerning things like parent-
child incest, pederasty, female genital mutilation, cannibalism, infant sacrifice, 
genocide, torture; but also inevitable disagreements about other prima facie 
“perversions.”397 
 
 There are also a few “problematic” areas in Thomistic natural law which contemporary 
theorists argue vehemently for and against.398 Because the focus here is not to explore the logic 
of the internal philosophical disputations but rather to situate the state of affairs, some of the 
issues are broadly delineated, 
 First, the new natural law theorists consider the “is-ought” question from a metaethical 
perspective, in which they argue that an “ought” cannot be derived from an “is.” Based on the 
existential nature of the human person, they argue that a deduction with regard to moral values 
cannot be primarily and simplistic a question of “ought.” Second, the new natural law theorists 
propound a “fact-value” separation to apply to viable ethical theorizing. The distinction made 
between fact and value in this metaethic is a major value, and “the factual prohibition of 
disregarding this distinction is considered a valuable directive for furthering progress in ethical 
theory.”399 In their view, the traditional natural law theory “is susceptible to criticism, especially 
if the ‘nature’ referred to with the adjective ‘natural’ is considered to be something factual in 
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which certain moral values are allegedly imbedded or implicated.”400 Third, the very popular and 
commonly pointed at “naturalistic fallacy” is based on classical natural theorists’ connection of 
nature to morality. It is named a fallacy because contemporary natural law theorists argue against 
defining goods in terms of associated goods of any kind. Kainz clarifies this further: “All of 
these associations are subject to the ‘open question’ test---‘but is x good?’ ---which can always 
be subjected to doubt, since x is not a synonym of ‘good.’ To maintain that saying ‘x is good’ is 
the same as saying ‘good is good’ is to fall into the naturalistic fallacy.”401 Fourth and finally, 
consideration is always given to contrasting the religious versus the secular version of the natural 
law. At the risk of unnecessary self-repetition, it is safe to conclude that this is the same 
argument based on ontology/teleology. The difference is between a natural law theory that has 
God and nature at its foundation and another that relies on human reason and argues for natural 
rights.  
 German Grisez, John Finnis and the NNLT School 
  Natural law theory has enjoyed a re-awakening within the last thirty to forty years, 
largely owing to what is now popularly referred to as the “Grisez School.” The works of the 
theologian Germain Grisez in the United States and his contemporary John Finnis in the United 
Kingdom, along with several other colleagues, are an attempt to respond to the prejudices placed 
against the traditional Catholic understanding of the natural law theory. These like-minded 
thinkers have “articulated a highly developed system of natural law built upon a sophisticated 
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account of practical reasoning and a rich and flexible understanding of the human good.”402 It is 
generally argued that the Grisez School did not immediately become accepted in mainline 
Catholic ethical studies due to Grisez’s attack on consequentialist theories and popular Catholic 
“proportionalists.” The Grisez School is a reaction to the perceived inadequacies of the previous 
natural law theories and the classical moral theology of the Catholic Church, which is an off 
shoot of scholasticism. The NNLT School argues that scholasticism is overly concerned with the 
law and classical moral theology’s inability to “identify a sufficiently rich conception of a 
person’s well-being (i.e., the good) to which moral principles would direct her.”403 Grisez 
opposes what he calls “a logically illicit step” wherein moral theology moves deductively from 
fact to value, from what is to what ought to be. It is the articulation between these two forms of 
reasoning that is foundational to understanding the ideas behind the systematic application of his 
NNLT.  
Grisez and Finnis argue that the use of theoretical reasoning is to pursue knowledge about 
aspects of reality while seeking to establish the truth of a proposition by testing the conformity of 
its content with some prior reality, and that theoretical reasoning can establish this conformity by 
both deductive and inductive reasoning.404 The Grisez School develops in its NNLT a virtue 
ethic which is concerned about human fulfilment and common good.405 Grisez and Finnis argue 
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for a new approach to re-interpreting Aquinas by eradicating all interpretations from the Neo-
Scholastics/Neo-Thomists; the 16th Century Spaniards, Vazquez and Suarez; Protestant 
contributions to the tweaking of Thomistic natural law found in Grotius, Pufendorf, Culwell, and 
Clarke; and, finally, the contribution of David Hume, who turned totally away from Aristotelian/ 
Thomistic tradition to virtue ethics. 
Germain G. Grisez, in his re-articulation of what is now broadly known as NNLT, 
argues that he remains faithful to Thomistic natural theory. He accepts that the natural law 
consists of intelligible sets of propositions of practical reason: first, that good is to be done and 
evil avoided. Basic human good in the NNLT consists of eight goods, of which five are 
existential and reflexive, and which accept deliberation and choice: (i) marriage, (ii) harmony in 
communal living, (iii) harmony in justice, (iv) harmony within one’s self, (v) harmony with God 
or another source of human meaning and value, like religion. The other three substantive goods, 
which do not require choice for their existence, include (i) life, health, and reproduction, (ii) 
appreciation of beauty and knowledge of truth, (iii) leisure and work. These are the modes of 
practical reason by which everyone weighs a moral decision, without reference to the eventual 
decision made for right or wrong. As such, they are not moral principles, as they do not help to 
pre-determine, before choice, what options are morally good or bad. The second set consists of 
what the NNL theorists refer to as the first principle of morality in its specification or modes of 
responsibility, which “exclude ways of choosing and acting that ignore, slight, neglect, arbitrarily 
limit, or damage, destroy or impede a basic human good, excluding as well emotional and non-
rationally grounded choices and actions.”406 Another set consists of moral norms that can be 
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verified in light of the first principle and its mode of responsibility. They identify certain kinds of 
moral human action which by the object of moral choice within specific alternatives are morally 
good or bad.  
This slight derivative re-reading of Aquinas by Grisez is said to be a movement from 
natural law principles to specific moral norms. The distinction between the first principle of 
practical reasoning and the first principle of morality, even though is not directly contradictory of 
Thomistic natural law, yet provides a Grisez with a newer approach and articulation. In Grisez’s 
thought, practical reason has two dimensions; one reflects on what might be done, and this is the 
principle of practical reasoning. The other reflects on what ought to be done: this is the principle 
of morality. The basic principle of morality as re-articulated by Grisez states, “In voluntary 
acting for human goods and avoiding what is opposed to them, one ought to choose and 
otherwise will those and only those possibilities whose willing is compatible with a will toward 
integral human fulfilment.”407 It from this articulation that Grisez proceeded to the derivation of 
what he calls “modes of responsibility.” According to Robert P. George, these modes of 
responsibility are formulated in a systematic way by integrating scripture and the writings of 
Aquinas. “The modes of responsibility are normative principles ‘pinning down’ the requirements 
of the first principle of morality. But they are not specific moral norms; that is, they are not 
normative propositions of practical reason identifying specific sorts of human acts as morally 
good or morally bad….”408 John Goyette and his co-editors conclude, 
….The integral directiveness of the first principles of practical reasoning, 
expressed in the first principle of morality that directs us toward the ideal of 
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integral human fulfilment, provides us with a criterion for establishing moral 
priorities among our interests in the basic goods of human existence. When these 
goods are considered from the perspective of this integral directiveness, the 
directiveness of unfettered practical reason, the good of religion, or of harmony 
between human persons and God or the more-than-human source of meaning and 
value is seen to have a priority insofar as commitment to this good offers human 
persons an overarching purpose in terms of which they can order their lives as a 
whole. Thus a commitment to religious truth emerges as the commitment that can 
integrate the whole of human life when this is conceived in the light of the 
demands of moral truth.409 
 
In the first principle of practical reasoning, Grisez identifies eight basic forms of human 
flourishing which serve to identify practically what ought to be done and which he 
methodologically arranged to correspond to the beatitudes.410 They include the following: (i) 
One should not be deterred by felt inertia from acting for intelligible goods. (ii) One should not 
be pressed by enthusiasm or impatience to act individualistically for intelligible goods. (iii) One 
should not choose to satisfy an emotional desire except as part of one’s pursuit and/or attainment 
of an intelligible good other than the satisfaction of the desire itself. (iv) One should not choose 
to act out of an emotional aversion except as part of one’s avoidance of some intelligible evil 
other than the inner tension experienced in enduring that aversion. (v) One should not, in 
response to different feelings towards different persons, willingly proceed with a preference for 
anyone unless the preference is required by intelligible goods themselves. (vi) One should not 
choose on the basis of emotions which bear upon empirical aspects of intelligible goods (or bads) 
in a way which interferes with a more perfect sharing in the good or avoidance of the bad. (vii) 
One should not be moved by hostility to freely accept or choose the destruction, damaging, or 
impeding of any intelligible human good. (viii) One should not be moved by a stronger desire for 
                                                          
409 Goyette, et al., St. Thomas Aquinas, 144-5. 
 
410 Cf. Mt. 5:3-12. 
 
156 
 
one instance of an intelligible good to act for it by choosing to destroy, damage, or impede some 
other instance of an intelligible good.  
These eight modes of responsibility help to shape the moral life of a person and to direct 
moral reflection towards basic human goods by forbidding evil and encouraging the good. Grisez 
notes that “integral human fulfilment means a single system in which all the human goods would 
contribute to the fulfilment of the entire human community…. This commitment shaped by the 
modes of responsibility will be basic in a person’s life—that is, it will be large enough to shape 
his or her whole life.”411 According to Grisez, 
The eight modes of responsibility together guide action positively towards 
integral human fulfilment. An ideal rather than a goal, integral human fulfilment 
shapes a good life by requiring that one’s actions be suited to its realization (if 
that were possible) and ruling out actions incompatible with this. The third and 
fourth modes direct one away from a life of sentient satisfaction toward 
intelligible human goods. The first and eight modes require one to pursue some of 
the goods and not act against any. The sixth mode excludes a life focused on mere 
self-satisfaction, and the fifth requires one to treat others fairly. The seventh mode 
forbids revenge and so conduces to community despite the wrongs people do one 
another. And the second mode calls for a will towards cooperation with others in 
genuine community.412 
 
All of these constructs in Grisez’s new natural law theory aim at creating normative principles by 
which human beings can rationally determine and judge their own moral actions. This is Grisez’s 
fundamental difference from Thomism; it is a movement from theistic ontology to a purely 
philosophical ethics concerned with rationality, basic human goods, choices, moral judgements 
and actions.  
John Finnis collaborates with Grisez in an attempt to “rehabilitate” Thomistic natural 
law. They both attempt to work out a theory of natural law which, unlike the Hobbesian/Kantian 
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revolution, has rights as a starting point.413 First, Finnis attempts to provide a philosophical 
framework for the contemporary relationship between morality and law.414 This framework 
should give an understanding of the underlying values on which the principles of competing right 
claims can be determined. Second, according to Westerman, Finnis tries to articulate common 
values that are independent of religious orientations, presuming that such values are objective 
and that they can therefore be argued mainly on a philosophical basis devoid of the idea of 
religion or God. Third, Finnis sees society as a community with common interests as differing 
from a society with calculated self-interests. “Finnis shares this criticism of liberal ideology with 
many contemporary ‘communitarian’ philosophers. Most of these writers, however, phrase their 
criticism by means of the alleged contrast between virtue-theories and rights-theories.”415 Finnis 
attempts a unification by accommodating rights theories with virtue ethics, by which 
contemporary ethical and legal questions can be resolved. 
Central to Finnis’ work is an understanding of the natural law as a normative principle by 
which persons are able to recognize principles and conditions for practical reasonableness, which 
establishes proper order among people and guides individual moral conduct. This is based purely 
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on the use of human reason to deduce basic values of human existence and to acquire the needed 
methodological requirements for practical reasonableness, which leaves no room for inferring 
from fact to value. Kainz remarks that Finnis’ work uses “several thousand words” in arguing the 
self-evidence of the value of knowledge that does not admit of consensus or feelings of certitude 
but is based on pure logic and rationality.  
Finnis, like Grisez, starts from the point of practical reasonableness and focuses on a 
theory that has as its starting point principles that help in decision making on moral matters. This 
is an attempt to retrieve Aquinas’s concept of natural law as a mode of approaching moral 
principles, which then become a guide for practical acts of decision making. In Finnis, two 
guidelines are given for natural law as practical reasonableness. First, Finnis speaks of “basic 
goods” or “basic human flourishing,” listing seven (as opposed to Grisez’s eight): (i) life, (ii) 
knowledge, (iii) play, (iv) aesthetics, (v) experience, (vi) friendship/sociability, and (vii) religion 
and practical reasonableness.416 In Finnis’ thesis, basic goods are “pre-moral” because they serve 
only as the starting point for moral reasoning. Through the second approach, which moves from 
a pre-moral starting point to moral judgement making, some formulations are proposed by 
Finnis: (i) a coherent plan of life, (ii) making no arbitrary preferences among values or persons, 
(iii) no exaggeration or arbitrary leaving out of any of the basic goods, (iv) fundamental 
impartiality among human subjects who are partakers of these basic goods, (v) detachment from 
personal projects in order to avoid fanaticism, with enough commitment to avoid apathy, (vi) 
pursuit of the good with reasonable efficiency, (vii) respect for every basic value in every act, 
(viii) diligent pursuit of the common good, (ix), and following one’s conscience. These are equal 
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to Grisez’s “requirements of practical reasonableness” or “modes of responsibility.” It is in the 
light of these requirements that moral judgements can be reached.417  
Between Grisez, Finnis, their colleagues and other new natural law theorists, much ink 
has been spent and many thousand pages scripted in articulating methods and approaches in 
response to critiques and critiquing others. One finds that even between the two collaborators 
and “godfathers” of the new natural law movement, there are subtle, maybe negligible, and yet 
nuanced differences in their approach to the question of basic goods.418 Inasmuch as the new 
natural law theorists try to incorporate theistic ontological natural law theory into legal 
positivism, they seem to fall short of a tenable conclusion.  
Critique of NNLT 
In order to consider some salient points that will be discussed again before the end of this 
chapter we need to look at some of the many critiques and criticisms of the Grisez/Finnis 
position. Russell Hittinger identifies what he considers the three major components of the new 
natural law theory of the Grisez/Finnis school. First, practical reason begins with reason’s 
relationship to goods, its contents derived from inclinations, similar to the conventional natural 
law understanding of primary precepts. Second, basic goods in the new natural law thinking are 
regarded not only as the prima principia of practical reason but also as ends/finalities. They are 
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irreducible objective principles because they are the primary principle of natural law. Third, the 
Grisez/Finnis account of goods is understood within the prism of total human flourishing and the 
good of the community. Foundationally, these goods are exhaustive on two grounds: (a) they 
ontologically constitute the essential goods of humanity, and (b) none of these universal goods 
can be left out without distorting practical rationality. According to Hittinger, these conclusions 
are in agreement with the older traditions of the natural law theory. Hittinger asserts, “In 
establishing their practical axioms, neither Grisez nor Finnis proceeds ex conditione finis, nor per 
force ex supposione naturae, where nature is understood to constitute the wider setting in which 
the convenientia between human agents and nature is presupposed.”419 Contrary to scholastic 
thinking, according to Hittinger, the NNLT seems not to require a natural theology to mediate 
between the natural teleology of inclinations and the necessity for a moral command to obey 
nature. Grisez and Finnis presumed a breakthrough in providing ‘natural categoricals’ as a new 
approach to the natural law reasoning. Hittinger, however, doubts if this system actually 
represents “a constructive advance beyond conventional natural law theory.”420 Hittinger 
questions what he perceives as a movement backwards, which attempts to secure the perceptive 
facet of natural law and the pre-moral natural facet. Hittinger therefore queries, “Is Grisez 
confused about his own method?”421 Hittinger argues that the Grisez School wants to stay true to 
traditional natural law but is unwilling to deploy the theoretical apparatus necessary to sustain it; 
he calls this a case of wanting to have one’s cake and eat it. He argues further that “since Grisez 
has to bring justifications, ex supposition naturae, in through the back door, and since Finnis 
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readily acknowledges that the speculative issues concerning nature place a question mark over 
the project, it is difficult to understand why neither is willing to make some provision for the 
employment of speculative rationality.”422 In the NNLT, the relationship between religion and 
practical reason is suspect for Hittinger. In natural law, religion is one of the first principles of 
practical reason, one of the foundational principles of practical rationality. In the new natural 
law, religion is perceived as “natural religion” and defined by anthropological and cultural traits. 
Therefore, the good of religion becomes intelligible even if we prescind it from a theistic 
perspective. Hittinger sees a problem with a principle and its content being posited by intuition: 
“Despite an agnosticism regarding the bearing of a philosophy of nature or a metaphysics upon 
practical rationality, a conciliatory gesture is made towards the empirical sciences which, Grisez 
and Finnis reason, ought to be able to come up with some ‘parallel’ list or evidence for the 
goods.”423 Hittinger goes further to insist that the Grisez School fails to provide a philosophical 
justification for moving from this rather casually posited anthropological base to the practical 
judgements regarding the value of religion and even the question of moral obligation. Hittinger 
states that “Grisez’s philosophical theology does not provide either a speculative or practical 
basis for a morally significant theistic referent.”424 Hittinger therefore surmises that,  
…. in the case of religion, there is nothing but the intuition and an ancillary 
argument from a philosophical theology that seeks to demonstrate by a via 
negativa that God exists—an argument that does not demonstrate any morally 
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significant properties on the part of the deity. Not only is there no basis for 
obligation with respect to the deity, there is no basis for understanding why there 
should be any sense whatsoever to religious practices. Atheists and agnostics, as 
well as theists, are bound by a universal form of the good that is defined simply as 
a need to establish good relations with unknown higher powers. In Christian 
Moral Principles the problem becomes more acute, for here religion is defined as 
the good of harmony between the human will and the will of God…. What began 
as a problem of merely intuitional evidence for a foundational principle of 
practical reason now becomes a problem of fideism. Because one of the prima 
principia requires the mediation of faith for its intelligibility…. arguably the 
whole of the foundation requires faith in Christian revelation, for Grisez argues 
that it is only by faith that we have sufficient data to establish the rationality of the 
eudemonistic motive, and thus of the first principle of morality (as Grisez 
understands it). We therefore concluded not only that religion is a particular 
instance of a problem with Grisez’s axiology and natural law method, but that it 
becomes a bellwether for problems with the system as such.425 
 
Hittinger proposes three elements to be considered if religion is to be kept on the 
foundational level of an account of practical reason. First, the basic principle or principles of 
practical reason must be proven to require propositions concerning humanity’s religious nature 
and or also humanity’s relationship with God. On a second level, in taking this to account, there 
must be evidence to indicate that the omission or suppression of religion distorts, either in whole 
or in part, the fundamental rationality of practical reason. Third, it must be proven that there is a 
duty to obey divine commands, or at least participate in some religious practices. These three 
criteria, Hittinger argues, are the only basis by which a foundational approach to the question can 
be established. However, “Grisez does not achieve this systematic intention…”426  
The effort to retain a natural law foundation for practical reason by substitution of 
intuition as evidence derived from a philosophy of nature, according to Hittinger, does not work. 
For him this either presupposes or postpones “a philosophical explication of the interrelation 
between inclinations, goods, and precepts, which in turn presupposes the intricate groundwork, 
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laid in a philosophy of nature and in natural theology.”427 On a third level Hittinger sees Grisez’s 
structure of human subjectivity as a “tailpiece” of his axiological theory. Here, Grisez’s account 
of the human person is less than clear his account of how or why the self is distinct from the 
person—or even if this is distinct from the human body. This puzzle, argues Hittinger, is the 
same one that is prevalent in the irreducibility and incommensurability of Grisez’s goods. Here 
“the topic of moral motivation and values receives a one-dimensional treatment: all agents 
pursue fulfilments, and all of the basic goods are modes of fulfilment to which we are morally 
bound.”428 Hittinger considers that this idea becomes more problematic if viewed through the 
lens of the role of virtues. Hittinger states, “The goods constituted by Grisez’s axiology are 
curiously Platonic-like forms. He vigorously admonishes scholastic natural law theory for 
rendering practical reason a mere footnote to the speculative sciences, but Grisez’s own 
understanding of the goods is rather Euclidian.”429 In the same vein Hittinger continues, “The 
virtues, on the other hand, are not so readily abstracted from the unity of the self and the unity of 
the project. The point of the virtues cannot be grasped piecemeal fashion, and therefore an ethics 
of virtue is forced to deal forthrightly with the issue of selfhood.”430  
Hittinger thinks that Grisez’s effort to recover a natural law system without the traditional 
approach but by an implicational approach may be applauded if seen as an attempt to reconstruct 
a virtue ethic.431 He is cautious, however, because “making sense of the virtues requires 
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something more than making sense of conventions in which the virtues are, at least in part, 
intelligible.”432 Hittinger opines that an ethic of virtue done this way is a halfway house that is 
stranded between a full-fledged natural law theory in the grand tradition and a thoroughly 
modern rejection of nature as having any constructive bearing upon ethics. For Hittinger, this is a 
conventionalism that has premodern credentials.433 Hittinger concludes that the Grisez/Finnis 
School achieved an impressive overall project by attempting a rehabilitation of traditional natural 
law theory in their envisioning of a more contemporary approach of practical reason, devoid of 
utilitarianism and deontology. However, based on the previously analyzed critiques, their NNLT 
has serious defects. He concludes by stating, “…we are sorry to report that despite the ambition 
of the Grisez-Finnis project, we are still waiting. What is clear is that there is no way to recover 
natural law theory by way of shortcuts.”434  
Pauline Westerman offers four critiques of the new natural law theory in the 
Grisez/Finnis tradition. First, she asserts that it is based on practical reasonableness, not natural 
law. Their first principle, which cannot be taken as a precept but regarded as basic orientation for 
moral issues, is grounded in the pursuance of basic goods. “That means that, strictly speaking, 
the new theory of natural law neither has anything to do with law nor with nature.”435 Second, 
Westerman agrees that the new natural law system deals with the naturalistic fallacy question. 
Yet, she believes it lacks foundation, stating that the new natural law theorists argue that their 
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older counterparts are wrong based on their own foundation: nature. However, Westerman 
contends that the alternative offered, self-evidence, is less convincing as a foundation. She 
continues that for “self-evidence and for this lack of foundation, a theory would be required in 
which it is argued that man has immediate excess to those self-evident forms of human 
flourishing. If we are not supposed to rely on nature, a (modern) equivalent of synderesis should 
be developed.”436 Such a theory, according to Westerman, is absent.  
In her third critique, Westerman asserts that besides the problem of foundation, there is 
the problem of obligation. The seven basic goods and the presumption that they are valid starting 
points for moral reasoning are set up as an obligation, which in reality no one is bound to keep. 
Westerman queries, “Why should we be guided by Finnis’ compass rather than by our own sense 
of direction?”437 This theory suffers from the dual problems of foundation and obligation, 
making the Grisez/Finnis’ claim that their own theory of practical reasonableness is not natural 
law to fail and not achieving the aim of broadening the scope of moral inquiry. In Westerman’s 
words, “The extension of one first principle to seven first principles may appear to widen the 
scope for practical reasoning but in fact turns reasoning into a somewhat arbitrary affair.”438 The 
scope of practical reasoning is short changed as it does not play any role in deciding which goods 
are desirable in themselves.  
Westerman’s fourth critique addresses the necessity to amend the theory of practical 
reasonableness by explicit references to the telos of human nature. In concluding the section of 
her book on the critique of the NNLT, she posits that the Grisez/Finnis School’s “attempt is 
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theoretically interesting… the attempt to unravel underlying objective values on the basis of 
philosophical argument alone, without assuming the existence of God.”439 This task Westerman 
notes can only be “carried out by assigning an important place to the notion of self-evidence.”440 
This self-evidence cannot be embedded within a wider conceptual framework “which might 
elucidate the kind of rationality required to ‘see’ this self-evidence and therefore remains 
unargued.”441 Concerning Finnis’ efforts in his natural law theory to find grounds for the 
foundation of rights and the critique of liberalism on the grounds of natural law, Westerman 
opines, “Finnis’ theory of natural law exhorts us to be more uncritically law-abiding than any 
other legal positivist has ever dared to suggest.”442 The problem adduced by Westerman is that 
Finnis’ theory is a hybrid of two traditions: Neo-Kantianism and natural law theory. Westerman 
sees the “common good” in relation to rights theory as developed by Finnis as unsatisfactory 
because it seems to waver between an instrumental and a non-instrumental meaning. The concept 
of the “common good” in Finnis’ work is not clearly explicated, but it seems to be the product of 
a pre-moral choice. Westerman adds, “It seems to me that human rights are more secure without 
a foundation than with this arbitrary foundation, especially when the foundation of these rights 
can be used in order to abrogate these rights, a possibility Finnis’ theory allows for.”443 
Westerman believes that the arbitrariness and insufficiency of the notion of the common good 
might be traced to Finnis’ neglect of virtues, along with his intention to criticize liberalism 
without recourse to the virtues-idiom. Therefore, Westerman concludes, “The fundamental 
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ambiguity of Finnis’ concept of the common good does not contribute to the attractiveness of his 
theory as an alternative to ‘rights-talk.’”444  
Lloyd Weinreb, a recognized and respected contemporary voice in the conversation on 
natural law theory, questions whether it is solely applicable to moral principles per se. In 
Weinreb’s opinion it is not, believing that the proper place for the natural law theory is in 
defense of the moral point of view against skepticism or its modern counterpart, 
existentialism.445 He outlines an articulate argument: 
The vitality of contemporary natural law theories is due to their insistence on an 
objectively valid moral order. Beneath that superficially strictly deontological 
claim is an affirmation of the reality and significance of human freedom, on 
which morality depends. (The connection with the older theories is, therefore, 
genuine; only it is a connection that the contemporary theorists do not want.) 
Legal positivists generally avoid discussion of the status of morality itself. 
Although many would deny that there is an ascertainable, objectively valid 
morality, some would not. They assert only that, whatever its status, morality and 
law are separate. That separation, however, on which positivists stake their whole 
case, is a surrogate for the much more fundamental argument that normative order 
and natural order—freedom and cause—are unbridgeable separate spheres. 
Without acknowledging that it does so, legal positivism rejects the conditions of 
freedom and, therefore, the possibility of freedom itself. Beneath the surface of an 
apparently inconsequential dispute, there lingers the central puzzle of the human 
situation.446  
 
Robert George cautions Weinreb and Hittinger in their criticisms of the Grisez/Finnis NNLT 
because, from his reading of Weinreb and Hittinger’s work, George thinks they have 
inadequately understood the overall project. He avers, “Perhaps the theory is vulnerable to 
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damning criticism. If so, the basic flaws in the theory are unlikely to be brought to light by critics 
who have not first achieved an accurate grasp of what is and is not being claimed…”447 George 
argues that some texts by themselves invite misinterpretation, but whether or not this is the case 
with Grisez and Finnis, “it is evident that special care will be needed in the presentation of ‘the 
new natural law theory’ if it is to get a fair hearing even among the philosophically most 
sophisticated, those to whom it is proposed.”448 Adam Seagrave reaches the same conclusions, 
stating that “while St. Thomas Aquinas’ Summa Theologica remains the locus classicus for 
natural law theory, this theory acquires more force and persuasiveness when it is placed at the 
summit of a preceding tradition of thought than when it is relegated to the foothills of an 
emerging one.449 Seagrave opines that the contemporary transition from traditional natural law is 
premature, in which case “what is required of current natural law theory is not the abandonment 
of the more traditional version but rather its further development and application to the pressing 
problems of contemporary society.”450 
Fulvio Di Blasi thinks that NNLT’s failure to understand the a posteriori proofs for the 
existence of God affects their perception of the meaning of nature and the world.  Natural law 
theory is incomplete if it is unable to view and understand the relationship between our world 
and its creator.  According to Di Blasi, “Natural law, before being a philosophical and 
theological concept, is a cultural and existential truth that belongs to the best dispositions and to 
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the highest moral nobility of the human being.”451  Di Blasi continues, “Natural law means to 
look at the world as a marvelous and mysterious fruit of divine intelligence, good and wise above 
all else, who creates it and governs it according to rules accessible to human minds-minds to 
whom it primarily and specifically turns.”452  Di Blasi argues that the mistake with NNLT is that 
they see facts not beings they replace intelligible meaning with sensory experiences, and by 
abandoning the possibility of finding intelligibility  of moral principles in nature, they turn to 
practical reason as a guide to moral insights.453 
Di Blasi opines that the assumption that a non-theistic NLT makes it possible to enter 
into conversation with an atheistic contemporary world in order to be able to talk about morality 
generally, is the way to go, such thinking make a fundamental mistake.  This conversation has 
only an open ended possibility since “contemporary atheism has been growing by denying the 
chief truths and principles of traditional morality, from marriage to the sacred character of 
human life.  Contemporary culture is losing the idea that we are creatures… God is the only 
medicine to this slippery slope trend- the medicine that some Christian thinkers try to avoid.” 454  
Di Blasi therefore concludes that the human person admitting it or not, tends towards 
understanding the overall meaning of existence.  This human person who is able to apply 
intellectual power to the knowledge of the world and God and to see eternal life as the highest 
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truth and final answer to human existence is the same human person the NNL theorists creates as 
“unable to reach God with his intellect and who cannot have God as the ultimate end.  New 
natural law theory consistently denies the proper role of God at both the metaphysical and moral 
levels.”455  
  Marriage as a Basic Good in the NNLT School: Crucial and central to this chapter, as 
well as to the thesis of this entire project, is the argument that marriage, as understood within 
traditional and contemporary natural law theories, rests on the assumption that the marital union 
is a basic good for human flourishing. It is interesting to note that whether one ascribes to an 
ontological theistic tradition or a deontological, there is mutual agreement that marriage between 
a man and a woman is a basic good with other goods attached, such as mutuality, conjugality, 
procreation, and the education of offspring. Within the Aristotelian/Thomistic tradition, there is a 
rich history of the development of marriage from contract to covenant and its understanding and 
establishment as a sacrament. In the theology of the Angelic Doctor, marriage is ordered toward 
a principal end: procreation and the education of offspring. The secondary end of marriage is 
mutuality and friendship, and in believers, the understanding that marriage is sacramental 
because it represents the great mystery of Christ and the Church. The work of the two great 
Dominicans, Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, establishes marriage firmly within Catholic 
doctrinal understanding as a sacrament which confers grace; it is fecund and has an indelible 
character erased only by death. This became the standard position of the Church structurally, 
with a few nuances added here and there since Vatican II. 
In a section of their work, Salzman and Lawler show marriage to be a basic good within 
the NNLT. They posit that the NNLT’s sexual anthropology is founded on the idea of marriage 
as a basic good or absolute norm, which is developed in both Grisez and Finnis in three steps: (1) 
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heterosexual marriage is a basic good; (2) the marital -sexual act results from that basic good; 
and (3) every other non-marital sexual act is unnatural, unreasonable, and immoral.456 In Grisez’s 
work, marriage as a basic good does not depend on, nor is it derived from, other goods of human 
flourishing. Marriage on its own is a reality having a basic good proper to it. In marriage “[t]his 
two-in-one-flesh reality is realized by both ‘marital consent which conjugal intercourse 
fulfills’… and bodily communion between the spouses. Marital consent and bodily communion 
are both required to realize a two-in-one flesh communion between a man and a woman.”457 
Marriage (and by extension sexuality and the sexual act) is such a profound good for human 
flourishing that Grisez states further, “For couples who are engaged and not yet married, sexual 
intercourse may realize bodily communion, but it lacks the public consent required of marriage 
and marital intercourse.”458 He maintains that without this public marital consent, bodily 
communion between male and female is not a real but illusory good, an unnatural, unreasonable 
choice and, therefore, immoral. Salzman and Lawler reemphasize the import of this part of the 
NNLT, recognizing marriage and marital sexuality as a basic good. “According to NNLT, a 
foundational moral principle is that ‘one may never intend to destroy, damage, impede, or violate 
any basic human good, or prefer an illusory instantiation of a basic human good to a real 
instantiation of that or some other human good.’ By definition, nonmarital sexual acts cannot be 
marital acts, and therefore, to engage in such acts is to ‘destroy, damage, impede or violate’ 
marriage as a basic good.”459 They state even more succinctly that 
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… in light of the basic good of marriage and two fold intrinsic meaning of marital 
acts, NNLT maintains that nonmarital sexual acts are absolutely prohibited 
because they cannot fulfill the intrinsic meanings of marital acts and, therefore, 
cannot activate and achieve the basic good of marriage. Such nonmarital acts 
include premarital sexual intercourse, artificially contraceptive sexual acts, 
homosexual acts, natural or nonmarital nonreproductive sexual acts, and 
masturbation. These acts are unnatural, unreasonable, and therefore immoral.460 
 
It is therefore safe to conclude with Grisez and Finnis, in line with the Catholic doctrinal 
tradition, that it is only within the marriage bond that the sexual act is legitimate. Aimed either at 
procreation or the union of friendship and love of the spouses, the sexual act constitutes a basic 
good. David Braybrook suggests that, in the post-modern context, the scholastic tradition does 
not enjoy a popular following because it prohibits any other form of sexual encounter outside of 
marriage as self-alienation and an illusory experience of personal gratification. He goes further to 
explain that outside of the Catholic Church, the tradition is held suspect because it is seen to 
entail a “subscription to Catholic beliefs about the existence of God… divorce, the status of 
women, and sexual activity, embracing, in regard to the latter—most notoriously— opposition to 
contraception and abortion, as well as to fornication and masturbation.”461  
Conclusion 
Thomas Aquinas’s philosophy, anthropology, and theology, applied to grounding his 
theonomic natural law theory, are designed to uphold the idea of ordered ends and their relation 
to the metaphysical idea of a sovereign God. Human nature is finite and depends on its 
participation in the eternal uncreated wisdom/law of God. Any movement towards the good is 
engendered by the human metaphysical dependence on the divine. Westerman argues this 
position, stating that to suppose a practical doctrine can be fashioned without recourse to 
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speculative metaphysical premises at the apex of such a moral theology is a stretch. “… [I]t 
would never be possible to develop the normative ethics of natural law doctrine in the absence of 
its metaphysical requisites.”462 Westerman concludes by suggesting that the contrast between 
“the new natural law theory with its praxic, antiteleological tendency, and the classical Thomistic 
doctrine of natural law, is instructive.”463 This contrast challenges us all to rediscover and 
reimmerse ourselves within a tradition of reflection, conscious that the work of Plato, Aristotle, 
Boethius, Augustine, and Aquinas “is definitive for the tradition of Catholic theology and 
philosophy.”464  
 Lloyd Weinreb thinks that the vital point of the new natural law theorists is their 
insistence on an object valid moral order. Even though there is a strictly deontological claim, 
there is also the recognition and acceptance of human freedom on which morality rests. There is, 
therefore, a connection between the classicist and contemporary natural law theories that the 
newer protagonists are unwilling to acknowledge. According to Weinreb, this is the reason why 
legal positivists avoid discussions about the status of morality itself. They argue rather that there 
is a distinct separation between morality and law. In Weinreb’s assessment, “[t]hat separation, 
however, on which positivists stake their whole case, is a surrogate for the much more 
fundamental argument that normative order and natural order—freedom and cause—are 
unbridgeably separate.”465 In this way, legal positivism rejects the conditions for freedom and the 
possibility of freedom. Weinreb says this dispute has more at stake than a mere argumentation on 
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the question of law and morals: “Beneath the surface of an apparently inconsequential dispute, 
there lingers the central puzzle of the human situation.”466  
 Weinreb refers to order in the universe as being a central force in Thomistic philosophy, 
political science, ethics, epistemology, psychology, ontology, and theology. The source of 
unitive order in the universe is Divine Providence initiated by the Creator who ordained 
everything into one purposeful and coherent end. In working out the meaning of human freedom 
and self-determinism, the natural law is Aquinas’s way of bringing the human condition within 
the providential order. Weinreb argues, “Not only is human freedom consistent with the natural 
order; nature actually requires freedom, without which a rational creature would be frustrated 
and kept from fulfilling its essence. Yet freedom is directed and limited by nature, lest reason be 
without responsibility or significance.”467 Nature and reason are therefore not opposed; rather 
they co-exist within the unity and coherence of the universal order of the Divine Creator. Time 
and ages have passed between Aquinas’s world and ours, but his world did not doubt as 
normative the existence of a providential Divine Creator who created the universe in an orderly 
symbiosis. Aquinas’s disputations were not intended to provide arguments to sustain or prop up 
that belief but rather to see how, with the intellectual language of the time, he could make 
matters of religious faith intelligible to everyone. Weinreb concludes that even if one were to 
reject Aquinas’s premises, one would still recognize his achievement and relevance to the work 
that has been done in the various theories about the natural law. “If natural law is now presented 
as a response to the problem of freedom in a morally indeterminate, non-providential universe, 
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one that Aquinas himself could not have contemplated, nevertheless it is associated unavoidably 
with Thomistic philosophy.”468 
 The problems with contemporary moral theorists are that they are disconnected from 
traditional Western theistic moral theorizing. Historically, the Western intellectual tradition took 
root in a theistic foundation which the Enlightenment, post modernity, and a vastly secular and 
pluralist society have abandoned.469 We find in the Kantian Critique of Pure Reason a separation 
of moral principles from nature as untenable against purely human reason.470 Pure reason “like 
the categorical imperative, they are proposed not as principles of natural law, but as if they 
were… they consider nature to be completely extrinsic to reason, and thus of no moral value.”471 
They therefore, try to use reason only to develop a new objective valid moral system which 
justifies their own brand of the new natural law theory. Martin Rhonheimer472 elucidates that 
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theorists who see a disconnect between reason and nature are mistaken. In a journal essay, he 
expounds on the idea that the basic requirements of Christian morality are intelligible and 
reasonable. However, they may appear unreasonable, unintelligible, difficult to fulfil, oppressive, 
unrealistic, and too demanding when perceived outside the prism of religious faith. According to 
Rhonheimer, “their inherent reasonableness easily converts into unreasonableness of an 
unattainable ideal, which is therefore unacceptable to most people… people in fact can fully 
accept these moral demands as practically achievable goals… it is in this context precisely that 
these moral demands fully recover their reasonableness.”473 I find Rhonheimer convincing when 
he summarized his position thus: 
…. Christian morality, to a large extent, throws light on the possibility of living a 
moral life which fully meets the intrinsic demands of human nature. This means 
that we can speak of a true specific Christian humanism which differs from the 
purely secular humanism of the non-believer. Thus, what initially appears 
unreasonable, regains reasonableness through faith, hope and charity. That is how 
faith in fact rescues reason and reason recovers all its power to make faith both 
human and effective. Rightly understood, reason therefore needs revelation for 
being capable of effectively working as moral reason and to maintain the 
“reasonableness of morality.”474 
 
Further on in Rhonheimer’s essay, he argues that for Christian humanism in its ecclesiological 
setting to remain profoundly reasonable, it must retain its full normative validity in its “original 
moral knowledge,” which is the same as the natural law. Rhonheimer emphasizes his idea as 
follows: 
…. The basic moral requirements—the human good—contains an intrinsic 
reasonableness which, in principle, is independent from faith, and in that sense 
autonomous. Yet, only under the conditions of Christian faith is it possible to 
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comply consistently with a morality which is in full agreement with the “human” 
and the “truth about man,” because, so I have argued, only when integrated within 
the context of faith can these requirements be defended and justified – precisely 
as reasonable! ….Thus, I think faith to be a necessary condition of a person’s 
being able both to reconcile the requirements of the human good with his striving 
for happiness, and therefore also to meet these requirements consistently.475 
 
This chapter is a broad review of the natural law theory within the Aristotelian-Aquinas-
Scholastic-Catholic tradition vis-à-vis its competing non-theistic NNLT and theorists. The 
natural law specialists have much more to say on the technical and purely philosophical aspects 
of these varied arguments. This chapter attempts to achieve three aims: one, establish a historical 
background; two, show how significant the natural law theory is within Catholic moral theology; 
and three, show that within both the traditional and contemporary natural law theories, marriage, 
human sexuality, and the sexual act are all seen as constituting a basic human good. Once these 
have been established, the next chapter will attempt a review of some thinkers who cover a wide 
range of anthropological, philosophical, feminist, and theological viewpoints to see how they 
approach and respond to the question of human sexuality and marriage from their own 
philosophical perspectives or traditions.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
INTERACTIONS: SOME CONTEMPORARY THINKERS ON  
SEXUALITY AND MARRIAGE 
In this chapter, I intend to engage contemporary voices that contribute to questions about 
the morality of the human body as a sexual body, the debates about human sexuality, and the 
position of the Church with regard to its doctrine on marriage, conjugality and marital sexuality.  
I have chosen John S. Grabowski, Lisa Sowle Cahill, Margaret Farley, and Mercy Amber 
Oduyoye as conversation partners.  They represent a wide variety of voices and positions that 
can help shed light on the many perspectives from which these issues are approached. Their 
Perspectives cover theological, philosophical, cultural, and gender issues from what might be 
considered a more liberal, postmodern ethical perspectives. These voices, provide us with 
alternative narratives which affords us an opportunity to appreciate contrasting positions.  This 
appreciation opens the possibility of a dialogic approach aimed at a possible synthesis of 
traditional and doctrinal position with contemporary theological perspectives.  
John S. Grabowski 
John S. Grabowski theologizes from a systematic application of biblical and virtue-based 
categories to questions of human sexuality.  He approaches these issues with certain biblical 
themes, such as covenant, beatitude, and discipleship. Grabowski’s theology is grounded in the 
Thomistic tradition whereby he approaches the subject matter by paying attention to the “person” 
rather than the law or the sin (i.e., the acts in themselves) as was characteristic of many Catholic 
moral manuals.  Grabowski heavily nuances and applies the virtue ethics of Thomas Aquinas in 
his work, a systematic approach which integrates the question of human nature, synthesizing it 
into a bigger theological method of virtue ethics.  Grabowski is an interesting dialogue partner 
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because he comes from the same Aristotelian and Thomistic foundation as the Catholic Church’s 
doctrinal tradition.  However, he goes beyond the “traditional” approach to build a newer virtue 
ethic that points to areas of possible renewal or re-articulation.   
Grabowski articulates his specific theological task in his book Sex and Virtue, noting that 
his focus is on a systematic application of biblical and virtue-based categories in sexual ethics for 
the renewal of moral theology as directed by Vatican II.  He acknowledges the work of Lisa 
Sowle Cahill in this area, stating that while Cahill approaches the same issue from themes such 
as community, gender, and identification in justice with the marginalized, he approaches these 
issues from the scripturally based themes of covenant, beatitude, and discipleship to give more 
weight to virtue itself.476  Grabowski’s aim is to “contend that biblical theology of covenant 
fidelity wedded to an account of chastity as an integral part of human flourishing can provide a 
suitable framework for a Christian approach to issues of sexuality in contemporary context.”477  
Grabowski’s moral theology centers on the question of how to avoid lapsing into 
legalism.  He is also concerned with how to address the moral and cultural relativism which he 
believes pervade contemporary life context.  In Grabowski argues that a renewal of Catholic 
moral theology is needed to overcome the heavily legalistic and act-centered morality of the 
period between Trent and Vatican II.  The moral growth of the person, he believes, was not 
considered, and the manualist utilized biblical “proof texts” were used in isolated ways to ground 
authoritative laws abstracted from the overall biblical message of salvation and failed to 
adequately attend to the moral growth of the person.   
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Grabowski avidly supports Vatican II’s call for renewal of moral theology.  This renewal, 
he posits, can be accomplished in three ways; first, as delineated in Dei Verbum, no. 24, genuine 
renewal requires that moral theology be immersed in Sacred Scripture which is the “soul” of 
sacred theology.478  Second, the focus should be shifted to the human person (as against the 
previous pre-occupation of focusing on human acts) fully revealed in and by Christ.  Quoting 
Gaudium et Spes, Grabowski states that “[t]he ‘livelier contact with the mystery of Christ’ called 
for in post conciliar moral theology necessarily brings the human person created for and 
redeemed by him into sharper focus.”479 Third, there is a renewed account of the moral 
dynamism of the person redeemed by Christ and this person’s free and personal acts in moral 
decision making as well as personal growth in moral goodness and holiness.480   
The seven chapters in Sex and Virtue seminally represent the theology of John 
Grabowski.  Grabowski approaches the question of virtue and sexuality from within the milieu of 
Western culture.  He focuses on American Catholicism and the modern-day clash of the idea of 
sexuality within society and faith, on “a culture which prizes individual autonomy and valorizes 
sexual expression as integral to personal fulfilment…, confronted with authoritative Church 
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teachings often perceived as hostile to such values and divorced from their own experience.”481 
In light of Paul VI’s encyclical, Humanae Vitae, he looks at the sexual scandals in the Church 
and the conversation on the perceived struggle between freedom and law as the basis of 
morality.482 
Grabowski develops a biblical foundation for understanding conjugality as the sign of a 
covenantal pledge between spouses.  Using the Church’s liturgical and sacramental tradition, 
Grabowski establishes a dynamic exegetical link between the second creation account in Genesis 
and Israel’s Pentateuchal and Prophetic tradition.  He traces its newer meaning in the New 
Testament account in Ephesians 5:21-33 where the analogy of mutual submission in the one 
flesh is presented as a metaphor for the relationship between Christ and the Church.  Applying 
his key biblical themes, Grabowski then lays the ground work for a covenantal ethic of marital 
spirituality and marital sexuality based on the invitation to discipleship and the beatitudes.  
Grabowski proposes a “recovery” of the virtue ethic-chastity from its historical and 
contemporary impulses, relying on what he refers to as modern psychology and philosophical 
personalism to provide nuances in the acquisition and expression of the virtue of chastity within 
the contemporary context. 
On the much debated question of gender differentiation, Grabowski views questions of 
equality or inequality within the dignity of human persons as male or female and the rise of 
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feminism as social, political and cultural phenomena.  His work attempts to “locate the equality 
of the sexes in their possession of a shared human nature, while arguing that sexual difference 
may be understood as a fundamental relation constitutive of personhood.”483   Grabowski 
therefore recognizes and points out threats to the dignity of the sexes such as prostitution, 
pornography, sexual violence/abuse and so on.  He takes note of and acknowledges internal 
revolts and disagreements on Humanae Vitae.  Unfortunately, the extremely critical inside 
debates affected a younger generation of Catholics whose understanding of sex and sexuality 
were largely then informed by an extremely liberalized society whose sexual culture is based 
purely on individual autonomy and on pleasurable and even “freeing” experiences.  As if this 
were not bad enough, there came the sexual scandals involving priests, further undermining the 
Church’s moral probity to adjudicate matters of sexual conduct.  Many cradle Catholics and a 
greater majority of priests and theologians in the Western world perceived this encyclical as an 
imposition of papal authority without taking into account people’s lived experience.  People were 
then taught to rely on their consciences by theologians and priests who argue that the teaching 
does not enjoy papal infallibility.  Grabowski opposes this trend by stating unequivocally that  
[t]he deformation of morality in its reduction to the dialectic between freedom of 
conscience over against an external law is at the heart of such a reading of the 
encyclical and many of the debates that it produced.  Yet it was precisely the 
narrow confines of a morality of obligation that Vatican II sought to challenge in 
its call for renewal.  Much of the controversy following the encyclical is in fact a 
testimony to the continuing presence of a morality of obligation and the casuistry 
it breeds within Catholic moral thought.  The alienation experienced by many 
older Catholics in regard to the Church and sexuality can be traced to the impact 
of such a paradigm.  Either they operate within this moral system, in which case 
the authority of the teaching can be doubted on the grounds of casuistry and 
conscience.  Or, having rejected this paradigm to one degree or another, yet not 
being given a new way to think about morality, they simply find it difficult to 
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relate their faith to moral teaching of any kind.  Faith and morality are thus 
disconnected.484     
 
To try to begin resolving this alienation, especially from within the Church, Grabowski 
proposes a radical re-thinking of how to present reasoning about sex devoid of its traditional 
legalism.  The new method should take into account the sources of moral theology and a better 
account of the human person growing in moral excellence.  On another level, magisterial 
teachings can no longer rely on “authority” but must be couched in a language that is 
“compelling enough to offer a cogent alternative to dominant cultural visions of sex as merely 
ecstatic release, personal fulfilment, or a commodity of exchange.”485  Grabowski advocates for 
teachings on sexuality that are embedded in the language of faith but fully aware of and 
sympathetic to genuine intellectual and cultural contexts, such as questions concerning the 
dangers of over-population with appalling and unequal distribution of the world’s natural 
resources.  Considering the emerging Western patterns of the role of women, the changing 
patterns of sexual mores and behaviors, and the difficulties parents and religious instructors face 
in trying to communicate Christian ethical values to youngsters confronted with a vastly 
irreverent, materialistic, and secularized world,  Grabowski concludes that because “no one 
treatment can fully resolve [these] issues, some attention must be given to them both on the level 
of theory and on the level of concrete moral praxis.”486      
Further, he argues for the primacy of the procreative purpose of sex and the self-donation 
that occurs in the couples’ sexual act when performed in chastity, as taught within the Catholic 
doctrinal tradition. Grabowski borrows from the Old Testament the idea of enacting covenants 
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by oath taking, thereby drawing a parallel with the marriage vow. “Sexual union is thus 
understood as a kind of anamnesis that recalls precisely the totality of a couple’s gift to one 
another expressed in their oath.”487 According to Grabowski, the intensity and exclusiveness of 
covenantal relationships remains true in the total self-donation of persons in a marital sexual act, 
and this he claims is the foundation for a theology of sexuality.488  It is in this self-donation that 
the covenantal/oath taken is ratified: “In coition a couple seals their covenant with one another 
by an embodied enactment of their complete self-giving… sex is thus the embodied symbol of a 
couple’s love and communion in a way similar to that in which liturgy symbolizes and enacts the 
communion between God and his people through gesture and ritual.”489 Grabowski concludes, 
therefore, that the sexual act is genuinely sacramental – however, only for the first time when a 
marriage is consummated and the two become one flesh.490  In completing this parallel, 
Grabowski explains, “Such observations suggest a fundamental analogy between the offering of 
self to God in the act of worship and the sexual self-giving of spouses to another.  Both are 
liturgical actions that recall and symbolize a covenant relation through bodily gesture of self-
donation…. It has an anamnetic quality in that it is a recollection and enactment of what the 
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couple promise in their vows to one another.”491 This covenantal and sacramental approach can 
serve as a foundation for the development of a more cogent and compelling vision of sexuality 
within contemporary theological conversation. 
Following the covenantal and sacramental approach, Grabowski situates the ideas of 
kingdom and discipleship, though not in any particular systematized account of morality. The 
New Testament strands of Jesus’s proclamation of the kingdom of God, his call to discipleship, 
his Sermon on the Mount, including the beatitudes, and the general New Testament treatment of 
Christian moral character can help to concretize the paradigm Grabowski is trying to build. 
Jesus’ proclamation of the kingdom was a call to repentance (metanoia) followed by 
discipleship.  The New Testament shows the development of a new approach to understanding 
covenant, which was re-envisioned at the last supper and constructed on the cross.  The 
“Eucharist is an anamnesis of the new covenant oath made on the cross…analogous to the role of 
a couple’s sexual communion.”492  The New Testament is filled with references to nuptial 
imageries even with imagery that transfers the notion of Yahweh as the bridegroom of Israel to 
the person of Christ.  Bridegrooms and wedding banquets proliferate in the inspired authors of 
the entire New Testament. 
The idea of chastity within Christian morality according to Grabowski is “one of the most 
maligned and misunderstood virtues in contemporary culture…”493  Such misunderstanding 
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492 Ibid., 54.  (Grabowski understands the nuptial meal of the Eucharist in which the bridegroom gives himself 
bodily to his bridal Church—as the ultimate analogy of the “one flesh” unity of spouses effected by their mutual 
self-donation in sexual intimacy. Cf. Ibid., 65.  In the self-emptying death of Christ on the cross, reveals the agape 
present from all eternity on the trinity.  Thus in Grabowski’s thinking the cross of Christ is an act of supreme self-
gift illumines both trinitarian and spousal self-donation.  Or as Grabowski states, “On this basis it can be said that, 
when fully personal, sexual communion in marriage serves as a created image of the transcendent and spiritual self-
giving that is the basis of Trinitarian communion.” Cf. Ibid., 69-70. 
 
493 Ibid., 71. 
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occurs because the word evokes prudery and inhibitions, even dysfunction or neurosis, as 
opposed to a culture that seeks sexual pleasure as a source of happiness and self fulfilment.  As 
chastity is disdained, fidelity naturally suffers the same fate.  Grabowski claims that recent a 
resurgence and interest in virtues as the basis for the moral life are making a come-back in the 
works of Alasdair MacIntyre and others.  Even within this development, the perception of virtue 
ethics as rigorist and anti-sex makes its wide acceptance problematic.  Grabowski avers, 
“Further, it is not immediately evident how even the strengths of the classical understanding of 
chastity can be reconciled with developments in modern thought that focus on the person and his 
or her cognitive development and specific cultural location.”494  Through tradition and the 
contributions of medieval authors, Grabowski states that chastity has always been regarded as the 
virtue which enables mastery over one’s sexual urges and desires, especially of the disordered 
kind.  The application of personalist philosophical ethics applied to sexual morality in the works 
of Dietrich von Hildebrand and Herbert Doms in the 1930-40s helped to clarify a more 
experiential perspective of marital chastity.  Pope John Paul II in his work Love and 
Responsibility later expounds on these ideas—that chastity is not merely mastery over passion 
but the integration of sexual desires and a wide range of human affectivity.  In the single, 
celibate, and married vocations, “chastity makes it possible for persons to discover the 
communion for which they were created.”495 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
494 Ibid., 71-2. 
 
495 Ibid., 87. Grabowski clarifies the virtue of chastity as having three distinctive forms: First, celibate chastity which 
is ordered to the gift of one’s body and sexuality in nongenital expressions of friendship, love, and service in the 
Church. Second, conjugal chastity ordered towards fidelity and the total self-gifts of spouses within the marriage 
covenant. Third, unmarried or widowed single persons, are required the same continence of the celibate except for 
the widowed person, who can legitimately choose to re-marry. Cf. Ibid., 88. 
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In an attempt to inculcate the virtue of chastity, Grabowski warns that the complex and 
far-reaching-effects of cultural influence must be noted, stating, “To some degree or other 
chastity is a virtue mediated by moral and religious narratives whose acquisition will be shaped 
by particular cultural contexts and symbols.”496  Grabowski notes that cultures are different; thus, 
what one holds sacred may not necessarily be so in another culture.  Therefore, he advocates for 
what JPII calls adopting a “culture of life.”497  Grabowski argues for engaging culture through 
critical evaluation, the elaboration of alternative views and practices, the presentation of a more 
positive vision of human sexuality, and engaging people in specific cultural practices that can 
allow chastity to flourish.  Following and in line with the foregoing, Grabowski explains the 
connection between “biology” and “environment-culture” or the nurture-versus-nature debate.  
Grabowski posits that just as in the Trinitarian life of God, wherein “each person is utterly equal 
in his possession of the divine nature and yet utterly irreducible to one another as persons…, the 
sexes share a common humanity—the same nature.  Yet they are irreducibly different as 
persons.”498 Grabowski’s overall marital and sexual ethic, though close to the magisterial 
position, offers a new method at approaching this important question.  Grabowski’s position is 
best summarized in his own words:  
…a covenantal understanding of sexual fidelity in conjunction with an account of 
chastity as an integral part of human flourishing can provide a framework for a 
Christian approach to issues of sexual morality in the present context.  This 
covenantal understanding provides a vantage to critique shallow and distorted 
views of sexuality in contemporary culture as well as for framing an alternative to 
them.  It is rooted in the mystery of Christ mediated by the biblical witness and 
the Church’s liturgical tradition.  It points towards the vocation of followers of 
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498 Grabowski. Sex and Virtue, 110.  JPII in TOB refers to this unique individuality and oneness of spouses as “the 
nuptial meaning of the body.” 
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Christ to be conformed to him in their capacity to love.  Chastity is the virtue that 
enables this vocation to be realized and lived in a variety of states of life.499  
 
 In an essay co-authored by Grabowski and Michael J. Naughton, the two authors 
responded to a previous Charles Curran essay published in Commonweal on October 11, 1996.  
In this essay, Charles Curran accused Catholics of suffering from “schizophrenia” on matters of 
papal/magisterial sexual ethics.  Curran asserts that issues of magisterial teachings on sexual 
ethics are often times inconsistent because they move from a classicist approach to a more 
historically conscious and personalist approach.  Grabowski and Naughton respond that JPII’s 
position on family life and sexuality is different from the pontiff’s approach on social issues.  
Social issues, Grabowski and Naughton claim, are embedded in constantly changing political and 
societal dynamics, whereas sexual morality remains within the family context.  “The family 
plays a fundamental role in the procreation and protection of human life through the conjugal 
union of man and woman in marriage.  Because of this role, the family has a more foundational 
and permanent character than other social institutions.”500 Grabowski and Naughton continue in 
their response to Curran by reiterating the importance of family as the locus of other institutions 
and the human society in its entirety:  “The family is the basic cell of every human society; hence 
society is dependent upon the family.  To claim that the family is a more immutable structure 
than other institutions is not to oppose a ‘historically conscious’ approach… but to recognize the 
                                                          
499 Ibid. 168.  Grabowski concludes his book by stating, “…this conceptualization of sexuality to be effective [it] has 
to be embodied in personal and communal praxis. A full answer to the crisis of sexuality in the contemporary 
Church and society can only be found in people who by their lives and practices proclaim a countercultural 
alternative to its trivialization – people’s whose masculinity-femininity is a sacramental sign of “the sincere gift of 
self,” whose sexual practices foster authentic human flourishing, whose sexuality is imbued with virtue.  The lived 
witness of the human vocation to communion within marriages, families, religious vocations, and the single life is 
both a sign and a participation in the One whose being is gift and whose life as a Trinity of Persons is an eternal 
communion of Love.  Ibid.  
 
500 John S. Grabowski and Michael J. Naughton, “Doctrinal Development: Does it Apply to Sex?”  Commonweal 
124, no. 11 (June 6, 1997): 2. 
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family’s fundamental role in social stability and its rootedness in the permanent union of a man 
and a woman in the covenant of marriage.”501  
 Grabowski and Naughton insist that the Church’s social teachings are more open to 
historical consciousness than its sexual ethic, because to have it any other way, “the Church 
would either have to relativize the family or baptize a particular social arrangement—for 
example, capitalism or socialism.”502  The authors argue that Curran’s charge that because the 
Church in history has changed her mind on politics, human rights, and democracy, she therefore 
should be able to change on the question of morality shows a failure on the part of Curran to 
recognize the basic nature of sexual values and the institutions they embody.  In Grabowski and 
Naughton’s view, there is no clash in JPII’s teachings as either classicist in sexual ethics or 
historically conscious in social teachings; rather, “what we do see is an effort to formulate an 
integrated account of morality that reflects the understanding of the human person as created in 
God’s image.”503  
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503 Ibid.  I find Grabowski and Naughton’s conclusion in their response to Curran interesting when they assert, “It 
must be admitted, however, that there is something in Curran’s diagnosis of schizophrenia that rings true. Still, the 
root of the problem is not a clash between classicist and historically conscious ways of thinking.  Rather, it is the 
endurance of the legalistic morality that dominated Catholic thought in the last four centuries.  Because the Catholic 
manualists held that, strictly speaking, one is only required to avoid evil rather than to do good, many of the positive 
injunctions of the social tradition were marginalized.  So in many cases, Catholic social teaching seems to lack 
‘teeth’ in Church law and in the practice of Catholic organizations.  The solution to this legalism is not, however, to 
equivocate in regard to values of life or sexuality, but to reject the mindset that makes social goods dispensable.  As 
a Church, we must discover ways to describe the binding character of the good without reducing the whole of 
morality to law.  Undoubtedly there is room for deeper understanding and better formulations in all of the strands of 
Catholic moral teaching.  Because the moral life is rooted in the spiritual life, it is always open to growth.  But 
Curran’s diagnosis of schizophrenia fails to appreciate the organic unity and integrity of the Church’s moral 
tradition.  It also fails to identify the legalism that is the real cause of the schizophrenia hamstringing the application 
of Catholic social teaching.” Ibid. 
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In a 2002 Logos journal article, Grabowski explores “spirituality” for families in the light 
of Ecclesia in America.504  Among other issues considered by this post-synodal Apostolic 
Exhortation, Grabowski pays particular attention to the Christian ideal of conjugal communion 
and family life, with extra focus on Vatican II’s universal call to holiness which then 
characterizes a spirituality for motherhood and fatherhood.  Grabowski’s concern is based on 
what he considers a “dearth of distinctive models of spirituality for families within the 
tradition.”505  Alluding to years of the misconceived ideal of the superiority of various forms of 
monastic spirituality as “watered down” for a second-class married vocation, Grabowski notes 
that in this tradition, a genuine spirituality for families seems impossible to achieve.  His re-
reading of Ecclesia in America in the light of Lumen Gentium and more recent magisterial 
pronouncements sees the possibility of highlighting numerous resources capable of pin-pointing 
distinctive and eminently practicable spiritualties for families. These resources will largely 
include biblical and theological themes suited to the vocation of those who have families and 
encounter society, being called to holiness thereby.  Grabowski therefore focuses on biblical 
themes of family as covenant, as communion, and as domestic Church which participates in the 
threefold office of Christ as priest, prophet, and king, and as a sanctuary of love and life. 
From his position in his journal essay together within the context of Ecclesia in America 
and other contemporary teachings to which he alludes, Grabowski is able to frame a possible 
model of a comprehensive vision for Christian family life.  Of particular significance in 
Grabowski’s thought is the array of social forces that mitigates against families seen and existing 
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505 Ibid., 75. 
 
191 
 
as places of covenant—a family covenant established through vows, blood, or adoption.506   In 
terms of the family as a place of communion, Grabowski helps modern persons to see the nature 
of the family as a foundational expression of the human and Christian vocation to communion. In 
learning to give and receive love, the couple enter into communion which will invariably 
embrace their gift of children and family, and embrace the same reason for which humanity was 
created.507  Seen and understood as a domestic Church, coming out of Vatican II, the family is 
perceived as a “specific revelation and realization of ecclesial communion or domestic Church” 
which is both evangelized and evangelizing.508  Finally, when family life is understood as a 
place of sanctuary of love and life, it is a sacred place of refuge and protection because it is a 
“holy” place inhabited by human and divine life.509   
According to Grabowski, powerful social forces are arrayed against the family and its 
role under these themes.  Grabowski, referring to Pope John Paul II, speaks of what JPII calls a 
kind of “anti-civilization” and “the culture of death.”510  Grabowski asserts that these influences 
are evident in a liberal/secularized post-modern world where there is 
[a]n aggressive secularism that banishes an understanding of God from public life 
and education; unbridled materialism and consumerism that reduce the goal of life 
to the acquisition of wealth and material goods; contemporary individualism that 
denies the social nature of the person and reduces his or her freedom to autonomy, 
various forms of relativism that undermine any account of the truth about the 
person; anthropological views that reduce human personhood to a level of 
function and hence deny it to the unborn, handicapped, or elderly; utilitarian 
views of morality that deny transcendent moral values and reduce people to 
objects of use; understanding of sexuality that reduce it to a mere biological outlet 
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for pleasure and see children as a burden; and current of thought spawned by 
instrumental reason that see the created world as mere inanimate matter to be 
dominated by scientific and technological means. 
The family is thus at the fulcrum of the struggle that makes up the drama 
of our age.  The forces arrayed against the family are not fictional beasts sketched 
by academic theory or ecclesial pronouncement… Given its pivotal role as the 
sanctuary of life, the family is crucial to the Church’s mission in proclaiming the 
gospel of life.511   
 
 Grabowski’s theologizing sees the family and its spirituality at the front line of an 
enormous cultural shift.  He therefore, in agreement with Ecclesia in America, advocates for a 
renewed evangelization of families, new catechesis, and new pastoral approach to family life. 
Grabowski’s hermeneutic gives weight to traditional magisterial positions, yet he is able to 
proffer and propose new methods by which tradition can speak to modern society and be 
intelligible.  His work adds a much needed critique and raises profound and related questions for 
contemporary thinking on marriage, family life, and human sexuality and the development of 
doctrine.  
Lisa Sowle Cahill 
    My second dialogue partner, Dr. Lisa Sowle Cahill,512  came into the limelight in the 
1980s with her studies on gender and sexual ethics. Cahill’s work focuses on the complexity of 
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512 According to William Bole in a 2011 Commonweal essay on Cahill, “As a scholar, Cahill finds her footing in the 
natural law tradition, which affirms the compatibility of faith and reason and the possibility of arriving at objective 
truths – ‘natural’ or self-evident truths on which people of all faiths (and no faith) can agree.  Natural Law discourse 
emphasizes public conversation about the social good, and Cahill believes that the Church and other Christian 
communities can both contribute to this conversation and profit from it, culling truth from a broad diversity of 
settings and assumptions.  Everyone has a capacity for reasonable judgement; no one should be dismissed out of 
hand.  This methodology is front and center in all of her theological investigations.”  Cf. William Bole, “No Labels 
Please: Lisa Sowle Cahill’s Middle Way,” Commonweal 38, no. 1 (Jan. 14, 2011): 3 
Roland Hoksbergen, in his review of Lisa Cahill’s 2013 book, Global Justice, Christology and Christian 
Ethics, alludes to Cahill’s style of doing theology as follows: “She constructs her argument in full recognition that 
she is herself embedded in the cultural, intellectual and theological context of her own world, and from that position 
and perspective works to reconcile opposing theological ideas that have long been in conflict.  Among the most 
prominent contemporary realities that have influenced her, while also calling out for ethical attention, are the 
increasing acceptance of postmodern understandings, the changing perceptions of the role of women, and our 
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moral issues and the tensions in theological disagreements between the Church and society.  She 
explores sexuality strictly from the hermeneutics of scriptures, gender differentiation, and 
contemporary Christian ethics.  She pays particular attention to how men and women relate 
sexually, to the rights and wrongs of human sexual relationships, and to what Christian ethics 
might contribute.  In Cahill’s own words, “sexuality is morality.  It is part of our expressing, for 
good or ill, relationship to the material world, to other life forms, to the self, and to other 
persons, including God.”513 Arguably, Cahill succeeds in finding a pathway by balancing 
extreme positions in locating a Christian ethic of equal gender relationality.  Her work gives a 
balanced and fair critique to Catholic moral theology and secular non-religious contemporary 
voices.  Cahill works from a feminist perspective which she claims is “simply a commitment to 
equal personal respect and equal social power for women and men.”514   In this expose of 
Cahill’s theological assumptions, attention is given to three of her books: Between the Sexes: 
Foundations for a Christian Ethics of Sexuality (1985); Sex, Gender and Christian Ethics (1996); 
and Family: A Christian Social Perspective (2000), they pay particular attention to questions 
about family and sexual ethics from within the Catholic tradition and therefore align with the 
trajectory of the central thesis of this dissertation.  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
increased global interaction and consciousness, especially the realities of cultural and religious pluralism…. Her 
writing models the sort of love, reconciliation and hopeful spirit that she would also instil in other Christian hearts 
and minds.  This spirit is amply manifested by the fact that she never really argues against any idea, nor attempts to 
show that one view is better than another.  Instead, she honors every tradition of thought, attempting to extract the 
positive, to show how opposing views arising from these traditions can be reconciled, and then to push supporters of 
such views to new syntheses that will get them working together for positive change.  This is no small task, but 
Cahill makes good progress.” Cf. Roland Hoksbergen, “Lisa Sowle Cahill, Global Justice, Christology and Christian 
Ethics,” Studies in Christian Ethics 27, no. 3 (2014): 340-382 
 
513 Lisa Sowle Cahill, Between the Sexes: Foundations for a Christian Ethics of Sexuality (Philadelphia: Fortress 
Press, 1985), 2.  
  
514 Lisa Sowle Cahill, Sex, Gender & Christian Ethics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 1 
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In Between the Sexes: Foundations for a Christian Ethics of Sexuality (1985), Cahill 
claims that her work specifically is focused on “the ‘rights and wrongs’ of relationships between 
women and men …it is about sexual ethics and the ethics of male and female cooperation.”515  
As in most of her other works, Cahill’s thesis relies on four reference points for her Christian 
ethics, (1) the Bible/Scripture as foundational text for the faith community, (2) the community’s 
faith tradition, (3) theology, praxis, and philosophical accounts of ideal humanity (normative to 
human experience), (4) and a descriptive account of what is common to human experience.  
Cahill opines that “fidelity to these four mutually correcting sources, and success in judiciously 
balancing them, is a standard by which we can measure the adequacy of various positions and 
traditions, including our own.”516 Further on, she contends that our reading of the Bible should 
respond to the mores of our culture, and that the standard of an adequate Christian theology and 
ethics of sexuality “is precisely the dialectical and complementary relationship of Bible, 
tradition, and normative and descriptive accounts of human existence.”517  Cahill warns against 
the presupposition that a philosophical account of sexuality is enough to define the essential and 
ideals of the meaning of sexuality.  Actual historical distortions and adaptations, she maintains, 
show philosophy’s limitations. Cahill proposes that sexuality may be understood better as an 
affirmation of the character of interpersonal relationships, procreation, and the equal dignity 
worthy of both women and men.  Cahill’s project ultimately is to be able to offer what she calls 
the two criteria by which the Christian community can approach questions of family and 
sexuality: commitment and procreative responsibility.  Cahill, however, reiterates, “Particular 
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sexual acts and relations can realize these values in different ways and in different degrees… Not 
all Christian interpretations of these criteria should continue to determine moral analysis of 
sexuality.”518  It is in this way, according to Cahill, that Christian ethics become dynamic and 
ordered in fidelity to the Christian symbols of beneficent Creator, righteous Judge, gracious 
Redeemer, and transforming Spirit.  “These symbols require us to attend to our own experience 
of God and community as the beginning point of reconciliation of body and spirit, self and 
others, and humanity and God.”519 
Cahill presents as central to the Christian tradition a communal aspect which serves reproductive 
acts, civil and religious communities, and even the love of the spouses, all of which are located 
within the service of same communitarian focus.  Cahill locates this social dimension in 
Augustine, Aquinas and Luther. In her estimation, the main stream of Western moral philosophy 
since the enlightenment has relied on autonomy, rationality, and freedom of the individual, as 
exemplified in John Locke’s liberalism that is common to North American society and politics.  
In this liberalist autonomy, the individual is concerned about personal interests and needs, and 
only paralleled by the competing rights of others in the pursuit of the same ideal.520  In sexuality, 
liberalism tends to support the autonomy of consenting adults to any liaison without necessarily 
acceding to religious or political control. Cahill perceives and warns about liberalism and 
autonomy, stating, “Still, liberal individualism and relativism in sexual ethics stand to be 
corrected by the traditional service-oriented and communal ideals against which contemporary 
personalism arose as a modification.”521  
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Cahill accedes that in both Testaments of the Bible, the institutionalization of 
heterosexual, monogamous, permanent, and procreative marriage is favored, such that 
procreative marriage is cohesive with the continuity of the body politic, the Church, and family.  
Biblical texts are also explicit in condemning deviations from these general norms because they 
are understood to be incompatible with the life of faith in the covenant community.  Among the 
unacceptable acts in sexuality are included adultery, fornication, porneia/sexual immorality and 
homosexuality.522  Cahill immediately proceeds to raise some questions in an attempt to clarify if 
normative scriptural texts are universal and have unquestionable authority.  The questions 
include whether “the authority of the ‘norm’ of heterosexual monogamy differs in any crucial 
sense from a ‘norm’ such as patriarchy whose decisiveness for Christian faith, practice and 
theology is dubious?”523  Referring to these as less unclear, she nonetheless asks if “the 
prohibitions that biblical authors derive from monogamous, heterosexual, and procreative 
meanings of sexuality unfailingly indicate specific relations and acts that decisively fail to 
embody those goods that meaningful sexuality is said to realize?”524 Cahill notes that the Bible 
itself provides for an occasional exception whose status does not contradict the norm against 
which they are defined, questioning if “divorce of some sort was permitted by Mathew and Paul.  
On the biblical model, the question of exceptions appears to be an open one.  How then shall the 
viability of proposed exceptions be determined?”525  With increasing data on the study of the 
etiology of homosexual phenomenon, Cahill again cautions, 
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No simple definitions of what is morally “normative,” or even what is “healthy,” 
in human sexuality will be available from sheer empirical investigations, even 
though the latter augment reflection immensely.  It must be remembered that 
even empirical “data” are organized and interpreted with the help of categories 
that are themselves not wholly “value free.”… Empirical evidence can be 
appropriated meaningfully in Christian ethics only if interpreted in the light of 
other, complementary sources: Scripture, tradition, and normative, as distinct 
from descriptive, accounts of the human.526 
 
Cahill accepts a nuanced departure from the traditional Christian central ethics of sexual 
norms which accommodates certain variant ways of living out these norms, proposing, first, that 
the Christian community “should formulate criteria that define fidelity to the essence of this 
norm, while allowing variance in the way it is fulfilled.”527  Second, she observes that “it is 
necessary to contemplate true departures from norms as well as unusual applications of them, 
though the vast majority of ‘exceptions’ fall into the latter category.”528 These possible 
exceptions, while tolerable, must be rare, with the understanding that “fixation of attention on the 
outer limits of applications and departures is not a perspective on sexuality congruent with the 
biblical one…”529  Cahill calls for a “responsible” application of sexual moral norms by 
Christians in situations where “strict adherence to the norm of procreative, heterosexual 
monogamy is inappropriate, difficult or impossible.”530  Cahill includes in these situations, 
questions about remarriage after divorce, committed but premarital (“preceremonial”) sex, 
avoidance of conception in marital conjugal sex, and committed homosexual relationships. 
Cahill acknowledges how difficult the sexual morality subject has been, but she remains hopeful 
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that despite all the differences in opinion, positions held as untrue can be held sincerely and 
conscientiously and that the presumed position, held and believed deeply, may from time to time 
stand in need of revision.  In Cahill’s words, “Shifts in sexual milieus do not necessarily mean 
that Christian ethics needs to be re-written entirely, but may require radical reappropriation of 
the images by which it is formed.”531    
In Sex, Gender and Christian Ethics, Cahill calls for a feminist critique of what it means 
to be male and female while upholding the insights of traditional Christian ethics of conjugality, 
commitment, and parenthood as the hallmark of human relationships.  This unitive component of 
marriage is an ideal which for Cahill is not an absolute norm.  Gender equality must entail 
dignity of persons, mutual respect, and equality of social power, excluding any kind of 
patriarchy.  In response to communitarian proponents of Christian morality and feminist critics 
of oppressive gender and sex norms, Cahill posits that there is a need for an effective 
intercultural criticism of unjust structures with a moderate defense of moral objectivity.532  Cahill 
argues that feminists’ deconstructions of moral foundations “creates a normative vacuum which 
cripples their political critique….they allow values like autonomy and freedom, tracing to 
Enlightenment roots, to slide in as tacit universals, operative without intercultural nuancing or 
explicit defense.”533  Cahill pursues a different path:  
Human embodiedness, as to some extent structuring our social relations, need to 
be reintegrated with freedom.  All must be elements in a Christian ethics of sex 
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and gender which is committed to equality, to intercultural discernment of real 
goods and evils, and to the human and moral interdependence of sexual desire and 
pleasure, sexual commitment, and responsibility.534  
 
In the conversation about sexual morality between revisers and traditionalists, the primary 
interpretative norm should be relationship and fulfilment.  These norms, according to Cahill, are 
both valid but must always be placed “in a deeper and more nuanced social context, with better 
attention both to the familial ramifications of sexual partnerships, and to differences and 
similarities in cross-cultural experiences of sex, gender and family.”535  Cahill opines that for 
Christian sexual ethics to be meaningful for contemporary times, “it must ground sexual freedom 
and fulfilment in some account of the human goods at stake in sex and in the relationships built 
upon it.”536  It also must develop a system that can speak to and listen to multiple moral 
traditions, each in their own cultures.  “This will require meeting the postmodern critiques of 
rationality and moral value, and reconstructing some recognizable foundations for sex and 
gender ethics.”537 Cahill also points out an interesting contemporary line of division in 
Christianity that must be overcome: 
I believe that a cautious but essentially realist ethics is necessary to avoid the 
social ineffectiveness of moral relativism.  I also believe it is warranted by the 
way practical moral debate and negotiation actually take place….  It also can 
escape the pitfalls of rigidity and abstraction to which both Kantian minimalist 
universalism (often in Protestant theological forms) and neo scholastic casuistry 
(a Catholic development) have been liable, and which have contributed to the 
retreat of many Christian ethicists into communitarianism.538 
 
  
                                                          
534 Ibid., 3. 
 
535 Ibid., 10. 
 
536 Ibid., 11. 
 
537 Ibid., 12. 
 
538 Ibid. 
 
200 
 
Sex, Gender and Christian Ethics, strives to place in context, what sex, gender and 
marriage should mean in contemporary times based on what it has meant historically.  According 
to Cahill, pre-modern cultures of fourth century migrants into Europe and Christianity set a high 
priority on the social functions of marriage and family and perceived gender from a hierarchical 
point of view.  Sex was understood with regard to its purely reproductive functions, family and 
parenthood by their socio-economic functions.  Cahill avers that “sexual intimacy was structured 
patriarchally, and sexual pleasure was not linked to the mutual affection of the reproductive 
partners, so much as to the accomplishment of reproduction itself, whose requirements it always 
exceeded.  Hence sex’s reputation as unruly and dangerous to its own social role.”539  Cahill 
claims that it was not until modern times that the Church’s theology of marriage presented its 
interpersonal dimensions as the primary goal of the union.  Nonetheless, Christians in most 
cultures approach marriage from that deep personal commitment of love and family above socio-
economic needs or function.  According to Cahill, “Sex, interpreted in light of the individual’s 
intersubjective experience, is valued for allowing intimacy as reciprocity, and as supplying 
mutual pleasure which enhances intimacy.”540  
Cahill thinks that women’s status has improved worldwide in contemporary times owing 
to “increased access to education, healthcare, and family planning measures.”541  
Notwithstanding, Cahill is quick to point out that there is a continued societal permissiveness 
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towards men’s sexual behavior which re-entrenches gender inequality.  Cahill clearly challenges 
the current state of things: 
The connection between sex, love and babies cannot be apprehended, much less 
credibly advocated, in any individualist or act oriented concept of sex, becoming a 
parent, or making a commitment.  A strength of Catholic tradition is its strongly 
social vision of these realities.  They now require re-visioning toward a 
personalized and gender equal paradigm, which recognizes the biographical and 
diachronic context of sexual and parental meaning and hence of sexual morality.  
To rehabilitate the parental significance of sexuality within such a paradigm, it 
may be necessary to give up specifying those purposes which fulfill sexual 
activity in the immediate experience of participants – where, in the event, 
procreation is rarely the dominant conscious aim – and to reposition reproduction 
in the social context which has for so long been so important in constituting its 
human meaning.  The parenthood of the individual should be placed in the context 
of relationship to one’s co-parent; conceiving, birthing, and parenting a child 
should be placed within the family, both nuclear and extended; and the family 
must be seen, neither as a “haven” from the world, nor as a nexus of social 
control, but as a school for critical contribution to the common good.  To place 
parenthood in social context would also mean, from a Christian standpoint, to ask 
how Christian values transform, the family, and shape the family’s contribution to 
society.542 
 
Even in light of this modern critique of commitment and inter-subjectivity in both the 
Protestant and Catholic traditions, Cahill argues that “a post-modern reticence about moral 
foundations has made it difficult for many social critics—Christian and otherwise—to argue 
convincingly that equality, reciprocity, and respect should function as cross-cultural norms.”543  
She goes further to proffer that liberal assumptions about the priority of freedom have made it 
equally difficult “to complement the importance of these values with a more complete 
consideration of human embodiment, its social dimensions, and its function in defining human 
goods and suggesting human moral values.”544  Therefore, there is a need for a consistent 
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commitment to embodiment and the redefinition of marriage, parenthood, and family in which 
gendered sexuality is re-imagined.  Cahill avers, “The Roman Catholic commitment to 
(provisional) objectivity in moral evaluation, and to the ideal unity of sexual expression, and 
shared parenthood, can contribute to a more complete Christian ethics of sex as an embodied 
social reality.”545  Contemporary Catholic theological ethics needs to draw from people’s cultural 
experiences to be able to redefine its concrete moral obligations.  The Church must recognize 
and take to heart culturally shared moral norms and critique commonalities for mutual criticism 
and improvement to develop.  Cahill concludes that Christian discipleship transforms sex, 
family, parenthood, and gender by recognizing and upholding the embodied and social aspects, 
the personal and intentional perspectives of persons, for discipleship to become transformative.  
“Christian sex and gender ethics… builds but reforms human cultural practices so that they better 
represent the Christian values of incarnation, community, solidarity, fidelity, compassion and 
hope that moral and social change are possible.”546 
In another piece published in Theological Studies (2003), Cahill notes that JPII’s post 
synodal Apostolic Exhortation and Theology of the Body, which developed a hermeneutic of 
marriage as an interpersonal expression of communal family life, may not be adequate for 
confronting and challenging the social realities of postmodern and societal approaches to 
marriage today.  She points to a new approach by a new generation of Catholic scholars “who 
write from a culture and for an audience pervaded by transience of relationships, trivialization of 
sex, and exploitation of just about every area of human meaning by market capitalism.”547  These 
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new scholars, according to Cahill, seek to make a credible case for marriage without naiveté and 
undue romanticization about marriage, sex, and interpersonal love and the ways in which they 
are woven into a dense web of social relations.  These scholars avoid absolutes, and do not 
engage official positions as “problematics” to be solved. Cahill states, “Their views cannot easily 
be categorized along ‘conservative’ and ‘liberal’ or ‘orthodox’ and ‘dissenting’ lines. Their 
attempt to formulate a fresh perspective in a different voice is of special significance in 
understanding the nature and future of catholic debates about the theology and ethics of 
marriage.”548  These emerging scholars are sensitive to the cultural and socio-economic 
conditions and gender equality which remains a bedrock to the success of any marital 
commitment.  Cahill elucidates further, “Their primary concern is to find resources for resistance 
of cultural trends toward family fragmentation and consumerism, and to do so by exploring in a 
realistic way their own experiences of sexuality, marriage, parenthood, and social 
connectedness.”549  In this sense, Cahill sees a new challenge but a positive one that can help 
move the Catholic tradition further and closer toward becoming intelligible for a largely 
postmodern Catholic theologians/scholars and young people. 
In Family: A Christian Social Perspective (2000), Cahill attends to the public 
conversation on a renewed approach to understanding “family” and “family values.”  Cahill 
acknowledges two schools of thought among social theorists of the 1990s in North America.  
These schools of thought understand and diagnose these phenomena quite differently: on the one 
hand, some see the widespread disintegration of traditional family life as a result of unfettered 
autonomy, individualism, hedonism narcissism and moral laxity.  On the opposing side, others 
                                                          
548 Ibid., 81. 
 
549 Ibid., 80. 
 
204 
 
perceive the newer understanding of pluralistic family forms as a breakaway from the traditional 
patriarchal nuclear family unit.  Cahill argues in support of the second position stating that 
although family, “created by kinship and marriage is the most basic family form or definition of 
marriage, it is not the only or exclusively legitimate form.”550 According to Cahill, “There are 
other types of human alliance…. for mutual economic and domestic support, as for reproduction 
and child rearing, that are analogous to the basic kin- and marriage-based family.  These need not 
entail biological kinship or male-female marriage.”551 Cahill argues further that the outer 
boundaries of what family life means are difficult to define because its analogous forms arise 
according to specific circumstances and needs.  Therefore, it would be imprudent to set definitive 
limits on what is strictly meant by family.  However, Cahill proposes to advance an inclusive 
interpretative model which can both hold up the traditional male-female understanding and at the 
same time not exclude “single parent families, divorced families, gay and lesbian families, 
blended families, or adoptive families.”552  To show a true Christian ideal of what it means to be 
family, Cahill posits that the focus should be on function rather than on the regularity of form 
since these other forms of “families” often, given the necessary support, can function as well as 
the traditional ones.  Cahill clarifies her position in this book as follows: 
My thesis is that strong family, spousal, and parental relationships are important, 
but that these very ideals are undermined by condemnatory and punitive attitudes 
and policies toward nonconforming families…. In my view, the Christian family 
is not the nuclear family focused inward on the welfare of its own members but 
the socially transformative family that seeks to make the Christian moral ideal of 
love of neighbor part of the common good…. Unfortunately, however, so-called 
Christian ideologies of family life are at least as likely to sanctify injustices of 
gender, class, and race as they have been to challenge and reform them.  The 
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term, Christian family is ambivalent. Often the family is preserved at the expense 
of any real Christianity, while “family values” rhetoric becomes a means of 
reinforcing social inequalities.553    
 
“Families” according to Cahill, are in trouble, and the crisis is different for men as compared to 
women, for whites as compared to people of color, for the chronically under educated, the 
unemployed compared to middle-class workers, and for teenaged or single parents.  This crisis 
has “other social and economic roots that are just as truly matters of Christian moral concern as 
are narcissistic individualism and unwillingness to make and keep commitments.”554  The plight 
of contemporary families gives ground to three convictions expounded by Cahill.  First, human 
beings are intrinsically social in nature.  Based on the human’s natural capacity for empathy, 
intimacy, and altruism, and coupled with technological advancement in communication media, 
human families can grow by enhancing their capacity for inclusive social communications and 
cooperation.  Second, the reality of sin allows humans to conceive violence, which can permeate 
and affect large numbers of peoples.  Third, Christianity, in its symbols, traditions, practices, 
teachings, and theological endeavors over the centuries needs to ensure that the “Christian family 
will begin to transform civil society and all the other co-arising institutions through and in which 
Christians exist with others on this planet.”555 
Cahill concludes her reflection on the family by proposing what she refers to as “five 
constructive recommendations for Christian family life.”  These recommendations address the 
nature, functions, and values of families and the Christian conversion of family bonds and roles.  
First, Christian families should be grounded in human relationships that promote general 
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wellbeing.  Second, Christian families should educate and promote the social, economic, and 
political participation of its members to engender the common good.  Third, kinship families, 
integrated and relativized by Christianity’s inclusive nature, should reach out to new families 
who are especially wearied and heavily burdened by exclusivity to welcome them into the body 
of Christ.  Fourth, given the Church’s social role of the preferential option for the poor, the 
institutionalizing of just treatments and access to goods must be first and foremost in importance 
whenever people are faced with conflicting practical claims.  Fifth and last, Christian families 
must train the moral commitment and imagination to see human beings and relationships in the 
light of the reign of God.  So that Christian social sins call equally to forgiveness which is slow 
to judge but quick to offer support.  Cahill states that the “Christian family is not the perfect 
family but one in which fidelity, compassion, forgiveness, and concern for others, even strangers, 
are known.  In striving to embody these virtues, however imperfect its success, a family lives in 
the presence of God and begins to transform its surroundings.  A Christian family is such a 
family.”556  
  Cahill’s moral foundation, she applies a critical realism based on practical, intercultural, 
reasonable, and prudent human experience while drawing on the works of Aristotle and Aquinas.  
Again, in this book, Cahill depends on Scripture (particularly the New Testament in this case), 
for her model of community, solidarity, compassion, and inclusion of those who are socially and 
economically pushed to the margins of society.     
Ted Peters, in commenting on Cahill’s work states that she is aggressively engaged in the 
task of “philosophically and theologically grounding Roman Catholic ethical thought in an 
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emerging postmodern and pluralistic culture.”557  Peters states further that Cahill’s work argues 
with an apologetic force and compassionate sensitivity for a natural law ethic that places the 
standard Roman Catholic tradition in conversation with contemporary voices to secure a solid 
foundation by which she establishes her sexual and family ethic.  Peters opines that Cahill offers 
“a most penetrating and edifying analysis of the Christian tradition regarding the relationship 
between reproduction and companionship in marriage.”558 Cahill’s work is distinctively feminist, 
situated within the natural law and Roman Catholic tradition but sensitive to Catholics and non-
Catholics alike.559  Cahill’s focus as a feminist theologian is on a vision of the human good by 
which transformatory action can take place. Cahill identifies several contexts and cultures 
involving the exploitation of women: oppressive marriage customs, patriarchal domination and 
subjugation of women, poor and uneducated women in developing nations, genital mutilation, 
human trafficking for commercial sex trade, and hierarchical structures that exclude women 
within the Church.  For Cahill, no consistent feminist critique of injustice can achieve any 
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transformatory project if it still assumes matters of sex and gender as reducible to social 
constructs that are subject to relativity of values.560  
Cahill’s theological method and overarching project are structured on a universal 
retrieval and re-application of the Thomistic natural law theory.561  She envisions a natural law 
ethic that engages the human goods of sex, love, and procreation for human flourishing, an ethic 
which, she argues, cut across cultural contexts and common universal human conditions. Cahill 
understands the family and reproduction as essential to the propagation of the human race and 
expansion of communities unto the next generation.  Therefore, sex, birth and family are intrinsic 
to the human condition, and outside of this perceived genetic self-perpetuation, human beings 
naturally create relationships, which cross culturally are the same everywhere and can be 
apprehended through reason and experience.  Therefore, Cahill’s ethical theologizing does not 
remain ideally on the level of foundations but includes “a middle axiom,” common, yet central to 
Cahill’s project: she proposes moving from theorizing about ideals to people’s lived experiences.  
Cahill’s middle axiom philosophy therefore equips her to ask the fundamental question which 
guides her philosophy and theology of marital sexual ethics: does the traditional biological basis 
for the recognition of a family remain necessary in the light of contemporary prevalence of non-
traditional family units?  This includes homosexual unions, divorced and remarried persons who 
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have children that do not belong biologically to both of them, and single parent homes.562 
Cahill’s middle axiom theory and basis for her theologizing stands or falls on this fundamental 
foundation. This is a common thread in Cahill’s expansive corpus of work.  
Cahill’s sexual and marriage ethics can be summed up broadly along these lines: 
advocacy for equality of the sexes and full reciprocity in the marriage union.  While she is in 
agreement with the Church on the question of abortion, she decries as at least patriarchal and 
oppressive the manner in which it seems the Church uses abortion to limit a woman’s role to that 
of a mother in the home.  Cahill endorses unitive personalism in marriage and acknowledges the 
good of procreation.  She also argues against any social, economic, political, cultural or religious 
structures that jeopardize women’s welfare around the world.  Peters thinks that Cahill’s 
theological method of family and sexuality is centered on the woman’s worth, which has to do 
not only with motherhood but also her personhood,  
A theology that restricts sexuality and marriage to biological procreation 
reinforces the oppressive weight of poverty.  Poor health, physical exhaustion, the 
unending struggle to provide materially for her children, when combined with 
submission to her man, leaves the woman of the underclass little access to 
personal joy beyond that offered by motherhood.  The Christian social message 
that Cahill wants to deliver is this: Full reciprocity between women and men in 
loving marital bonds will create families that will be genuine schools of 
transforming values. In this school of transforming values, she adds, the Christian 
family should teach inclusive love for the outsider, for the marginalized, for those 
beyond our kin connection.563  
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Margaret FarleyMargaret Farley, a religious nun of the Sisters of Mercy proposes a 
framework for a Christian sexual ethic which takes into account the question of justice.  She 
carefully recounts the harm, violence, stigma and unjust actions perpetrated against others daily 
and worldwide in the name of sexuality.  In two major works, Personal Commitments: 
Beginning, Keeping, Changing (1986) and Just Love: A Frame Work for Christian Sexual Ethics, 
(2008), we find most of Farley’s thought on the ethics of gender, sexuality, and marriage.  In 
most of her writings, Farley tries to propose various means for rethinking the ways we approach 
issues of sex and sexuality.  Interacting with western cultures of the past, Farley reconstructs 
how we can now envision embodiment, gender, sexuality, love, and desire.  She concludes that 
the key to understanding ourselves, given our new awareness, lies in the justice of our loves, our 
desires, and our actions.  She opines that the role of the academic theologian is to ask questions 
so as to come up with new insights, anchored in tradition yet able to address the future.  Farley’s 
Just Love: A Frame work for Christian Sexual Ethics (2006) was censured by the Congregation 
for the Doctrine of the Faith (CDF) which judged her views as being in direct contradiction to 
traditional Catholic teaching.  The CDF noted that Farley’s position showed a “defective 
understanding of the objective nature of natural moral law…, [is] in direct contradiction with 
teaching in the field of sexual morality…, [poses] a great harm…, [and] cannot be used as a valid 
expression of Catholic teaching either in counselling and formation, or in ecumenical 
dialogue.”564  Nonetheless, Farley’s work adds great value to this conversation, in so far as she 
logically addresses questions of sexuality by raising further questions which cannot remain 
uncritically challenged.  She invites everyone to take a second look at the problems faced by 
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Christians in their relationships and to find ways by which the Catholic magisterium can justly 
acknowledge and accept them. 
In Personal Commitments, Farley sets out a frame work by which she approaches the 
question of marriage, family life, and sexuality from a key concept of the question of personal 
commitment.  She asserts that for every individual’s experience, personal commitments are 
always a social question and that social contexts shape people’s personal commitments.  Farley 
is convinced that the discernment and interpretation of experience deserves clarity in moral 
concepts and reasoning.  In what Farley refers to as the era of rebellion from the 1950s through 
to the 1970s, engendered by a new focus on commitments to peace movements, civil rights, and 
social concerns of all kinds, the traditional understanding of commitments to entities like family, 
church, and country were questioned.  These traditional perspectives were perceived as rigid, 
narrow, superficial, complacent, and uncritical obedience to structures and institutions.  The 
traditional beliefs were demythologized by rapid changes in a socio-culturally rapidly evolving 
world in which personal and permanent commitments were looked at from another angle.  
Various studies at the time pointed to a new sociology of a kind of “Protean Man” characterized 
by “self-process.”  This new face of humanity was studied by psychologists, sociologists, and 
philosophers who came to the conclusion that long term or permanent commitments are not only 
impossible but also unwise because human freedom is incapable of controlling the future.  
Turning to the idea of commitment in which one person claims to love another, Farley argues 
that since love cannot be bound or obligated, it is impossible to predict if love will last.  
According to Farley, “Love is too easily stifled by the very idea of being obligated.  Indeed, the 
binding of love may be what destroys it—destroys the spontaneity that makes us want to keep 
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loving and doing the deeds of love.”565 Farley however, recognizes and acknowledge that 
personal commitments are generally perceived as being deeply connected with our deepest 
religious concerns, deeply woven into the fabrics of our existence “that they inevitably touch our 
most fundamental convictions and our most fundamental loves.  And some commitments not 
only intersect with these beliefs and loves; they are expressions of them.”566     
Farley equates commitments with a gift, a pledge, which belongs to the giver but is then 
held in trust by the one to whom the pledge was made.  It then establishes a claim on faithfulness 
and constancy because, in Farley’s words, “Much of the time ‘all’ that we give is our word—not 
money, not rings, not special tokens that ‘stand for us’ us.  We stand in our word.  Still, when we 
give just our word, we search for ways to ‘incarnate,’ to ‘concretize,’ to make tangible, the word 
itself.”567  Farley understands “commitment” as 
…. a new relation in the present—a relation of binding and being-bound, giving 
and being-claimed.  But commitment points to the future. The whole reason for 
the present relations as “obligating” is to try to influence the future, to try to 
determine ourselves to do the actions we intend and promise…. I give to the 
[other] person the power to limit my future freedom.  The limitation consists in 
the fact that I stand to lose what I have given in pledge if I fail to be faithful to my 
promise…. The essential elements of interpersonal commitments are an intention 
regarding the future action and the undertaking of an obligation to another 
regarding that intended action.568 
 
According to Farley, the commitment to love is a resolution and not a prediction, the 
giving of one’s word as promise, to act faithfully as best as one can.  All that it entails is an 
obligation undertaken to do what is promised.  Farley points out that in a real sense, people 
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commit themselves to a “framework” of love, to whatever one believes to be essential to this 
framework in such relationships as friendship, marriage, family and membership in communities 
of various sorts.  To be present to one’s commitment is to be committed to a future in a promise 
that was made in the past.  Farley asserts, “If we are to be ‘present’ to our commitments, we must 
find a way to hold together their past and their future.  We must find a way for free choice to 
prevent the loss of our love to the past and to sustain its engagements (even its spontaneous 
response) in the future we have promised.”569  The heart of the matter for Farley, then, is the 
question of what moral obligation or duty lays claim on the one who makes such a commitment; 
what is the content and basis of this moral obligation?  “Just love” is Farley’s prescription for 
sorting out competing claims and responsibilities for discerning obligations and faithfulness to 
commitments. 
Farley posits that goodwill and altruism notwithstanding, there are experiential situations 
where people are unable to keep their promises or commitments and might justly need a release 
from it.  Farley explores four categories that might be considered valid for a release from 
commitments: 
1. If and when the original meaning of the commitment was not true in itself, such as if the 
capacity to fully comprehend the nature of the commitment one was making; the one 
making the commitment “must have the capacities ordinarily required for free choice – 
hence, not to be too young, or mentally incompetent, not to be coerced by force or fear or 
fraud, not to be seduced…and not to be ignorant of factors that essentially change the 
nature of the commitment-relation.”570 
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2. A second condition is a “release by the promise”; this is a situation whereby a claim to 
commitment is waived or relinquished by the recipient or is simply mutually dropped. 
3. The third condition is constituted by impossibility of fulfilment, which naturally leads to 
the conclusion that the said obligation does not hold. 
4. The fourth condition is a situation where there are competing obligations, which Farley 
explains thus: “The claim I have given to someone by my promise always points in the 
direction of an obligation, but other claims (even claims from other commitments) may 
actually determine a different obligation in a given situation… the obligation not to harm 
persons (even myself) may take priority over the obligation to keep a promise.”571 
The commitment to love, for Farley, means to love justly: “It is to a new claim, to undertake a 
new level of obligation, for loving and for a way of loving according to the content of our 
commitment.”572  Farley expounds further on the theme of just love: “… the norm for a right 
love is the concrete reality of the beloved, of whoever or whatever is loved.”573  To be bound or 
released from a commitment one makes, one needs to take into account the seriousness and 
urgency of the needs of those who lay claim to one’s love and the overall implication of the good 
involved.  Farley concludes that the “incapacities of the human heart may indeed break human 
hearts, but they need not destroy their loves.  The clue to this truth is not outside of but within the 
meaning of commitment.  As we have seen, in lives stretched out in time, there can be no 
absolute fullness, no utter once and for all yielding of love.”574  Farley’s conclusion: 
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“commitment, therefore, is love’s way of being whole when it is not yet whole, love’s way of 
offering its incapacities as well as its power.”575 
In Farley’s Just Love, while developing and drawing on themes from Personal 
Commitments, she creates a frame work for patterns of relationships with particular focus on 
marriage, family, sex, and sexuality.  In contemporary times, owing to the proliferation of the 
various forms of “family life,” a “seismic” shift in practice has evolved, with deep implications 
for how we now see and interpret marriage, family, and sex.  According to Farley, because this 
shift contradicts cultural and religious traditions of relationships between families, the rearing 
and education of children, inheritance rights, and the reinforcing of gender roles, this newer 
understanding precludes the ability of providing newer perspectives.  In expounding on the idea 
of religious and traditional marriage, Farley states, “A primary determinant of marriage was the 
need of families to gain in-laws, to establish or secure political and economic alliances between 
and among families. Yet the history of the functions of marriage is a complex one that cautions 
us against too hasty interpretations of the past or its relation to the present.”576  Within Western 
civilization, the new trajectories of marriage and family have changed in a most profound way in 
the “motivation for marriage and who regulates its forms, and in the patterns of gender relations 
within both marriage and family.”577 
In Farley’s estimation, the major shift in the evolution of western marriage from family 
dominated arrangements to interpersonal love and changes in gender relations took place over 
four centuries of history.  The role of Christianity in shaping the political and cultural under-
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pining of marriage and family is complicated and substantial, especially the idea of monogamy.  
Farley asserts that “monogamy was incorporated more broadly into early Christian beliefs and 
theologies—in terms of its potential symbolic significance for understanding the relation of Jesus 
Christ and the Church, and in terms of its amenability to Christian understandings of neighbor-
love.”578  Within this Christian influence, Farley points out three negative attitudes from 
antiquity that have affected the idea of marriage and family life: first, a seeming rejection of 
family ties where the Christian message became a sword of division (Mt. 10:34-39);  second, the 
demand on adherents of the faith to leave everything behind—father, mother, children, etc. (Mt. 
12:25); third, an apocalyptic anticipation of the dawning of a new age which enhanced a desire 
for martyrdom and which meant that marriage and family life were not a necessity.  In response, 
the early Church fathers tried to counter this trend by providing what Farley calls “the Pauline 
household codes.”579 However, Farley does not see these codes in a good light; based “on an 
imperial model for the subordination of all in a household to the paterfamilias, the codes 
supported slavery and reinforced patterns of the domination of husbands over wives.”580  Farley 
insists that the message of the early Christian Church was largely ambiguous and ambivalent at 
the very least.  “Attitudes of rejection, substitution, and affirmation regarding marriage and 
family continued in tension…. Through many centuries, the Christian church continued to affirm 
marriage as good, although celibacy was considered better.”581 
Farley points out the ambiguity and disparity between the understanding of marriage and 
celibacy, noting that the affirmation of the family was based on its functional role, the 
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propagation of the race and the socializing of children.  Farley argues further that while marriage 
was raised, in the twelfth century, to the dignity of a sacrament, it was still not seen to be on the 
same level with celibacy.  Farley locates a significant shift in emphasis from the fourteenth 
century when Renaissance humanists introduced a change of focus: from otherworldliness to 
social responsibility, from sexual renunciation to self-discipline, and the combination of family 
and productive labor.  The Protestant reformation (especially Luther and Calvin) re-articulated 
the attitude towards marriage, sex, and family life, though acknowledging and accepting 
whatever was perceived traditionally to be wrong with sexuality to be part of human nature after 
the fall.582  The reformation tradition inadvertently also led to the separation between the private 
world of the family and the public world of productive labor.  In this new cultural matrix, 
“femaleness” became associated with the private and domestic sphere.583  
In reflecting on relationships, Farley insists that the framework of justice is the ethical 
governing principle that should guard every relationship.  Therefore, since there are various 
forms of “families” as we now understand it, the same norm of justice should apply to all.  Farley 
questions how we approach the varied forms of socially understood and accepted families in 
justice, “… single-parent… same sex individuals, partners or spouse, with children?  Blended 
families following divorce and remarriage? Families with parents whose children are not 
genetically related but also not legally adopted.  Families where parents are not legally married 
but who raise children together?”584 Farley refers further to, “families where there are multiple 
‘mothering’ or ‘fathering’ of children not only by biological mothers and fathers but also by 
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grandparents or aunts or uncles or cousins or close friends?  Families that do not live together at 
all?  Nuclear families and extended families?”585  Like many ethicists, Farley advocates 
inclusiveness in the understanding and acceptance of what is recognized as “family” today.  
Farley asserts, 
We do need not only to support but to celebrate every configuration that ‘works’, 
that functions reasonably well in facilitating and undergirding a life for people 
together in mutual affection and flourishing, perhaps especially when it comes to 
the rearing of children…. What limits there are have to do less with our 
preferences for, or idealization of, a ‘best’ model, than with the justice and love 
that a model makes possible.586 
Farley consistently disagrees with any marriage that excludes the framework of just love, 
if it be inequality between spouses by the stipulation of roles such as “breadwinner” and 
“helper.”  Farley rejects misleading language which grounds male hegemony in the marital 
structure, where there is talk of “total self-gift” or of two halves who come to complete each 
other.  For Farley, it is only in slavery that there is a totality of self-giving and to talk of halves 
completing each other is to exclude those who do not marry as never becoming sufficiently 
whole.  Because interpersonal love grounds the sphere of marriage, its goal must be the goals of 
love, “embodied and inspirited union, companionship, communion, fruitfulness, caring and being 
cared for, opening to the world of others, and lives made sacred in faithfulness to one another 
and to God.”587  In Farley’s opinion, “Christianity has not always been a good articulator of 
this.”588  Farley therefore calls attention to the rhetoric about marriage and family which needs to 
be realistic and cautious—neither too high sounding nor skeptical because the goals of both 
marriage and family are difficult to realize fully through life.  “Hence, in everyday life, our 
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choices to ratify our commitments, our effort to grow in simple patience, kindness, forms of 
presence, forgiveness, and the ‘little by little’ of welcoming love: these can be part and parcel of 
the ‘in between’ of lives marked not just by success and joy but by failure, irritation, confusion, 
and the need for radical hope.”589  In this book, Farley concludes her theological reflections on 
marriage, family and human sexuality thus: 
In the end, I have… attempted to contextualize and illuminate our understandings 
of sexuality and its possibilities for human fulfilment… to sort out the multiple 
meanings and goals of sexuality, sex, gender, and embodiment.  Above all, I have 
asked and tried to respond to the question of when sexuality and its expressions 
are appropriate in human relationships.  I have proposed a sexual ethic grounded 
in and specified by concerns for justice.  Justice, I have tried to show, is not a cold 
notion apart from love; it is what guides, protects, nourishes, and forms love, and 
what makes love just and true.  It concerns our loves and our action; it concerns 
the sort or persons we want to be…. It is not an easy task to introduce 
considerations of justice into every sexual activity.  But if sexuality is to be 
creative and not destructive, then there is no substitute for discerning ever more 
carefully whether our expressions of it are just.590 
 
James M. Gustafson, in an essay responding to Farley’s constructual framework for a just 
love and personal commitments, offers a single criticism while applauding most other aspects of 
Farley’s work.  Gustafson notes that Farley’s position tends to perceive love and commitment 
from the perspective of the primary agent involved, instead of the two agents involved.  Whereas 
Farley’s argument may be understood to support one agent only, her same argument is applicable 
to the other agent as well.  According to Gustafson, what he finds missing in Farley’s position is 
“a development of obligation and commitment in such a way that the rights and interests of each 
party receive some protection from the vagaries of human desire, the tendencies to deceive and 
exploit one another, the propensity to neglect the other out of indifference and heedlessness.”591  
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Gustafson concludes his critique by stating that commitments are like dikes against the flood of 
immediate desires and actions which “violate the well-being of the beloved and properly 
establish the grounds for claims for loyalty, for fidelity, and for obligations.  They are necessary 
for the preservation of order in human society.”592  Gustafson states his belief that Farley’s view 
of commitment includes the propriety of such a claim.  However, Gustafson differs in the degree 
in which he would emphasize the more sordid aspects of human propensities in a philosophy of 
the person. 
Luke Timothy Johnson reviewed Just Love in Commonweal magazine edition in January 
2007. He praised Farley’s overall project as an effort which does not emphasize any particular 
conclusion but encourages a responsible reflection towards conclusions. Though Johnson agrees 
on many points with Farley, he points out three areas where he finds her work lacking.  First, the 
framework Farley constructs as an ethical structure is lacking in terms of the “Christian” 
dimension mentioned in the book’s subtitle, thereby paying little attention to the ecclesial 
dimension of sexuality.  Johnson queries Farley’s work thus: “How does the church’s standard of 
holiness with respect to the body come into play?  How might the church as a community play a 
role in discerning appropriate codes of personal behavior?  And how can this discerning activity 
(which properly puts emphasis on human experience) negotiate the often difficult declarations of 
the magisterium?”593  On a second level, Johnson questions Farley’s person-based sexual ethics 
based on a justice which resonates with Christian ethics, but which Farley never distinguishes as 
distinctive of the Christian identity or Christian commitment.  Third and lastly, Johnson notes 
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that Farley’s just love framework lacks an in-depth and robust engagement with Scripture. 
Johnson states, “I would have appreciated a more robust engagement with both the problems and 
possibilities offered by biblical witness; Farley’s method as a scholar ends up giving more space 
to the Samoans than to scripture.”594  Despite the critique, Johnson concludes his article by 
crediting Farley’s Just Love as a work which does not attempt to provide all the answers to 
questions of sexual ethics, yet lays a solid framework by which reflections on these questions can 
be carried out. 
Amber Mercy Ewudziwa Oduyoye 
Amber Oduyoye’s theology is done from the African-feminist and post-colonial Christian 
studies perspectives.  She is also known to have made massive contributions to the field of 
Christian ecumenical work.  Central to her theological reflection is the question of how African 
religions and cultures influence the experiences of African women in marriage, sex, family and 
society today.  She also focuses on the effects of economic oppression of African women.  Her 
work raises some questions about the role of African women but even more so about women 
impoverished by stagnated cultures from different developing nations of the world.  Her work is 
examined here for its focus on women’s sexuality from inside a traditionally patriarchal society 
and the role of women in the battle against HIV/AIDS in economically impoverished societies, 
with consideration for the narratives of African women who are marginalized by a male 
dominated and controlled culture, oppressive marriages, sexual subjugation and violence, and the 
residual effects of colonialism.595 In chronicling her life story, Oduyoye emphasizes her 
                                                          
594 Ibid. 
 
595 Kwok Pui-lan, in her journal essay “Mercy Amba Oduyoye and African Women’s Theology” using the idea of 
post-colonial experience of African women states the situation thus, “The issue of gender featured prominently in 
the cultural debates between the colonizers and the colonized. The encounter between Western colonizing culture 
222 
 
opportunity to obtain a Western education. She was one of the first to study in the UK after 
Ghanaian independence.  She was at the forefront, or as she expresses it, the “first fruit”’ in a 
field that prior to her time was dominated mainly by males.  Oduyoye remarks, “With theology 
came the passion for justice and dignity.  With teaching came also all my involvements in 
humanization and with this, an interest in the development of characters in African novels, 
especially those by women.”596  Oduyoye’s style and approach to building this feminist-
theological system is two pronged, involving inculturation and liberation.597 
In the collection of essays African Women, Religion and Health,598 the African women 
theologians who celebrate the life and work of Mercy Amba Oduyoye eulogize her immense 
insights into women issues in Africa. In her piece contributed to this corpus, Nyambura J. 
Njoroge reflects on the ability to name the African woman’s pain, suffering, and indignity.  
Through the advocacy of Oduyoye, African women theologians for over two decades have 
continue to study and attempted to “name” these challenges and courageously address them “in 
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ways that are healing, transforming and life giving.”599 Reflecting on Oduyoye’s childless 
marriage, Njoroge is able to name the indignity associated with childlessness in African 
marriage, which brings indignity and suffering upon many African women.  Copiously referring 
to Oduyoye’s reflections on this topic, Njoroge, in Oduyoye’s voice avers, “The issue I have 
been addressing may have only marginal relevance for feminists, womanists, and mujerista 
theologians, the theological sisterhood in the Western world; but in a community of women-
centered theologians, where one hurts, all should hurt.”600  She further expatiates that in the 
context of a liberating eschatology, to raise a question so personal and so “old fashioned” that it 
may embarrass even African women, Njoroge quotes Oduyoye in questioning the “child factor in 
African marriage and family life as… complex, and its public faces are daunting; but nothing is 
more oppressive than the ordinary meanings imposed on the absence of children in a marriage.”  
Njoroge summarizes this unjust decimating African narrative against women in marriage thus: 
As African women theologians, our celebration is complete only when we hear 
and respond to Mercy’s central cry for creating a life-giving theology of 
procreation and eschatology… we hear an unambiguous, yet intense voice, calling 
us as African women theologians to create a life-giving theology… that addresses 
the trauma women undergo in the quest for a child of their own... Put simply, 
Mercy passionately calls us to assist Churches to formulate teachings, counselling 
methodologies, and materials that help women, men and their families to realize 
that there is more than one way of being fruitful in the eyes of God.601 
 
In her famous book, Beads and Strands, Oduyoye critiques the socialization, 
internalization, or domesticating of cultural norms which juxtapose poverty and motherhood in 
Africa.  She sees as fundamental to this sort of thinking a dramatic change in the economic 
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systems of African nations.  This system deliberately excludes women from opportunities to 
generate wealth, and in this individualistic and competitive culture, having children can also be a 
source that leads to poverty.  Oduyoye expounds further on this line of thinking by saying that all 
of these are antithetical to the moral norms, family values, and sense of community traditional to 
African cultures.  Children are children and are assets as long as they belong to their community 
and nation.  This poverty that Oduyoye speaks about is compounded when a woman is perceived 
to be “single” even if her home is filled with children she must provide for in all ways.  Oduyoye 
sees Western influence in this matter and sees a situation where “The criteria is not the welfare 
of women and children, but their relation to the androcentric laws by which most of humanity is 
ordered and governed. These androcentric legal provisions have difficulty recognizing mothers 
as heads of households but choose to invent names like ‘single mothers’, suggesting they have 
stepped outside the norm of submitting to male authority.”602 She argues for a contrary position 
where in African pre-colonial incursion, there was no such thing as a single parent, woman or 
man, as they are understood to be integral to family life.  In contemporary times, women who 
head homes do because of events beyond anyone’s control, such as migrant workers prevented 
by the laws of the country where they work from bringing in those closest to them, including 
spouses and children.  Wars, political unrest, and natural disasters that displace people may also 
force women to be heads of homes. 
The impoverishment of African women is the economic impoverishment instituted by a 
world order that is patriarchal.  According to Oduyoye, this aspect of impoverishment in Africa 
is ignored and undisclosed.  Oduyoye, reflecting on the impoverishment of African women, 
observes that 
                                                          
602 Oduyoye, Beads and Strands, 59. 
 
225 
 
[i]n Africa, socio-cultural impoverishment is more evident as western 
technological culture intensifies its claim to be the human culture and imposes its 
norms of what is legal and ethical on the rest of the world.  Women in Africa do 
not fall into the category of the under-employed, if anything, they are over-
employed as none can claim a 40-hour week…. [They suffer] the phenomenon of 
being taken for granted, of not having one’s labor enter the statistics of national 
production….  
The impoverishment of women that has resulted from the joint effects of 
Western Christianity and Islam, Arabic and African cultures, is still being 
overlooked.  In conflicts of cultural values, women’s culture and women’s 
welfare have always taken second place.  The real roots of the impoverishment of 
women, socially, economically, are to be found in the materialistic Western 
culture with its androcentric laws and perspectives, for these reinforce African 
ones and together suppress and often eliminate women’s welfare from their 
provisions.603  
 
This institutionalized impoverishment continues to date, according to Oduyoye, because 
androcentricism has certain needs that women fulfil, whether knowingly or unknowingly.  These 
needs keep patriarchy in power and women in subjugation: 
The androcentric world needs to have a continual flow of human beings, to carry 
patriarchal names and other naming systems… needs children to be born and 
socialized into citizens who will even lay down their lives for their country.  This 
androcentric world expects women to be the producers of human beings, but the 
experience of women is that their own development and perception of humanness 
and the human community has to be set aside in order to be ‘good women’, 
serving the system.  Material and economic poverty are the experience of many 
mothers.  What makes the latter thoroughly unacceptable is that the system often 
shields the fathers from the ‘poverty’ that could be associated with their 
paternity.604  
 
 This androcentricism and its exploitation of women, in Oduyoye’s thinking, also account 
for the exploitation of nature for pure gain which tries to exclude others.  Along these same lines, 
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Oduyoye recognizes the exploitation of poorer countries still at the very beginning of 
development by the richer and more advanced countries.  It is exploitation, according to 
Oduyoye when poor countries have to export more to already rich countries in order to support 
industrialization in the North rather than safeguarding what mothers need to feed their children in 
the South.  These same economic measures are used ideologically to entrench the “anti-baby 
economy of the North.”605  Oduyoye explores the idea of young women in Africa seeking work 
in formal sector who are required to show that they are on ‘anti-motherhood drugs.’  This she 
sees as one of the conditions placed before African women to challenge their access to wealth 
and independence; “So the message is clear, if you do not want to be poor or become 
impoverished, do not become a mother.”606 Oduyoye therefore strongly advocates for a “better 
management of creation, the earth, the human community, the nation and the home, by both 
women and men, rich and poor, North and South… Mothers give our race the guarantee of 
survival.  Mothers are not only to be honored, they are to be empowered.”607 The misconceived 
notion embedded in African minds that a woman necessarily needs a suzerain, and that a woman 
who is “single” and “independent” and manages her affairs well without a man is an affront to 
masculinity, must be overcome in all texts, according to Oduyoye’s theology.  Paradoxically, 
women in their familial and public roles are expected to be mothers or not, depending on if it 
serves the status quo, without regard or respect for womanhood.   
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 The Church is also one such locus of the mental and physical impoverishment of the 
African woman, done knowingly or unknowingly, through the agency of post colonization608 or 
just mere cultural hegemony. Oduyoye states unequivocally, 
Liberation for women must also happen in the Church.  It was a ‘church father’ 
(Augustine of Hippo, a city in ancient Africa), who declared that a woman apart 
from a man is not made in the image of God, whereas a man apart from a woman, 
is.  Furthermore, it was a ‘protesting’ monk, pastor, and theologian, Martin 
Luther, who declared that women were fit only to go to church, to work in 
kitchens and to bear children.  So, who defines the humanity of woman?  Is it the 
male, or is it God?  If it is God, how do we get at the God-originated definition of 
womanness?  Is family life a vocation, a demand of biology, or a convenient base 
for organizing human society?  Patriarchal systems often forbid questions of this 
genre.609 
 
 Oduyoye that this kind of exclusion predates the coming of missionaries to Africa.  She 
points to the history of many African traditional religions where some women were in charge of 
shrines and cultic centers.  However, in Oduyoye’s words, “it is also observable that there are 
more women in secondary roles of mediums and cultic dancers, than there are women who serve 
as high priests of shrines or as healers.”610  At the same time, Oduyoye points out that women 
clients of these cults and shrine outnumber men.611  Oduyoye therefore concludes by warning, 
“When examining the role of women in religion in Africa – whether speaking of Christianity, 
Islam, or traditional religions – we must face two fundamental questions: What responsibilities 
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do women have in the structures of religion? How does religion serve or obstruct women’s 
development?”612   
 In Oduyoye’s book, Hearing and Knowing, she provides two critiques of assumptions 
which relegates women to the background within the Church.  First, she points to the assumption 
“that the greater includes the lesser.  Since man is said to include woman, maleness has been 
made to stand for humanness, and female means either to be supportive of or to tamper with the 
male norm.”613 Second, she addresses the “linguistic assertion that male pronouns include the 
female and that the term man includes woman.  Some languages, English for one, confuse the 
issue further by the use of ‘man’ as both specific and a general term.”614  Oduyoye challenges 
and calls for a change of thinking for all forms of religion in Africa that calls in question 
women’s sexuality and the birthing process.  She argues that the time has come to throw out the 
idea of pollution owing to menstruation or childbirth.  In marriage, “women are persons-in-
communion, not persons who ‘complete’ the other…. We may need to re-orient our thinking so 
that we see communion as a relationship devoid of hierarchical relations and power seeking.”615   
Conclusion 
The exploration of these divergent contemporary voices on the questions of marriage, family, 
gender and sexuality, remains essential to this project. These voices help to clarify that there is 
an understanding that the traditional Judaeo-Christian understanding of family life remains 
cogent even for our time and variant cultures.  Some contemporary social and cultural situations 
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call our attention to and advocate for an expansion and inclusion of the expanding understanding 
of family life outside of the traditional, nuclear male-female-child understanding. All these 
thinkers agree that for the propagation of the human species, the traditional marriage system 
remains crucial and central to our understanding of family life. Crucial also to the Christian faith 
is its ability to transform its message (doctrine) to accommodate the ever changing cultural and 
moral landscape of the postmodern human community.  The work of John Grabowski that I have 
reviewed in this chapter, while appropriating covenant and sacraments with a focus on 
personalism challenges a re-think of traditional Catholic understanding of marriage, sex and 
family life.  Lisa Cahill’s hermeneutics based on scriptures, gender differentiation and 
contemporary ethics calls attention to the need for a reappropriation of the meaning of what can 
be considered as ‘family’ in the light of contemporary thinking.  For Cahill, family today, once it 
entails communality, compassion and solidarity must not be limited to monogamous forms of 
family life.  Margaret Farley approaches the question of family, marriage and sex from a just 
love position.  Wherein personal commitment and personal love becomes the hallmark of unions 
which includes all forms of family life and love.  Amber Oduyoye, challenges the patriarchy and 
economic oppression of women in Africa and impoverished nation, as a way to re-imagine and 
appropriate the justice that should exist in married life.  These contemporary voices and the 
challenges they present to the Church, nuances ones again the viability of the possibility and the 
necessity for a development in doctrine. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
ENGAGING VARIOUS CONTEXTS FOR CONTINUED THEOLOGICAL AND 
PASTORAL IMPLICATIONS 
This final chapter contains four sub-sections. The first explores what “development of 
doctrine” means, taking into careful consideration the works of John Henry Cardinal Newman, 
Jan Hendrik Walgrave and Christopher Kaczor. The second section pays particular attention to 
engaging two contemporary pastoral questions and contexts in order to tease out their theological 
and pastoral implications within the wider context of contemporary Christian sexual ethics and 
the development of Christian doctrine. First, I will engage a variety of sources on questions 
concerning HIV/AIDS, sex, and the use of condoms within the conjugal act in the marriages of 
discordant Catholic couples, especially in Africa and in other developing areas around the globe. 
This issue relates to the lived experiences of the people whom the Church leads, teaches, and 
instructs. It pushes to the heart of this dissertation in so far as it challenges the idea that norms in 
doctrine must remain the same because of the ever-new questions to which the Church must 
respond. In this way, the all-important question of development in doctrine comes into focus 
again. The second question addressed is same-sex unions whether they are equal to heterosexual 
and monogamous marriage. This question is the ultimate pastoral challenge, as many countries in 
the Western hemisphere either have already written homosexual unions as marriages into law or 
are coming close to passing such laws. Again, the Church will have to provide clear and 
unambiguous clarification on where she stands doctrinally on the definition of marriage, what it 
entails within Christian tradition, and what the Church understands marriage to be. In the third 
sub-section, borrowing the idea of “matter” and “form” from sacramental theology, I will apply 
this notion as a descriptive tool to understanding the nature of the development that is possible in 
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doctrine. In the fourth section, the works of Josef Pieper, Orlando Espin, and Stephen Bevans 
among other contemporary thinkers are reviewed to situate the idea that the development of 
doctrine exists within a paradigm of faith that becomes tradition, which continues to exist in time 
as a faith that is traditioned.  The conclusion contains some pastoral and theological evaluations 
with some proposals for a theological engagement in dialogue on questions of tradition, 
development, doctrine, cultures, and post modernity. 
The Development of Doctrine 
“In the past God spoke to our ancestors many times and in many ways through the 
prophets, but in these last days he has spoken to us through his Son” (Heb. 1:1). In this text, 
scripture makes clear the progressive nature of God’s self-revelation, which culminates in Christ. 
That which pre-existed the epiphany of the Lord, the Old Testament, is a form of preparation to 
receive the fullness of revelation. Jesus says of this, “I have come not to abolish the law and the 
prophets but to bring them to fulfilment” (Mt. 5:17). In another text, Jesus says, “All things have 
been delivered to me by my Father, and no one knows the Father except the Son and anyone to 
whom the Son chooses to reveal him” (Mt. 11:27). In Jesus’ life, ministry, death, and 
resurrection, he reveals all that is necessary for salvation. After the ascension, the Holy Spirit 
will continue the work of revelation to the apostolic age and the Church. “Those who do not love 
me do not obey my teaching. And the teaching you have heard is not mine but comes from the 
Father who sent me. I have told you this while I’m with you. The Helper, the Holy Spirit, who 
the Father will send in my name, will teach you everything and make you remember all that I 
have told you.” (Mt. 14:24-25) What Jesus revealed to the apostles made them privileged and 
authentic witnesses, who could carry on these revealed truths into the new age of the Church. 
The Sacramentum Mundi states,  
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This process of authentic interpretation of the message of Jesus, through inspired 
meditation on the saving acts of the Lord, and hence not restricted to human 
insight but aided by revelation, is restricted in time to the age of the apostles and 
of the primitive apostolic Church…. We must sharply distinguish between the 
foundation period of the Church (apostolic age) and its subsequent history.616 
 
Apparently, the apostles themselves clearly saw the task of preserving the purity of these 
revealed truths as the Gospel of Jesus, deposits of faith which may not be adulterated or added to 
but faithfully preserved (cf. 1 Tim. 6: 20, 2 Tim.1:13ff). In the first Council of Jerusalem, the 
task of “development” is faced by the infant Church of the apostles. The decision to accept 
gentile converts into the community of faith, with or without circumcision, is resolved and within 
the text, a theological position is arrived at: “And God, who knows the thoughts of everyone, 
showed his approval of the Gentiles by giving the Holy Spirit to them, just has he had to us… 
No! We believe and are saved by the grace of the Lord Jesus, just as they are” (Acts 15:8, 11).  
The next generation of the Apostolic Fathers carried on the tradition because of their 
belief that this uncorrupted message must be carried on from generation to generation and until 
the end of the ages. Their duty is not only to preserve the deposit of revealed truths “but also to 
interpret it, authoritatively setting forth its content.”617 These deposits of the faith must always be 
rooted in what is revealed as the word of God and must be demonstrably grounded in it because 
only then can the Church present these truths as dogma born of intellectus fidei (theological 
reflections about God). This coupled with sensus fidei, the consciousness and sense of the 
faithful “founded on the grace-given connaturality of this sense with the objects of faith,”618 
                                                          
616 Karl Rahner, ed., Sacramentum Mundi: An Encyclopedia of Theology, Vol. 2 (New York: Herder & Herder, 
1968): 99. 
 
617 Ibid., 100.  It must be said that any message that goes through various cultures, languages and epochs in history 
have the tendency to lose something of its nature.  It is the responsibility of the Church to continually find ways to 
keep the essential purity of the deposit of faith true to its foundational revelation, for all times and all places.  
 
618 Ibid., 101. These decisions about the faith, while they do not contradict reason, at the same time cannot be subject 
purely to empirical verification. Dogma in the apostolic period was applied to common and general Christian belief 
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inspires the entire Church in the development of doctrine, in the Church’s infallibility and 
rebuttal of errors. The “dogmas” formulated by the Church as a whole, reflecting on the 
changing cultural horizon of different times and places, attempts to present living doctrines that 
are firmly rooted in faith in Jesus, based on Scripture and tradition. According to Richard 
McBrien—following up on revelation, scripture, and adherence to tradition in Catholicism—a 
configuration of values exists in a special way which is specific to Catholicism. This includes a 
“sense of sacramentality… its principle of mediation… a sense of communion… its drive 
towards rationality and critical realism… respect for history, tradition and continuity… a radical 
notion of sin… appreciation of grace as well as for conscience and freedom; indeed its 
fundamental openness to all truth and to every value – in a word, its catholicity.”619 The Catholic 
Church subsisting in its catholicity therefore recognizes that there is a true development of 
doctrine pieced together by Fathers of ecumenical councils, episcopal conferences, and the 
college of bishops working in tandem with the papal office continuously to draw out the 
understanding of the deposit of faith given to the Church by Christ and the apostles. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and how the Church teaches these truths. In terms of distinguishing between what is authentically Christian belief 
and what is not in precisely formed statements, The New Dictionary of Theology says, “In this historical context, the 
meaning of dogma was modified. The meaning it had attained in its previous contexts was never denied, but its new 
connotation prevailed and remains so to this day. In its attempt to stem the tide of rationalism engendered by the 
enlightenment, the Church not only emphasized that revelation is a source of truth, that authoritative decisions flow 
from the Church’s reception of God’s revelation, but did so in the currency of its time, the proposition. It was at this 
time that dogmatic statements became identified with syllogistic reasoning propositionally expressed. This 
understanding of dogma grew in direct proportion to the development of the theology of the papal magisterium, a 
theology also conditioned by the Enlightenment… It must be emphasized that to be considered dogmatic a 
proposition must be set forth explicitly, and must pertain to divine, public, and official Christian revelation, that is, 
sacred scripture and tradition. It should be noted that although dogmatic propositions are expressions of revelatory 
truth, they are neither commensurate with the totality of truths, divine mystery, nor are they primarily juridical or 
legal statements. They are intended, as the early Church knew so well, to communicate truth to the Church in order 
that the Church as a community and each person within the community could become existentially engaged with 
God’s truth.” Cf. Joseph A. Komonchak, Mary Collins, and Dermot Lane, eds., The New Dictionary of Theology 
(Wilmington, Delaware: Michael Glazier, 1988), 295. 
 
619 Richard P. McBrien, Catholicism, Vol. 2 (Washington, DC: Winston Press, 1980), 1183-4. 
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John Henry Cardinal Newman (1801–1890), was an important figure in the 19th 
century and the religious history of England. Prior to his conversion into the Roman Catholic 
Church, Newman was an Oxford academic and priest in the Church of England who became 
attracted to the High-Church tradition within Anglicanism. He became a leader and an able 
polemicist within the Oxford Movement. This was a radical and controversial group of 
Anglicans who wished to return to many of the Catholic beliefs and liturgical rituals that had 
been lost in the English Reformation within the Church of England. Newman’s contribution to 
the idea of development of Christian doctrine is perhaps the first monograph on the topic. In his 
book on the reality of development in Christian doctrine, published in 1846, Newman argues as 
follows:  
It is not a great assumption, then, but rather mere abstinence from the wanton 
admission of a principle which would necessarily lead to the most vexatious and 
preposterous, to take it for granted that the Christianity of the second, fourth, 
seventh, twelfth, sixteenth, and intermediate centuries, is in its substance the very 
religion which Christ and his apostles taught in the first, whatever may be the 
modifications for good or evil which lapse of years, or the vicissitudes of human 
affairs, have impressed upon it.620 
                                                          
620 In 1845 Newman, joined by some of his followers, left the Church of England, as well as his teaching position at 
Oxford University, and was received into the Catholic Church. He was ordained a priest and continued as an orator 
and influential religious leader, based in Birmingham. In 1879, he was created a cardinal by Pope Leo XIII in 
recognition of his services to the cause of the Catholic Church in England. He was a founding father of the Catholic 
University of Ireland which later became University College, Dublin, and is today regarded as the largest university 
in Ireland. He is highly respected for many literary contributions to theology, both as an Anglican and later on as a 
Catholic. John Henry Newman, An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine (New York: Appleton & 
Company, 1846), 11. In a later section, Newman reiterates that “[n]o one will be disposed to deny that the body of 
doctrine which at this day goes by the name of Catholic is at once the historical and logical continuation of the body 
of doctrine so called in the eighteenth, in the seventeenth, in the sixteenth and so back in every preceding century 
successively till we come to the first. Whether it be corrupt development or a legitimate, conducted on sound logic 
or fallacious, the present so-called Catholic religion is the successor, the representative, and the heir of the religion 
of the so-called Catholic Church of primitive times. Neither can anyone, I think, deny… that the doctrines of which 
the present Catholic religion consists are prima facie the correct, true, faithful, legitimate developments of the 
doctrines which preceded them, and not their corruptions; that a very strong case ought to be made out against that 
religion, to prove that it is materially corrupt, and not in its substance Apostolic… It was said, then, that a true 
development retains the essential idea of the subject from which it has proceeded, and a corruption loses it.” Ibid., 
98. 
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Newman, who was a major player in the great debates about orthodoxy in the mid-1800s, 
was not unaware of the major shifts in the universities, culture, and evolving “theologies” of the 
time, especially in the climate of post reformation Anglicanism, a State owned Church and arch-
enemy of Roman papacy. Within the three hundred years prior to the 1800s, Christian doctrines 
had faced all sorts of scrutiny along with philosophical and polemical argumentations that had 
engendered infidelity, controversies and varying positons. Therefore, for Newman, “[t]he facts of 
revealed religion, though in substance unaltered, present a less compact and orderly front to the 
attacks of its enemies, and allow of the introduction of new conjectures and theories concerning 
its sources and its rise.”621 Newman goes on to explain that while Sacred Scripture contains the 
letters (and spirit) of doctrines, they cannot remain merely written words. Using the example of 
the biblical phrase “the word became flesh,” Newman demonstrates that making this phrase 
intelligible to people’s minds involves a process of investigations that naturally lead to 
development. In Newman’s process, a multitude of propositions result “which gather round the 
inspired sentence of which they come, giving it externally the form of a doctrine, and creating or 
deepening the idea of it in the mind.”622 In scriptural revelation, the idea of prophecy is put into 
play by Newman, in which he argued that these various prophecies could have been given 
definitively and without dependence or connections, yet they are “pregnant” texts, types, wherein 
one gives birth to another. According to Newman, “it is not that first one truth is told then 
another; but the whole truth or large portions of it are told, then their rudiments, or in miniature, 
and they are expanded and finished in their parts, as the course of revelation proceeds.”623 The 
                                                          
621 Ibid., 19. 
 
622 Ibid., 50. 
 
623 Ibid., 53. Expounding on this same theme, Newman added, “Nothing can take place without age, and all things 
wait their time… it is for a while rudimental and unformed, till by degrees tempering its own age, it is matured into 
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entire Bible is written based on the principle of development, prophetic announcements, 
predictions, and injunctions of doctrine. They all have had “that development which has really 
been given them, first by succeeding revelations, and then by the event, it is probable 
antecedently that those doctrinal, political, ritual and ethical sentences, which have the same 
structure, should admit the same expansion.”624 
In a review of the transition from the “old dispensation” to the very end of Jesus’ ministry 
and into the beginnings of the apostolic period after the ascension of the Lord, Newman 
ascertains that “we shall find ourselves unable to fix an historical point at which the growth of 
doctrine ceased, and the rule of faith was once for all settled.”625 Newman further explicates: 
It may be added that, in matter of fact, all the definitions or received judgements 
of the early and medieval Church, rests upon definitive, even though sometimes 
obscure sentences of scripture…while scripture nowhere recognizes itself, or 
asserts the inspiration of those portions which are most essential, it distinctly 
anticipates the development of Christianity, both as polity and as a doctrine… 
From the necessity then of the case, from the history of all sects and parties in 
religion, and from the analogy and example of scripture, we may fairly conclude 
that Christian doctrine admits of formal, legitimate, and true developments, or of 
developments contemplated by its Divine author.626 
Newman concludes therefore that development in Christian doctrine is a larger part of 
God’s work: 
And there is a plan for things beforehand laid out, which, from the nature of it, 
requires various systems of means, as well as length of time, in order to the 
carrying on its several parts into execution. Thus, in the daily course of natural 
providence, God operates in the very same manner as in the dispensation of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
mildness of flavor. So too righteousness, for there is the same God both of righteousness and of creature, was at 
first, in its rudiments, a nature fearing God; thence, by the gospel, it burst forth into its youth; and now, by the 
Paraclete, it is fashioned into maturity.” Ibid., 165.  
 
624 Ibid. 
 
625 Ibid., 55. 
 
626 Ibid., 56. 
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Christianity, making one thing subservient to another; this, to somewhat further; 
and so on, through a progressive series of means, which extend, both backward 
and forward, beyond our utmost view. Of this manner of operation, everything we 
see in the course of nature in as much an instance as nay part of the Christian 
dispensation.627 
In his work, Newman focuses on the gradual consolidation of Christian doctrine and 
ritual, examining the processes by which this development is achieved. These different principles 
of development and continuity remain valid as long as they remain subservient to the divine 
author, revelation, faithfulness to tradition without corruption and without the latter contradicting 
the former or vice versa. Newman’s work was a repudiation of the various schisms and counter 
accusations of schism between the Church of England and the Roman Catholic Church of the 
eighteenth century. Newman concludes that “the tradition of eighteen centuries becomes a chain 
of indefinitely many links, one crossing the other; and each year, as it comes, is guaranteed with 
various degrees of cogency by every year which has gone before it.”628 
 Jan Hendrik Walgrave is a renowned specialist/theologian whose work in the area of 
the development of doctrine remains a tour de force. Walgrave has authored a book on Newman 
that focuses on the development of dogma. In his seminal work, titled Unfolding Revelation: The 
Nature of Doctrinal Development, Walgrave argues for the position that development of doctrine 
                                                          
627 Ibid. 58. Newman makes an interesting allusion to the “battles” the Church has had to face through the ages: “If 
then there is now a form of Christianity such, that it extends throughout the world, though with varying measures of 
prominence or prosperity in separate places; -- that it lies under the power of sovereigns and magistrates, in different 
ways alien to its faith; -- that flourishing nations and great empires, professing or tolerating the Christian name, lie 
over against it as antagonists; -- that schools of philosophy and learning are supporting theories, and following out 
conclusions, hostile to it, and establishing an exegetical system subversive of its scriptures; -- that it has lost whole 
Churches by schism, that it is now opposed by powerful communions once part of itself; that it has been altogether 
or almost driven from some countries; -- that in others its line of teachers is overlaid, its flocks oppressed, its 
Churches occupied, its property held by what may be called a duplicate succession; -- that in others its members are 
degenerate and corrupt, and surpassed in conscientiousness and in virtue, as in the gift of intellect, by the very 
heretics whom it condemns; --that heresies are rife and bishops negligent within its own pale; -- and that amid its 
disorders and fears there is but one voice for whose decisions its people wait with trust, one Name and one See to 
which they look with hope, and that name Peter, and that see Rome; -- such a religion is not unlike the Christianity 
of the fifth and sixth Centuries.” Ibid., 150.  
 
628 Ibid., 172. 
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is the ongoing effort of the church to consistently try to fit the expressions of faith into 
contemporary patterns of thought, retouching, recreating, and guiding the progressive movement 
of Christian belief by which faith is constantly and continuously reincarnated in human culture 
and giving it new meaning within a developing human history. Walgrave attempts, as precisely 
as possible, to investigate what can be considered a legitimate development in doctrine, what is 
organic growth that is perceivable in the original deposit of faith, and therefore “what is 
warranted extension of the primitive discipline of the Church, and what, on the other hand, is 
accretion, additive increment, adulteration of the deposit, distortion of true Christian 
discipline.”629 Walgrave approaches the question of development in doctrine from the standpoint 
of systematized historicism to elicit a way of explaining and justifying the history of several 
dogmas,630 which exist in a world of constant cultural evolutions. For the Church to be able to 
penetrate this world, “the Church itself must become world, must translate its life into forms of 
human culture.”631 Walgrave insists that “… the Church must also become history, not in some 
of the aspects of its life but in all of them, including the doctrine and the language of the 
Church.”632  
                                                          
629 Jan Hendrik Walgrave, Unfolding Revelation: The Nature of Doctrinal Development (Philadelphia: Westminster, 
1972), xii. 
 
630 Walgrave states, “Consequently, the theological question of development can only be stated as a special question, 
on the acceptance of a number of presuppositions resulting from a certain conception of the nature of revelation and 
faith. The theologian has to explain how a revelation, if its truth must be expressible in human language, maybe 
objectively closed at a fixed period of history and nevertheless admit of further development not only by way of 
subjective penetration but also by way of objective understanding.” Ibid., 6. 
 
631 Ibid., 16. 
 
632 Ibid. Referring to the opposing positions within the ecclesial community, Walgrave notes, “The basic opposition, 
the opposition of principle, between theological conservatism and progressivism has to be overcome. There is no 
danger in a dialectical rivalry between conservative minded and progressive minded groups in the Church. Such 
competition is part of the very structure of history. But if these cease to understand and accept one another, if they 
are separated by a radical split based on opposing first principles, the consequences may in the long run become 
disastrous.”  
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 Definitionally, development for Walgrave is interchangeable with evolution; therefore, it 
is a “gradual process or action of bringing out something concealed or latent in whatever way 
from another thing or a previous state of the same thing.”633There are two approaches to the idea 
of doctrine in Walgrave’s thought: doctrine as theology and doctrine as dogma. In Walgrave’s 
summation, Christine doctrine consists of the official teachings of the Church which voice 
apostolicity; as such, doctrine is semper eadem handed down one generation to another. Viewed 
in this light, as an undisturbed historical continuity, it becomes a living tradition.634 Rephrased, 
Walgrave states that “the vague traditional expression development of doctrine may be narrowed 
down to its true meaning by the expression development of dogma and then restored to its full 
meaning by the expression development of tradition.”635 In the “development” of theology in the 
Anselmic dictum, “fides quaerens intellectum” guides theologians to find the balance between 
faith and reason, or to affirm dogma and the discoveries of new science as the products of man’s 
restless intelligence. “Theology is the leading link between Christian tradition ruled by authority 
and autonomous human thought trying to understand and to order by its own means the 
continuous stream of new experiences and thought.”636 Walgrave opines,  
Theology never ceases to be creative. However much it may depend on the history 
of the past, its true nature is not historical but systematic. It always tries to fit the 
expression of faith into the patterns of contemporary thought, and to influence in 
return the products and movement of the modern mind. Its attitude toward 
contemporary thought is at once assimilative and critical. Theology, then, guides 
the progressive movement of Christian belief within the Church. It is the 
                                                          
633 Ibid., 17. 
 
634 Ibid., 39. Walgrave clarifies further: “Tradition, then, is a process of living continuity. In its course new aspects 
of the reality in which faith is living come into sight. It is like a stream, always the same from its source to its mouth, 
but rising and widening through the influx of fresh waters as it runs through different landscapes.” 
 
635 Ibid., 40. 
 
636 Ibid., 41. 
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instrument by which faith is continuously incarnated and reincarnated in human 
culture, assuming and purifying its earthly historical body. 
 It follows, then, that theologians’ study is the intellectual work house in 
which the development of doctrine is ultimately achieved… Theology incessantly 
copes with the new problems, discusses them, clarifies them; and some of its fruits 
are gradually recognized by the Church as true developments of its divine 
deposit.637 
 
 Walgrave understands revelation as a part of the unveiling of history which is also the 
gradual self-revelation of God. The idea that the revealed will gradually take form, in time, in the 
mind of the Church, is the basis for understanding the Church’s consciousness of historicity. 
Walgrave cites the works of the Patristics—Irenaeus, Tertullian, Origen and others—to support 
the gradual nature of development and God’s self-revelation according to the “growing 
receptivity of man, which is itself a work of divine education.”638 The problem of development 
and immutability, according to Walgrave, was not much of a concern for the Scholastics. “The 
‘authorities’ of antiquity were not viewed in their historical settings and succession, but only as 
building blocks for their dialectical constructions or doctrinal systems.”639 It was in this manner 
that without working out any specific theory of development, the Scholastics laid out all the 
building blocks, the concepts and distinctions that will be applied to the logical theories of 
development that later arose. This method was also based on the argument, according to 
Walgrave, that “[e]very doctrine of faith accepted by Christians must be equally as true to a 
message of the past as to the present appearance of saving truth in the light of faith. We cannot 
                                                          
637 Ibid. 
 
638 Ibid., 55. Walgrave gives another perspective, another window by which ‘development’ could be understood: “It 
is important to note from the very beginning that the same general principles by which Irenaeus and Origen, 
Tertullian and Gregory the Great, Hugh of St. Victor and Thomas Aquinas justify a development in revelation may 
be invoked as well to anticipate that between the first and the second coming of Christ too there may be a 
development of doctrine. Origen explicitly states that although Christ is the fullness of revelation the real fullness is 
not found in His humble Incarnation but is awaited in His glorious manifestation. The period between the two 
advents is the reign of the Spirit, who is the main gift of the glorified Lord to His Church. It is the Spirit, then, who 
guides the Church towards the final stage of divine revelation.” Ibid., 62. 
 
639 Ibid., 115. 
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appeal to the present appearance of truth against anything that is clearly intended by the traditio 
constitutiva.”640 Within the gamut of Catholic sources of doctrine (scripture, magisterium, 
conciliar formulas, dogmatic definitions, etc.) is an underlying belief that the Holy Spirit inspires 
them. “Therefore it may be rightly said that the later dogmas are included in the sensus plenior or 
the full sense of the scriptures.”641 
 Walgrave, in a very dense but carefully thematized treatise, argues that there is 
development in Christian doctrine from within the Church, sometimes as a reaction to internal 
schism or to fight heresy. Other times, the response is to movements, shifts, and changes in 
cultures, society, and behavioral patterns outside the Church. Walgrave concludes his work thus: 
The development of doctrine is a social phenomenon. All factors at work in the 
history of Christianity are also at work in the history of its self-understanding and 
self-interpretation. This implies that the negative factors of one-sidedness and 
passion, leading to division and disruption, are as active in the history of Christian 
thought as in that of humanity in general. If, the, a definite truth, historically 
determined by God, has to be preserved in the process of its divergent 
interpretations, the idea of an institutional authority, equally determined by God 
and enabled by Him to settle controversies of interpretation, is as natural to the 
mind as the idea of an historically revealed truth itself.642  
 
 
 Reflecting on the moral theology of John Paul II and piecing together a variety of sources 
from his works, Christopher Kaczor established a decent theory of development of doctrine. 
Paying particular attention to John Paul II’s encyclical, Veritatis Splendor, Kaczor situates 
development in relation to a post conciliar Church. Kaczor affirms that John Paul II 
acknowledges multiple factors that influence the formulation of newer insight, especially in 
questions on faith and morals. Advancements in science, new philosophical insights, and cultural 
                                                          
640 Ibid., 381. 
 
641 Ibid., 391. 
 
642 Ibid., 394. 
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and societal changes that challenge and enrich the Church’s need to respond by providing newer 
ways of explaining the ontological realities of dogma and revelation. The process of expounding, 
explaining, and communicating newer approaches to evangelization and catechesis is part of the 
process of development in doctrine. According to Kaczor’s reading of John Paul II, a proper and 
legitimate process of development retains the content and meaning of the original teaching, while 
it finds perhaps, a new language or method of re-communicating these truths without deviation.  
Kaczor summarizes his position thus,  
Authentic development of doctrine, in John Paul’s view, must always be a fuller 
expression of previously proclaimed truth and must never be a reduction or 
elimination of essential elements of the Christian patrimony. Authentic 
development includes the fullness of faith, a retention of the meaning of dogmatic 
formulas, and a proposing of Christian truths, even if not commonly understood in 
a particular cultural context.643 
 
Condomized Sex within Sacramental Marriage 
The first question to examine here now arises frequently: whether Catholics in the 
medical field, Catholic aid agencies, professionals in counseling and education, and clergy may 
suggest the use of condoms within marriage to reduce the possibility of transmitting the HIV 
virus to an uninfected spouse?644 Vatican II stresses the importance of an authentic conjugal love 
in marriage and the divine laws pertaining to the responsible transmission of life, which must be 
                                                          
643  Christopher Kaczor, “John Paul II on the Development of Doctrine,” Nova et Vetera 11, no 4 (2013): 1178. 
 
644 One of the earliest documented official positions that mentions the use of a “prophylactic” to avoid further 
infection is found in a document prepared by the United States Catholic Conference administrative board, titled 
“The Many Faces of AIDS: A Gospel Response.” A short paragraph in the Appendix addresses what a health worker 
might be permitted to do, practically speaking: “On the more personal level of the healthcare professional, the first 
course of action should be to invite a patient at risk, or one who already has been exposed to the disease, to live a 
chaste life. If it is obvious that the person will not act without bringing harm to others, then the traditional Catholic 
wisdom with regard to one's responsibility to avoid inflicting greater harm may be appropriately applied.”  Cf. 
James F. Keenan, ed., Catholic Ethicists on HIV/AIDS Prevention (London: Continuum, 2002), 21. 
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harmonized as acts proper to conjugal love and in accord with human dignity.645 These issues 
present a modern day ethical dilemma for the Church because on both sides of the debate, one 
finds equally plausible yet mutually exclusive arguments, valid yet conflicting reflections from 
biblical and theological points of views on the use of condoms in the conjugality of monogamous 
unions of discordant Christian couples, among many other contemporary ethical questions. Julie 
Hanlon Rubio expresses the discordancy question quite succinctly: “Is condom use morally evil, 
or can it be justified by double effect, the lesser of evils, compassion or justice?”646 Rubio speaks 
to what she considers a more fundamental problem within the controversy: “Still it seems that 
underneath these attempts to find an exception that will save lives is an affirmation of the 
important place of sex in marriage.”647 Rubio sees as equally important and questions “[w]hether 
couples should be required to sacrifice sexual pleasure in order to comply with the moral duty to 
be open to life… whether the good of ongoing sexual practice in marriage must be forgone.”648 
Theologians have argued for and against condomized sexual encounters for married 
people using various theological principles, from the principle of double effect to the principles 
of epikeia, lesser evil, and so on. The United States Catholic Conference (USCC) in 1987 
proposed what they called the principle of toleration. They stated clearly their opposition to any 
kind of advocacy for the use of condoms but, in a casuistic approach, proffered toleration of the 
use of condoms to deter the spreading or infecting of others as a viable alternative. This, 
according to the USCC, was a recommendation that does not endorse contraception or illicit 
                                                          
645 Pope Paul VI, Gaudium et Spes: Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, published December 
7, 1965, accessed February 5, 2016, https://www.ewtn.com/library/COUNCILS/v2modwor.htm, #51.  
 
646 Julie Hanlon Rubio, "Family Ethics: Beyond Sex and Controversy," Theological Studies 74, no. 1 (2013): 149. 
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648 Ibid. 
 
244 
 
sexual activity or a quick fix.  Rather, a recommendation that the condom in this case was to be 
seen as prophylaxis.  It is not intended to prevent conception (as a contraceptive) but to prevent 
harm.649 Demographics show that the pandemic of HIV/AIDS is of global proportions with a 
particular focus on the developing nations of the world. Our attention must be drawn to people 
who live on the margins, who are minorities in impoverished countries and who are more 
vulnerable to the scourge of this disease. According to James Keenan, moral questions are 
shifting from an “analysis of the individual set against social forces to those which weigh the 
balance of goods and benefits for various groups in society.”650 Keenan states further that since 
the most sophisticated treatments in technologically advanced nations do not provide a cure for 
this infection, the “primary prevention of HIV infection must become the focal point of our 
reflection. This reflection must occur with adequate attention to the concrete realities which 
shape the day-to-day experience of vulnerable populations.”651  
Many countries in Africa, among other developing nations of the world, are the epicenter 
of the battle to save lives from a disease that is decimating populations, especially the poor, in 
unprecedented numbers.652 Current data from the joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDs 
                                                          
649 Keenan, Catholic Ethicists, 22-4. 
 
650 Ibid., 38. 
 
651 Ibid. 
 
652 Margaret A Farley, “Hope for the Future,” Journal of Feminist Studies 28, no. 2 (2012): 137. Here, Farley points 
to developments in understanding the etiology of the disease, the demographics around the peoples most at risk of 
infection, possible prevention, and treatment of infected persons. There is recognition that to stop the spread of this 
dreadful disease, multiple factors enter in, “a paradigm that incorporates studies of gender and religion.” She argues 
that based on the work of African women theologians, especially those of Sarojini Nadar and Isabel Phiri, empirical 
work on HIV and AIDS remains deficient if they continue not to take into account a “fourfold development out of a 
conviction that health cannot be understood without including gendered and religio-cultural aspects of health; to a 
prioritization of contexts over universal principles; to an opening in concern for women but also for men; to an 
‘active,’ critical but transformative, mode of research and its deployment for behavioral change” Ibid., 138. Farley 
agrees with the predominant school of thought that low, middle-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia, 
and parts of Latin America, less than half the population has access to antiretroviral therapies. These countries 
depend on the largesse of other countries outside of their own regions for programs, medication, therapies, and 
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provide statistics showing that instances of infection dropped remarkably between the years 2000 
and 2015. Nonetheless, according to UNAIDS current data and facts sheet, in 2014, 36.9 million 
people were living with HIV and the numbers continue to increase, in large part because there 
are more people globally accessing antiretroviral therapies and as a result are living longer, 
healthier lives. As of June 2015, 15.8 million people were accessing treatment. Despite obvious 
amelioration, the number of new HIV infections and AIDS-related deaths occurring globally 
each year is unacceptably high. According to this UNAIDS report, in 2014, around 2 million 
people were newly infected with HIV and 1.2 million people died of AIDS-related illnesses. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
treatments. Farley, like many other theologians, sees and supports the necessity of shifting from a predominantly 
regional preoccupation with HIV/AIDS to a more central global vision and discourse. Ibid., 140.  
In another piece, in response to the role of religions and religious leaders who were attending a summit on 
HIV/AIDS and the impact of world religions, Farley wrote, “…. I was also confused by the relative lack of attention 
given to some questions directly related to the substance of religious traditions themselves. Are there, for example, 
any ways in which religion has shaped beliefs, attitudes, and practices that either contribute to or prevent the spread 
of HIV? Little was said about the impact of religious teachings on sexual practices, the status and roles of women, 
and the connections among gender, race, and poverty in the context of AIDS. Perhaps implicit in the whole summit 
was a recognition of the relevance of such questions, yet explicit attention to them was largely missing. The words 
spoken about compassion raised little controversy; words about sex, the place of women, and a gendered analysis of 
poverty might have been controversial.” Margaret A. Farley, “Partnership in Hope: Gender, Faith and Responses to 
HIV/AIDS in Africa,” Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion 20, no. 1 (2004): 134. Farley cautions against inertia, 
by positing,  
If religious traditions have anything to say that is healing word, a strengthening and promising word, in such 
situations, it must be a word that is embodied in deeds. Short of this, religious traditions will be, as they have all 
too often been in relation to the spread of HIV, more a part of the problem than a part of any remedy. The first 
response of most persons who stand in religious traditions and have any understanding at all of the AIDS 
pandemic is compassion. But compassion is an empty word unless there is a clear-sighted recognition of what 
compassion requires. All the major world religions have had something to say in response to the large questions 
of people’s lives, including the question of suffering. Far from being completely irrational, religions have 
helped to ‘make sense’ of parts of life in relation to wholes, of aspects of life that philosophy alone has not been 
able to fathom. In so doing, they have given meaning to both ordinary and extraordinary experiences of persons, 
and they have shed light on our responsibilities to one another…. Faith communities must also critically review 
their role in shaping beliefs, constructing attitudes, and reinforcing behaviors that have contributed to the spread 
of AIDS. Just as religious traditions are profoundly influenced by the cultures in which they are embedded, so 
cultures are shaped and reinforced by the religions that are part of them.” Ibid., 138.  
Farley concludes that “sometimes the response within religious traditions is simply to reiterate moral rules 
prohibiting behaviors that happen also to put persons at risk of infection. Such a response has often not been very 
successful. Indeed, it has all too often heightened the shame and stigma associated with AIDS, and it has prevented 
behavioral changes that might be preventives against the disease, such as the use of condoms and the achievement of 
greeter freedom of choice on the part of women.” Ibid., 139. 
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UNAIDS states that  
[n]ew HIV infections have fallen by 35% since 2000 (by 58% among children), and 
AIDS-related deaths have fallen by 42% since the peak in 2004. The global response to 
HIV has averted 30 million new HIV infections and nearly 8 million (7.8 million) AIDS-
related deaths since 2000. …Ensuring access to antiretroviral therapy for 15.8 million 
people is an achievement deemed impossible 15 years ago. In 2000, fewer than 1% of 
people living with HIV in low- and middle-income countries had access to treatment. In 
2014, the global coverage of people receiving antiretroviral therapy was 40%. But HIV 
continues to shine a harsh light on the inequalities of the world. AIDS is unfinished 
business. 653  
 
UNAIDS agrees that the case for change is compelling and commanding especially in 
developing nations and poorer populations. In these places, significant gaps and shortcomings in 
the response must be rectified. UNAIDS makes the claim that accelerating the AIDS response in 
low- and middle-income countries could avert 28 million new HIV infections and 21 million 
AIDS-related deaths between 2015 and 2030. “The next phase of the AIDS response must 
account for new realities, opportunities and evidence, including a rapidly shifting context and a 
new sustainable development agenda.”654 As I have stated earlier, the UNAIDS fact sheet 
concurs that in 2014, there were about 25.8 million (24.0 million–28.7 million) people living 
with HIV in sub-Saharan Africa, of which more than half are women. In 2014, there were an 
estimated 1.4 million (1.2 million–1.5 million) new HIV infections in sub-Saharan Africa, even 
though this number represents a decline of 41% in new infections between 2000 and 2014. In 
sub-Saharan Africa, which accounts for 66% of the global total of new HIV infections, 
approximately 790,000 (670,000–990,000) people died of AIDS-related causes in 2014. - 
Between 2004 and 2014, the number of AIDS-related deaths in sub-Saharan Africa fell by 48%. 
The numbers show that impoverished people of developing nations, especially women and 
                                                          
653 UNAIDS, AIDS Epidemic: Enduring the Urban AIDS Epidemic, Data and Facts Sheet, 2015, accessed Dec. 17, 
2015, http://www.unaids.org/en/HIV_data/report. 
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children, are most vulnerable to HIV infection. The reasons are many, but mainly poverty, 
illiteracy, and economic imbalance in poor countries are key causes. Many women are exposed 
to illicit sexual affairs to make ends meet, and through conception, many children are exposed to 
infection. It is owing to this unjust social imbalance that the question of condomized sex by 
discordant couples becomes pertinent. 
The disagreement on the use of condoms by discordant persons among theologians has 
been has gone one of two ways.  Some maintaining that condomized sex should be permissible 
between infected sacramentally married couples.  Others maintain that it may not be permitted as 
condoms will always interfere with the natural intention of sexual intimacy within marriage and 
thereby contradict doctrinal tradition. Surprisingly, the Catholic magisterium to date, has not 
given an official position on this matter. Often times, people who deal with this question of 
discordancy in pastoral settings, especially in regions widely affected by HIV/AIDS, are in a 
quandary in terms of providing adequate pastoral counseling and advice. Somewhat 
disconcertingly, various published and unpublished positions can be found among episcopal 
conferences, theologians, pastoral agents and some agents who work in advocacy. Often, 
bishops, theologians, and aid agents in heavily affected areas, which are usually also poor areas, 
seem to see a practical utility in an exemption for the use of condoms between discordant 
couples to prevent the spread of HIV to the uninfected partner or even to prevent conceiving a 
child.655  
                                                          
655 In research carried out in Ghana and published as a journal article, the authors, James Yamekeh Ackah and 
Benjamin Spears Ngmekpele Cheabu, point to the example of the US Catholic Bishops Conference in 1987 in a 
document in which they argued for a look at educational programs to be given out as accurate information about 
prophylactic devices or relevant means proposed by medical experts to prevent the spread of the disease. Ackah and 
Cheabu also alludes to Archbishop Boniface Lele of Mombasa and Bishop Kevin Dowling of South Africa who 
stated clearly that the use of condoms for discordant couples should be encouraged to reduce reinfection. However, 
like Bishop Kirima of Nyeri Diocese, they are quick to point out that the best way to prevent infection or spread is 
through chastity and abstinence. James Yamekeh Ackah and Benjamin Spears Ngmekpele Cheabu, “Humanae Vitae 
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Dr. Margaret A. Ogola speaks in an urgent and cogent way to the situation of HIV/AIDS 
patient in Africa, with particular focus on women and children.  Ogola is a pediatrician and 
director at the Cottolengo Center for Children with HIV/AIDS in Kenya. In her many years of 
working generally with HIV patients, she states that about half of the infected patients who come 
to the health center are discordant couples who often times go to a second level of re-infection 
and then to a third level of co-infection.  Ogola avers, “The nature of this virus is such that it 
changes its face… An individual may start an HIV journey with one strain and end up with 
several strains.”656 She notes that there has been a significant shift in the risk group for 
infections.  Previously, the highest infection rate was among young women aged 15 to 24.  Now, 
there are more infections among women living in relatively stable marriages.  In this cultural 
matrix, the women are mostly powerless.  As the virus mutates and more strains of the virus are 
discovered, infection by spouses, re-infections, co-infections, and drug resistant strains put more 
people at risk.  According to Ogola, “Women in Africa have few if any sexual rights, particularly 
married women who are socialized to give in to sexual demands.  Sixty percent of all HIV cases 
are women… women in marriage are in a different situation all together because they are owned; 
in much of Africa the dowry men pay when marrying represents a purchase price.”657  Ogola 
challenges the Catholic Church to courageously look at the plight of poor African women who 
should not be left to their fate,   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
and Birth Control: Practices and Perspectives from the Ghanaian Catholic,” Research on Humanities and Social 
Science 4, no. 28 (2014): 51-2.  
 
656 Margaret A. Ogola, “Looking Back and Looking Forward at HIV/AIDS in Africa: Serodiscordant Couples, Re-
infection, the Role of Women, and the Condom,” in James F. Keenan, ed., Catholic Theological Ethics Past, 
Present, and Future: The Trento Conference (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2011), 201. 
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This journey has taken twenty-five years.  I must confess that twenty-five years 
ago I was in the forefront of burning condoms, which indicates something about 
the journey I have had to make to be able to make this statement today:  In view 
of the fact that people are living together, the need to rethink the condom as a 
prophylactic is inescapable.  As a church we have to look at this issue with greater 
clarity. 
I worked for Kenyan bishops for over ten years and have helped write 
pastoral letters and strategic plans.  Yet we are still arguing over the issue, leaving 
service providers who are actually dealing with patients on the front line in a 
fuzzy limbo over what to do with couples who come for advice… As people live 
longer and couples live longer, they cannot be abandoned to their fate… Statistics 
show that that (virucidal) jellies give a protection rate of 50 percent.  Condoms, 
with all that has been said against them, provide a protection rate of 80 percent.  
In my view, both condoms and jellies may protect African women from their 
vulnerability to HIV and AIDS.658 
 
Ogola is convinced and concludes that the condom is the cheapest and most accessible and 
effective way to keeping infection rates low, especially among vulnerable women.  In which 
case, it cannot be argued that it is anti-life as in the case of condom use as contraception.  When 
combined with antiretroviral medications, it reduces infections significantly.  Ogola opines that 
the one thing the scourge of HIV/AIDS has been able to do is to “remove us from our comfort 
zones and un-thought-out dogmas.”659  She avers further, “Unless one wishes to continue in 
acceptable levels of casuistry, the inescapable conclusion is that latex rubber saves lives.”660 
Here, and again, the Church is confronted with the existential and personal experiences of people 
who encounter the “really-real,” people who are on the side of the Church and understand a 
problem from a purely scientific, yet theological dimension.  Not to listen carefully to voices like 
this is tantamount to impetuousness and arrogance. 
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Fr. Martin Rhonheimer, phenomenologist, philosopher, and new natural law theorist, 
supports the idea of condomized sex for discordant couples. The moral dimension to this use in 
conjugality is strictly limited to preventing the transmission of the HIV virus. Rhonheimer agrees 
with the magisterial position that contraception is intrinsically evil and therefore wrong. 
Condoms, in Rhonheimer’s philosophizing, are not necessarily evil in themselves; rather, they 
can be used for good even while they have a contraceptive effect.661 In his thought, the 
discordant couple is not employing an evil means to achieve a good end; hence, the contraceptive 
part of the use of condoms would be merely an undesired side effect and thus would not 
contravene the Church’s position on contraception. Fr. Rhonheimer argues for a caveat for 
promiscuous persons such as prostitutes and sexually active homosexuals to show responsibility 
by using condoms to reduce the risk of infecting others and spreading the disease. While not 
arguing that this is morally right, he states that it is less vicious. Fr. Rhonheimer agrees 
completely that married couples who are in good health may never resort to any form of 
contraception, devices or chemicals.662  
Luc Bovens opines that marital relations between discordant partners663 are not a normal 
circumstance and that, thus, the principle of double effect may be applied to justify the use of 
condoms in such circumstances. According to Bovens, “the good outcome of condom usage is 
that the healthy partner will not become infected. This is clearly a sufficient weighty reason 
relative to the absence of procreation. So long as one intends only not to infect one’s partner, and 
                                                          
661 Martin Rhonheimer, “A Debate on Condoms and AIDS,” The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 7, no. 2 
(2007): 40-8. 
 
662 Ibid.  
 
663 In this essay, Luc Bovens consistently uses the phrase ‘partner’ which makes the application unclear. Whether 
this term refers strictly to discordant sacramentally married people or is inclusive of partners in other forms of 
sexual situations remains amorphous and unclear. 
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one does not intend to thwart procreation, neither as a means nor as an end…,”664 Bovens 
argues, the fear of condoning the use of condoms based on the possible negative impact on 
public morality is not enough grounds to deny discordant persons the possibility of continuing to 
consummate their marriage licitly. Bovens clarifies further that there are cases where the intent 
to thwart procreation is non-existent, like having sex when conception cannot naturally take 
place, such as in circumstances of infertility, post-menopausal women, or the use of 
contraceptive pills for therapeutic reasons, as contained and approved in the encyclical Humanae 
Vitae. Arguing against the position that the use of condoms in conjugal sex interferes with the 
completeness of the act, where the sperm is not deposited into the vagina, making it a non-
unitive act, Bovens responds that the interference of the condom in the sex act cannot be 
considered a moral difference: 
….[S]uppose that we can work up some sympathy for the position that a couple 
really cannot become truly one unless genitals actually touch and seminal fluid 
make contact with vaginal secretion. Becoming a we is still not a binary issue – 
that is, there is a continuum between forming a shared we and fully remaining 
separate selves. And so we may not fully succeed in fusing with one another now 
that there is a piece of latex between us. We may lose some of the we in love 
making. But then the question remains, would our HIV-discordant couple retain 
more a sense of a we through committing themselves to perpetual abstinence? Is 
this little bit of unitive function that is thwarted by latex really more worrisome 
for the we than a cold bed would be?665 
 
Bovens concludes that the argument that the accessibility of condoms my increase promiscuity 
among the general population is not important enough as to deprive discordant persons of a great 
good within their marriage. 
                                                          
664 Luc Bovens. “Can the Catholic Church Agree to Condom Use by HIV-Discordant Couples?” Journal of Medical 
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Simon Aihiokhai,666 while acknowledging the Catholic Church as the largest global care 
giver through many of her social agencies for those infected or affected by the HIV virus, 
nonetheless accuses ecclesiastical authorities of not doing enough, especially for discordant 
couples in Africa. Aihiokhai decries the lack of specificity in the Church’s official 
pronouncement concerning discordancy. The often articulated position, including the comments 
of Pope Benedict XVI while visiting the Cameroon in 2009, constantly reiterate and emphasize 
responsible sexual mores and the fear that the use of condoms will bring about greater moral 
decay. Aihiokhai states, “This view of the pope does not address the African situation. Sexual 
promiscuity is not the only cause of HIV infection among discordant couples.”667 He further 
maintains that “not to call attention to the need for an approach that will address the situation 
faced by discordant couples is to miss a pastoral opportunity.”668 He argues for using the 
principle of epikeia669 as a hermeneutical tool that allows for the use of condoms within the 
context of a sacramental, monogamous, and Catholic marital relationship.  
Aihiokhai submits that since there is no canonical or juridical/sacramental legislation that 
bars discordant couples from sacramental marriage in the Church, especially given the 
framework of Africa’s economic, social and cultural practices (which, in itself is 
disadvantageous), the Church needs to change her narrative and be more pro-active in 
confronting these problems. Alluding to Humanae Vitae, no. 15, Aihiokhai has challenged the 
                                                          
666 Simon Mary A. Aihiokhai, “A Case for the Use of Condom as a Therapeutic Means by Discordant Couples in the 
Roman Catholic Moral Tradition,” International Journal of African Catholicism 4, no. 2 (2013). 
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669 Epikeia requires that an individual act beyond the words prescribed by law, and having determined the intention 
of the legislator (not the intention which is expressed in the words of the law, but rather that which constitutes an 
exception or a contradiction to those words), to deviate from the course clearly prescribed by the words of the law, 
on the basis of the belief that the lawmaker in enacting the law benignly excluded from it the case at hand. 
 
253 
 
episcopal conference in Africa670 to be more prophetic and to speak to the reality of the suffering 
and pains of their people.671 Aihiokhai points out that discordant and sacramentally married 
couples are at a crossroad in their marital obligations to each other. The total self-giving between 
married people—physically, emotionally, spiritually, sexually and otherwise—all ought to be life 
affirming. According to Aihiokhai, this self-giving should be “such that each partners’ health is 
nourished and not jeopardized. Thus, actions that are life denying ought to be avoided. In this 
case, unsafe sex will amount to life denying…. It is important that a distinction between medical 
necessity and promiscuity be made when referring to the use of contraceptives.”672 In his final 
comments, he argues that moral theology should engage authentic human wisdom, share ideas 
that are relevant to bettering the lives of people in disadvantaged places, and properly apply the 
notion of “epikeia to moral dilemmas faced by the people.”673 Similar arguments have been 
raised based on the principle of double effect, offering that the use of condoms within marriage 
is the lesser of two evils when the other choice is to risk infecting the un-infected partner. So far, 
the Roman Catholic Church has insisted on what she refers to as a “heroic self-sacrifice in 
abstinence” in the case of discordant couples. 
                                                          
670 According to Aihiokhai, “Since the majority of new HIV infections are in Africa, one would think that there will 
be a consensus among the African catholic Bishops, who constitute part of the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic 
Church, in their efforts to tackle this epidemic. They have been divided on the approach to preventing HIV. 
Generally, most of them have accepted the general magisterial position; that any form of the use of condom is a false 
approach to managing and preventing the disease.” Aihiokhai, “A Case,” 90. Elsewhere, Aihiokhai challenges the 
Church in Africa: “The task of priests and bishops, as well as nuns and those with pastoral responsibilities in the 
African Catholic Churches ought to reflect a pragmatic approach to tackling the situation faced by discordant 
couples. It will be injurious to these persons if the pastoral agents simply recite to them what the official position of 
the magisterium is – one that does not address specifically of discordancy and HIV infections.” Ibid., 110.  
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On the opposing side of the conversation, Janet E. Smith’s response to Fr. Martin 
Rhonheimer’s essay is useful. She is among those who side with Church teaching in maintaining 
that no condom use is permissible whatever the situation, and she offers, succinctly and clearly, a 
precise, theologically sound argument. Smith states that the difference in position between 
herself and Rhonheimer (Grisez, Finnis and Ralph McInerny) is a question of how to determine 
the object of a moral act, what constitutes the “end” of an act, what the “practical reason” is, and 
the role of “nature” in the evaluation of any moral act. Smith explains that condomized674 sex, in 
general, is wrong but differentiates between homosexual and heterosexual condomized sex. 
Homosexual condomized sex, according to Smith, is devoid of any kind of procreative meaning 
while heterosexuals (including infertile couples) thwart the procreative meaning of the sexual act 
by using contraception. Smith explains the state of infertile couples thus: 
It is certainly true that the infertile cannot remove fertility from acts that have no 
possibility of being fertile…. They can still perform actions that per se have a 
contraceptive telos or meaning… that is why marriage between the infertile is 
permitted: because they can engage in actions that by their nature, by their intrinsic 
potency, are ordained to procreation even though they cannot actualize that 
potency. If their acts can have that telos in a per se way and can express the 
meaning of sexual intercourse, it would seem that it is possible for them to do 
things that would violate that telos or meaning. If they fail to do or to give to each 
other what is minimally necessary for an act of sexual intercourse to be per se apt 
for procreation, they would be falsifying the meaning of the act. Condom use 
prevents them from doing or giving what is necessary for an act to be per se 
procreative of its kind.675 
 
 Condomized heterosexual sex in all situations, according to Smith is not only non-   
consummating, it is also non-unitive. Smith uses the analogy of condomized sex as “simply two 
                                                          
674 Smith makes an interesting clarification on “condomized” thus: “I use the neologism ‘condomized’ because I 
understand the suffix “-ized” to mean something that is characterized by a noun that has been made into a verbal 
adjective and that it refers to an action that shares in the nature of the thing named: on the analogy with 
‘marginalized’ I think ‘condomized’ is correct. ‘Condomistic’ seems to me to be parallel with ‘hedonistic’ which 
suggests ‘sharing something in common with’ but not necessarily ‘being an instance’ of the named reality.” Cf. 
Janet E. Smith, “The Morality of Condom use by HIV-Infected Spouses,” The Thomist 70 (2006): 30. 
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bodies rubbing against each other or, in fact, rubbing against latex.”676 Smith submits that 
“condomized sexual intercourse shares in the essential characteristics of coitus interruptus or 
withdrawal and mutual masturbation more than in an act of expressive of complete self-giving. 
Coitus interruptus is wrong not only because it is contraceptive but also because it is not 
unitive.”677 The analogy employing the idea of coitus interruptus in Smith’s argument is because 
the male leaves nothing of himself which defeats the purpose of union. In such a case, the 
penetration alone does not complete the act but the depositing of the semen in the vagina.678 
 To support her argument that the use of condoms within the sexual act always carries a 
contraceptive intent for heterosexuals, she appeals to the moral tradition of the Church. Here, the 
Church uses the terms finis operantis/agentis and finis operis/actus, the former meaning the 
intention, end, or motive of the agent, and the latter meaning the “end, ordination, meaning, or 
character of an act that is inherent in an act and so intrinsic to it or ‘embedded’ in it that one 
cannot choose that action without also choosing that end along with any further ends the agent 
                                                          
676 Ibid., 48. 
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678 In supporting her argument, Janet Smith clarifies that she does not intend to debate the effectiveness of the use of 
condoms or how they can reduce the transmission of disease. Smith states that her focus is on the question of the 
morality of condom use as a means of reducing the transmission of the HIV virus. Smith’s arguments is based solely 
on the contemporary Catholic understanding of marriage and human sexuality—that the sex act is located only 
within marriage, open to procreation, and unitive—using the essential terminologies of traditional Catholic moral 
analysis, which often the characteristically Aristotelian/Thomistic metaphysic developed into such principles as the 
principle of double effect. This will be used to ground her position that “the use of a condom prohibits a 
heterosexual act of sexual intercourse from being unitive and that the use of a condom by heterosexuals is always 
contraceptive.” Ibid., 31. Smith therefore refers to John Paul II’s Theology of the Body, stating, “Pope John Paul II’s 
theology of the body significantly deepens our understanding of the unitive meaning of marriage. He speaks of the 
nuptial meaning of the body, by which he means that the body itself expresses that human beings are essentially 
meant to be in relation with each other. H speaks of Adam’s ‘original solitude’ that is overcome by the ‘original 
unity’ that he enjoys with Eve before the fall. One supposes that had man not fallen each of us would have been in a 
monogamous spousal relationship—we all would have had matches made in heaven! The desire that many 
experience for multiple sexual partners and the difficulty of sustaining marital unions are results of the fall. Fidelity 
and indissolubility would surely have characterized prelapsarian marriages. The Church’s understanding of marriage 
as a symbol of Christ’s love for the Church serves to illuminate the unitive meaning of marriage. The procreative 
meaning of the sexual act is not accidental to the unitive meaning; it is, in fact, part of its deepest essential 
structure.” Ibid., 35. 
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might have.”679 Any moral act, therefore, either meritorious or sinful, includes both finis 
operantis and finis operis, and if the act is to be meritorious, both must be ordered to right 
reason. Smith, therefore, insists:  
I maintain that the use of a condom by those seeking to reduce the transmission of 
the HIV is the object and means of the action and as object has its own 
end/meaning (the finis operis) – namely, the prevention of procreation – and the 
“intention to reduce the transmission of the HIV” is the end (the finis operantis) 
of the action, that is, it is the intention of the agent… I maintain that even though 
something is not intended as the end of the agent, the finis operantis, if it is 
chosen as a means to the end of the agent, it too is an essential component of the 
act and enters into the moral evaluation of the action. It is “beside” the primary 
intention of the agent but nonetheless has its own telos or end or meaning, and 
insofar as it is chosen as an essential element of the larger action, its inherent telos 
is part of that action: it is not undertaken per accidens but is essential to the 
action. To apply this principle to the action at hand, a condom used by fertile 
heterosexuals has its own inherent ordination or telos, the intentionality of 
preventing the deposit of semen and the prospect of a sperm fertilizing an egg. 
Thus, whether the spouses use a condom to prevent pregnancy or the transmission 
of the HIV they cannot fail to intend the intrinsic telos of the condom in an act of 
heterosexual sexual intercourse.680 
 
 This argument supports the idea that an agent’s act, even if the agent does not desire a 
specific probable outcome (finis operis/actus), is a choice for a bad effect, not simply as a side 
effect, but as an intrinsic part of the object or means. Smith accepts that the original intention is 
an attempt to reduce the risk of transmitting HIV, but the means of achieving this is by 
contraception, “choosing to do something immoral for the sake of something moral.”681 Smith 
closes her essay noting that those outside of Catholic tradition may not be persuaded by these 
arguments. However, the accusation that the Church is somewhat complicit in the spreading of 
the disease by rejecting the distribution of condoms (especially in poor countries) is, at the very 
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least, puzzling. According to Smith, the Church stands behind its rule of chastity before marriage 
and fidelity after marriage as the real solution to stopping further spread and infection. 
Anthony Fisher questions whether the Church has any real argument for insisting that 
every sexual act “must be completed by seminatio intra veginam and so be per se aptum ad 
generationem in order to be a conjugal act.”682 Fisher attributes the Catholic understanding and 
arguments to a long history and dependence on tradition. Following in the Thomistic tradition, 
Fisher sees sex as fides, proles and sacramentum (spouses’ commitment to each other, to their 
family and to God). The Second Vatican Council teaches that conjugality in marriage must 
“preserve the full sense of mutual self-giving and human procreation” in which subjective 
intentions cannot make right what is objectively wrong.683 Conjugality in this sense must both be 
unitive and procreative, and the inseparability of these two aspects makes other forms of sex 
morally wrong, even when done lovingly by spouses. Fisher establishes that the Church’s 
position is the consequence of a long Catholic tradition, standing, and established sound 
philosophical anthropology, canon law and moral theology. Consequent upon this logic, Fisher 
asserts that “even HIV-discordant married couples may not engage in condomized 
intercourse.”684 This tradition is in dissonance with the viewpoint of modern persons, who lack 
the sensibilities of chastity and sexual discipline that characterized previous generations. In 
agreement with others who hold the same opinion on condomized sex, Fisher argues that such is 
not plausible because the act does not end in the couple’s complete giving of themselves to each 
other. These are the same principles, according to Fisher, that make homosexual and extra-
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marital sexual acts impermissible. Fisher states that this position is not popular because modern 
minds think this teaching is opaque.  Fisher leaves room for a possible scenario for condomized 
sex, which he favors as the “use of a condom to reduce the risk of HIV transmission and not with 
a view to preventing conception. In such a case I think they would have no contraceptive object 
or will and their acts would not be contraceptive.”685 Fisher adds that in some instances, even for 
fertile couples, condomized sex is possible. He bases his supporting argument on the section in 
Humanae Vitae that permits oral contraceptives on therapeutic grounds if such is needed, 
“foreseeing that that it has a contraceptive side-effect: the lack of a contraceptive will or 
intention means this is not an act of contraception.”686  
In his work, Fisher devotes a good number of pages to dealing with the role of Catholic 
relief agencies and their position in advocacy for or against training in the use of, educating 
about, or distributing condoms. Fisher opines that “despite some impressive psycho-linguistic 
gymnastics, efforts to characterize distributing and encouraging the effective use of condoms as 
merely material cooperation in extra-marital intercourse fail.”687 Thus, the official policies of 
Catholic relief agencies all over the world are constant: they insist that they do not finance, 
distribute, promote, urge, or even suggest the use of condoms. 
Much more might be said about the appropriate response to the HIV crisis, 
including the best means of prevention. Beyond promoting behavioral change, 
including delaying onset of sexual activity, reducing partners and above all 
promoting chastity, there are many issues to be addressed such as attitudes to the 
body, Third World disadvantage, relations between sexes and moral relativism…. 
I conclude that distribution and promotion are clearly ruled out and that even 
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information programs are morally problematically cooperation in extra marital 
sexual activity.688  
 
 When it comes to the question of possible reasons for cooperating in informational 
programs aimed only at HIV-discordant couples, Fisher articulates some of the salient points 
arguing against this position as follows: 
- Programs such as this creates a false sense of security which supports “behavioral 
disinhibition” or “risk compensation,” still putting them at risk of infection. 
- This gives the false impression that contraceptive sex or extra- (non) marital sex is 
permissible. 
- Immediate damage is done to those affected physically, psychologically, in their 
relationship with God, the Church and with others. 
- The Church’s traditional position, which is already misunderstood, stands to be further 
misconstrued by a mixed message of exceptions to the rule, which may be a fatal 
compromise to the life of faith. 
- Consequently, a consistency in magisterial and papal teachings will be compromised with 
regard to marriage, sexuality, and family life. 
- This may also exacerbate widespread moral decline, widespread use of contraception and 
all sorts of defiant sexual behaviors that will aid the continuous spread of the disease.  
 
 Fisher therefore concludes that it is wrong for any Catholic agency to cooperate in the 
promotion of condoms, even if by merely participating in “factual” information dissemination 
for any kind of option, even when such information is seen to be restricted to HIV-discordant 
couples. Ultimately, Fisher thinks that abstinence from sexual intercourse is possible within 
marriage, as it is a free and responsible choice that married people have to make at various times 
and various reasons. Sometimes, this abstinence extends for considerable lengths of times and 
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may be the only prudent option left at the time. According to Fisher, by this kind of prudent 
abstinence, “spouses affirm rather than undermine their marriage as a communion of persons 
which has chronological and moral priority over its one-flesh expression.”689 In Fisher’s opinion, 
“abstinence is clearly the safest course for HIV-discordant couples.”690 For discordant couples 
who may have to abstain from sexual intercourse within their marital life, Fisher advocates for 
counselling, education, and spiritual support. Both the Church and society have a moral 
obligation to support single people as they strive to live the virtue of chastity; “so too, many 
married couples need more help in dealing with sexual frustration and other challenges in the 
physical-emotional side of their marriage.”691 This position, which has remained constant in 
Catholic tradition, professionals and agencies will open them to severe criticism and “at odds 
with the powers and wisdom of the age.”692 
 Benezet Bujo is a renowned and eminent African theologian, a priest of the diocese of 
Bunia in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and a professor of Moral Theology and Social 
Ethics at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland. On the question of HIV/AIDS and 
discordancy, Bujo acknowledges that this scourge is afflicting great numbers of people in Africa. 
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Bujo notes also that the efforts of the Church to proffer a solution to this problem is brought 
about by an attempt to remain committed and defend the good news of Jesus. Bujo avers that this 
moral positon of the Church oftentimes seems too rigorous and does not speak realistically to the 
lived experience of those who are affected by this scourge. Condom use as a response to 
HIV/AIDS, in Bujo’s opinion, was raised in the West as a panacea. This is in conflict with the 
traditional teaching of the Church which sees contraception as intrinsically evil, and evil cannot 
be tolerated as a means to achieving a good. Based on this logic, discordant couples may not 
resort to the use of condoms but rely on permanent abstinence. Having acknowledged this 
official teaching and position of the Church, Bujo draws attention to the specificity of the 
African situation. Bujo asserts, “Despite the contrary view of the Catholic Church in Africa, 
many believe that right now condoms are the only means to protect the population from 
complete extermination.”693 Bujo states further that experience has shown that absolute 
continence usually fails, leading to wider spread of the disease and the infection of a hitherto 
uninfected partner and most likely the newly born child. Bujo therefore advocates “a context in 
which the principle of the lesser evil (manus malum) or the application of the principle of double 
effect (actus cum duplici effectui) should be applied.”694 In order to clarify his point Bujo 
reiterates: “it must be clearly stressed that the use of condoms is to be understood as a lesser evil 
(minus malum) or avoiding the use of condoms as a lesser good (minus bonum), only as long as 
no better option is available.”695 In proposing an “interim ethic,” Bujo sheds greater light on his 
position by re-emphasizing the difference between what is, and what ought to be: 
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… the principles of lesser evil and of double effect urgently require us to seek a 
more adequate solution: that is, it is legitimate to endorse an “interim ethics” only 
until something better comes along. The real and fundamentally valid solution, 
however, involves a change in behavior and demands a new lifestyle, an inner 
renewal of one’s approach to sexuality, rather than naively trusting technical 
solutions. Such behavioral change concerns not just the individual; it is essential, 
rather, that the whole of society contribute to it.696  
 
Recalling the 1994 Synod on Africa, in which the Bishops of Africa adopted “family” as a model 
for the Church in Africa, Bujo sees this model as apt and appropriate, an African understanding 
of family which encapsulates the living, the dead, and the yet to be born. In light of the various 
problems faced in Africa, Bujo appeals for a pragmatic use of this family model: “it is more 
urgent than ever to develop a community morality that corresponds to the Church as family 
according to the African model.”697 Bujo insists that checking HIV/AIDS in Africa is a common 
project between communities, the Church, and the international community, and that the 
situation will not improve until “the world community is ready to address all issues—particularly 
in relation to the people of the South, first and especially in Africa the most exploited—with 
justice and letting love prevail.”698 
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 In another essay, Bujo calls attention to the efforts of Basic or Small Christian 
Communities (SCC)699 to support those afflicted by HIV/AIDS. These communities act as a 
healing community whose presence offers comfort, counseling, and help. Their ministry is not 
limited to the Church but includes every one of every faith and ethnicity. Because this ecclesial 
ministry offers “real” presence, Bujo calls for a renewed look at “the administration of the 
sacraments of the Eucharist, penance and the anointing of the sick.”700 Many contemporary 
African theologians are of the opinion that women suffer the most in the HIV epidemics, as care 
takers, care givers, those most often infected, and so on. Bujo characterizes the situation thus: “In 
Africa, there are so many women in the service of those infected with HIV/AIDS that the phrase 
‘feminization of ecclesial identity’ was coined, which could give to our ecclesiology a new 
dynamic. This outstanding presence of women in the service of the sick renders the question of 
administration of the sacraments even more complex.”701 Bujo therefore poses the question, 
“Would it not be good to rethink the traditional theology of the two sacraments, reconciliation 
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and anointing of the sick, in the context of Africa today regarding the ministers of the 
sacraments?”702 
 In terms of Bujo’s proposal for the active role of the Church that is based on the family 
structure as model, solidarity and common responsibility must be the Church’s watchword. 
Surprisingly, Bujo makes a bland and open-ended statement that is un-nuanced: “This concerns, 
after all, and especially, husband and wife… being members of Christ’s, they must live out their 
marriage knowing fully their responsibility to one another, and because of HIV/AIDS, avoid any 
risks to themselves”703 (emphasis mine). Bujo appeals for better education in both schools and 
catechesis, to curb illiteracy and the kind of ignorance that makes poor people turn away from 
modern-scientific medicine and technology (where available) to consulting with necromancy and 
mystical visionaries. 
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 Paulinus Ikechukwu Odozor is another well-known African theologian whose 
contribution to the conversation on HIV/AIDS in Africa and the situation of discordancy 
approaches the question with an appeal to casuistry. In Catholic theology, casuistry as a principle 
is an aspect of moral theology that is applied to moral singular facts in the face of moral conflict. 
Casuistry is employed to find practical solutions that preserve all intrinsic values. Experience 
shows that rules/laws have limits because they are sometimes not self-interpreting and do not 
naturally resolve ambiguities and conflicting moral principles. According to Odozor, humans 
formulate values that will help communities to flourish, but sometimes these values are 
incomplete in their expression—“thus, the need for constant revision of some of the norms that 
govern human conduct. Casuistry is an important way of effecting these revisions, which may 
lead to the abrogation of particular norms, the enlargement of some others or the refinement of 
yet others.”704 Reflecting on the question of contraceptive intercourse, Odozor while 
acknowledging the magisterial position, also questions whether, where HIV/AIDS is concerned 
within discordancy, condomized sex can be seen simply as contraceptive. Following those who 
think that in discordancy the use of condoms is not contraceptive, Odozor agrees with them in 
seeing it as an example of the ordering of the hierarchy of values found in casuistry:  
Life and marriage are here seen as higher values to be preserved when faced with 
this rather regrettable choice. Thus, when faced with AIDS and its consequences, 
the community is forced to rethink its moral principles and presuppositions. The 
goal is not to abandon the result of many years of communal wisdom taught 
authoritatively by the magisterium of the Church. Rather, it is to find 
imaginatively creative ways of understanding or coming to terms with the 
community’s ethical commitment in the face of this entirely new and devastating 
phenomenon…. Catholic moral casuistic tradition has always paid attention to 
circumstances, principles, and the individual conscience in the search for 
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solutions to the problems which new phenomena raise for the individual and 
society.705  
 
 While Odozor does not commit either to supporting or not supporting the use of condoms 
for discordant couples, his statement, like Bujo’s, is un-nuanced and therefore open to reader 
translation. Odozor opines that in the casuistic tradition, a special value is placed on human life. 
Therefore, “solutions that are in favor of life are more in keeping with the best insights of our 
moral tradition.”706 Odozor supports the casuistic tradition, in which an unusual situation may 
call for extraordinary action. These insights in Odozor’s reflection “are present in the casuistic 
tradition and can be used mutatis mutandi to treat HIV/AIDS related cases.”707 Odozor thinks 
that the application of casuistry to the problem of HIV/AIDS and the use of condoms can help to 
find the balance between moral idealism and reactive rigorism. The application of casuistry, in 
Thomistic terms, is helpful when prudent people react to diverse persons and situations, draw 
from past experiences to make judgements about future possibilities to arrive at sound 
conclusions about ethical problems, including HIV/AIDS and the use of condoms in 
discordancy.  
 While a lot more ink can be expended on various approaches and arguments for and 
against, one thing is sure: the Church needs to make a definitive statement on the matter of 
condomized sex in discordancy. Clearly, this matter challenges prior teaching and creates an 
avenue for a development in doctrine. Pope Benedict XVI appointed a commission to study the 
possibility of permitting the use of condoms for discordant couples, and to determine under 
which theological ethical principles this might be permissible. Surprisingly, years later, the 
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Church remains silent about the outcome of the commission’s work and remains silent on an 
official magisterial and doctrinal position. Two events make the situation more troubling in the 
light of a lack of an official position. The first is a situation that is now often referred to as a 
classic example of a “double down” by Pope Emeritus, Benedict VXI, when he made comments 
that male prostitutes (and all who engage in dangerous sexual activities) are better off using 
condoms to prevent the spread of disease. The second case involves religious missionary nuns 
travelling to work as missionaries in the Congo during the civil war years of the early 1960s. 
Because they were in danger of rape, they received permission to use contraceptive drugs as a 
form of protection. The technical aspects of each case is long and unnecessary at this point. The 
import of both events is well summarized in Lisa Sowle Cahill’s response the nuns/Congo case 
which I believe applies also to the Pope Benedict/male prostitute case. In a journal essay Cahill 
writes, 
The debate was important, instead, because it presented the possibilities that 
practical problems could challenge the accustomed ways of thinking about 
contraception, and because it joined respected theological voices in a re-
examination of the prohibition on it – although it is revealing of racial attitudes 
that these particular circumstances were required to raise the question in the 
European mind. The debate was one of several movements in the Church which 
together, at the time of Vatican II, were to sponsor a hope among both theologians 
and laypersons that the traditional strictures on control of conception would be 
revised.708 
 
 Cahill’s position resonates because to seek solutions (even if temporary) to the problem 
of HIV/AIDS in Africa and developing poorer nations around the world, there is the necessity for 
a closer study of cultural problems, marriages rites, rites of young adult initiations and passage, 
and the sexual mores of different societies. These varied contexts make it often more realistically 
difficult to navigate or to proffer one single solution as one size fits all. It is even more 
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dangerous for the Church to remain silent on how to respond a disease that is taking the lives of 
huge numbers of poor people as a lack of concern or show of empathy. God forbid that banners 
like “Black Lives Matters” ever show up as a reaction against the Church on this issue. For now, 
the Church offers the argument that since scientifically we do know that even condoms are not 
always 100% safe, discordant couples are encouraged to embrace abstinence even if indefinitely; 
“by so doing spouses affirm rather than undermine their marriage as a communion of persons 
which has chronological and moral priority over its one-flesh expression. They must find other 
ways of demonstrating love and experiencing physical and emotional intimacy together.”709  
Same Sex Unions 
 The second pastoral problem to be examined is the question of same sex unions, a 
situation where we have two equally committed Catholics who believe they have taken the moral 
highroad and are expressing the will of God in their same gender relationship. This peculiar 
pastoral and contemporary problem needs to be thoroughly engaged, scrutinized, and re-
articulated within the magisterial tradition. Many countries, especially within the Western 
hemisphere have recently legalized same sex unions. Many more countries around the world are 
debating legislation on the same matter, and it appears that it is only a matter of time, likely 
sooner than later, until the legalization of same sex unions will be widely acceptable. This 
represents a locus where a dramatic change in society and culture comes in direct headlong 
collision with the established magisterial and traditional position on the meaning of marriage and 
family life. Because of the nature of the Christian understanding of marriage, that it is strictly 
between a man and a woman, this new form of same sex unions has created an impasse.  This 
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sort of impasse creates a break in communion, communion as unity in the body of Christ and 
communion as coming to partake at the Eucharistic table. In this second section of my final 
chapter, same sex unions of baptized Catholics and the question of admission to Eucharistic 
communion and the universal communion of the people of God is part of a larger theological and 
pastoral problem with far-reaching implications for the Christian Church in contemporary times 
more than at any other time in the history of Christianity. Based on what the Church sees as the 
norm, which is a definitive scriptural condemnation of homosexual acts, this needs careful 
attention. 
 Choon-Leong Seown avers that “….there are those of us convinced that the authenticity 
of the Church is in question if it is unchanging and exclusivistic…. In this scriptural tradition, the 
Church is unfaithful if it turns its back on those who are marginalized in various ways by society 
or if the Church itself excludes people on the basis of their race, gender or sexual orientation 
from full participation in its life and leadership.”710 And while arguments range on both sides of 
the divide on the morality or immorality of the homosexual act,711 Charles Curran notes that 
“since the 1980s many more Catholic moral theologians have entered the discussion about 
homosexual relations, but for the most part the methodological and substantive positions do not 
depart from the earlier positions. Most of the new voices argue in favor of homosexual relations 
in a committed relationship, but defenders of the existing hierarchical teaching continue to 
write.”712 Homosexuality and the question of same sex unions are often argued from a 
theological and ethical perspective. However, the inferences drawn by these questions have 
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wider implications for all sources of moral theology; “scripture, Church teaching, reason, 
experience, and the data of human sciences.”713 More than this, I agree with Choon-Leong 
Seow’s articulation of a more profound dilemma, “The issue of homosexuality is not merely a 
question of what the ancient text meant. It is, more importantly, a hermeneutical issue, a question 
of how we understand the texts and appropriate them for our specific contexts. It is, further, a 
theological-ethical issue, a question of how we as Christians think about ourselves and our 
conduct in relation to God.”714 This dialectic is the basis for my exploration questions pertaining 
to same sex unions and their greater pastoral implications for what it means to be Church, to be 
in communion with the Church, and to be able to go to the table of the Eucharistic communion. 
Certain questions arise: are we reading the texts right? Are we legislating rightly about who we 
include and who we exclude? Even in a more simplistic kind of way, one may ask, “What would 
Jesus do? 
  The Church has been consistent in her teaching and position on homosexuality. 
Homosexual orientation, while not a sin, is yet an “objective disorder because it is ordered to an 
intrinsically moral evil.”715 The Church makes a distinction between orientation and homosexual 
acts: “The homosexual orientation is ‘objectively disordered’ while the homosexual acts are 
‘intrinsically disordered.’716 These terms have been translated into an indictment on the 
personhood of homosexual persons. However, according to Zalot and Guevin, this 
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misunderstanding is based on a lack of understanding of the philosophical language as based on 
the natural law theory. These authors refer to the understanding that God created male and 
female in complementarity for a union of life and procreation. “Because homosexual acts are 
deficient—notice again, we speak of deficiency, not sin—in their ability to bring forth new life, 
they are deemed to be contrary to the natural ordering of creation. They are in this sense, 
‘disordered.’”717 Further clarification is made that every human person suffers a certain kind of 
disordered inclination, be it to cowardice, gluttony, gossip, theft, etc.; these simply remain 
inclinations and are not sinful until one willingly acts on them, at which time they become moral 
evil. Within the same logic, homosexual orientation is not sinful, but to engage in homosexual 
acts is. Central to the Church’s teaching on this matter is the centrality of the male-female 
marital relationship, and the call of all Christians to chastity in whatever state of life they choose 
to live. For homosexual persons, the Church calls on all to see in such persons the image of God, 
to afford them the dignity due to them, to fight any discrimination against them, to love them as 
brothers and sisters in Christ. When this position on homosexuality is put side by side the 
Church’s position on marriage, the picture on the future possibility in the development of 
doctrine in this area seems to be a completed project. The catechism of the Catholic Church and 
the code of canon law state unambiguously, “The matrimonial covenant, by which a man and a 
woman establish between themselves a partnership of the whole life, is by its very nature ordered 
toward the good of the spouses and the procreation and education of offspring; these covenant 
between baptized persons has been raised by Christ the Lord to the dignity of a sacrament.”718 
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Within the New Natural Law Theorists’ enclave, in this instance, relying on John Finnis’ 
work, we find a total rejection of same sex unions based on the logic that homosexual and 
heterosexual non-reproductive sexual acts are unnatural, unreasonable, and for this reason 
immoral. Finnis and his colleagues argue in favor of heterosexual marriage and the conjugal act 
employing three arguments. First, marriage between a man and a woman is a basic good; second, 
sex also is a basic good of marriage; and third, every other non-marital sexual act is unnatural, 
unreasonable, and immoral. In line with Catholic tradition, NNLT accepts the two intrinsic and 
inseparable inner meanings of marriage: procreation and unity (friendship). Finnis and his 
colleagues maintain that homosexual acts do not fulfil or achieve these two intrinsic values as 
such homosexual acts (as well as those of non-married persons, sodomites, masturbators, 
contracepting couples, those who perform oral sex, and all who violate the intrinsic meaning of 
the marital act) cannot achieve the basic good of marriage: 
But the common good of friends who are not and cannot be married (for example, 
man and man, man and boy, woman and woman) has nothing to do with their 
having children by each other, and their reproductive organs cannot make them a 
biological (and therefore personal) unit. So their sexual acts together cannot do 
what they may hope and imagine. Because their activation of one or even each of 
their reproductive organs cannot be an actualizing and experiencing of the marital 
good – as marital intercourse (intercourse between spouses in a marital way) can, 
even between spouses who happen to be sterile – it can do no more than provide 
each partner with an individual gratification… their choice to engage in such 
conduct thus dis-integrates each of them precisely as acting persons.719 
 
 The NNL theorists claim that homosexual acts are unnatural since they do not have any 
possibility of a reproductive telos, and the two persons’ reproductive organs fail to create the 
natural desired complementarity. Finnis states that “the biological union of the reproductive 
organs of a husband and wife is part of, not an instrument of, their personal reality… sexual acts 
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are not unitive in their significance unless they are marital…”720 The NNL theorists therefore 
conclude that since homosexual acts are not a marital act, they damage and impede a major 
moral principle, violating a basic human good. In addition, since marriage is a basic human 
good, homosexual acts are unnatural, unreasonable and immoral.  
The work of Todd Salzman and Michael Lawler questions the presumption that all 
homosexual acts are intrinsically evil and see a distortion of tradition. Both writers argue that the 
Church understands and accepts in finding theological truths the input of sound theological 
exegesis, application of scientific data where applicable, history, culture, and experience. This is 
a complex process involving patient dialogue, research, discernment, and time. Carefully 
examining these foundations (borrowed from the theology of Cardinal Josef Ratzinger), Salzman 
and Lawler submit that by following this principle of holistic complementarity, not all 
homosexual acts can be judged to be morally wrong. From a biblical perspective, Salzman and 
Lawler argue that since the Bible itself is subject to history, there can be no absolute norms on 
any kind of sexuality which can be broadly applied across varying cultural contexts. 
Contemporary theology today, therefore, cannot rely on abstract biblical texts from a different 
epoch and cultural context. Reflecting on the natural law argument employed by the 
magisterium, Salman and Lawler aver that “[h]omosexual acts are ‘natural’ for people with a 
homosexual orientation just as heterosexual acts are ‘natural’ for people with heterosexual 
orientation.”721  
Both writers understand the interpretation of “natural” to be socially constructed. 
Therefore, “as such, what is ‘natural’ in sexual activity, which is an expression of the sexual 
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person, will vary depending 722on whether or not the person’s sexual orientation is homosexual 
or heterosexual.” They make the case against the objection that the homosexual act is non-
procreative, arguing that permanently or temporarily non-reproductive heterosexual acts are 
essentially different since they also are non-procreative. Again, based on human experience, 
Salzman and Lawler posit that “homosexual couples manifest ‘the gift of life’ in their sexuality 
through embodied interpersonal union… both fertile and infertile, manifest ‘the gift of life’ in 
their sexuality in their embodied interpersonal union.”723 Therefore, what constitutes morally 
good sexual acts for both heterosexual and homosexual couples is embodiment and interpersonal 
union. Against the complementarity argument, they state that “abundant social-scientific data to 
support the claim that personal, unitive complementarity is experienced in committed, stable, and 
justly loving homosexual relationships… and in the case of homosexual parents, these 
complementarities facilitate both parental complementarity and the positive nurture of 
children.”724  
 Salzman and Lawler challenge the Church and ask for a revision of the current 
magisterial position which teaches that all homosexual acts are intrinsically immoral. Both 
authors call for a more systematic approach based on sound biblical exegesis, scientific data 
based on experience and the best of magisterial teaching on human sexuality. For them, the 
consensual sexual act between two persons, heterosexual or homosexual should not be a means 
of objectifying, dominating, or exploiting another; any sexual violence in either heterosexual or 
homosexual union is never justified. In their conclusion, they state their position clearly: 
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Heterosexual orientation is an innate, deep-seated, and stable orientation to, 
predominantly, persons of the opposite sex; homosexual orientation is similarly 
innate, deep-seated, and stable orientation to, predominantly, persons of the same 
sex. Ethics can have for its object only acts that are free, acts that can be imputed 
to personal responsibility. Whatever is determined, insofar as it is determined, is 
neither moral nor immoral’ it simply is. Sexual orientation is neither chosen nor 
readily changeable; it simply is. It is, therefore, in itself neither moral nor 
immoral. The sexual behaviors that flow from it, however, may be moral or 
immoral.725 
 
 Stephen J. Pope agrees with Salzman and Lawler’s position that recent scientific findings 
lend credence to the concept of the naturalness of homosexuality and therefore examine what 
impact this claim may have on contemporary natural law ethics. Pope sees the Church as 
traditionally using the natural law argument to prohibit homosexual acts. The natural law 
argument has been used to reinforce the idea of human nature in a singular dimension—the 
divinely intended or sanctified person, characterized for the heavenly kingdom. Pope argues that 
this image does not acknowledge a broader range of human flourishing, which includes a natural 
desire for the good. According to Pope, “This tendency goes hand-in-hand with the tendency to 
isolate its theological interpretation of the descriptively human from empirical interpretations of 
the descriptively human.”726 As a result, the natural law theory separates the “normatively human 
from scientific information and insights regarding the descriptively human.”727 Pope identifies 
the normative human as crucial within the Church’s application of its sources for theology and in 
its excursion in finding moral truths; scripture, tradition, human experience and magisterial 
authority in translating and interpreting what constitutes genuine human flourishing. According 
to Pope, “Human flourishing is conceived much more strongly in affective and interpersonal 
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terms than strictly natural terms. Interpersonal love is here the locus of human flourishing.”728 
Pope sees a relationship with a Thomistic understanding of practical reason which arrives at 
ethical principles by generalizations based on judgements or the understanding of virtuous 
persons who experience connaturality with the good. Pope insists that despite all the works of 
biblical scholars and Christian tradition, which clearly condemn homosexual sex, the 
conversation is by no means ended, “but it does imply that the burden of proof must be borne by 
those who would argue for the legitimacy of some kind of homosexual covenant.”729 Pope calls 
for a more precise and comprehensive account of what truly constitutes human flourishing 
according to a natural law ethic, which “as a moral tradition offers neither timeworn prohibitions 
nor vague platitudes but genuine moral wisdom.”730 For Pope, what trumps the natural law 
argument is the affective complementarity of two people of the same sex who are living in a 
committed and loving relationship.  
Matter and Form: A Hypothetical Frame Work 
The complexity of the subject matter requires a dialogical and cross fertilizing of differing 
theological and non-theological positions, taking into account the historical, revisionist, 
contemporary, philosophical, and anthropological foundations of the Church’s understanding of 
marriage and human sexuality.  Here, I intend to apply “Matter” and “Form” as a descriptive tool 
for understanding the essentials of the development of Catholic doctrine.  As I have referenced 
several times earlier on, doctrine can include revealed truths, Scripture, sacred tradition, 
definitions, or even ongoing synodal formulations of the magisterium.  Within the doctrinal 
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tradition, a dogmatic definition or teaching proclaimed infallibly has greater weight than other 
teachings not so defined.  All doctrines proposed by the magisterial tradition require adherence 
from the entire Church, yet the weight of one proclamation differs from that of another.  No one 
encapsulates this idea better than John Cardinal Newman who spoke eloquently to this situation 
thus: 
…certainly some rule is necessary for arranging and authenticating these various 
expressions and results of Christian doctrine.  No one will maintain that all points 
of belief are of equal importance.  There are what may be considered minor 
points, which we may hold to be true without imposing them as necessary; there 
are greater truths and lesser truths, points which it is necessary, and points which 
it is pious to believe.  The simple question is, “How are we to discriminate the 
greater from the less, the true from the false….”   
If the developments, which have above been called moral, are to take 
place to any great extent, and without them it is difficult to see how Christianity 
can exist at all, if only its relations civil government have to be ascertained or the 
qualification for membership with it defined, surely an authority is necessary to 
impart decision to what is vague and confidence to what is empirical, to ratify the 
successive steps of so elaborate a process, and to secure the validity of inferences 
which are to be made the premises of more remote investigations.731 
 
To approach the fundamental question of my thesis, I here appropriate the idea of 
“matter” and “form” in the sacramental theology of the Church employed as a metaphor, or an 
analytical tool, or a hypothetical framework to try to explain the converging point of the 
disagreeing positions.  I suggest that understanding possible changes or shifts in the doctrinal 
position on human sexuality can be better explored borrowing the idea of matter and form from 
sacramental theology.  Using matter and form as metaphors helps to delineate the difference 
between theological essentials and incidentals, between its subjective and objective components.   
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The form/matter distinction has a long standing history in theology, with roots in both 
Aristotelian/Thomistic science and philosophy.  It is applied to the sacraments in contemporary 
Catholic liturgical theology:  
The nature of each sacrament is explained in terms of its distinctive form and matter.  
Thus the “matter” of baptism is the pouring of water…. The “form” is the saying of the 
accompanying words “I baptize you in the name of the father and of the son and of the 
Holy Spirit.”  This gives religious meaning to the material gesture and makes the 
composite act an efficacious supernatural sign of grace… Although this form/matter 
analysis is not the only or the exhaustive explanation of the full meaning and reality of 
the sacraments, it is a very illuminating one as far as it goes, and it would be difficult 
indeed to dispense with it entirely.732  
  
The form in sacramental theology is often the word of Jesus, while the matter consists of the 
operative materials used, as handed down by sacred Scripture and Christian tradition. Sacraments 
are enacted in symbolic acts and words, matter and form, and I am adapting this analogy to try to 
explain the nature of marriage within the Christian tradition.  There are certain aspects that 
remain unchangeable and can be seen as the form of its sacramentality, whereas the Church’s 
response to newer questions that need re-interpretation and re-articulation can be seen as matter, 
which has changeability. Therefore, we can trace shifts in the teachings concerning conjugality 
between married couples, questions concerning artificial birth control and natural birth control 
etc., leading to raising further questions about discordant couples and even the question of same 
sex unions. 
I argue that since the Church, through the actions of the Holy Spirit, is itself a sacrament 
of salvation, so are her teachings.  Therefore, while the teaching on sexuality as form remains 
historically and doctrinally the same, its matter evolves and will continue to evolve as society 
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and cultures evolve.733  The imagery that sacramental symbols evoke for the Church are clearly 
mediated to the Church’s mission of teaching.  Sebastian Madathummuriyil posits that even 
though emphasis is shifting from the power of language and symbol to the activity of the Holy 
Spirit, this agency of mediation can be “described in terms based on the double and 
complementary missions of the word and spirit… explained only in terms of the originary 
giveness of the spirit, who mediates Christ through the language and symbols of the 
sacraments.”734  JPII makes copious references to the sacramental dimension of sexuality, a point 
that will be highlighted and addressed below, though there is variance in the perspectives.735  
Morton and Barbara Kesley note that “a sacrament is an outward and visible sign of an inner and 
spiritual grace…. Sexuality is at its best is an outer, visible, physiological sign of the inner and 
spiritual grace of love.”736   The Kesleys state that not all forms of sexual behavior fit into this 
definition but that when it does fit, human sexuality becomes a living symbol or sacrament of 
love—“a window into the self-giving love of God, a spiritual experience, a communion with love 
or God.”737   
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Arguing along the same line of thought, Longfellow and Nelson posit in their book that a 
Christian understanding of sexuality is a “far more comprehensive matter, broader, richer and 
more fundamental to our human existence than simply genital sex.”738  They contend that human 
sexuality, as intended by God, is neither incidental nor detrimental to our spirituality; rather, it 
fully integrates this dimension of our being.  They argue further that human sexuality is “more 
fundamentally and inclusively…., who we are as body-selves who experience the ambiguities of 
both ‘having’ and ‘being’ bodies.  Sexuality embraces our ways of being in the world as persons 
embodied with biological femaleness or maleness and with internalized understandings of what 
these genders mean.”739  They posit that “sexuality,” based on its etymology from the Latin, 
suggests an incompleteness that constantly seeks connection and wholeness, “a physiological and 
emotional grounding of our capacity to love.”740  My conclusion is to insist that the core of 
doctrine741 does not change because of its normativity, but incidentals that relate to contemporary 
challenges need the attention of the Magisterium, theologians, and secular society to study and 
dialogue carefully with mutual respect in a listening environment, and to give answers that are 
ethical and respect human beings and lead to life. 
  Many theologians, ethicists and general commentators agree that there is an impasse as 
well as a large gap between teachings from the Church’s magisterium and their reception by the 
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lay faithful as well as the secular or public sphere’s opinion on these matters.742  It is therefore 
worthwhile to continue the conversations that will close this gap, either by insistence on the 
coherency of doctrine or an acknowledgement that there is a need to change certain aspects of 
this position.  While it is possible in conscience to dissent to the non-infallible teachings of the 
Church, Vincent Genovesi warns that when it comes to moral discourse, an appreciation and 
understanding of the difficulties and struggles of the lay faithful need to be acknowledged by the 
magisterium.  In this way, the lay faithful are more open and less antagonistic to what the Church 
teaches as doctrine, as revealed truths.  “Clearly the magisterium, as the authentic teaching body 
in Roman Catholicism, enjoys the presumption of truth in its pronouncements, so that if ever a 
Catholic is inclined or impelled to disagree with an official Church teaching, this may never be 
done lightly or facilely but only cautiously, conscientiously, prayerfully, and respectfully.”743 
Therefore, while the Church has a moral duty to adhere to, and insist on the normativity of her 
role as “mater et magistra,”744 the individual Catholic and Catholics collectively, as a faith-
confessing people, must be open to nurturing and the possibility of engaging the Church in a 
truthful exposition of their lived experiences as married Christian spouses and parents. 
                                                          
742 “Questions of sexual morality are among the most volatile issues in the Roman Catholic Church today.  They are 
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Catholic practice….  There is only one prevailing consensus: a serious rift exists between official teaching about sex 
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Christopher Roberts, reflecting on the impasse between contemporary secular voices on matters 
relating to the Church’s position on sexuality, marriage, and sex, states that these two voices do 
not agree as secularists deviate from the traditional categories of Christian theology and 
anthropology and the Church’s historic confessions of faith on these matters.  For him 
“arguments about sexuality that dispense with theological logic and that are premised on human 
autonomy and experience are incongruous in debates within the churches.”745  He further states 
that such liberal and secularist arguments are “glossed with appeals to justice or love…[and that] 
such liberal arguments suggest that we can know ourselves sufficiently apart from revelation and 
doctrine, as if there were parts of life removed from God’s grace, address, vocation, command, 
judgment or teleology.”746  Likewise, the disparity between these two positions is highlighted 
further by lay theologians Jon Davis and Gerald Loughlin when in their edited work they 
observe, 
In contrast to the traditional-reticent view of sex is the liberal view, which sees 
the body and its sexuality as the central location of the “self,” and which sees 
any repression or restriction of the self and its sexual appetites as a denial of 
human being.  This is the view that promotes and celebrates the plasticity of 
the body’s sexual energies…. Sex is like food, a commodity, and the culture in 
which it is bought and sold a veritable pornotopia.  It is the culture in which we 
live.747 
Claims such as the foregoing—of deviation from “traditional” categories of Christian 
confessional faith, theology, and anthropology—are always where the battle line is drawn among 
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those who insist on “tradition” as static and unchanging, and those who insist that tradition must 
be fluid, flexible, and malleable.   
Faith, Tradition and Traditioning the Faith  
According to Terrence Tilley in his seminal work, Inventing Catholic Tradition, the 
problem is that many participants in religious debates presume a supernatural origin of tradition, 
especially ritual tradition, passed as a whole from one generation to the other.  He argues that 
historically known shifts in practices and beliefs have hitherto been accepted as a given.  He 
surmises that “[i]f that which is passed on as tradition has to be passed on ‘unchanged and 
uncorrupted’ over long periods of time, then there are no concrete traditions that will pass the 
test.”748 For Tilley, “…traditions, to endure, seem to require reconstruction, revision, and 
reinvention as circumstances change.”749  However, and in agreement with my position, Tilley 
states, “we can concede that tradition can change in accidentals, but you haven’t shown it 
changes in essentials.”750  For Tilley, traditions are fluid not fixed.   
Josef Pieper, in explaining what he considers the basic elements of tradition, asserts that tradition 
involves two partners, one of them transmitting and the other receiving what is transmitted.  The 
latter (traditum/tradendum) can belong to a wide range of human experience.  All of these bodies 
of knowledge (tradita), in whatever way they are communicated, end up as a teaching.  
According to Pieper, “Is not tradition, in so far as we mean by that word the handing on of truth, 
basically the same as the communication of what is known by teaching from generation to 
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generation? In brief, are not the words ‘tradition’ and ‘teaching’ synonyms?”751  To accept 
tradition either as a teaching or something that is handed down, involves belief, because 
receiving tradition is to accept a claim based on someone else’s insight.  The process of tradition 
is not just a teaching, instruction or handing down.  It is also a process of reminding.  Pieper 
opines that “[h]uman existence can come to grief not only because people neglect further 
learning, but also because people forget and lose something indispensable.”752  
Tradition, especially where belief is involved, includes the idea of authority; “traditum” stands or 
falls based on the trust of the person standing at the end of the line of reception, who is trusting 
that the process goes back to the person who stood closest to the origin of traditum--because that 
first person, closest to the origins, can testify and vouch for its authenticity.  Therefore, “this 
closeness to the origin of the tradition provides proof and basis for the authority of the one who 
is handing down tradition—the authority, of course, not the penultimate in line, but of the 
first.”753  This authority of the “ancients” is not based on age, the elderly or those with snow-
white hair; Pieper states that the essential element and what constitutes the ancients is their 
proximity to the origin, the very beginning of tradition: 
…there is hardly any question that there is at least a profound analogy between 
this description of the “ancients” and the definition by which Christian theology 
characterizes the “prophets,” the “hagiographer,” the charismatic called by God, 
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someone who is “inspired” in the strict sense, the author of a sacred book.  The 
common element, for which “analogy” is perhaps too weak a term, consists in the 
fact that both of them, the “ancients” and the “prophets,” are thought of as the 
first recipients and transmitters of a theios logos, a divine speech, a word of 
God… Naturally, in the “wisdom of the ancients”… the decisive element is not 
that it comes “from old,” but that it has its origins from a divine source.  The 
ancients do not just stand at the beginning of time.  They are the earliest in the 
chain of the succession of tradition, the first recipients of tradition.754  
Pieper surmises that it is logical to say, therefore, that Christianity conceives the divine 
proclamation given to the apostles as new and the very beginning of the sequence of tradition.  
The apostles are the primeval “ancients” who are linked ultimately to the very source; the 
incarnated Logos.  Pieper then alludes to a nexus, the connection of theology with the 
transmission/development of Christian doctrine: “In so far as theology is understood as the 
interpretation of revelation, theology cannot even exist legitimately without presupposing the 
reality of revelation.”755  In this sense, “traditio” must always be linked to truth, “[i]t must be 
thought of as something definitive; that is, in principle, no human thinking can make it obsolete, 
in so far as people are convinced that what it transmits goes back ultimately to a divine speech, 
therefore to revelation strictly speaking.”756 For Pieper, as long as these links exist and are 
maintained or kept in sync, sacred tradition continues, linking the present to the past, indeed to 
the very source and origin of tradition. 
Orlando Espin sees the process of “traditioning” as more significant than arguments 
about tradition.  For Espin, “without ‘traditioning’—the transmission of Christianity across 
generations and across cultural boundaries—there would not be a Christian religion in the twenty 
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first century.”757  This process of traditioning is found in lo cotidiano758 (daily human 
experiences)—“an epistemological womb within and through which all of daily reality is 
produced and reproduced.”759  Traditioning across these various cultures and centuries, within 
the sensus fidelium, “acts as inculturation and transculturation of revelation, making it possible 
for the latter to become understandable and received by the people (thus empowering ongoing 
evangelization and conversion),”760  He concludes that the means of traditioning is always 
traditioning something whereby “there is no traditioning, then, without tradition.”  To assume 
that the content of Christianity that is traditioned is part of tradition is to acknowledge that 
whatever is traditioned is shaped, presented, and received within the social position, gender, and 
culture of those who transmit and receive the good news across time and cultural boundaries.761   
It is this sort of social and cultural traditioning that Nancy Pineda-Madrid alludes to in saying 
that “…experience is viewed as social, then traditioning, an inherently social idea, entails 
processes of interpretation that necessarily and invariably create community… These processes 
take place ad infinitum.762 For her, traditioning “occurs through a process of interpreting our past 
toward a hope-filled future in the context of our present…”763  Pinedad-Madrid’s thinking re-
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asserts and re-enunciates the social aspect and condition of the traditioning process already stated 
by Espin.  This position gives credence to the idea that traditions evolve as the social milieu in 
which they are found evolves.  
Stephen Bevans provides another key set of frameworks by which tradition, society, and 
culture intermingle with theology to provide a living tradition and doctrine that speaks to 
contemporary hearts.  Bevans sees tradition as the faith atmosphere in which the entire Church 
engages in the work of theology, a collection of “classics” which fuels and inspires theologians 
to understand their faith based on the wisdom of ancients.  According to Bevans, tradition as 
derived from its Latin etymological roots is a handing on, handing down, or handing over, done 
within a community suffused with humanity, which in itself is traditioned and hands on in turn 
its own traditions.  Theology is, therefore, a result of this traditioning process.  Human life itself 
and community are possible only because of tradition and traditioning.  For Christian tradition 
specifically, Bevans opines that it 
…. is the way that the faith we believe today is the same faith that Christians have 
always and will always believe—that our faith today is the faith of the “apostles,” 
…. Who despite the various changes in the faith’s content and expression 
throughout history and through its encounters with various cultures, nevertheless 
preserves Christian faith in all its integrity and freshness.764   
 
According to Bevans, there are various sources, objects, or monuments of tradition (loci 
theologici), which provide Christian tradition with an essential link to the wisdom of the past, 
which, in turn, sets parameters to which the Church today must conform.  These “classics” as 
enumerated by Bevans include the sacred Scriptures of the Christian Church (both Old and the 
New Testament); the patrimony of the fathers (and mothers) of the Church; the liturgy—not 
merely as participation but more in the sense of lex orandis, lex credenda (the law of prayer is 
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the law of belief)—a theologia prima; the magisterium, which remains one of the most respected 
means of articulating the Church’s tradition through the ages; and  then the art, architecture (and 
music) of the various periods, which are also harbingers of tradition.  In agreement with Espin 
and Pinedad-Madrid, Bevans states “we are not maintaining tradition if we simply parrot 
formulas or transmit ideas that have not been appropriated.  Tradition as the legacy of the 
Church’s faith is something alive, something that, like ourselves, changes while ever remaining 
the same.”765  Bevans offers the over-arching argument that 
[t]o be Christian, in other words, means to be faithful to the Christian tradition.  But 
that fidelity—given the plurality of tradition—has to be a creative one.  
Sometimes—and this is the particular task of theologians—for the sake of the 
tradition, we need to “abandon” the tradition and prove our fidelity to it by creative 
reinterpretation.766 
 
Therefore, for Bevans, the question of the possibility of doctrinal development is not only 
possible, it is essential to the nature of the Church for her to remain faithful to her mission and to 
the ministry of proclaiming the good news.  Every culture and every religion thrives because it 
builds and grows on a tradition; otherwise it becomes deformed and derailed from its 
foundations.  Contemporary and post-modern persons pride themselves on their civility by 
keeping to “high class culture” in the arts, music, literature, etc., but then frown on religious 
adherence to tradition.  When the Church recognizes what is true within her sacred traditions, she 
has the responsibility to transmit these truths uncontaminated. 
 Conclusion 
Considering how volatile the conversation on human sexuality generally has become, 
especially since the 1960s, and how in particular, sexuality within marriage, its attendant and 
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related problems are still being argued, perhaps this conversation can be seen as a form of 
dialectic towards a renewed hermeneutic for our time.  The idea of a church that is fossilized can 
never be applicable to any Church of Christ that is alive in the Holy Spirit.  The Church in all 
times and places must always engage different cultures and situations and must be willing to 
open herself up so that people can encounter Christ in their socio-historical consciousness and 
times.  Lisa Sowle Cahill, referencing the Cameroonian theologian Eloi Messi Mesongo, noted 
that the Church’s tradition is always “undergoing adaptation, indigenization, inculturation, 
liberation, reconstruction’, and sometimes distortion or perversion in the name of ‘mastery’ or 
fear.”767  While society relies on logic, experience, and history, the Christian Church goes a step 
further to rely on divine revelation to sustain various communities of faith.  These various 
communities, differing in language, culture, and traditions must find ways by which what has 
been passed on is not only interpreted in a way that is undistorted but is essentially the same, 
with the coloring of the diverse cultures the faith nurtures.  Janet Soskice ascribes preeminent 
authority to sacred Scripture; what is “handed on” is in the sacred texts. Soskice states, “… any 
crude contrast between scripture and tradition is self-defeating.  The first Christians were Jews or 
proselytes who identified with Judaism. They received as ‘handed on’ the scriptures of the 
Jewish people.”768 What the Christians of the New Testament experienced of Jesus did not cause 
them to reject the Old Testament books but to reread them.  Soskice thereby concludes that 
[t]radition, even in its more central received form of scripture, is given but it is 
not static – scriptures are always open to being reread or reperformed.  The 
process of “rereading” … was documented in the book of Acts, but it is already 
evident in the Hebrew Scriptures.  The book of Hosea recalls for its readers the 
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book of Exodus.  The later chapters of Isaiah reread the earlier chapters in the 
light of the exile.  It appears that what is “passed on” has always been reread in 
the light of God’s new actions in the world… To stand in tradition is not to stand 
still but to stand in the deep, loamy soil that feeds further growth.769 
Alasdair MacIntyre agrees with Soskice that what we inherit is a part of the past that 
constitutes our present.  One thus becomes a part of history, a bearer of tradition transmitted 
through many generations.  Therefore, “[a] living tradition then is historically extended, socially 
embodied argument, and an argument precisely in part about goods which constitute that 
tradition.”770  MacIntyre maintains that an adequate appreciation of tradition provides the 
possibility of grasping those things of the future made possible by the past for the present.  
“Living traditions, just because they continue a not-yet-completed narrative, confront a future 
whose determinate and determinable character, so far as it possesses any, derives from the 
past.”771  Central, therefore, to this reflection is to come to terms with which religious tradition is 
affected by post modernity, and the many ways in which humans understand the social construct.  
The dialogue that continually takes place between the sacred space, theology, and magisterial 
authority with the shared space of the secular society must find a middle ground of mutual 
understanding. 
I find Rowan Williams, the Archbishop of Canterbury, instructive in his comments to the 
symposium of Christian and Muslim dialogue (Building Bridges) which he conveyed in May 
2010 and was held at Georgetown University, Washington DC, where he stated that what is 
considered “modern” is itself tradition, a set of habits and beliefs handed down and accepted as 
meaningful, a history that is real and complex.  Williams believes that “this does not mean either 
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an acceptance that traditional claims to truthfulness are empty or that ‘modern’ accounts of 
knowledge and certainty are to be taken as beyond criticism.”772  Rather, it means that the 
location of a belief against a backdrop of its social condition does not determine its truths.  While 
‘modern’ is not to be feared, where there is no assumption that “there is one and only one 
socially and intellectually credible way of arriving at a belief, and that this is essentially through 
unaided observation on the part of the individual ego.”773  Williams asserts that people of faith 
are who they are because they participate, they take time to believe.  “They assume that what is 
spoken about and explored in a share imaginaire over time is worthy of trust on the basis of a 
range of criteria that are not easily reduced to ‘modern’ terms.”774  Tradition, according to 
Williams, can appear ambivalent when perceived as having been kept away from the corrosive 
influence of modernity.  Tradition can be profoundly positive if it is understood as the human 
embeddedness in a world that is fluid through time and language.  “For the believer, that 
language itself is ultimately grounded in God’s own movement outward to what he has 
graciously made; and that is where our gratitude finds it terminus.”775  In other words, tradition is 
the womb from which our present exists; this present will then be “traditioning” the future, in 
this movement we all learn to co-exist. 
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GENERAL CONCLUSION 
At the beginning of this dissertation, my foundational thesis was to explore the core contents of 
doctrinal development within the Catholic tradition.  Using John Paul II’s Theology of the Body 
as a frame work, the focus for locating doctrinal development was a view from the lenses of 
human sexuality.  Within this context, to dissect and expound on why and often times the Church 
is perceived by many to be archaic and out dated in her teachings and doctrinal position on 
questions of sexuality, marriage, sex and family life.  I believe that a close examination of this 
work provides a coherent and logical sequence of argumentation that supports my thesis.  I have 
argued that in the question of the Church’s doctrinal position, there are teachings that by their 
very nature (with or without magisterial definition) are essential to the core of Christian doctrine 
(when it is known as dogma) that are unchangeable.  Further, that there are aspects of the 
Church’s teachings that are flexible, malleable and changeable as they respond to newer 
questions in the historical changes in society and cultures. By no means are my reflections in 
these chapters “the answer”, rather, these reflections, as I will expound on later, are only a 
contribution to a question that needs constant tinkering and thinking to arrive at the mind of 
Christ for His Church. 
In my first chapter, I present a time line of a hundred years of magisterial and papal 
teachings on various aspects of sexuality and family life. Within these encyclical tradition, there 
are obvious developments in various aspects of the Church teachings.  For instance, In Pope Leo 
XIII’s encyclical, Arcanum, and Pius XI’s Casti Connubii, marriage was understood as a 
contract.  However, when we encounter John Paul II’s 1981 synodal apostolic exhortation, 
Familiaris Consortio and all other subsequent writings, the language shifts to understanding 
marriage as a covenantal bond.  In the second chapter, while reviewing John Paul II’s Theology 
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of the Body, we find a new language which places companionship and lifelong commitment at 
the center of marriage.  This language is different to the hitherto teaching that places procreation 
first in the order of the goods of marriage.  In the third chapter, the review of the history and 
development of the Natural Law Theory is given consideration.  This study is extended to the 
New Natural Law theory and theorists.  I consider this study central to the overall argument 
because the Church traditionally has relied on defending her positions on human sexuality 
fundamentally on arguments based on nature.  The Church has faced criticism based on 
arguments from nature, which explains why Grisez, Finnis and others have tried to construct a 
deontological new natural law theory.  Within the historical development enunciated in chapter 
three, there are major historical shifts from Cicero and the Greco-Roman thinkers, to the Stoics 
who philosophize from an Aristotelian background,  then Thomas Aquinas who synthesized a 
natural law theory that prior to his time was purely philosophically based by grounding it in 
theism.  Scholasticism thus took over the natural law theory and made it foundational to Catholic 
deontologism.  The resurgence of the natural law theory in the 16th and 17th Century gave rise to 
thinkers like Francesco Suarez, Hugo Grotius, Samuel Pufendorf, Immanuel Kant, Jeremy 
Bentham and John Locke.  The tradition of the natural law theory continues to expound to date in 
the work of Germain Grisez, John Finnis and their other collaborators under the title of the New 
Natural Law Theory.  This historical excursion is aimed at achieving two goals; one, to grasp the 
importance of this argument and its impact on the history of thinking.  Second, to see how the 
theory is applied from a purely philosophical (and often times applied to political jurisprudence) 
and its impacts on theological thinking from scholasticism to date.  The disparaging attacks and 
opinions against arguments from ‘nature’ by revisionists and non-theists does not contend well in 
the face of such historical analysis.   
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These first three chapters are the basis on which I presume the conclusion that I have 
successfully proven my thesis.  The importance of this topic lies on the fact that at the rate in 
which secularism is growing in the West and the idea of religious faith symbolized by a Church 
not all together free of internal problems, it is necessary to separate proverbially, ‘the wheat from 
the darnel.’  I believe it is the responsibility of theologians to try to articulate and make 
comprehensible, the logic of theological presuppositions. Arguments can dialogically become 
meaningful and useful if both parties, in this case, liberal and secularist society and the Church, 
can understand the basis and foundational starting points on which both proceed to argue their 
different positions.  What I perceive as a problem within the ongoing conversation is the inability 
or even the unwillingness of both conversation partners to try to learn and understand the 
background to the other’s position.  From my studies, I can say confidently that the problem is 
more on the part of a liberal and secular world.  Society seem to challenge the Church to change 
its position and teachings as if all of these teachings are made up by a committee.  Therefore, can 
be revised and changed to fit into newer and ever changing socio-cultural circumstances.  I see 
within the Church, some ‘theologians’ and revisionists whose argument seem to exclude the 
divine aspect of the message the Church carries and teaches.  While I am quick to point out that 
not all revisionists and theologians can be lumped into this group, it seems the larger parts of 
revisionists have an agenda of always trying to re-write the history of doctrinal teachings.    
The aim generally can be perceived to be an altruistic desire to be welcoming and loving 
to all.  They are quick to quote the popular refrain that ‘God loves the sinner but hates sin.’  
Within their self-acclaimed progressive ideology they make a caricature of past errors in the 
Church, often times demonizing popes, prelates and people who do not fit into the scheme of the 
‘new Church’, a Church of the future they envision which will accommodate individual 
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preferences.  I perceive a schism that will be of epic and cataclysmic proportions in western 
civilization as secularists and revisionists attempts a re-write of these cultures devoid off its 
Christian history, intellectual growth and cultural heritage.  Beyond the ill-advised dependence 
on pure reason of Descartes and Kant, the new humanisms propounded without religious ethic 
looks only inwards, it is selfish and can only lead to an implosion.  There is a broad innovation 
of the ways in which moral theology is seeing to have shifted from its traditional prohibitive and 
manualist approach.  The new understanding in the 20th and the 21st century, the person centered 
approach, a personal interiority, the flourishing of the acting person in a search for moral truths is 
the new approach.  Here the shift is from external actions in the pursuit of the good to one’s 
disposition in acting according to conscience.  The Church agrees, Pope John Paul II is at the 
fore front of seeing the ‘acting-person’ play a leading role in making moral decisions, the 
difference only being that this person acts according to the commands of Christ and according to 
the mind of the Church. 
The implications for this sort of impasse is almost irreconcilable at this time.  The forces 
on both sides of the discourse are like two parallel lines that can never converge.  While liberal-
secularist modernity challenge and ask for change in what traditionally the Church has always 
proposed as an official and doctrinal position, the conservative traditionalists ask for faithfulness 
to tradition.  One of the most difficult questions of our time is how to approach same sex unions, 
to be seen and accepted on the same level as the traditional understanding of Christian marriage.  
Based on scriptural evidence, and sound biblical exegesis, it is clear that within the Christian 
tradition, heterosexual marriage is the norm.  In line with apostolic tradition, heterosexual 
marriage has existed from the beginning of the Christian Church of the first millennium and has 
been extended to the Church of today in a continuity of tradition.  There are specific texts, (that 
296 
 
we have alluded to several times in this work) from the gospels which are ascribed to Jesus, 
elucidated on later especially within the Pauline corpus (especially Ephesians chapter 5: 21ff), 
which establishes the ‘man’ and ‘woman’ gender differentiation and complementarity as a 
necessity for the ontological basis of Christian marriage.  This gender differentiation, its unitive 
and sexual complementarity, the reproduction of offspring and formation of the individual 
human family sets the basis by which the good of Christian marriage can be received.  In an 
effort to clarify what is at the heart of the question here, I approach Christian marriage within 
Christian tradition to be ‘form’ – which means in its sacramentality, not even the magisterium is 
capable of changing its fundamental meaning.   Having said this, I must acknowledge that this 
immutability cannot totally be immuned to the possibility of cultural adaptations.  A case in mind 
will be the various instances where the Christian missionary enterprises have come in contact 
with polygamists or polyandrist cultures and the ways in which this encounter took place and the 
ways in which the Church had to be creative and allow for an encounter that includes these 
‘others’ within the Church and at the table of the Lord.  This, in a sense, is another theological 
implication; is this question of same sex unions a question of contextualization or historicity?   
The Church continues to exist and continue to speak to the men and women of different 
times, places and cultures.  As the world grows and evolves, for good or bad, the Church must 
learn to live in this world and not be of this world.  The Church must connect with the world 
with the mercy of God and the courage that comes from the way, the truth and the life.  This 
question of ‘mercy’ must be nuanced and understood carefully from its theological basis.  Pope 
Francis’ appeal to mercy (and the proclamation of a jubilee year of mercy) must not be re-
interpreted and hijacked by a media only interested in subterfuge.  The questions that are 
seriously under contention in the contemporary Church are no longer theological disputations 
297 
 
over creedal formulas. They are no longer about reformations, and not even seriously about 
Patriarchates and bishoprics.  In our time, our doctrinal disagreements are over the newer ways 
in which society is redefining its understanding of sexuality as experienced in marriage, the 
sexual act and family life.  Moral theologians and ethicists –moral and medical, continue to study 
and proffer suggested solution for the different problems within the area of human sexuality.  
From pre-marital sex, pre-marital cohabitation, trial unions with cohabitation, pre-marital 
teenage pregnancies, single parenthood, divorce, extra-marital affairs, to same sex unions – the 
list continues; theology and theologians continue to argue and debate the foundations, ontology 
and teleology of these issues.  While those who argue in favor of traditional magisterial position 
on marriage, sex and family life see an impasse, those who are revisionists seek grounds by 
which historicity and contextualization be a yardstick for judging new sexual ethics.  While there 
has been a shift from ‘nature’ to persons and their experiences, I see a need to combine these 
sources at arriving at moral uprightness and healthy development in doctrine. 
In my previous review of what I proposed as two ways by which an understanding of the 
Church’s arguments are based; the question of same sex unions, seen as equal to heterosexual 
sacramental marriage, and the question of condomized sex for discordant couples especially in 
economically disadvantaged arears of the world; I made allusions to the possibility of change in 
‘matter’ and unchangeability in ‘form.’  Both examples are not defined dogmatic teachings of the 
Church that enjoys infallibility ‘ex cathedra.’   However, both teachings are subsumed under the 
ordinary magisterial infallibility of the Church acting collegially in union with the sensus 
fidelium.  When these two issues are viewed, putting into consideration the contextualized, 
historically conscious and reflecting on the lived experience of Christians around the globe,  I 
think it is safe and logical to conclude that the question of same sex unions to be accepted as 
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being on the same level with traditional sacramental marriage is at best a theological oxymoron.  
Now, whether this sort of ‘union’ can be translated as a newer form of way of life, or whether it 
is even possible within the Church to reference same gender unions as ‘sacrament’ or ‘marriage’, 
that is another kettle of fish all together.   This question at this time, in my opinion, has brought 
the Church to the burning bush that is not burnt.  It requires of all of us, a humbling, a need to 
take off our shoes, for the grounds on which we stand is a hallowed ground.  Here, like Moses, 
we must encounter God anew and allow him to speak His word to us.  The entire Church needs 
the wisdom of the “I AM WHO AM” to be able to act mercifully and justly with each other.   
However, I have a benign prejudice in favor of the question of the possibility of 
condomized sex in discordant situations; one, it does not in any way contradict sacred doctrine 
(dogma) or challenge defined ecclesial position.  This is an event in time that requires a 
definitive magisterial declaration and teaching, even if it is a temporary fix.  It is clear that the 
Church is careful in her teachings and public statements so that no one stands to be misled into 
error.  In this case, the Church needs to be present in the suffering of those infected with the 
dreadful HIV/AIDS disease.  The Church is already present to them in the many programs, 
health care and pastoral provisions which the Church is at the fore front and leads especially in 
economically impoverished places.  
 Whatever arguments one may proffer, one thing is sure: the Church needs to make a 
definitive statement on the matter of condomized sex in discordancy. This matter challenges 
prior teaching and creates an avenue for a development in doctrine. Pope Benedict XVI 
appointed a commission to study the possibility of permitting the use of condoms in discordancy, 
to determine under which theological and ethical principles this might be permissible, and years 
later, the Church is still silent about the outcome of the commission’s work, and provides no 
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official magisterial and doctrinal position. Three events in the Church make the situation more 
troubling; the first is involves religious missionary nuns travelling to work as missionaries in the 
Congo during the civil war years of the early 1960s. Because they were in danger of rape, they 
received permission to use contraceptive drugs as a form of protection.  The second case is a  
situation that is now often referred to as a classic example of a “double down” by Pope Emeritus, 
Benedict VXI, when he made comments that male prostitutes (and all who engage in dangerous 
sexual activities) are better off using condoms to prevent the spread of disease.  The third and 
final one is the recent comments of Pope Francis on the question of either taking the option of 
abortion or the prevention of conception in the light of the most recent question of the Zika 
virus.776  While the Pope is reported to have strongly opposed abortion as always evil in and of 
itself.  In the case of the Zika virus, Pope Francis references Humanae Vitae and the nuns in the 
Congo scenario, and with clarification later on by Fr. Lombardi, the Holy Father’s spokesperson, 
Lombardi tries to clarify, “Pope Francis asserted that in cases of emergency women in good 
conscience may consider the use of contraceptives as a legitimate alternative for choice.”777 The 
world media have immediately translated this to mean that the Pope has endorsed the use of 
contraceptives in emergency cases and based on the decision of the woman when acting 
according to the dictates of her conscience.  The import of these events is well summarized in 
Lisa Sowle Cahill’s response to the nuns/Congo case which I believe applies also to the Pope 
Benedict/male prostitute case and Pope Francis’ ‘off the cuff’ remarks in the Zika virus case. In a 
journal essay Cahill writes, 
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The debate was important, instead, because it presented the possibilities that 
practical problems could challenge the accustomed ways of thinking about 
contraception, and because it joined respected theological voices in a re-
examination of the prohibition on it – although it is revealing of racial attitudes 
that these particular circumstances were required to raise the question in the 
European mind. The debate was one of several movements in the Church which 
together, at the time of Vatican II, were to sponsor a hope among both theologians 
and laypersons that the traditional strictures on control of conception would be 
revised.778 
 
 Cahill’s position resonates because to seek solutions (even if temporary) to the problem 
of HIV/AIDS in Africa and developing poorer nations around the world, there is the necessity for 
a closer study of cultural problems, marriage rites, rites of young adult initiations and passage, 
and the sexual mores of different societies. These varied contexts make it often more realistically 
difficult to navigate or to proffer one single solution as one size fits all. It is even more 
dangerous for the Church to remain silent on how to respond to a disease that is taking the lives 
of huge numbers of poor people as a lack of concern or show of empathy. God forbid that 
banners like “Black Lives Matters” ever show up as a reaction against the Church on this issue. 
 However, to respond from the peoples’ places of suffering is to become a Church that speaks in 
mercy, without fear of misunderstanding; it is to adapt to a new perspective that is life giving and 
not death dealing.  All the faithful in the Church wait in great obedience and hope for a clarified 
position.  One cannot but recall the words of the great St. John XXIII at the opening of the 
second Vatican council on October 11, 1962, reminding the council Fathers of their principal 
duties, 
The major interest of the Ecumenical Council is this: that the sacred heritage of 
Christian truth be safeguarded and expounded with greater efficacy.  That 
doctrine embraces the whole man, body and soul.  It bids us live as pilgrims here 
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on earth, as we journey towards our heavenly homeland… If this doctrine is to 
make its impact on the various spheres of human activity – in private, family and 
social life – then it is absolutely vital that the Church shall never for an instance 
lose sight of that sacred patrimony of truth inherited from the Fathers.  But it is 
equally necessary for her to keep up to date with the changing conditions of this 
modern world, and of modern living… This… Council… is to give to the world 
the whole of that doctrine which, notwithstanding every difficulty and 
contradiction, has become the common heritage of mankind –to transmit it in all 
its purity, undiluted, undistorted… And our duty is not just to guard this treasure, 
as though it were some museum-piece and we the curators, but earnestly and 
fearlessly to dedicate ourselves to the work that needs to be done in this modern 
age of ours, pursuing the path which the Church has followed for almost twenty 
centuries… What is needed is that this certain and immutable doctrine, to which 
the faithful owe obedience, be studied afresh and reformulated in contemporary 
terms.  For this deposit of faith, or truths which are contained in our time-honored 
teaching is one thing; the manner in which these truths are set forth (with their 
meaning preserved intact) is something else… In these days… it is more obvious 
than ever before that the Lord’s truth is indeed eternal.  Human ideologies change.  
Successive generations give rise to varying errors, and these often vanish as 
quickly as they came… The Church has always opposed these errors, and often 
condemned them with the utmost severity.  Today, however, Christ’s Bride 
prefers the balm of mercy to the arm of severity.  She believes that, present needs 
are best served by explaining more fully the purport of her doctrines, rather than 
by publishing condemnations… The great desire, therefore, of the Catholic 
Church… is to show herself to the world as the loving mother of all mankind; 
gentle, patient, and full of tenderness and sympathy for her separated children… 
She unseals the fountains of her life-giving doctrine, so that men, illumined by the 
light of Christ, will understand their true nature and dignity and purpose.  
Everywhere, through her children, she extends the frontiers of Christian love, the 
most powerful means of eradicating the seeds of discord, the most effective 
means of promoting concord, peace with justice, and universal brotherhood.779 
While attentively listening to the words of John XXIII, Catholics are expected to 
acquiesce in obedience to the processes of a greatly hierarchical and magisterial Church, they are 
also advised to look deep into their consciences – where God speaks to every man and woman in 
the depths of their being.  For a Church in full communion, consideration should be given to 
                                                          
779 John XXIII, “Address to at the Opening of Vatican Council II,” October 11, 1962 (Washington, DC: TPS Press, 
1964), accessed on Feb. 20, 2016, www.catholicculture.org/culture/library/view.cfm?recnum=3233. 
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reviewing and rearticulating what ought to be done in the case of discordancy within marriage, 
and the use of condoms as prophylactics.  This in my opinion does not distort the Church’s 
teaching on the prohibition of contraceptives, it does not diminish in anyway the sanctity of 
marriage, conjugality or family life.  The mandate of the Church is to teach, guided by the Holy 
Spirit.  The Church has a sacred trust to remain faithful to the message of Jesus Christ as found 
in sacred scripture, as it was handed down within the tradition of the apostolic Church, in 
collegiality and subsidiarity.  Working with the theologians of the Church, the joint reflections of 
the entire Church must always lead us back to the truths of the faith, without curtailment or 
compromise.  The Church must remain courageous ‘in’ and ‘out’ of season to insist on the 
teachings of Christ even at the possibility of alienation by society.  St. Paul’s words remain 
instructive to the Church of all times,  
I solemnly urge you to preach the message, to insist upon proclaiming it (whether 
the time is right or not), to convince, reproach, and encourage, as you teach with 
all patience.  The time will come when people will not listen to sound doctrine, 
but will follow their own desires and will collect for themselves more and more 
teachers who will tell them what they are itching to hear.  They will turn away 
from listening to the truth and give their attention to legends.  But you must keep 
control of yourself in all circumstances; endure suffering, do the work of the 
preacher of the Good News and perform your whole duty as a servant of God.”780   
The Church must also be courageous to move away from traditions that are either 
moribund or are no longer applicable to contemporary time and age.  The Church cannot 
maintain silence interspaced by ‘off the cuff’ remarks, disjointed and uncoordinated statements 
about questions that affects people at the deepest parts of their being and existence.  In the light 
of the pontificate of Pope Francis and his call to a jubilee year of mercy, the Church must lead 
this march of mercy and justice.  In Francis’ Bull of Indiction for the Jubilee year of mercy titled, 
Misericordia Vultus, he states, 
                                                          
780 2Tim 4:2-5 
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Jesus Christ is the face of the Father’s mercy.  These words might as well sum up 
the mystery of the Christian faith… The Church is commissioned to announce the 
mercy of God, the beating heart of the gospel, which in its own way must 
penetrate the heart and mind of every person… wherever the Church is present, 
the mercy of the Father must be evident.  In this Holy Year, we look forward to 
the experience of opening our hearts to those living on the outmost fringes of 
society: fringes which modern society itself creates.  How many are the wounds 
borne by the flesh of those who have no voice because their cry is muffled and 
drowned out by the indifference of the rich!  During this jubilee year, the Church 
will be called even more to heal these wounds, to assuage them with the oil of 
consolation, to bind them with mercy and cure them with solidarity and vigilant 
care… Let us open our eyes and see the misery of the world, the wounds of our 
brothers and sisters who are denied their dignity, and let us recognize that we are 
compelled to heed their cry for help… this extraordinary Jubilee Year dedicated 
to living out in our daily lives the mercy which the Father constantly extends to 
all of us.. The Church feels the urgent need to proclaim God’s mercy.  Her life is 
authentic and credible only when she becomes a convincing herald of mercy… 
The Church is called above all to be a credible witness to mercy, professing it and 
living it as the core of the revelation of Jesus Christ.781 
The mercy that Pope Francis advocates for is not a frivolous and irresponsible 
transmitting on of revelation, doctrine and dogma. Rather, it is a call to expound on the meaning 
of these sacred truths and making it intelligible to modern women and men.  Following the 
example of St. John XXIII, the Church is encouraged not to be quick to invoke anathemas or 
hand down interdicts.  The arms of mercy of the Father must be the first recourse and must be 
explored to its furthest possible.  Making a case for discordant couples and stating an official 
position is clearly one of the ways in which mercy can be pursued.   In the gospel of Mark, Jesus 
warns against juxtaposing human made traditional constructs to replace what is the 
commandments of God. Mark quotes Jesus who referenced Isaiah, “These people, says God, 
honor me with their words, but their hearts is really far away from me.  It is no use for them to 
                                                          
781 Pope Francis, Misericordia Vultus, Bull of Indiction of the Extraordinary Jubilee Year of Mercy, April 11, 2015, 
accessed March 14, 2016, https://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/apost_letters/documents/papa-
francesco_bolla_20150411_misericordiae-vultus.html 
304 
 
worship me, because they teach human rules as though they were my laws!  You put aside God’s 
command and obey human teaching.”782  Within the broad framework of human sexuality, the 
Church must find adequate ways to respond to the exigencies of the 21st century.   The modern 
theologian cannot afford to gloss over the witness of the apostolic fathers and of the early Church 
to the work of the living Jesus among the people of his time.  We cannot do theology as if there 
is no Holy Spirit to lead us to all truths.  Theology becomes a pure intellectual work if it does not 
want to work with the authority granted to the apostles by Christ and subsequently to the Church. 
In all things of faith and Christian doctrinal tradition, it must all lead back to the mind of Christ.  
This is the task with which we are faced in our time, as in all times of the past and of the future.  
One must acknowledge that within the locus of sexuality alone, there are still many questions the 
Church must respond to.  Hopefully, the outcome of the Synod on the family will answer or shed 
light on these question.  As long as humanity continues to evolve, there will be new 
developments, good and bad that will continually need to be faced.  In the words of John 
Cardinal Onaiyekan, the Cardinal Archbishop of the Metropolitan Archdiocese of Abuja, 
Nigeria, speaking about the Church and the fears of many about the criticisms from within and 
outside the Church on the questions about sexual morality, marriage and family life, the cardinal 
states, “No need for panic.  The boat of Peter maybe in turbulence.  But it will never sink.  It will 
always arrive at its shores because Jesus is in it.”783  
  
                                                          
782 Mk. 7:6-8 
 
783 John Cardinal Onaiyekan, “Marriage in our Contemporary World: Pastoral Observations from An African 
Perspective,” in Eleven Cardinals Speak on Marriage and the Family, ed. Winfried Aymans (San Francisco: 
Ignatius Press, 2015), 63. 
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